

Juvenile Justice Committee Meeting Agenda

January 18, 2018

I. Call to Order and Approval of November 16, 2017 Meeting Notes

II. JDAI Presentation – Regina Lurry, Jim Cole & Judge Fragale

Regina Lurry will give an introductory overview of the core values of JDAI and its spread in Ohio. Jim Cole will present specific data on the impact of JDAI on the detention population and probation caseloads in Montgomery County. Judge Fragale will discuss JDAI generally as well as its impact in Marion County.

Members will then consider whether or not a small group from our committee working with JDAI coordinators can guide the effort toward realizing probation reform recommendations.

III. Data Wish List Discussion

Researchers from Case Western Reserve University Frederick Butcher, PhD and Krystel Tossone, PhD and members will discuss the data wish list, sources that may already exist and possibilities for future research.

VI. Pending Legislation

Members will review legislation, including updates on interested party meetings on HB394 from the Ohio Judicial Conference. Additionally, Ohio Judicial Conference staff will take the lead in discussion of the upcoming implementation of Marsy's Law and its impact on juvenile courts.

V. Adjourn

Next meeting:

Full Commission – March 15, 2018 10:00a – 31st floor Riffe Center

Juvenile Justice Committee – February 2018 Meeting TBD

April 19, 2018 Room 281 Ohio Judicial Center

JUVENILE JUSTICE BILLS CURRENTLY PENDING

Bill:	Sponsor(s):	Committee:	Summary:	Status:
SB 63 Confinement Credit	Thomas	Sen Judiciary	The bill changes the definition of "confined" to include locked and secure facilities as well as community corrections facilities (not necessarily locked and secure) The bill clarifies that a juvenile court retains jurisdiction to correct any error in calculating confinement credit	Introduced – 02/21/17 Referred to committee – 02/22/17
SB 64 Mandatory Bindovers	Thomas	Sen Judiciary	The bill eliminates mandatory bindover for juveniles; discretionary bindover, which requires an amenability hearing, is not altered	2 nd hearing – 12/12/17
SB 196 Bullying	Williams, Brown	Sen Judiciary	The bill creates the offense of aggravated bullying as a third-degree misdemeanor The definition, which applies only to public school students, requires knowingly causing emotional harm or knowingly causing someone to believe that emotional or physical harm will occur	1 st hearing – 10/3/17
SB 197 Bullying	Williams, Brown	Sen Ed	The bill requires a tiered disciplinary procedure for harassment, intimidation, or bullying in school The bill creates the offense of aggravated bullying as a third-degree misdemeanor	1 st hearing – 10/11/17

JUVENILE JUSTICE BILLS CURRENTLY PENDING

Bill:	Sponsor(s):	Committee:	Summary:	Status:
HB 318 School Resource Officers	Patterson, LaTourette	House Ed	The bill permits a school resource officer to make arrests, conduct searches and seizures, carry a firearm, and exercise other police powers	2 nd hearing – 10/31/17
HB 355 Sexting	Rezabek	House Crim Justice	The bill defines the crime of sexting as specific to images on electronic devices The bill requires that all courts utilize a diversion program for first-time sexting offenders who are younger than age 21	Introduced – 09/21/17 Referred to Committee – 10/10/17
HB 360 Bullying and Hazing	Greenspan	House Ed	The bill outlines expulsion policies for acts of bullying, harassment, intimidation The bill requires community service for students expelled for bullying and the Board of Education is responsible for developing the community service plan	3 rd hearing – 12/12/17
HB 394 Juvenile Omnibus	Rezabek	House Crim Justice	The bill: eliminates mandatory bindover; changes the process for discretionary bindover to include an interlocutory appeal and 14-day stay; changes calculation of confinement credit; changes how financial sanctions are ordered; and provides special parole eligibility for certain offenders serving life or indeterminate terms for a crime (other than agg murder) committed when the person was under age 18 and provides for special Parole Board procedures in those cases. NOTE: The Ohio Supreme Court held that there is no statutory right to an interlocutory appeal on a juvenile bindover. A child whose case has been transferred by a juvenile court to adult court cannot appeal the bindover decision until adult court proceedings have concluded, the Supreme Court ruled. In re D.H., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-17, January 4, 2018. If passed, HB 394 (Juvenile Omnibus Bill) would contain a statutory right to an interlocutory appeal in juvenile bindover cases.	1 st hearing – 11/14/17

JUVENILE JUSTICE BILLS CURRENTLY PENDING

Bill:	Sponsor(s):	Committee:	Summary:	Status:
HB461 Delinquency Abeyance- Child Trafficking	Fedor, Galonski	N/A	The bill requires a juvenile court to hold a delinquency complaint in abeyance if the court has reason to believe that the act charged might be prostitution-related or that the child might be a victim of human trafficking; the bill provides that the same elements for the offense of trafficking in persons that apply to a victim under the age of sixteen also apply to a victim who is age sixteen or seventeen.	Introduced – 01/09/18
SB235 Sex Offender Registry	Eklund	N/A	The bill creates a procedure for a court to modify or terminate the sex offender registration requirements of certain youthful, low-risk sex offenders. To be eligible for review of registration requirements, the offender must have been between 18 and 21 at the time of the offense and not an authority figure over the other party; the other party cannot have been younger than 14; and the offender must have complied with all conditions of community control.	Introduced – 11/27/17
SB246 Student Safety Act	Lehner, Manning	N/A	Among other things, the bill revises the procedures for emergency removal of a student and prohibits certain suspensions and expulsions of students in grades pre-K - 3.	Introduced – 12/21/17

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Offender data	N/A	DYS
date of intake or referral		Individual courts
date of birth		
race		
ethnicity		
sex		
zip code/city		
OYAS risk level		
source of referral		
legal representation		
education status		
grade in school		
housing situation		
previous out of home non- detention placements		
open children services cases		
prior children services custody		
mental health diagnosis		
substance abuse diagnosis		
prior adjudications		
Referrals		
# by category of offense		
# with formal complaint filed		
# referred that receive mental health screening		
Victim data	National Crime Victimization Survey	Prosecutor's Offices
general demographics		
vulnerable populations		
court appearances		

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
# Probation Officers in Ohio	SCO Officer Training Course Attendees	Individual courts SCO if require reporting on quarterly reports
# of juveniles on probation 5 year period	DYS has some information for some counties	DYS Individual courts/probation departments
Dispositions that incl. probation	N/A	DYS (RECLAIM/JDAI)/BHJJ
# delinquent		
# misdemeanors		
# unruly		
# placed on comm. control		
length of comm. control		
per diem costs		
Level of supervision available	N/A	DYS Individual courts
Avg duration of probation	N/A	Individual courts
# on probation beyond 18	DYS Fiscal Year Reports (partial)	Individual courts
Community programs ordered as probation	RECLAIM/JDAI	Individual courts

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Diversion	Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission (partial)	Prosecutor offices
eligibility		Individual courts
risk level		DYS
stage in proceeding		
requirements for success		
# diverted each year		
result if successful		
# referred/denied access		
recidivism rate		
funding for diversion		
per diem costs		
Use of local detention		
<i>Pretrial</i>	Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission (partial)	Local jail administrators
Nature of charge	Data point in bail committee (adult)	Individual courts
# detained		
avg length of detention		
<i>Disposition</i>		
nature of charge		
# detained		
# referred to comm. alt.		
avg length of detention		
risk level		
mental health involved		
recidivism rates		

Juvenile Justice Committee
Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Detention Facilities	N/A	DYS
# beds available		
Avg daily population		
# held pre/post adjudication		
avg length of stay		
offense levels		
bindovers		
# of school referrals		
# receiving education		
# incidents of violence		
Juv Rehab Centers & CCF	N/A	County Commissioners
# of youth sent		DYS
# of available beds		
avg. daily population		
offense type		
avg. length of stay		
available programming		
per diem costs		
recidivism rates		

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
DYS Facilities	DYS	DYS
# committed to DHS		
offense types		
average daily population		
average length of stay		
# new offenses		
# recommitments		
# revocations		
# review hearings		
RECLAIM data		
per diem costs		
# released		
# w/ re-entry plan		
post-release programs		
Out of State Placements	N/A	Individual courts
# sent out of state		DYS
type of placement		
average length of stay		
offense type		
reason for placement		
per diem costs		
Unruly cases	N/A	Individual courts
diversion?		
probation?		
programs available		

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Probation Violations	USDOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics	Individual courts
% violate	(adult)(partial)	
# technical violations		
# pretrial arrest		
# positive drug test		
Probation officer caseload	N/A	Individual probation departments
Adjudication data	N/A	Individual courts
# adjudicated delinquent		
offense type		
# of trials/# of pleas		
# of dismissals		
amended charge data		
Disposition data	N/A	Individual courts
services ordered		
successful completions		
time to complete		
# placed in comm. programs		
per diem costs		
Serious Youthful Offenders	N/A	Individual courts
# of SYO cases filed		
# found guilty of SYO offense		
# of adult sentences invoked		
# outcomes for SYO juveniles		

Juvenile Justice Committee

Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Bindovers	N/A	Prosecutor offices
# motions filed		Individual courts
# discretionary/mandatory		
# bound over		
# discretionary/mandatory		
reason for mandatory		
# of discretionary retained		
in juvenile system		
Other Dispositions		
# driver's license suspension	N/A	Individual courts
# ordered restitution		
# on electronic monitoring		
Parole		Individual courts
Avg length of time by offense		DYS
# of violations		
per diem costs		
Residential Facilities	N/A	DYS
admission/release dates		
cost of operation (annual)		
Shackling	N/A	Individual judges
# shackled for court		
type of shackle		
group or individual		
Specialized Dockets	N/A	Supreme Court of Ohio
# of youth referred		
recidivism rates		
per diem costs		

Juvenile Justice Committee
Data Wish List

Data Point	Current Collection (if any)	Possible Data Sources
Recidivism data	DYS has some recidivism reports	Individual courts
6 months		DYS
1 years		
3 years		
Re-entry/Comm. Transition	N/A	Individual courts
# release hearings		
# of ct hearings post-release		
School history data		*Not Sentencing Commission related
# w/ > 10 absences		
# w/ special ed involvement		
type of school attended		
last grade completed		
reading level		
# suspended		
# of days of suspension		
Child Welfare Involvement	N/A	*Not Sentencing Commission related
# prior/current cases		
abuse, neglect, dependency		
prior out of home placement		
prior/current PCSA custody		
household income		
prior/current parent incarcerated		



**Juvenile Justice Committee
Meeting Notes
November 16, 2017**

I. Call to Order and Approval of October 18, 2017 Meeting Notes

The meeting was called to order by Chair Paul Dobson. Jim Cole moved to accept the notes from October 18, 2017 meeting, Director Reed seconded the motion and members unanimously approved the same.

II. Old Business

A. Juvenile Probation – Project Proposal from RFK

Chair Dobson began by discussing the project proposal, noting that other funding sources hadn't been consulted by Sara due to the cost being higher than expected. Members acknowledged considering the topic of probation for quite a while and that reform is important to address uniformity and movement toward a risk based system. Members questioned if recommendations from RFK are necessary to accomplish those goals.

Members then discussed that there seems to be a dual track with JDAI – which is, in essence, probation reform and continued expansion to other counties may be an alternative to the RFK project proposal. Members expressed some concern that a paid study is only the beginning of the cost – training, implementation costs will continue. Overall, members were pleased with the presentation/project proposal but questioned if it the right way to proceed with reform, especially since JDAI has identified best practices.

The analysis and study through JDAI in Montgomery County found that change of philosophy is the key for how probation departments conduct themselves. Members recognized that practitioners know the issues by participating in JDAI – 5 of 6 metro counties and mid population counties are also embracing JDAI. Members agreed that knowing the issues is one thing, but identifying strategies to translate that to all departments with varying resources is difficult. Officer training is critical – best practices, strength based.

Members agreed that a refresher on JDAI and the (8) core values and practical application will be helpful. Judge Fragale noted that JDAI is a process and requires community collaboration to provide services to families to avoid contact with justice system. At the January meeting Judge Fragale, Regina and Jim Cole will present on JDAI. Jim will provide data from Montgomery County. The committee can then use that information to guide probation reform recommendations and whether or not to form a small subcommittee to brainstorm and create a roadmap from successes or pursue the RFK project proposal. Erin Davies volunteered to review reports on probation and evaluate the data.

B. Best Practices Document – redistributed for review

There was no discussion.

III. New Business

A. JDAI Conference Update

The conference was a success – approximately 300 people, 23 counties participated. It was an educational and a learning opportunity. Organizers hope to do it annually, noting the networking among participants is useful.

B. Criminal Sentencing Commission staffing update

Sara advised that there are two positions for the Commission currently posted. One is for the vacancy created by Jo Ellen’s departure and the other is a second research position.

