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State of Ohio v. Jason Singleton, Case no. 2008-1255
8th District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Cincinnati City School District Board of Education
v. State Board of Education of Ohio
and Ohio Department of Education, Case no. 2008-1480
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Court Asked to Clarify Re-Sentencing Process in Cases Where Required Term of Post-Release Control Omitted
State of Ohio v. Jason Singleton, Case no. 2008-1255
8th District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: In cases where a trial court fails to include in its sentencing entry or to notify a criminal offender at the time of sentencing that he will be subject a mandatory term of post-release control, does R.C. 2929.191 allow the court to correct that error by simply adding the required term of post-release control to the offender’s original sentence, or must the court vacate the entire sentence imposed at trial and pronounce an entire new sentence on the offender?
BACKGROUND: This case asks the Court to determine whether, by enacting R.C. 2929.191, the General Assembly eliminated a requirement imposed by earlier Supreme Court decisions that a trial court that fails to include a mandatory term of post release control when it sentences a criminal defendant must vacate the original sentence in its entirety and must impose an entire new sentence on the defendant, including the required term of post-release control.
Jason Singleton of Cleveland entered guilty pleas to charges of felonious assault and rape. In sentencing him for those crimes, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas advised Singleton that after serving a 10-year prison sentence he “could” be subject to post-release control by the Adult Parole Authority for up to an additional five years. Singleton later filed an appeal attempting to withdraw his guilty pleas and obtain a new trial, arguing that before accepting his plea the court had failed to accurately notify him of the maximum sentence he could face because it failed to advise him that a five-year term of post-release control was required by law for any person convicted of rape. The 8th District Court of Appeals refused to allow Singleton to withdraw his plea, but found that his original sentence was void because the court had failed to state in its pronouncement or sentencing entry a clear requirement of five years of post-release control.
Citing the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 2007 decision in State v. Bezak, the 8th District vacated the entire sentence pronounced on Singleton and remanded the case with a directive that the trial court must conduct a complete new sentencing hearing.
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office has appealed the 8th District’s ruling to the Supreme Court. They argue that the court of appeals should have followed a new provision of law, R.C. 2929.191, that was adopted by the legislature after the Supreme Court’s Bezak decision was released. They note that the new provision specifies that a trial court can remedy a criminal sentence that is found defective based on the omission of mandatory post-release control by conducting a hearing at which the court “may prepare and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction” that includes a statement that the offender will be subject to the specific term of post-release control required by law for his offenses.
The state argues that R.C. 2929.191 supersedes the Bezak requirement that a defendant’s entire original sentence be vacated and a complete new sentence pronounced, and asks the Court to hold that the 8th District erred by failing to allow the trial court to follow the simplified “correction” process adopted by the legislature for cases of this type. They assert that by vacating Singleton’s original prison sentence, which was properly imposed, the 8th District’s ruling is contrary to another 2007 decision, State v. Evans, in which the Supreme Court held that appellate courts should not vacate a defendant’s entire sentence when an error in sentencing “pertains only to a sanction imposed for one specification” of which the defendant was convicted.
Attorneys for Singleton respond that, contrary to the state’s position, the language of R.C. 2929.191 does not require that a court resentencing an offender based on the omission of post-release control must simply “tack on” post-release control to its original sentence. To the contrary, they argue that in Bezak and several other recent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that a sentence from which a mandatory term of post-release control has been omitted is legally “void,” which means that the original sentence was invalid from the moment it was pronounced and thus is a nullity that must be replaced with a new, valid sentence and cannot be “corrected.”
They contend that this distinction has practical implications, because several of the state’s appellate districts initially held that adding post-release control to a sentence after the fact was unconstitutional, and before those rulings were overturned, some trial courts responded by imposing longer prison sentences than they would otherwise have imposed to compensate for the absence of post-release control. In light of that history, they assert, it would be unjust to mandate that a trial court resentencing a defendant to add post-release control must always and “automatically” reimpose the same term of imprisonment it imposed originally.
Contacts
T. Allan Regas, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office.
Stephen P. Hardwick, 614.466.5394, for Jason Singleton.
Is School District an ‘Organization’ Barred From Seeking Attorney Fees From State After Winning Court Judgment?
Cincinnati City School District Board of Education
v. State Board of Education of Ohio
and Ohio Department of Education, Case no. 2008-1480
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: Does a provision of state law that bars an “organization” with more than 500 employees from recovering its attorney fees after successfully suing the state apply to a local school district?
BACKGROUND: Ohio’s Equal Access to Justice Act, R.C. 2335.39, provides that under specified circumstances a party that successfully pursues a civil claim against the state may also recover its attorney fees incurred in that litigation. The statute enumerates several categories of litigants that are excluded from eligibility to recover attorney fees. Among those excluded are the owner of an unincorporated business or “a partnership, corporation, association or organization” that has a net worth exceeding $5 million or employs more than 500 people.
In this case, based on a change in the way it calculated the average daily number of students enrolled in the Cincinnati City School District, the State Board of Education reduced its allocation of state funds to the district for the 2005-2007 school years by approximately $7 million. The district and the department negotiated but were unable to resolve their disagreement, and the district ultimately filed suit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court issued a summary judgment in favor or the school district, and that judgment was affirmed by the 1st District Court of Appeals.
The school district subsequently sought to recover its attorney fees incurred in the litigation from the state under R.C. 2335.39. The state opposed that motion, arguing that the district was ineligible to recover attorney fees because it fell within the statutory exclusion for an “organization” that has more than 500 employees. The trial court agreed with the state’s argument and denied the district’s motion. The school district appealed. On review, the 1st District reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court of appeals held that a school district is a political subdivision rather than a profit-seeking corporation or “organization” as that term is used in R.C. 2335.39, and found that the statute does not preclude recovery of attorney fees from the state by a local government entity such as a school district. The state appealed, and the Supreme Court has agreed to review the 1st District’s decision.
The Ohio Board of Education, represented by the state attorney general’s office, contends that nothing in the language of R.C. 2335.39 requires that an “organization” barred from recovering attorney fees from the state be a private or for-profit entity, but merely that it be a large enterprise able to support its own legal expenses, as evidenced by a net worth of $5 million or a payroll of more than 500 employees. They argue that the legislature’s intent in enacting R.C. 2335.39 was to assure that individual citizens and small businesses would not be intimidated from opposing improper actions by the state based on the prohibitive costs of litigation, not to reimburse large and well-staffed entities, private or public, for the costs of pursuing court actions that advance their organizational interests.
Attorneys for the school district point out that the section of R.C. 2335.39 addressing “organizations” is found in a paragraph that refers only to private entities. They note that an earlier paragraph in the same section addresses governmental rather than for-profit entities, and that paragraph specifically precludes only “the state” from recovering attorney fees, without any reference to local political subdivisions such as a school district.
They contend that the legislature routinely makes statutory provisions applicable to “the state and its political subdivisions” when it intends for state and local agencies to be subject to the same powers or limitations. Therefore, they argue, the reference in R.C. 2335.39 only to “the state” without parallel mention of political subdivisions indicates legislative intent that entities such as local school boards not be precluded from recovering their legal expenses when improper conduct by the state forces them to sue in order to obtain moneys to which they are legally entitled.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for the State Board of Education and Ohio Dept. of Education.
Jennifer A. Flint, 614.227.2365, for the Cincinnati City School District Board of Education.
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