Law Allows Wildlife Officer to Enter Property to Check License, Bag Limits Without Cause to Suspect Violation
2008-0536. State v. Coburn, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-834.
Erie App. Nos. E-07-049, E-07-050, and E-07-051, 176 Ohio App.3d 600, 2008-Ohio-371. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
O'Donnell, J., concurs separately.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-834.pdf 
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(March 5, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that, under R.C. 1531.14, a state wildlife officer has authority to enter private land when acting in the normal, peaceful and lawful enforcement of game and fish laws or rules regardless of whether the officer has “good cause” to believe that a law has been violated at the time of entry.
Today’s decision, authored by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, affirmed a ruling of the 6th District Court of Appeals.
On Sept. 1, 2006, an Erie County wildlife officer observed William Coburn and two guests hunting for mourning doves in a rural field owned by Coburn. The officer entered Coburn’s field for the purpose of checking the hunting licenses of the guests and determining that the hunters had not exceeded their bag limit. After entering the property, the officer observed several piles of wheat seed and an additional amount of wheat seed scattered on the ground in the area where the men were hunting.
The officer cited all three hunters for violating a state law that prohibits the hunting of game birds “by the aid of baiting or on or over a baited field.” The defendants filed a motion asking the Erie County Common Pleas Court to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that the officer’s entry into Coburn’s field was illegal. The trial judge held that, under R.C. 1531.13, a wildlife officer is required to demonstrate “good cause” to believe a law has been violated before entering private property, and because the officer had not made such a showing in this case, the evidence he obtained by entering Coburn’s field was inadmissible.
The state appealed. On review, the 6th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and reinstated the charges against the hunters. The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to consider a different section of law, R.C. 1531.14, that gives wildlife officers authority to “enter and be upon private property” while they are engaged in the “normal, peaceful and lawful enforcement of laws or division rules relating to game or fish ... ” Because the officer’s normal enforcement duties included interacting with hunters he observes in order to check on their compliance with licensing and bag limit regulations, the 6th District held that his observance of the hunters in Coburn’s field was a legally sufficient basis for him to enter the property, where he observed the baited field that resulted in the charges against the defendants.
Attorneys for the defendants sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the 6th District’s decision.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Chief Justice Moyer observed that state wildlife officers are authorized to enter a private field by two different sections of state law that set forth different standards for lawful entry.
He wrote: “R.C. 1531.13 provides as follows: ‘Any regularly employed salaried wildlife officer may enter any private lands or waters if the wildlife officer has good cause to believe and does believe that a law is being violated’ The meaning of this provision is clear, unambiguous, and not disputed by the parties – when a wildlife officer has good cause to believe that a law is being violated, he or she may enter upon private lands to investigate the potential violation. Because there is no evidence in the record that the officer in this case had good cause to believe that appellants were violating the law at the beginning of the encounter, the officer did not have authority under R.C. 1531.13 to enter Coburn’s land.”
“However, R.C. 1531.14 gives wildlife officers an additional form of authority to enter private land: ‘Any person regularly employed by the division of wildlife ... in the enforcement of laws or division rules relating to game or fish, ... while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful pursuit of such investigation, work, or enforcement may enter upon, cross over, be upon, and remain upon privately owned lands for such purposes and shall not be subject to arrest for trespass while so engaged or for such cause thereafter.’ This provision is similarly clear and unambiguous; it plainly permits wildlife officers to enter upon private land while in the normal, lawful, and peaceful pursuit of enforcing game and fish laws.”
The Chief Justice noted that, “(i)n this case, the officer stated that he entered Coburn’s land to check appellants’ hunting licenses and to ensure that they were complying with the applicable bag limits pursuant to his statutory powers to do so. Under R.C. 1533.14, hunters must carry their hunting licenses and exhibit them to wildlife officers upon request ... Because the appellants were not within a building at the time of the encounter, the officer (also) had the authority to approach them to conduct a bag-limit inspection. As the foregoing demonstrates, the officer was acting in the normal, lawful, and peaceful pursuit of his law-enforcement powers when he approached the appellants. The officer therefore had the authority to enter Coburn’s land under the plain language of R.C. 1531.14.”
In rejecting Coburn’s argument that the two sections of law should be read together to permit officers to enter a private field for any purpose only when they have “good cause” to suspect a violation, Chief Justice Moyer wrote: “(T)here is absolutely nothing in the statutory scheme that suggests that a wildlife officer may only enforce routine laws, e.g., determining whether hunters are licensed (or properly exempted from license requirements) and complying with bag limits under R.C. 1531.13, when they have good cause to believe that such laws are being violated. Appellants’ reading would essentially eliminate the plain language of R.C. 1531.14, which we must avoid in construing statutes. ... Given the independent nature of these powers, we reject the appellants’ argument that wildlife officers may enter private land only if they have good cause to believe that a law has been violated.”
Chief Justice Moyer’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell entered a separate opinion in which he concurred with the majority’s holding, but wrote that in his view the separate authority conferred on wildlife officers by R.C. 1531.14 to enter private land for any routine enforcement purpose “appears to have rendered R.C. 1531.13 superfluous and nullified the legislative requirement that a wildlife officer have both good cause to believe and an actual belief that a law is being violated before entering private land. While I concur with the majority, I would urge the General Assembly to clarify its intent with respect to these statutes.”
Contacts
John R. Climaco, 216.621.8484, for William and Marvin Coburn and Todd Parkison.
Kevin J. Baxter, 419.627.7697, for the state and Erie County prosecutor’s office.