VI. Pending Legislation

The question was asked whether or not the Commission has empowered the Committee to go to the legislature on its behalf. It was noted that there has been legislation introduced as a result of Commission recommendations, but that it is often changed or revised from what was proposed (voted on). Chair Dobson suggested the full Commission provide guidance on the role of the Committee regarding advocacy on legislative matters.

Sara explained the goal is for the Commission staff to prepare objective impact analyses and be more active in providing historical perspective on pending legislation. Members agreed that the discussion of relevant legislation is valuable and should be a standing agenda item for the Committee.

The question/concern about the impact of Marsy’s law implementation and juvenile courts impact was raised. The Ohio Judicial Conference is preparing a guidance document which can be shared with members.

V. Adjourn

With no further business before the Committee, Erin Davies moved to adjourn, Jim Cole seconded the motion and the meeting was adjourned.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT

Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative – JDAI

JUVENILE COMMITTEE OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION

January 18, 2018



Nick Kuntz, Administrative Judge
Anthony Capizzi, Judge

CONTACT INFORMATION:

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JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER – JANUARY 2008

144 Detention Secured Beds.

- 27 Beds – Corrections
- 24 Beds – JCARE Program (Targeted Reclaim)
 - 16 – ART
 - 8 - STP
- 57 Beds – Pre-adjudication/Pre-disposition sentencing.
- 36 Beds – Closed unfunded.

GENERAL DEMOGRAPHICS – 2009 - BASELINE


	Montgomery County Population (Age 10 – 17)	Youth Held in Secure Detention	Youth Not Held in Secure Detention
Total	55,399	2299	438 (16%)
Female	27,288 - 49%	667 (29%)	180 (41%)
Male	28,111 - 51%	1,632 (71%)	258 (59%)
Caucasian	74%	828 (36%)	166 (38%)
African American	21%	1,426 (62%)	259 (59%)
Other	5%	45 (2%)	13 (3%)

In 2009, 2,299 youth were admitted to the Montgomery County Detention Center.


- Overall, 84% of the 2,689 youth brought to the Intervention Center were detained.
- The total number of days that youth were detained in the Detention Center for 2009 = 28,459 days.
- Approximate cost of housing a youth per day in the Detention Center is \$238.00 per day.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 BASELINE

Annual Admissions




Youth of Color – Annual Admissions




**64% Youth Of Color
of Annual Admissions**

MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 BASELINE

Average Daily Population (ADP)




Youth of Color – Average Daily Population (ADP)




**67% Youth Of Color
In ADP**

MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 BASELINE

Average Length of Stay




Average Length of Stay




MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 BASELINE

Ohio Department of Youth
Services (ODYS) Commitments



Youth of Color – Ohio
Department of Youth Services
(ODYS) Commitments




**70% of All Commitments were
YOC**

2010 – JDAI START Low Hanging Fruit



Low Hanging Fruit - 2010

- 
- An illustration of a person with brown hair, wearing a red long-sleeved shirt and blue pants, standing on the ground and reaching up with both hands to pick a red apple from a tree. The tree has several other red apples hanging from its branches and green leaves. The background is a solid light blue color.
- Inordinate Amount of Warrants issued for Youth and eventually detained.
 - 2009 – 822 Detained on Warrants
 - 2.25 per day detained
 - 2009 – Failure to Appear – 241
 - 2009 Probation – 581 Violation of Court Orders

Low Hanging Fruit - 2010

- Domestic Violence Detentions
- Domestic Violence Protocol – Arrest.
- Since 2004, Domestic Violence top 3 for Detention.
- 2009 – 354 detained for Domestic Violence. Nearly one per day.
- 25% released within 2 days. Many of these:
 - Unruly or Disorderly Conduct
 - Failure to Control
 - Respite Cases
 - Sibling on Sibling



Low Hanging Fruit - 2010

Summarize

2009 – Detained

VCO's	- 581
FTA's	- 241
D.V.'s	<u>- 354</u>
	1,176



Total Detains for 2009 – 2,299

51% of all Youth detained

JDAI – Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative

Alternatives and processes and procedures already in place that could be enhanced.

- Few Juvenile Courts in the State of Ohio and in the country that have Detained Hearings 365 days a year.
 - Every youth detained appears before a magistrate within 24 hours – even on weekends and holidays.
- Population Control Committee
 - Formerly met once a week to review Detention Population.
 - Expanded to meet and review twice a week.
 - MCCSD Representative.
- Court Transportation Officer
 - Most Courts utilize Sheriff's Office to transport Youth to State Institutions or Out-of-Home Placements.
 - DYS Funds – Transportation Officer

- Every morning, every Judge/Magistrate/Director/Prosecutor's Office/Public Defender receives a Detention Admissions Report.
- Instituted a Warrant Clean-Up Committee.
 - Review Warrant List



INTERVENTION CENTER DAILY ADMIT REPORT

Intervention Center Totals:

Population End Date: 9/21/2017 Thursday

Facility Populations

Gender Breakdown

Available Beds

Admitted to Center	17
Released by Center	7
Detained	10
Warrants Admitted	5
Warrants Released	1
Rel from DET hearing	0

Detention	50	Boys: 44	Girls: 6		
MTT	2	Boys: 2	Girls: 0		
Corrections	0	Boys: 0	Girls: 0	Boys: 24	Girls: 3
CAS	35	Boys: 17	Girls: 6	Boys: 10	Girls: 3
		DYS Girls: 12			
JCARE (ART): Boys	8			Boys: 10	
JCARE (STP): Boys	6			Boys: 2	
NRTC Boys	16			Boys: 6	
ERC	17	Boys: 12	Girls: 5	Slots Available:	3
EHM In Use:	28			Units Available:	13

	Last	First	ID #	JUDGE	MAG	HEARING	P.O.	CHARGES	DEPT	REL	RAI	STAFF	W/O	SEX	RACE
1			871202	AC	AC	9/21/17 1:30 PM	MCWHORTER	W-16-0077 (0E) VCO/ROBBRY FLEELU F3 // RESPRP F4 // OBOFBS F5	GPD	DET	27	KS	NO	M	B
2			173332	AC	AC	9/21/17 1:30 PM	GANTNER	FLEELU F3 // RESPRP F4 // OBOFBS F5 W-17-0282 (0D) VCO/RESRP	GPD	DET	27	KS	NO	M	B
3			216215	AC	AC	9/21/17 1:30 PM	NONE	FLEELU F3 // RESPRP F4 // OBOFBS F5	GPD	DET	22	KS	NO	M	B
4			221460	AC	AC	9/21/17 1:30 PM	DYS-MOSS	FLEELU F3 // RESPRP F4 // OBOFBS F5	GPD	DET	22	KS	NO	M	B
5			1034523	NK	GP	9/21/17 1:30 PM	NONE	UNRULY XX	PTPD	SS/EHM	6	KS	NO	M	W
6			158099	-	-	-	A. SMITH	FOUR HOUR HOLD-ERC 1	MCJC	HOME	11	AC	NO	M	B
7			1048482	-	-	-	NONE	UNRULY XX	MPD	PLACE	2	MB	NO	F	BIR
8			445925	-	-	-	NONE	NON-RES RUNAWAY	DPD	DET	18	MB	NO	F	W
9			155980	AC	GF	9/21/17 9:00 AM	JOHNSON	W-17-4898 (0A) VCO/EHMP RESPRP	MCJC	DET	18	MB	NO	M	B
10			259102	-	-	-	NONE	DVIOL M1	JTPD	HOME	8	MB	NO	M	W
11			206323	AC	GF	9/21/17 1:30 PM	NONE	CCWEAP M1	DPD	DET	24	MB	NO	M	B
12			701482	-	-	-	A. SMITH	FOUR HOUR HOLD - ERC I	MCJC	HOME	8	MB	NO	M	H
13			1048486	-	-	-	NONE	UNRULY XX	PBURG	HOME	5	MB	NO	M	W
14			937782	AC	GF	9/21/17 1:30 PM	NONE	DVIOL M1	HHPD	DET	10	MB	NO	M	B
15			396862	AC	AC	9/21/17 8:00 AM	GANTNER	W-17-1398 (0B) VCO/THEFT	MSCO	SS/EFC	10	AL	NO	F	B
16			781202	AC	AC	9/21/17 9:00 AM	HAVER	W-17-1508 (0B) VCO/GTHFTA	DPD	DET	21	AL	NO	M	B
17			175436	AC	GP	9/21/17 1:30 PM	KREMER	UNRULY XX	HHPD	DET	11	AL	NO	M	BIR

Ledger:

W/O = Warrant Override	SS/EFC = EFC Placement w/Special Summons	PLACE = Release to Existing CSD or other Ct agency, or Law Enforcement
DET = Detained	SS/EHM = Release on EHM w/Special Summons	HOME = Release to parent
SS = Special Summons	EFC = Emergency Foster Care Placement	IC HOLD = Held in IC till Hearing
** or ++ = Co Offenders	EHM = Electronic Home Monitoring	ERC = Evening Reporting Center

Intervention Center (IC) – Gatekeeper

- Law Enforcement transport Youth to IC
- IC
 - Assessments
 - Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI)
 - Low, medium, high risk
 - Public Safety/FTA/Safety to Youth
- Alternatives to Detention
 - Electronic Home Monitoring (EHM)
 - 2010 - 666
 - 2011 - 653
 - 2012 - 628
 - 2013 - 613 ADP – 26; ALOS 22.5 days
 - 2014 - 653 ADP – 33; ALOS 21.5 days
 - 2015 - 684 ADP – 22; ALOS 20 days
 - 2016 - 772 ADP – 18; ALOS 18 days
 - 2017 – 687 ADP – 29; ALOS 17 days
- Emergency Foster Care (EFC)
 - Domestic Violence Cases – Respite period
 - 2010 – 37
 - 2011 – 46
 - 2012 – 60
 - 2013 – 66
 - 2014 – 75
 - 2015 – 92
 - 2016 – 93
 - 2017 - 75

Looking for additional providers.



Evening Reporting Center I

- Partner with Mt. Enon Baptist Church
- Monday – Friday: 4:00 – 9:00 p.m.
- Provide Transportation and Meals
- Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
 - Aggression Replacement Therapy
- Tutoring
- Recreation
- Special Speakers
- Both Pre/Post Dispositional
- Capacity – 20 Youth (Male and Female)
- 2017
 - 298 Referrals – 223 Successful
 - 75% Success Rate

- Special Summons Alternative
 - To appear in Court next day with specific instructions – Follow-up phone calls.
 - Instituted in July 2011, Special Summons issued in 2017.
 - 578 Special Summons – only 29 F.T.A.
 - Success rate of 95%



Greater Number of Youth to IC are being released on alternatives.

January 2010	19% of Youth to IC Released. 81% of Youth to IC Detained.	2015	52% of Youth Released 48% of Youth Detained
All of 2010	27% of Youth to IC Released. 73% of Youth to IC Detained	2016	53% of Youth Released 47% of Youth Detained
2011	37% of Youth to IC Released. 63% of Youth to IC Detained.	2017	56% of Youth Released 44% of Youth Detained
2012	42% of Youth to IC Released. 58% of Youth to IC Detained		2010 - 624 Released 2011 - 820 Released 2012 - 952 Released 2013 - 952 Released 2014 - 1074 Released 2015 - 1197 Released 2016 - 1296 Released 2017 - 1322 Released
2013	45% of Youth to IC Released 55% of Youth to IC Detained		
2014	48% of Youth to IC Released 52% of Youth to IC Detained		

Other Low Hanging Fruit Results

Warrants for FTA

2009 – 241 Detained.

2010 – 132 Detained.

2011 – 121 Detained.

2012 – 144 Detained.

2013 – 171 Detained.

2014 – 137 Detained.

2015 – 106 Detained.

2016 – 127 Detained.

2017 – 127 Detained.

47% Reduction of FTA's Detained.

Other Low Hanging Fruit Results

Domestic Violence Cases.

2009 – 354 Detained.

2010 – 219 Detained.

2011 – 191 Detained.

2012 – 171 Detained.

2013 – 160 Detained.

2014 – 118 Detained.

2015 – 114 Detained.

2016 – 140 Detained.

2017 – 88 Detained.



75% Reduction of DV's Detained.

Probation Violations , Warrants – VCO's

Instituted a Two Tier Process

- Warrant with a Presumption of Release
- Warrant with a Presumption to Detain

IC would assess further with power to override.

2009 - 581 VCO's – Detained

2010 - 524 VCO's – Detained

2011 - 418 VCO's – Detained

2012 - 371 VCO's – Detained

2013 - 202 VCO's – Detained

2014 - 233 VCO's - Detained

2015 - 246 VCO's - Detained

2016 - 202 VCO's - Detained

2017 - 225 VCO's - Detained


61% Reduction of VCO's Detained.



MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 – 2017


Detention Admissions

ANNUAL ADMISSIONS



From 2009 – 2017(-1263)
55% Decrease

YOUTH OF COLOR – ANNUAL ADMISSIONS




From 2009 – 2017(-784) 53% Decrease

MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 – 2017


Detention ADP

AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION



From 2009 – 2017 (-45)
59% Decrease


YOUTH OF COLOR – AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION



From 2009 – 2017 (-29)
57% Decrease


MONTGOMERY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 2009 - 2017

Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) Commitments



From 2009 – 2017 (-44)
67% Decrease

Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) Youth of Color



From 2009 – 2017 (-26)
57% Decrease
Yet 91% of all Youth committed to DYS

OTHER JDAI RESULTS – 2009 - 2017

Delinquency Referrals	7328 – 5807 = (-1521) 21% ↓
Unruly Referrals	2968 – 2678 = (-290) 10% ↓
Traffic Referrals	2528 – 1992 = (-536) 21% ↓
Felony Adjudications	551 – 250 = (-301) 55% ↓
Youth on Probation	1478 – 592 = (-886) 60% ↓
Youth Committed to ODYS	66 – 22 = (-44) 67% ↓
ADP in Detention Center	76 – 31 = (-45) 59% ↓
Detention Admissions	2299 – 1068 = (-1231) 54% ↓
Domestic Violence Detentions	354 – 88 = (-266) 75% ↓
Probation VCO Detentions	581 – 225 = (-356) 61% ↓

Youth Released from
Intervention Center

$624 - 1322 = (+698)$ 53%↑

Rate of Release

$19\% - 56\% = 37\%$ ↑

Days of Youth in Detention

$28,459 - 11,051 = (-11,408)$ 40% ↓

Cost Savings \$238.00 per diem = \$2.7 Million



YOUTH OF COLOR NUMBERS SINCE 2009

Admissions Decreased by (-784) 53%

Detention ADP Decreased by (-29) 57%

ODYS State Commitments by (-26) 57%

Felony Adjudications by (-71) 22%

Youth Transferred to Adult Jurisdiction (-3) 18%

YOUTH OF COLOR % OF POPULATIONS

Admissions – 67%

Detention ADP – 71%


ODYS State Commitments – 91%

Felony Adjudications – 77%


Youth Transferred to Adult Jurisdiction – 100%

Probation Efforts

- Strengths Based Focus
 - Relationship Building
 - Pro-Social Activities
 - Training Committee
 - Policy Updates
 - Schedule Changes



Montgomery County Juvenile Court
 Probation Services
 Youth on Probation
 2014-2017 Figures



Probation Efforts

- Development and Training
 - Reclaiming Futures
 - Michael Clark
 - Motivational Interviewing (MI)
 - Advanced MI
 - MI Training Committee



Diversion Efforts

- 10 and Under Program – Since 2007
 - 1866 Referrals – 1606 Successful Closings
 - 86% Success Rate

2017 – 273 Referrals

PROSECUTOR/JUVENILE COURT SEXTING DIVERSION PROGRAM

2009 - 2016

- 250 Referrals

93% Success Rate – Keeping
cases unofficial

ADDITIONAL DIVERSION EFFORTS

- With official Probation numbers decreasing, 4 Probation Officers and Supervisor re-assigned to newly created Diversion Unit in April 2016 to manage more difficult unofficial cases.

- In 2017, handled:

263 – Diversion Cases

160 – Truancy Cases

95 – DMC Cases

- Creation of Evening Reporting Center II (ERC II) in October 2016 to provide programming for unofficial low-risk juveniles.

In 2017, served 98 youth.

67 Successfully completed; 71% Success Rate

2009 – 2017 Successful Results with our Partnership with the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Ohio Department of Youth Services. Thank you to all of our Community Partners and Agencies.

Prosecutor's Office

Public Defender's Office

Children Services

Law Enforcement

Schools

Service Providers

County Administration

City Officials

Faith Based Community

Court Staff

JDAI Work Team

Judge Kuntz and Judge Capizzi

Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division

Deborah A. Alspach, Judge
Robert D. Fragale, Judge

OUR JDAI JOURNEY

REFORM EFFORTS 2015

Court Appointed Defense Representation at Detention Hearings:	January
Weekly Population Control Meetings:	February
Pilot Fast Tracking Diversion Cases:	March
Diversion Trauma Groups:	August
Truancy Mediation/Conferences @ largest HS & MS (Marion City Schools):	September
Pilot use of Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) in Detention:	December

REFORM EFFORTS 2016

Court Appointed Defense Representation expanded to include defense representation at arraignments:	July
Evening Reporting Center opened as an alternative to detention: (August '16 – June '17)	
RAI goes live:	September
Trauma Informed Yoga – weekly detention program:	September
Detention policy modified to allow talking during meals:	October
Positive Quote of the day (selected by youth):	December

REFORM EFFORTS 2017

Youth Art & Wellness – detention programming:	January
◦ Mixed Media Art (major art project – murals in cafeteria)	
◦ “River Guide” - inspirational book & discussions w/Scott Weibling, author and speaker	
◦ Dance & Meditation	(March – June 2017)
Assessment of Detention Courtroom Environment	November
◦ Changes were made to hearing proceedings /courtroom control to promote a less intimidating yet respectful courtroom environment.	

Diversion Trauma Groups A Closer Look

(Implemented August 2015)

Program serves diversion youth who score low to moderate risk on the Diversion OYAS screening tool and trip the trauma screening tool.

Curriculum used:

- Structured Sensory Interventions for Traumatized Children, Adolescents, and Parents (SITCAP)
- Cognitive Behavioral Intervention for Trauma in Schools (CBITS)

Data (through December 31, 2017):

- 43 youth served
- 31 youth have successfully completed the program
- 6 youth have been unsuccessful at completing the program
- 28 out of 31 (90%) successful youth have not reoffended since completion

Evening Reporting Center – “ERC” A Closer Look

(Implemented August / September 2016 – June 2017)

Funding: DYS - Detention Alternatives & Enhancements Grant (Category 1)

Partnership:

- Rushmore Academy (Community School sponsored by Marion City Schools)
 - In-kind Services
 - Space
 - Evening meal
- The Village Network – ERC daily programming

Schedule:

- Monday – Friday; 3:00pm – 9:00pm
- Tutoring/homework, meal, skills based programming, recreation/arts & crafts, daily evaluation, and transportation to and from ERC

Evening Reporting Center – “ERC” Con’t.

Target Population

- Males
- 13-17 years old
- Moderate risk (OYAS or RAI)

Data (through June 30, 2017):

- Total admissions, 75
 - Individual youth, 42
 - Youth with multiple admissions, 16
- 56 successful completions
- 30 out of 56 (54%) successful completions were not been placed in detention at 6 month follow-up

RAI A Closer Look

(Implemented September 2016)

RAI: Objective Admissions to Detention / Release Decisions screening tool

- Scoring
 - 0-9, Release
 - 10-14, Release to a Detention Alternative
 - 15+, Hold
- Scoring Overrides
 - Mandatory Holds
 - Aggravating Factors -Supervisory Override to hold
 - Mitigating Factors – Supervisory Override to less restrictive placement
 - Probation / Court Holder

RAI Con't

Data (1-1-17 thru 10-3-17)

- Youth Detained: 233 youth out of 240 youth were detained at time of intake/assessment = 97%
 - Scored High Risk – 82/233 = 35% overall 82/82 = 100% high risk holds
 - Scored Medium Risk – 118/233 = 51% overall 118/119 = 99% medium risk holds
 - Scored Low Risk – 33/233 = 14% overall 33/39 = 85% low risk holds
- Youth Released at next day detention hearing: 74 youth out of 233 youth = 32%
 - Scored High Risk – 17/74 = 23% 17/82 = 21% high risk holds
 - Scored Medium Risk – 46/74 = 62% 46/118 = 39% medium risk holds
 - Scored Low Risk – 11/74 = 15% 11/33 = 33% of low risk holds
- Youth Released (at time of intake/assessment) to detention alternative – N/A
 - Current Court policy/procedure is to release to alternatives at time of detention hearing
- Youth Released Outright: 7 youth out of 240 youth were released at time of intake/assessment = 3%
 - Scored High Risk - 0-
 - Scored Medium Risk - 1
 - Scored Low Risk - 6

Trauma Informed Yoga – TI Yoga A Closer Look

(Implemented September 2016)


Instructors are trained in TI Yoga

One hour session is offered weekly and are co-instructed


Data (September 1, 2016 thru December 31, 2017):

- Classes offered – 62
- Total Participants – 403 (77% of total population)
 - Female Participants – 71 (88% of female population)
 - Male Participants – 332 (69% of male population)
- Feedback form for youth and staff developed September 2017; these are currently being tabulated


Historical Data



Historical Data



Historical Data



Points to Ponder

Be data driven / be mindful

It's ok to go slow – reform is a marathon not a sprint

Identify reform efforts to address first, “low hanging fruit”

Utilize JDAI resources

- State Coordinator
- Other JDAI jurisdictions
- JDAI Helpdesk / JDAIconnect

Dig deeper into data

Train & Engage staff and community stakeholders

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JDAI AT 25

JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE

INSIGHTS FROM THE ANNUAL RESULTS REPORTS



THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION



The Annie E. Casey Foundation is a private philanthropy that creates a brighter future for the nation's children by developing solutions to strengthen families, build paths to economic opportunity and transform struggling communities into safer and healthier places to live, work and grow. For more information, visit www.aecf.org.

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The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative® (JDAI™) is

a nationwide effort of local and state juvenile justice systems, initiated and supported by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, to eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate use of juvenile secure detention and to reduce racial disparities. Begun in 1992, JDAI has grown to become the most widely replicated juvenile justice reform initiative in the United States, reaching youth in more than 300 local jurisdictions across 39 states and the District of Columbia. JDAI sites submit annual results reports to the Foundation for two primary purposes: (1) to gauge the progress of their own JDAI collaboratives on an annual basis for the benefit of local system stakeholders; and (2) to generate initiative-wide aggregate measures and comparisons among sites to deepen our understanding of the overall impact of the detention reform movement.

Since 2009, JDAI has summarized these aggregate measures of progress to share with the JDAI network and the public at large. In recognition of JDAI's 25-year milestone, this document presents the first results reports' analysis that draws on data from multiple years — 2008 through 2016. The results reports provide evidence that JDAI sites have achieved significant reductions in both juvenile incarceration and juvenile crime; and in most sites, those reductions have been sustained or deepened over time. Yet the results reports also indicate that despite sites' best efforts, racial and ethnic disparities have persisted or worsened overall; and in some sites, the momentum of detention reform appears to have slowed in recent years. In addition to sharing insights from this longitudinal perspective, this document reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of the results reports as a tool to advance data-driven practices across the detention reform movement. Finally, this document sets forth some new strategic goals for improving the current results reports, with new tools and strategies designed to help JDAI sites do better, innovate and sustain the improvements they have achieved through 25 years of JDAI.

BACKGROUND: THE ANNUAL RESULTS REPORT PROCESS

Every year, JDAI sites report data on their use of secure detention for pre- and post-adjudicated youth, the number of youth committed to state custody, overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system and indicators of public safety and compliance with the court process. Changes in these indicators over the course of a site's participation in JDAI — between a pre-JDAI year selected by the site (the baseline year) and the current results reporting year (the recent year) — show the difference detention reform has made within sites, and those changes can be rolled up to the initiative level to tell a broader story about JDAI's nationwide impact.

As of 2016 there were 197 active JDAI sites, pursuing detention reforms based on JDAI core strategies. Some of these sites serve multiple counties and independent cities, so the total number of local jurisdictions involved in JDAI was more than 300. Roughly 10 million youth ages 10 to 17, about 30 percent of the national total, live in these communities.¹


The start and end dates used for the baseline and recent reporting

periods are selected by each site. For the 2016 reporting year, all the 12-month reporting periods for the sites that submitted reports ended between December 31, 2015, and September 30, 2016. All results reports data are self-reported by JDAI sites, and although they are reviewed for completeness and internal consistency by Foundation staff, they are not independently validated. Some reports have valid information on some indicators but not on others, so the number of reports included in the analysis of a given indicator in one or more given years may be lower than the total number of

reports received. Foundation staff supplement the results reports data with the most recent data available from the Census Bureau, so that our analysis of the results reports can be informed by the sites' demographic context.

For the 2016 reporting cycle, 164 sites submitted results reports. This is the second-highest total to date, and more than twice the number received in 2009, the first year that results reports were systematically collected in something close to their current form (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
RESULTS REPORTS RECEIVED FROM JDAI SITES BY REPORTING YEAR



Insights from the Annual Results Report Indicators Through 2016

The annual results reports provide evidence that JDAI sites have achieved significant reductions in both juvenile incarceration and juvenile crime (Table 1).

Table 1: Overall 2016 Results on Frequently Cited Indicators

Indicator	Pre-JDAI Baseline	2016 Results	Numerical Change	Percentage Change	Sites Included in Analysis
Detention Population					
Average Daily Population (ADP)	8,780	4,964	-3,816	-43%	164
Annual Admissions	188,948	95,939	-93,009	-49%	
Disparities in Detention					
Youth of Color ADP	6,209	3,679	-2,530	-41%	140
White Non-Hispanic ADP	2,049	934	-1,115	-54%	
Youth of Color Admissions	119,287	66,968	-52,319	-44%	
White Non-Hispanic Admissions	50,952	20,826	-30,126	-59%	
Youth of Color Detention Rate per 100,000	150	83	-67	-45%	
White Non-Hispanic Detention Rate per 100,000	45	23	-22	-49%	
Commitments to State Custody					
Total	17,457	7,432	-10,025	-57%	162
Youth of Color	12,381	5,593	-6,788	-55%	132
Juvenile Crime					
Felony Petitions	79,391	48,770	-30,621	-39%	79
Delinquency Petitions	42,562	29,351	-13,211	-31%	22
Juvenile Arrests	33,511	14,333	-19,178	-57%	19
Referrals/Intakes	32,526	17,298	-15,228	-47%	7

ADVANCES

Reduced reliance on juvenile detention. Across the 164 JDAI sites that reported in 2016, there were more than 3,800 fewer youth in detention on an average day in 2016 than before those sites undertook JDAI — a reduction of 43 percent. That means that over the course of a year, sites use about 1.4 million fewer days of juvenile detention than they used prior to JDAI. There were roughly 93,000 fewer admissions per year to juvenile detention facilities in JDAI sites — a decrease of 49 percent — compared with pre-JDAI levels.

Reduced commitments to state custody. Although the primary focus of most JDAI sites over the years has been the use of juvenile detention, the initiative has always strived to reduce other forms of youth incarceration as well. For that reason, the results reports ask sites to provide information on the number of youth they commit to state custody each year. As of 2016, the 162 sites providing this information reported committing 10,000 fewer youth to state custody each year — a reduction of 57 percent — compared with pre-JDAI levels.

Reduced juvenile crime. The results reports allow sites to select a juvenile crime indicator (JCI) and ask them to report on it annually, to see how youth behavior and public safety are changing while detention reforms take hold. For the 127 sites providing this information in 2016, juvenile crime was well below pre-JDAI levels across all JCIs used, by an average of more than 40 percent. The most frequently used JCI, the number of felony petitions filed against juveniles in a year, was down by 39 percent among the 79 sites using that indicator. Decreases in the less frequently used indicators ranged from 31 percent for sites reporting on the number of delinquency petitions filed to 57 percent for sites reporting on juvenile arrests.

These gains have been achieved across a wide diversity of JDAI sites.


Detention reductions across the vast majority of sites. Of the 164 sites reporting in 2016, 140 (85 percent) had a lower detention population than before JDAI.

Reductions in both urban and non-urban communities. Eighty-one of the sites were predominantly urban and 83 were not.² Although the urban sites reported larger reductions than rural sites, most sites in both groups relied less on detention than they had prior to JDAI. As of 2016, urban sites had reduced their overall detention population by 45 percent, with 90 percent of the sites showing reductions, and non-urban sites had reduced by 35 percent, with 80 percent of the sites showing reductions.


Reductions across multiple states and all regions. Thirty-five states were represented among the sites reporting in 2016. In 31 of those states (89 percent), the 2016 detention population in local JDAI sites was lower than their pre-JDAI baseline; in 32 states (91 percent), most local JDAI sites had reduced their use of detention. Large overall reductions were reported across all regions of the United States (ranging from 35 percent among sites in the South to 56 percent among sites in the West), and the vast majority of sites in all regions reported using less detention than before JDAI (ranging from 82 percent of sites in the Midwest to 91 percent of sites in the Northeast).³

Looking across the results reports received in recent years, it is possible to see that these overall gains have been sustained and deepened (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2
TRENDS IN FREQUENTLY CITED INDICATORS
 Overall reductions in incarceration across JDAI sites have been sustained or deepened...



While indicators of juvenile crime have remained low or improved



THERE WERE MORE THAN **3,800 fewer youth in detention on an average day in 2016 than before those sites undertook JDAI — a reduction of 43 percent.**

Sustained and growing reductions in incarceration. As of 2009, JDAI sites had already achieved significant reductions in juvenile detention and state commitments. Yet over the next seven years, even as more new sites joined the initiative, the scale of those reductions increased. As a result, the overall reductions in detention ADP, detention admissions and state commitments that sites recorded in 2016 were the largest to date.

Sustained and growing reductions in juvenile crime. Over the past seven years of results reports, sites have also maintained or improved upon their overall reductions in juvenile crime. Because sites use different JCIs, the number of sites reporting on any single JCI in each year is much smaller than the number that report on the detention and commitment indicators. Therefore, the trends in these indicators are comparatively more volatile. Since 2010, there has been a notable trend among sites using the felony petitions indicator, with the decreases in felony petitions filed generally getting larger each year. The trends among the other three JCIs — which are used by fewer sites than the felony petitions indicator — have been generally flat. That is, the size of the overall reductions in those indicators stayed roughly the same from 2010 to 2016.

CHALLENGES


The results reports also show that important challenges remain, including the persistence of racial and ethnic disparities and loss of detention reform momentum in some sites, characterized by rising lengths of stay.

Persistent, glaring disparities in the incarceration of youth of color.⁴ A defining characteristic of American juvenile justice is the overrepresentation of youth of color at every level of system involvement. JDAI sites strive to change this reality in their jurisdictions, but based on the results reports, little overall progress has been made. Among the 140 sites that provided disaggregated detention data in 2016,

youth of color accounted for 52 percent of the total youth population, but 80 percent of the detention ADP. This overrepresentation has changed little since the sites' baseline years, when youth of color were 47 percent of the total youth population and 75 percent of the detention ADP. Among the 132 sites providing disaggregated data on state commitments, similar levels of overrepresentation were reported in 2016, with youth of color accounting for 78 percent of overall commitments in the baseline year and 83 percent in 2016 (Figure 3).


Looking across multiple years, the overrepresentation of youth of color has been remarkably persistent. The share of youth of color in the detained juvenile population in JDAI sites has fluctuated over the years, but has never fallen below 75 percent of the overall ADP, or 70 percent of detention admissions, across JDAI. Similarly, the percentage reductions in detention among all youth versus youth of color have fluctuated over the years; but in no year has the percentage reduction in detention admissions or detention ADP among youth of color exceeded the percentage reduction among all youth.

**FIGURE 3
OVERREPRESENTATION OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN JDAI
INCARCERATION INDICATORS**



The growth of this disproportionality over time is due in part to demographic changes in JDAI sites (Figure 4). Since their baseline years, the 140 sites that provided disaggregated data in 2016 saw an overall 7 percent increase in their population of youth of color, while their population of white youth fell by 10 percent. Simply because youth of color are more likely to be detained than white youth, this demographic shift by itself would tend to increase the total use of detention across JDAI sites. If the only thing that had changed in JDAI sites since their baseline years was their community demographics, then the overall detained population would have been 3 percent *higher* than its baseline level. Instead, because these JDAI sites reduced their reliance on detention, their actual ADP was 44 percent *lower* than its baseline level. To accomplish that, sites reduced their overall detention rate (defined as the detention ADP per 100,000 youth ages 10–17 living in the site’s jurisdiction) among both youth of color and white youth by similar degrees. In 2016, a youth of color living in a JDAI site was about 45 percent less likely to be in detention and a white youth was about 49 percent less likely to be in detention than their peers were prior to JDAI.


FIGURE 4
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ALONE WOULD HAVE LED TO MORE DETENTION;
BUT SITES REDUCED THE RATE OF DETENTION BOTH
FOR YOUTH OF COLOR AND WHITE YOUTH



NOTE: Based on 140 sites providing disaggregated data on detention ADP.

It is encouraging that reductions in the detention rate have been similar among white youth and youth of color — but disparities remain large, and have widened across the three main indicators of juvenile incarceration collected through the results reports (the ADP in detention, the number of youth admitted to detention centers annually and the number of youth committed to state custody). Reductions in all three of these rates for white youth have been greater than the reductions for youth of color since sites began JDAI. Moreover, incarceration rates for youth of color in 2016 are still higher than those rates were for white youth even before JDAI (Figure 5).

**FIGURE 5
DECREASING RATES OF INCARCERATION,
BUT INCREASING DISPARITIES**



Change in Incarceration Rates for White Youth and Youth of Color (YOC), Baseline to 2016

NOTE: Based on reports from 132 sites that provided disaggregated data on Commitments, Admissions and ADP.


Looking at the 132 sites that submitted disaggregated information on all three of these indicators in 2016:

- Before JDAI, the overall detention rate (ADP per 100,000 persons ages 10–17) for youth of color was 3.3 times higher than the white youth detention rate. In 2016, despite steep reductions in detention for both groups, that ratio had increased to 3.7.
- The rate of detention admissions (annual admissions to detention per 10,000 persons age 10–17) for youth of color was 2.6 times the rate for white youth before JDAI. In 2016, that ratio had increased to 3.0.
- The incarceration rate that has fallen the most across these JDAI sites is the commitment rate (annual commitments to state custody per 100,000 persons age 10–17). But while that rate was 3.8 times higher for youth of color than for white youth before JDAI, it was 4.5 times higher in 2016.

The results reports do not collect data disaggregated beyond the very broad category of youth of color. The reports therefore shed little light on the reasons that these disparities persist, nor do they help to identify practices that sites have used to mitigate them successfully.


Increasing lengths of stay in detention among some sites. Although sites have decreased their overall use of detention over the years, the rate of decrease appears to have leveled off since approximately 2012. Among the 40 sites that submitted results reports every year from 2008 through 2016 (nine consecutive years), this can be clearly observed. From their baseline years to 2008, these sites reduced their overall ADP by 27 percent. Over the next four years, from 2008 to 2012, they reduced by another 30 percent. But over the four years from 2012 to 2016, they reduced by only 2 percent (Figure 6).

FIGURE 6
AMONG 40 SITES REPORTING FROM 2008 THROUGH 2016,
THE PACE OF ADP REDUCTION SLOWED AFTER 2012




To better understand this dynamic, trends in each of these 40 sites were examined and compared. This analysis found that while most of the sites (33 of the 40) had continued their progress in reducing ADP after 2012, a few (the remaining seven sites) did not. Up to 2012, the trajectories of these two groups were similar, with ADP reductions of around 27 percent between their baseline years and 2008, and around 30 percent over the four years from 2008 to 2012. But in the four years from 2012 to 2016, their paths diverged. ADP across the 33 sites that continued their downward trajectory fell another 15 percent, while the seven sites with an upward trajectory saw a 30 percent increase, reversing most of their progress since 2009 (Figure 7).

FIGURE 7
CONTINUED ADP REDUCTIONS IN MOST SITES; INCREASES
IN A FEW AFTER 2012



The population of a detention center (ADP) is a function of two factors: how many young people are admitted and how long they stay. The difference between the trajectory of sites that saw continued reductions and those that saw increases after 2012 was mostly due to changes in lengths of stay (Figure 8). Both groups saw continued decreases in admissions, but the seven sites whose ADP rose after 2012 also saw the average length of stay in their detention centers rise by more than 40 percent (from about 19 days to 27 days). Those that remained on a downward trajectory held their average length of stay to a much more modest 8 percent increase (from 17 days to 18 days).

FIGURE 8
FOR SITES SEEING INCREASES IN ADP, LENGTH OF STAY IS THE DRIVER




Some of the factors that drive longer average stays in juvenile detention centers are well known, such as increasing use of these facilities to hold young people awaiting trial in adult courts (where cases typically take much longer to process than juvenile court cases) and the growth of post-dispositional placement programs that are housed in juvenile detention centers. Unfortunately, the results reports do not collect the necessary data to determine whether and to what extent these, or any other, factors are contributing to escalating lengths of stay across the initiative.

Need for renewed momentum in some sites. The results reports help to illustrate the importance of being able to distinguish not just how far a site has come since the start of its JDAI work, but also that site's trajectory. Focusing on a larger set of 79 sites that submitted results reports for five consecutive years (from 2012 through 2016), four distinct groups can be identified based on two criteria: how much *impact* had the sites achieved in 2016, defined as whether the site's reduction in ADP since their baseline year was greater than or less than 30 percent; and whether the site had *momentum* for further reductions at that time, defined as having a downward trend in ADP over the five-year period from 2012 to 2016 (Figure 9, left panel).

- The largest group (58 percent of sites) had achieved a large impact to date and continuing momentum (with ADP reductions of more than 30 percent from their pre-JDAI baseline and ADP trending downward over the 2012–2016 period).
- A smaller group (10 percent of sites) had not achieved as large an impact up to 2016; but did have momentum, with a downward trend in ADP over the past five years.

FIGURE 9
SITES REPORTING FROM 2012 THROUGH 2016,
GROUPED BY MOMENTUM AND IMPACT
(n=79 Sites)




- Another small group (15 percent of sites) reported a large impact as of 2016, with ADP much lower than their baselines. But they had lost momentum, with their ADP trending higher over the past five years.
- The remaining group (16 percent of sites) did not report a large impact, with ADP increases, or reductions of less than 30 percent, compared with their baselines. They also showed a lack of momentum, with an upward trend in ADP over five years.


It is heartening that most sites are in the high-impact/high-momentum group. It is also encouraging that another one-fourth of sites are either trending in the right direction, or are able to take confidence from the fact that they have substantially reduced their use of detention since launching JDAI. But it is concerning that 1 in 6 sites face a rising trend in their detention population that either threatens to or already has negated any reductions they have achieved since beginning JDAI (Figure 10).

Clearly these distinctions matter: The sites in each group can be expected to present very different needs for technical assistance, training and other support, based on their impact to date and recent trajectory. Moreover, the greatest opportunities for further reductions in detention in the future reside among the minority of sites whose ADP is trending upward. Among the sites examined, although just 31 percent had a rising trend in ADP, those sites accounted for nearly half of the 2016 ADP (Figure 9, right panel).

FIGURE 10
ADP TRAJECTORIES BY MOMENTUM-IMPACT GROUP



ADP TRAJECTORIES BY NO MOMENTUM-IMPACT GROUP



Note: Based on 79 sites providing reports each year from 2012 through 2016, plus their baseline year.

Looking Forward: Priorities for Improving the Annual Results Report Process

In the past 10 years, both at the site level and across the initiative, JDAI has invested in the results reporting process to acquire evidence related to its original core aims: to reduce reliance on juvenile detention while preserving public safety, using strategies that can be replicated widely and adopted at a large scale. As demonstrated in this report, the results reports have provided encouraging evidence of success on these core goals. JDAI sites have achieved significant reductions in detention while reducing juvenile crime, and those gains have been sustained or improved.

But the scale and maturity of JDAI has arguably outgrown the current results reporting process and the current design of the annual results report itself. As valuable as results reports have been up to this point, the initiative's experience with them has shown that they are limited in some important respects. Those limitations need to be addressed if the results reporting process is going to become what JDAI needs it to be: a tool for fostering and accelerating continuous improvement across JDAI sites.

Fundamental questions remain unaddressed. In some areas, the results reports do not ask for data needed to provide actionable information for sites or for JDAI technical assistance providers.

- Most prominently, the results reports disaggregate the detention and commitment indicators only by a single, overly broad racial and ethnic category — youth of color — that is inadequate to shed much light on the source of disparities in detention rates. While it is important to show overrepresentation, there is also a need to help sites diagnose and address its causes. Sites need to understand which specific demographic groups and communities are the most overrepresented in the juvenile justice system. That knowledge is an important starting point to building partnerships with those communities and developing targeted strategies to help prevent their young people from unnecessary exposure to and deeper involvement in the juvenile justice system.
- Similarly, the results reports ask for just one piece of information about the use of post-dispositional out-of-home placements: the number of commitments to state custody. Yet we know from JDAI sites


JDAI SITES HAVE ACHIEVED significant reductions in detention while reducing juvenile crime, and those gains have been sustained or improved.

that are pursuing deep end reforms that commitments are just one type of dispositional out-of-home placement that needs attention. As designed, the results reports can provide only a glimpse of this complex picture.

- The results reports also need to address some important areas of detention reform work — areas that are among the highest priorities in many sites — including: adherence to the recommendations of objective decision-making tools at the point of detention admission; appropriate use of alternative-to-detention programs (ATDs); and the use of graduated responses and case processing strategies to avoid detention based on probation violations. These approaches represent the bulk of JDAI work in many sites, and sites’ success in implementing them will help to determine how much further they can go in the future. At JDAI’s current level of maturity, these strategies belong front and center in the initiative’s data gathering.

Laborious process, with incomplete data. Despite diligent efforts across sites, JDAI as an initiative still struggles to assemble meaningful data about how to advance detention reform, especially with respect to key indicators of effectiveness, such as the rates at which youth who are not detained fail to appear for court hearings or are rearrested before their cases can be resolved. Even within the core reporting metrics, data are sometimes incomplete or based on nonstandard calculation methods (Figure 11).

FIGURE 11
SITES REPORTING ON SELECTED INDICATORS



Note: Based on reports received in 2016.

.....

STARTING IN 2017, the Casey Foundation will reach out to the JDAI community to formulate a new approach that builds on results reporting.

.....

Improving usefulness to sites and responsiveness to their needs. Because JDAI’s process for analyzing and synthesizing the results reports is laborious and time consuming, sites need useful feedback from the results reports in a timely way. Moreover, the results reporting process should help sites that are tackling similar challenges to identify and communicate with one another and better capitalize on one of the most important potential benefits of having such a vast national network of sites. That some sites make the value judgment that submitting high-quality results reports is too costly could be related to the slow and centralized nature of conversations generated by the results reporting process. The reports come from the sites to JDAI leadership, and with some lag, aggregate numbers are shared through written reports like this one. But it’s not clear how well this relates to site-level reform efforts. The report gives sites clues to where they fit in to the broader JDAI community, but needs to provide them opportunities to plug in and engage with their peers.

For these reasons, the Casey Foundation is interested in exploring new ways to promote and support the development of good data practices among JDAI sites, so that sites can be better equipped to *do better, innovate and sustain* their progress. To that end, starting in 2017, the Casey Foundation will reach out to the JDAI community to formulate a new approach that builds on results reporting. Our goal will be to create a new infrastructure to support continuous data-driven learning and improvement across JDAI that:

- takes full advantage of the vast JDAI network;
- uses more advanced technology;
- goes deeper into racial disparities and other areas of focus for JDAI sites;
- is more responsive to the needs and challenges of sites across the initiative; and
- focuses JDAI’s data strategies, not just on measuring progress to date, but also on guiding the priorities and direction of detention reform into the future.

An initial concept paper outlining such an approach is planned for later in 2017, to be followed by an invitation to JDAI sites that wish to take part in building, and building upon, this new infrastructure.

JDAI has always emphasized the critical importance of data-driven policies and decision making as a core element of detention reform. Through this transition, we will hold fast to that principle — and as JDAI enters a new era, we will strive to realize that principle more fully than ever before.

ENDNOTES

- 1 As of 2017, the 197 active JDAI sites serve more than 300 counties and independent cities. Per U.S. Census Bureau statistics, the population of 10- to 17-year-olds in these jurisdictions was more than 10 million in 2015; while the national population of 10- to 17-year-olds was just over 33 million. Therefore, about 30 percent of the nation's youth population lives in a community that participates in JDAI.
- 2 Most of the U.S. population lives in areas that the U.S. Census Bureau classifies as "urban" based on population density and other factors. About half of JDAI sites serve counties in which more than 90 percent of all housing units are in urban areas; and those sites are counted as urban for this analysis. Non-urban sites are those in which less than 90 percent of housing units are in urban areas.
- 3 Among the sites reporting in 2016, Northeast states were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island; southern states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia; Midwest states were Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin; and western states were Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico and Washington.
- 4 The results reports define youth of color as youth of any race who identify as having Hispanic ethnicity, and youth of non-Hispanic ethnicity who identify as having a race other than white, based on the racial/ethnic categories used by the U.S. Census Bureau. The results reports do not further disaggregate any data by race or ethnicity, so we are unable to evaluate trends in JDAI sites at a more discrete level. Nor can we independently verify that sites are using these categories, although for purposes of this analysis we assume that they do.

DEEP END INITIATIVE
OHIO JDAI
CONFERENCE
NOVEMBER 1, 2017




THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION

The Deep End work is built on JDAI foundations.

Through JDAI, Ohio has used a data-driven, collaborative approach to reduce juvenile confinement at the front end of the system. As a result, the average daily detention population in Ohio's JDAI sites has dropped by about 50%.

Three Ohio counties are now embarking on the next step: applying JDAI principles from the “front end” to reduce confinement at disposition – the “deep end” of the system.



The Deep End Goal

To safely and significantly reduce out-of-home placements, especially for youth of color.

OK, every slide so far talks about “Deep End”. What is “Deep End”?


A youth is in a Deep End placement if he or she is:

- 1) Placed out-of-home in a facility, including a group home
- 2) As the result of a delinquency adjudication
- 3) Pursuant to a court order related to the delinquency case.

In Ohio, this includes DYS, Community Corrections Facilities, residential treatment centers, group homes, facilities contracted through local Children’s Services, and short-term substance abuse.

The degree to which Deep End sites rely on placement varies across sites.


**PLACEMENTS PER 10,000 JUVENILE POPULATION
(2016 unless otherwise noted)**




This graph shows the number of placements for every 10,000 young people (under 18) in the jurisdiction's overall population.

The number of placements is influenced by the size of the county and the amount of juvenile crime, so we look at placement numbers relative to population and relative to felony filings.

PLACEMENTS FOR EVERY 10,000 UNDER 18 IN POPULATION (2016)




PLACEMENTS FOR EVERY 100 FELONY FILINGS (2016)




Using the same measures, we can also look at changes over time.

**CHANGES IN PLACEMENTS
RELATIVE TO JUVENILE POPULATION
(2014 TO 2016)**




**CHANGES IN PLACEMENTS
RELATIVE TO FELONY FILINGS
(2014 TO 2016)**



To use the Deep End Performance Measures in your own site, download a tracking sheet from www.aecf.org/deependtoolkit.

The Deep End Highway

Delinquency



Placement

The Deep End Highway

Delinquency

Young person lives in a neighborhood that isn't heavily policed, attends a school without SROs, etc.

EXIT 1



EXIT 2



EXIT 3



Police diversion

EXIT 4



Prosecutor declines to file

EXIT 5



Prosecutor refers to diversion



EXIT 6



Probation/Court Intake chooses informal track

EXIT 7



Court grants Consent Decree prior to adjudication



EXIT 8



Team Meeting or Staffing Process to design home-based disposition



EXIT 9



Administrative Probation



EXIT 10



Supervised Probation



EXIT 11




Probation with program participation

Intensive Probation



Placement



WHAT ARE DEEP END SITES DOING TO EXPAND ACCESS TO EXITS?


Lucas County is implementing innovations that limit the reach of probation, structure dispositional decisions and leverage family and community partnerships.

- ❖ Structured Decision Making Matrix
- ❖ Expanded Diversion – Misdemeanors Services
- ❖ Community Asset Mapping
- ❖ Family Navigators
- ❖ Community Advisory Board
- ❖ Positive Youth Development




Impact of the Lucas County Juvenile Court Assessment Center – Misdemeanor Services

2015 Lucas County Juvenile Court Filings



■ Misdemeanors ■ Felonies ■ Status/Other


2015 Assessment Center Screenings



- Nearly 2,000 more cases will be screened for diversion; 1,000 more likely diverted
- Reduction in probation caseloads

Working with youth with higher risk and needs in the community requires a shift in thinking.

- Need to get more comfortable with youth falling down.
- Reduce probation violations for behavior that other non-involved justice teenagers are involved in...data showed violations were a major factor in kids being sent to ODYS.
- Working with high risk youth in the community requires a commitment and philosophy to keep coming back to the table with the youth to address behaviors and problem solve solutions. This is an opportunity to teach problem solving skills to youth and families.
- Belief that incarceration is not the answer!



Summit and Franklin are newer to the Deep End, but have already made impressive gains.

Summit

- One of the lowest placement rates of all Deep End sites nationally
- From 2014 to 2016, sharpened focus of probation by reducing the number of misdemeanors disposed to probation by 55%
- Nearly eliminated placements due to technical violations (86% drop)

Franklin


- 49% reduction in the number of placements due to VOPs – from 275 in 2014 to 139 in 2016

Probation should focus on the right youth and interact with them, their families and communities in a developmentally appropriate way

	Traditional Probation in the US	Effective Probation
Population	<p>Default disposition: “Gotta do something”</p> <p>Used to “get the attention” of low risk youth</p> <p>Last chance for high risk youth</p>	<p>No low-risk youth on probation</p> <p>No low-level offenses</p> <p>Small caseloads</p>
Role of JPO	<p>PO as monitor, focused on compliance & surveillance</p> <p>Long lists of conditions/rules</p> <p>One-size-fits-all programs</p> <p>Sanctions/incarceration for non-compliance</p>	<p>PO as coach, focused on progress & growth</p> <p>Relationship-based intervention</p> <p>Individualized case plans</p> <p>Probation violations ≠ probation failure</p> <p>Incentives to motivate real change</p> <p>No court-ordered conditions</p>
Families & Community	<p>Minimally engaged by the system</p> <p>Viewed as part of the problem</p> <p>Viewed as having minimal assets</p>	<p>Partners in changing youth behavior</p> <p>Viewed as part of the solution</p> <p>Treated as experts</p> <p>Partners in providing opportunities for youth</p>
Racial/Ethnic Equity	<p>Focused on not making the problem worse</p> <p>“Rising tide raises all boats”</p> <p>Cultural competence</p> <p>Implicit bias shapes view of adolescence</p>	<p>Seeks to reverse systemic inequities</p> <p>Targeted strategies for youth of color</p> <p>Culturally responsive services</p> <p>Young people are seen as adolescents</p>


Relative to population, placement rates for African American v. white youth range from about 3 to 1 in Summit County (OH), to 55 to 1 in Hennepin County (MN).

**PLACEMENTS PER 10,000 JUVENILE POPULATION (2016) –
WHITE V. AFRICAN AMERICAN YOUTH**



Placement disparities don't arise out of the blue – they are heavily influenced by earlier decision points.


**% YOUTH OF COLOR ACROSS
DECISION POINTS - OHIO**



- Most jurisdictions see a big jump in racial disproportionality between population & the front door to the system (shown here as bookings).
- Decision-point analysis and relative rate indexes are tools that can be used to help identify places where disparities are getting worse.
- But if equity work stops there, we risk sending the message that decision-makers need only be concerned with not making things worse.


Deep End sites aim for equity.

% YOUTH OF COLOR ACROSS
DECISION POINTS - OHIO



- In the Deep End, the goal is much more ambitious than “don’t make it worse”.
- **Decision-makers in Deep End sites are crafting policy, practice, and programs in a way that aims to counter pre-existing disparities.**
- That means, for example, that intake/diversion decisions should be **race conscious**, not race neutral.

Equity, Privilege, and Structural Racism



Questions?

- **JDAIConnect – www.jdaiconnect.org**
- **Deep End Tool Kit – www.aecf.org/deependtoolkit**
- **Deep End Resource Guide – www.aecf.org/deependresourceguide**

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A Justice Policy Institute Report
By Barry Holman and Jason Ziedenberg

The Dangers of Detention:

The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities

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A Justice Policy Institute Report
by Barry Holman and Jason Ziedenberg

The Dangers of Detention¹

Introduction: The Growing Impact of Youth Detention

Despite the lowest youth crime rates in 20 years, hundreds of thousands of young people are locked away every year in the nation's 591 secure detention centers. Detention centers are intended to temporarily house youth who pose a high risk of re-offending before their trial, or who are deemed likely to not appear for their trial. But the nation's use of detention is steadily rising, and facilities are packed with young people who do not meet those high-risk criteria—about 70 percent are detained for nonviolent offenses.²

"[F]airly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile gives rise to injuries comparable to those associated with the imprisonment of an adult."

—Justice Marshall for the minority in Schall v. Martin, 1984.

*"Detention: A form of locked custody of youth pre-trial who are arrested—juvenile detention centers are the juvenile justice system's version of "jail," in which most young people are being held before the court has judged them delinquent. Some youth in detention are there because they fail the conditions of their probation or parole, or they may be waiting in detention before their final disposition (i.e. sentence to a community program, or juvenile correctional facility)."*³

The increased and unnecessary use of secure detention exposes troubled young people to an environment that more closely resembles adult prisons and jails than the kinds of community and family-based interventions proven to be most effective. Detention centers, said a former Deputy Mayor of New York of that city's infamous Spofford facility, are "indistinguishable from a prison."⁴ Commenting on New York's detention centers, one Supreme Court Justice said that, "fairly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile gives rise to injuries comparable to those associated with the imprisonment of an adult."⁵

Detained youth, who are frequently pre-adjudication and awaiting their court date, or sometimes waiting for their placement in another facility or community-based program, can spend anywhere from a few days to a few months in locked custody. At best, detained youth are physically and emotionally separated from the families and communities who are the most invested in their recovery and success. Often, detained youth are housed in overcrowded, understaffed facilities—an environment that conspires to breed neglect and violence.

A recent literature review¹ of youth corrections shows that detention has a profoundly negative impact on young people's mental and physical well-being, their education, and their employment. One psychologist found that for one-third of incarcerated youth diagnosed with depression, the onset of the depression occurred after they began their incarceration,⁶ and another suggests that poor mental health, and the conditions of confinement together conspire to make it more likely that incarcerated teens will engage in suicide and self-harm.⁷ Economists have shown that the process of incarcerating youth will reduce their future earnings and their ability to remain in the workforce, and could change formerly detained youth into less stable employees. Educational researchers have found that upwards of 40 percent of incarcerated youth have a learning disability, and they will face significant challenges returning to school after they leave detention. Most importantly, for a variety of reasons to be explored, there is credible and significant research that suggests that the experience of detention may make it more likely that

youth will continue to engage in delinquent behavior, and that the detention experience may increase the odds that youth will recidivate, further compromising public safety.

Each year it is estimated that approximately 500,000 youth are brought to juvenile detention centers. On any given day more than 26,000 youth are detained.⁸

Detention centers do serve a role by temporarily supervising the most at-risk youth. However, with 70 percent being held for nonviolent offenses, it is not clear whether the mass detention of youth is necessary—or being borne equally. While youth of color represent about a third of the youth population, the latest figures show that they represent 61 percent of detained youth.⁹ Youth of color are disproportionately detained at higher rates than whites, even when they engage in delinquent behavior at similar rates as white youth.

This policy brief looks at the consequences of detention on young people, their families, and communities. This policy brief shows that, given the new findings that detaining youth may not make communities safer, the costs of needlessly detaining young people who do not need to be there are simply too high. Policymakers, instead, should look to detention reform as a means to reduce the number of young people needlessly detained, and reinvest the savings in juvenile interventions proven to reduce recidivism and crime, and that can help build healthy and safe communities.

⁸This policy brief brings together the best existing literature on the efficacy and impact of detention, and also examines the reported outcomes of incarcerating juveniles in secure, congregate detention facilities in order to provide practitioners and policymakers with a deeper understanding of “the dangers” of overusing detention. Some of the findings reported here are the result of research conducted on youth and young adults in facilities or programs outside of juvenile detention facilities. The implications and conclusion drawn from research outside of detention centers proper is worthy of consideration: detention is usually the first form of congregate institutional confinement that youth falling under the authority of juvenile justice agencies will experience, and like residential or adult correctional or pretrial institutions, it is reasonable to infer that the impact of other kinds of incarceration and secure, congregate facilities do apply to the detention experiences. Every attempt has been made to accurately portray the population that the cited authors were studying, and the environment in which the study was conducted—generally, we referred to “detention” when the youth were detained, and “incarceration” when they were somewhere else.


The Impact of Detention on Crime, Rehabilitation, and Public Safety

Detention can increase recidivism

Instead of reducing crime, the act of incarcerating high numbers of youth may in fact facilitate increased crime by aggravating the recidivism of youth who are detained.

A recent evaluation of secure detention in Wisconsin, conducted by the state's Joint Legislative Audit Committee reported that, in the four counties studied, 70 percent of youth held in secure detention were arrested or returned to secure detention within one year of release.¹⁰ The researchers found that *"placement in secure detention may deter a small proportion of juveniles from future criminal activity, although they do not deter most juveniles."*

Prior Incarceration was a Greater Predictor of Recidivism than Carrying a Weapon, Gang Membership, or Poor Parental Relationship



Source: Benda, B.B. and Tollet, C.L. (1999), "A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders Among Adolescents." Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 27, No. 2 111-126.

Studies on Arkansas' incarcerated youth¹¹ found not only a high recidivism rate for incarcerated young people, but that the experience of incarceration is the most significant factor in increasing the odds of recidivism. Sixty percent of the youth studied were returned to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) within three years. The most significant predictor of recidivism was prior commitment; the odds of returning to DHS increased 13.5 times for youth with a prior commitment. Among the youth incarcerated in Arkansas, two-thirds were confined for nonviolent offenses. Similarly, the crimes that landed the serious offenders under the supervision of adult corrections were overwhelmingly nonviolent—less than 20 percent were crimes against persons.

Congregating delinquent youth together negatively affects their behavior and increases their chance of re-offending

Behavioral scientists are finding that bringing youth together for treatment or services may make it more likely that they will become engaged in delinquent behavior. Nowhere are deviant youth brought together in greater numbers and density than in detention centers, training schools, and other confined congregate “care” institutions.


Researchers at the Oregon Social Learning Center found that congregating youth together for treatment in a group setting causes them to have a higher recidivism rate and poorer outcomes than youth who are not grouped together for treatment. The researchers call this process “peer deviancy training,” and reported statistically significant higher levels of substance abuse, school difficulties, delinquency, violence, and adjustment difficulties in adulthood for those youth treated in a peer group setting. The researchers found that “unintended consequences of grouping children at-risk for externalizing disorders may include negative changes in attitudes toward antisocial behavior, affiliation with antisocial peers, and identification with deviancy.”¹²

Detention pulls youth deeper into the juvenile and criminal justice system

“Locking up kids is the easiest way. But once they get in the juvenile justice system, it’s very hard to get them out.”

—San Jose Police Chief
Bill Landsdowne¹³

Similar to the comment by the San Jose police chief, studies have shown that once young people are detained, even when controlling for their prior offenses, they are more likely than non-detained youth to end up going “deeper” into the system; these studies show that detained youth are more likely to be referred to court, see their case progress through the system to adjudication and disposition, have a formal disposition filed against them, and receive a more serious disposition.




Source: Frazier, C.E. and Cochran, J.K. (1986) Detention of Juveniles: Its Effects on Subsequent Juvenile Court Processing and Decisions. *Youth and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 1986, p. 286-305 (N=9,317; p=.05)

A study done in Florida in the late 1980s found that, when controlling for other key variables such as age, race, gender, and offense severity, detained youth faced a greater probability of having a petition filed at intake (6.2 percent), a greater probability for having a petition filed by the State Attorney (9 percent), and a greater probability of receiving formal judicial interventions (8.5 percent) than youth not detained. Another study in Florida by the Office of State Court Administrators found that when controlling for other factors—including severity of offense—youth who are detained are *three times more* likely to end up being committed to a juvenile facility than similar youth who are not detained.¹⁴

Alternatives to detention can curb crime and recidivism better than detention

Several studies have shown that youth who are incarcerated are more likely to recidivate than youth who are supervised in a community-based setting, or not detained at all. Young people in San Francisco’s Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, for example, have about *half the recidivism rate* of young people who remained in detention or in the juvenile justice system.¹⁵

Various Measures of Recidivism between Detention and Diversion



Source: Sheldon, R.G. (1999), "Detention Diversion Advocacy: An Evaluation." Juvenile Justice Bulletin Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (DDAP n=271; Comparison n=271)


Research from Florida shows that when controlling for other factors, youth who are detained are three times more likely to end up being committed to a juvenile facility than similar youth who are not detained.

Research from Texas suggests that young people in community-based placements are 14 percent less likely to commit future crimes than youth that have been incarcerated.¹⁶

Detention can slow or interrupt the natural process of “aging out of delinquency”

Many young people in fact engage in “delinquent” behavior, but despite high incarceration rates, not all youth are detained for delinquency. Dr. Delbert Elliott, former President of the American Society of Criminology and head of the Center for the Study of the Prevention of Violence has shown that as many as a third of young people will engage in delinquent behavior¹⁷ before they grow up but will naturally “age out” of the delinquent behavior of their younger years. While this rate of delinquency among young males may seem high, the rate at which they end their criminal behavior, (called the “desistance rate”) is equally high.¹⁸ Most youth will desist from delinquency on their own. For those who have more trouble, Elliott has shown that establishing a relationship with a significant other (a partner or mentor) as well as employment correlates with youthful offenders of all races “aging out” of delinquent behavior as they reach young adulthood.

Most Young People Age Out of Crime on Their Own



Source: FBI Crime in the United States (1993).

There is little observed relationship between the increased use of detention, and crime.

Whether a youth is detained or not for minor delinquency has lasting ramifications for that youth's future behavior and opportunities. Carnegie Mellon researchers have shown that incarcerating juveniles may actually interrupt and delay the normal pattern of "aging out" since detention disrupts their natural engagement with families, school, and work.¹⁹


There is little relationship between detention and overall crime in the community

While there may be an individual need to incarcerate some high-risk youth, the mass detention of a half-million youth each year is not necessarily reducing crime.

During the first part of the 1990s, as juvenile arrests rose, the use of detention rose far faster (See table, "Different Directions"). By the middle of the 1990s, as juvenile arrests began to plummet (and the number of youth aged 10-17 leveled off), the use of detention continued to rise. *In other words, while there may be some youth who need to be detained to protect themselves, or the public, there is little observed relationship between the increased use of detention, and crime.*

Different Directions: Detention Populations vs. Arrest Rates for U.S. Juveniles in the 1990s

DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS: Detention Populations vs. Arrest Rates for U.S. Juveniles in the 1990's



Researchers believe that the combination of mental health disorders youth bring into detention coupled with the negative effects of institutionalization places incarcerated youth at a higher risk of suicide than other youth.²¹

To the contrary, several communities ranging from the Western United States (Santa Cruz, California and Portland, Oregon) to one of the nation's biggest urban centers (Chicago, Illinois) have found ways to both reduce detention and reduce crime, better serving the interests of youth development and public safety. Between 1996 and 2002, violent juvenile arrests in the country fell by 37 percent; Santa Cruz matched that decline (38 percent), and Portland and Chicago exceeded it (45 percent and 54 percent, respectively).²⁰ And during roughly the same time, juvenile detention populations fell between 27 and 65 percent in those jurisdictions.

The Impact of Detention on Young People's Mental Health, and Propensity to Self-Harm.

Of all the various health needs that detention administrators identify among the youth they see, unmet mental and behavioral health needs rise to the top. While researchers estimate that upwards of two-thirds of young people in detention centers could meet the criteria for having a mental disorder, a little more than a third need ongoing clinical care—a figure twice the rate of the general adolescent population.²²

Why is the prevalence of mental illness among detained youth so high? First, detention has become a new "dumping ground" for young people with mental health issues. One Harvard academic theorizes that the trauma associated with the rising violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s in some urban centers had a deep and sustained impact on young people. At the same time, new laws were enacted that reduced judicial discretion to decide if youth would be detained, decreasing the system's ability to screen out and divert youth with disorders. All the while, public community youth mental health systems deteriorated during this decade, leaving detention as the "dumping ground" for mentally ill youth.

Detention makes mentally ill youth worse

Another reason for the rise in the prevalence of mental illness in detention is that the kind of environment generated in the nation's detention centers, and the conditions of that confinement, conspire to create an unhealthy environment. Researchers have found that at least a third of detention centers are overcrowded,²³ breeding an environment of violence and chaos for young people. Far from receiving effective treatment, young people with behavioral health problems simply get worse in detention, not better. Research published in *Psychiatry Resources* showed that for one-third of incarcerated youth diagnosed with depression, the onset of the depression occurred after they began their incarceration.²⁴ *"The transition into incarceration itself,"* wrote one researcher in the medical journal, *Pediatrics*, *"may be responsible for some of the observed [increased mental illness in detention] effect."*²⁵

An analysis published in the *Journal of Juvenile Justice and Detention Services* suggests that poor mental health and the conditions of detention conspire together to generate higher rates of depression and suicide idealization:²⁶ 24 percent of detained Oregon youth were found to have had suicidal ideations over a seven-day period, with 34 percent of the youth suffering from *"a current significant clinical level of depression."*

An indicator of the shift was spelled out by a 2004 Special Investigations Division Report of the U.S. House of Representatives, which found that two-thirds of juvenile detention facilities were holding youth who were waiting for community mental health treatment, and that on any given night, *7 percent of all the youth held in detention were waiting for community mental health services.* As one detention administrator told Congress, *"we are receiving juveniles that 5 years ago would have been in an inpatient mental health facility. . . [W]e have had a number of juveniles who should no more be in our institution than I should be able to fly."*²⁷

A Washington state detention administrator interviewed by the U.S. House of Representatives said, "We are receiving juveniles that five years ago would have been in an inpatient mental health facility. . . . [W]e have had a number of juveniles who should no more be in our institution than I should be able to fly."

Detention puts youth at greater risk of self-harm


While some researchers have found that the rate of suicide in juvenile institutions is about the same as the community at large,²⁸ others have found that incarcerated youth experience from *double to four times* the suicide rate of youth in community.²⁹ The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reports that 11,000 youth engage in more than 17,000 acts of suicidal behavior in the juvenile justice system annually.³⁰ Another monograph published by OJJDP found that juvenile correctional facilities often incorporate responses to suicidal threats and behavior in ways that endanger the youth further, such as placing the youth in isolation.³¹

The Impact of Detention on the Education of Detained Youth

Detained youth with special needs fail to return to school

Juvenile detention interrupts young people's education, and once incarcerated, some youth have a hard time returning to school. A Department of Education study showed that 43 percent of incarcerated youth receiving remedial education services in detention did not return to school after release, and another 16 percent enrolled in school but dropped out after only five months.³² Another researcher found that most incarcerated 9th graders return to school after incarceration but within a year of re-enrolling two-thirds to three-fourths withdraw or drop out of school: After four years, less than 15 percent of these incarcerated 9th graders had completed their secondary education.³³

Detention May Affect Youth's Ability to Re-enroll in School



Source: LeBlanc, (1991), "Unlocking Learning" in Correctional Facilities. Washington, D.C. Department of Education.

In one study, 43 percent of incarcerated youth receiving remedial education services did not return to school after release. Another 16 percent enrolled in school but dropped out after only 5 months.

Young people who leave detention and who do not reattach to schools face collateral risks: High school dropouts face higher unemployment, poorer health (and a shorter life), and earn substantially less than youth who do successfully return and complete school.³⁴ The failure of detained youth to return to school also affects public safety. The U.S. Department of Education reports that dropouts are 3.5 times more likely than high school graduates to be arrested.³⁵ The National Longitudinal Transition Study reveals that approximately 20 percent of all adolescents with disabilities had been arrested after being out of school for two years.³⁶

The Impact of Detention on Employment


Formerly detained youth have reduced success in the labor market

If detention disrupts educational attainment, it logically follows that detention will also impact the employment opportunities for youth as they spiral down a different direction from their

non-detained peers. A growing number of studies show that incarcerating young people has significant immediate and long-term negative employment and economic outcomes.

A study done by academics with the *National Bureau of Economic Research* found that jailing youth (age 16-25) reduced work time over the next decade by 25-30 percent.³⁷ Looking at youth age 14 to 24, Princeton University researchers found that youth who spent some time incarcerated in a youth facility experienced three weeks less work a year (for African-American youth, five weeks less work a year) as compared to youth who had no history of incarceration.³⁸

Annual Estimated Loss of Work Weeks Due to Youth Incarceration



Source: Western, Bruce and Beckett, Katherine (1999), "How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?: The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 104: 1030-1060.

"Having been in jail is the single most important deterrent to employment...the effect of incarceration on employment years later [is] substantial and significant," according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Due to the disruptions in their education, and the natural life processes that allow young people to "age-out" of crime, one researcher posits, *"the process of incarceration could actually change an individual into a less stable employee."*³⁹

A monograph published by the *National Bureau of Economic Research* has shown that incarcerating large numbers of young people seems to have a negative effect on the economic well-being of their communities. Places that rely most heavily on incarceration reduce the employment opportunities in their communities compared to places that deal with crime by means other than incarceration. *"Areas with the most rapidly rising rates of incarceration are areas in which youths, particularly African-American youths, have had the worst earnings and employment experience."*⁴⁰

The loss of potentially stable employees and workers—and of course, county, state, and federal taxpayers—is one of numerous invisible costs that the overuse of detention imposes on the country and on individual communities.

The Larger Economic Impact of Detention on Communities

Detention is expensive— more expensive than alternatives to detention

The fiscal costs of incarcerating youth are a cause for concern in these budget-strained times. According to Earl Dunlap, head of the National Juvenile Detention Association, the annual average cost per year of a detention bed—depending on geography and cost of living—could range from \$32,000 (\$87 per day) to as high as \$65,000 a year (\$178 per day), with some big cities paying far more. Dunlap says that the cost of building, financing, and operating a single detention bed costs the public between \$1.25 and \$1.5 million over a twenty-year period of time.⁴¹

“It is quite reasonable to suggest that a single detention bed costs the public between \$1.25 and \$1.5 million over a twenty-year period of time.”

—Earl Dunlap, CEO, National Juvenile Detention Association

By contrast, a number of communities that have invested in alternatives to detention have documented the fiscal savings they achieve on a daily basis, in contrast to what they would spend per day on detaining a youth. In New York City (2001), one day in detention (\$385) costs 15 times what it does to send a youth to a detention alternative (\$25).⁴² In Tarrant County, Texas (2004), it costs a community 3.5 times as much to detain a youth per day (\$121) versus a detention alternative (\$35), and even less for electronic monitoring (\$3.75).⁴³


Detention is not cost effective

Whether compared to alternatives in the here and now, or put to rigorous economic efficiency models that account for the long-term costs of crime and incarceration overtime, juvenile detention is not a cost-effective way of promoting public safety, or meeting detained young people’s needs.

The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), a non-partisan research institution that—at legislative direction—studies issues of importance to Washington State, was directed to study the cost effectiveness of the state’s juvenile justice system. WSIPP found that there had been a 43 percent increase in juvenile justice spending during the 1990s, and that the main factor driving those expenditures was the confinement of juvenile offenders. While this increase in spending and juvenile incarceration was associated with a decrease in juvenile crime, WSIPP found, *“the effect of detention on lower crime rates has decreased in recent years as the system expanded. The lesson: confinement works, but it is an expensive way to lower crime rates.”*⁴⁴ The legislature directed them to take the next step, and answer the question, *“Are there less expensive ways to reduce juvenile crime?”*

WSIPP found that, for every dollar spent on county juvenile detention systems, \$1.98 of “benefits” in terms of reduced crime and costs of crime to taxpayers was achieved. By sharp contrast, diversion and mentoring programs produced \$3.36 of benefits for every dollar spent, aggression replacement training produced \$10 of benefits for every dollar spent, and multi-systemic therapy produced \$13 of benefits for every dollar spent. Any inefficiencies in a juvenile justice system that concentrates juvenile justice spending on detention or confinement drains available funds away from interventions that may be more effective at reducing recidivism and promoting public safety.

Cost Effectiveness of Interventions per Dollar Spent



Source: Aos, S. (2002), *The Juvenile Justice System in Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness*. Olympia, Washington: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

Given the finding by the Journal of Qualitative Criminology that the cost of a youth offender’s crimes and incarceration over their lifetime (including adult) can cost as much as \$1.7 million,⁴⁵ a front-end investment in interventions proven to help young people would seem to be more effective public safety spending.

“The effect of detention on lower crime rates has decreased in recent years as the system expanded... it is an expensive way to lower crime rates.”

—Washington State
Institute for Public
Policy

By the end of the 1990s, the system became more punitive, and every state in the nation had changed their laws in some way to make it easier to incarcerate youth in the adult system. An adult charge often means a young person must be held pre-trial in either a detention center or an adult jail.

The rise of youth detention: policy or politics?

With falling youth crime rates, and a growing body of research that shows that alternatives are less expensive and more effective than detention, why do we continue to spend valuable resources building more locked facilities to detain low-risk youth?

Similar to the fate of the adult criminal justice system, the traditional mission of the juvenile justice system has been altered by the politicization of crime policy in this country.

At the turn of the century, when reformers developed the nation’s first juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois, they set up a separate system for youth to meet the needs of adolescents, acknowledging that youth have different levels of culpability and capacity than adults. They also believed that youth deserved a second chance at rehabilitation. Within 30 years, every state in the nation had a juvenile court system based on the premise that young people were developmentally different than adults.


But the “tough-on-crime” concerns of the 1990s changed the priorities and orientation of the juvenile justice system. Rising warnings of youth “superpredators,” “school shootings,” and the amplification of serious episodes of juvenile crime in the biggest cities fueled political momentum to make the system “tougher” on kids. By the end of the 1990s, every state in the nation had changed their laws in some way to make it easier to incarcerate youth in the adult system. As many states made their juvenile justice systems more punitive, the courts made more zealous use of detention.

The rise of youth detention borne by youth of color

The rapid expansion of the use of juvenile detention has hit some communities harder than others. From 1985 to 1995, the number of youth held in secure detention nationwide increased by 72 percent. But during this time, the proportion of white youth in detention actually dropped, while youth of color came to represent a majority of the young people detained. The detained white youth population increased by 21 percent, while the detained minority youth population grew by 76 percent. By 1997, in 30 out of 50 states (which contain 83 percent of the U.S. population) minority youth represented the majority of youth in detention.⁴⁶ Even in states with tiny ethnic and racial minority populations, (like Minnesota, where the general population is 90 percent white, and Pennsylvania, where the general population is 85 percent white) more than half of the detention population are youth of color. In 1997, OJJDP found that in every state in the country (with the exception of Vermont), the minority population of detained youth exceeded their proportion in the general population.⁴⁷

The latest figures show that the shift in the demographics of detention that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s continues today: In 2003 African-American youth were detained at a rate 4.5 higher than whites; and Latino youth were detained at twice the rate of whites. Minority youth represented 61 percent of all youth detained in 2003.⁴⁸

Disproportionate Minority Confinement
Racial and ethnic proportions of the juvenile detention population





Source: Sickmund, Melissa, Sladky, T.J., and Kang, Wei (2004), "Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook," <http://www.ojdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp/>.

The greatest levels of racial disparity in the use of detention are found in the least serious offense categories. For example, surveys from the late 1990s found that whites used and sold drugs at rates similar to other races and ethnicities, but that African Americans were detained for drug offenses at more than twice rate of whites.⁴⁹ White youth self-reported using heroin and cocaine at 6 times the rate of African-American youth, but African-American youth are almost three times as likely to be arrested for a drug crime.⁵⁰ On any given day, African Americans comprise nearly half of all youth in the United States detained for a drug offense.⁵¹

WHITE YOUTH REPORT USING DRUGS AT 6 TO 7 TIMES THE RATE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS, BUT AFRICAN AMERICAN YOUTH ARE ARRESTED AT HIGHER RATES THAN WHITES FOR DRUG CRIMES

While white youth and minority youth commit several categories of crime at the same rate, minority youth are more likely to be arrested.



Sources for both graphs: Yamagata, Eileen Poe and Michael A. Jones. *And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Minority Youth in the Justice System*. Washington, DC: Building Blocks for Youth, April 2000; *U.S. Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1980–1999*. Population Estimates Program, Population Divisions, U.S. Census Bureau, 2000; *Monitoring the Future Report, 1975–1999*, Volume I. Washington, DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2000.

The causes of the disproportionate detention of youth of color are rooted in some of the nation's deepest social problems, many of which may play out in key decision-making points in the juvenile justice system.

While white youth and minority youth commit several categories of crime at the same rate, minority youth are more likely to be arrested. Once arrested, white youth tend to have access to better legal representation and programs and services than minority youth.

People involved in the decision to detain a youth may bring stereotypes to their decision. One study shows that people charged with the decision of holding youth prior to adjudication are more likely to say a white youth's crimes are a product of their environment (i.e. a broken home), while an African-American youth's delinquency is caused by personal failings—even when youth of different races are arrested for similar offenses and have similar offense histories.⁵²

The way to reduce the impact of detention is to reduce the number of youth needlessly or inappropriately detained.

A Better Way: Juvenile Detention Reforms Taking Hold Across the Nation

The way to reduce the impact of detention on young people is to reduce the number of youth needlessly or inappropriately detained. The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is a response to the inappropriate and unnecessary detention of youth in the nation's juvenile justice systems. JDAI is a public-private partnership being implemented nationwide; pioneering jurisdictions include Santa Cruz County, California; Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon; Bernalillo County (Albuquerque), New Mexico; and Cook County (Chicago), Illinois.

JDAI is a process, not a conventional program, whose goal is to make sure that locked detention is used only when necessary. In pursuing that goal, JDAI restructures the surrounding systems to create improvements that reach far beyond detention alone.

To achieve reductions in detention populations, the JDAI model developed a series of core strategies, which include:

- **Inter-governmental collaboration:** bringing together the key actors in the juvenile justice system—especially courts, probation, and the police—as well as actors outside the justice system such as schools and mental health.
- **Reliance on data:** beginning with data collection and leading to continuous analysis of data as well as the cultural expectation that decisions will be based on information and results.
- **Objective admissions screening:** developing risk assessment instruments and changing procedures so they are always used to guide detention decisions.
- **Alternatives to secure confinement:** creating programs and services in the community to ensure appearance and good behavior pending disposition, and to be available as an option at sentencing.
- **Expedited case processing:** to move cases along so youth don't languish in detention for unnecessarily long time periods.
- **Improved handling of "special cases":** Youth who are detained for technical probation violations, outstanding warrants, and youth pending services or placement create special management problems and need special approaches.
- **Express strategies to reduce racial disparities:** "good government" reforms alone do not eliminate disparities; specific attention is needed to achieve this goal.
- **Improving conditions of confinement:** to ensure that the smaller number of youth who still require secure detention are treated safely, legally, and humanely.

The fundamental measure of JDAI's success is straightforward: a reduction in the number of youth confined on any day and admitted to detention over the course of a year, and a reduction in the number of young people exposed to the dangers inherent in a detention stay.

Detention Reform Decreases Detention Populations: Admissions Impact of JDAI on Select Sites.				
County	Average Daily Population		Annual Admissions	
	Pre-JDAI	2003	Pre-JDAI	2003
Cook	623	454 (-27.1%)	7,438	6,396(-14.0%)
Multnomah	96	33 (-65.6%)	2,915	348 (-88.1%)
Santa Cruz	47	27 (-42.6%)	1,591	972 (-38.9%)

Source: Cook County, Multnomah, and Santa Cruz Probation Departments.

Decreasing the use of detention has not jeopardized public safety. In the counties implementing JDAI, juvenile crime rates fell as much as, or more than, national decreases in juvenile crime. These communities have also experienced an improvement in the number of young people who appear in court after they have been released from detention, further reducing the need for detention.

Detention Reform Coincides with Crime Declines, and Failure to Appear Rates Fall.			
County	Violent Juvenile Arrest Rate (1996-2002)	Failure to Appear	
		Pre-JDAI	2003
Cook	-54%	39%	13%(-66.7%)
Multnomah	-45%	7%	7%
Santa Cruz	-38%	N/A	3%
United States Average	-37%		

Source: Uniform Crime Report, Crime in the United States Survey (1996; 2002); Cook County, Multnomah and Santa Cruz Probation Departments

Like the impact of detention—which can extend beyond the walls of the locked facility—reducing detention populations influences the entire juvenile justice system. In Cook County, the number of youth sent from local detention to state prison beds declined from 902 in 1997 to 498 in 2003, at average annual savings of \$23,000 per bed.⁵³ In addition, more kids who rotated through the juvenile justice system re-enrolled in school and obtained scholarships for college.

Cities and counties engaged in detention reform also note their progress by their acceptance in the community. Cook County engaged system kids and their parents for advice about how to improve the system, and persevered (and supported the staff) through some daunting complaints. In the aftermath, the probation department adjusted its office hours and locations, changed the way it communicated with clients and their families, and institutionalized feedback mechanisms. Now community members are genuinely engaged in decisions including policy formulation, program development, and even hiring. It is not a formal measure, but it leads to improved services and priceless levels of respect and engagement in the community.

A better future: invest juvenile justice funds in programs proven to work

If detention reform is successful, communities should be able to reinvest the funds once spent on detention beds and new detention centers in other youth-serving systems, or other interventions proven to reduce recidivism.

The Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, and a plethora of other research institutes have shown that several programs and initiatives are proven to reduce recidivism and crime in a cost-effective matter. Some common elements in proven programs include:

- Treatment occurs with their family, or in a family-like setting
- Treatment occurs at home, or close to home
- Services are delivered in a culturally respectful and competent manner
- Treatment is built around the youth and family strengths
- A wide range of services and resources are delivered to the youth, as well as their families.

Most of these successful programs are designed to serve the needs of youth in family-like settings, situated as close to home as possible with services delivered in a culturally sensitive and competent manner.

These proven programs identify the various aspects of a youth—their strengths and weaknesses as well as the strengths and resources of their families and communities. Progress is based on realistic outcomes and carefully matches the particular needs of the youth and family to the appropriate intervention strategy.

For online information and assistance on detention reform, visit: www.jdaihelpdesk.org

To learn more about the work and research of the Justice Policy Institute, visit: www.justicepolicy.org.

In the counties implementing JDAI, juvenile crime rates fell as much as, or more than the national decreases in juvenile crime.

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- ¹ Adapted from the publication by Holman, Barry and Ziedenberg, Jason, *The Dangers of Detention: The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Congregate Facilities* (forthcoming). Baltimore, Maryland: Annie E. Casey Foundation.
- ² Sickmund, M., Sladky, T.J., and Kang, W. (2004), "Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook." Online. Available: <http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp/>
- ³ Schiraldi, V. and Ziedenberg, J. (2003), "The Multnomah Experiment: Reducing Disproportionate Minority Confinement." Washington, D.C.: The Justice Policy Institute.
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- ⁵ *Ellen Schall, Commission of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice v. Gregory Martin et al. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York.* No. 82-1248, 82-1278. (Decided, June 4, 1984).
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- ⁷ Mace, D., Rohde, P., and Gnau, V. (1997), "Psychological Patterns of Depression and Suicidal Behavior of Adolescents in a Juvenile Detention Facility." *Journal of Juvenile Justice and Detention Services* Vol. 12 No. 1 18-23.
- ⁸ Sickmund, M., Sladky, T.J., and Kang, W. (2004), "Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook" <http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp/>. In regards to the estimate of the number of youth moving through detention each year, the most recent data available from surveys administered by the National Council on Juvenile Justice (NCJJ) estimate that 350,000 youth were detained in 1999 (OJJDP, 2001b). This figure, however, does not include youth detained while they are awaiting a court-ordered out-of-home placement. Further, according to Dr. Barry Krisberg, "The NCJJ data covers court hearings for detention—many youths come into detention via law enforcement agencies, schools, parents, social service agencies etc, and are released before a court hearing is held—this might also include probation and parole violators in some jurisdictions." Personal correspondence (2003).
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- ¹⁰ Bezruki, D., Varana, D. and Hill, C. (1999), *An Evaluation of Secure Juvenile Detention*. Madison WI: Legislative Audit Bureau.
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- ¹³ Hubner, J. and Wolfson, J. *Unlocking the Future: Detention Reform in the Juvenile Justice System*. Washington, DC: Coalition for Juvenile Justice.
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- ¹⁶ Fendrich, M. and Archer, M. (1998), "Long-Term Re-arrest Rates in a Sample of Adjudicated Delinquents: Evaluating the Impact of Alternative Programs," *The Prison Journal* Vol. 78 No. 4 360-389. In a 12-year study that compared the outcomes of 266 juvenile defenders in Texas placed in correctional centers and alternatives to detention centers, Fendrich and Archer found that the recidivism rate of youth in alternatives was 65percent, whereas the recidivism rate of those placed in correctional facilities was 71percent.
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- ²² Grisso, Thomas (2004), *Double Jeopardy: Adolescent Offenders with Mental Disorders*. University of Chicago Press.
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- ²⁷ Committee on Government Reform, Special Investigations Division, Minority Staff (2004) *Incarceration of Youth who are waiting for Community Mental Health Services in the United States*, Prepared for Sen. Susan Collins, and Rep. Henry A. Waxman. Available at www.house.gov/reform/min/; Committee on Government Reform, Special Investigations Division, Minority Staff (2002) *Incarceration of Youth with Mental Health Disorders in New Mexico*, Prepared for Sen. Jeff Bingaman, Rep. Tom Udall, and Rep. Henry A. Waxman. Available at www.house.gov/reform/min/.
- ²⁸ There is a debate within the juvenile justice research community surrounding the true suicide rate in juvenile institutions, and how that compares to youth in the community at large. One researcher posits that the suicide rate is no higher in juvenile institutions than what is the rate in the community at large, while another has recently found that it is at least double what is about the same as the rate in the community at large. The reason for the difference reflects a debate among researchers as to how you calculate rates in a correctional population that "turns over"

frequently. Others question whether the number of suicides being accounted in more recent studies accurately reflects the true number of suicides in juvenile institutions (Hayes, Personal Communications; 2006). It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer which method yields a more accurate reflection of true youth risk of “successful” suicidal behavior—something resulting in a young person’s death, rather than the kind of self-harm behaviors young people engage in when in custody. As the researcher who finds no difference in “free-world” and juvenile custody suicide rates notes, “any suicide in custody is unacceptable. Its circumstances should be investigated and practice adjusted when possible.” Synder, Howard (2005), “Is Suicide More Common Inside Or Outside of Juvenile Facilities,” *Corrections Today*; Gallagher, Catherine A. and Dobrin, Adam. “The Comparative Risk of Suicide in Juvenile Facilities and the General Population: The Problem of Rate Calculations in High Turnover Institutions.” (forthcoming). *Criminal Justice and Behavior*.

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- ⁴³ Tarrant County Juvenile Services (2004).
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