Different Time Limit for Refiling Wrongful Death Claims Does Not Violate Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights
2008-0366. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-1970.
Muskingum App. No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32. Judgment reversed.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-1970.pdf 
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(May 5, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a section of state law that sets a different time limit for refiling a previously dismissed wrongful death claim than for refiling other types of civil actions does not violate the right to equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitutition and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
The Court’s 6-1 majority decision, which reversed a ruling by the 5th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
On Nov. 26, 2003, Joshua Eppley, a student in the Tri-Valley Local School District, was killed in a traffic accident on his way home from school while riding as a passenger in a car driven by Corey Jenkins. Under Ohio law, the time limit for filing a wrongful death lawsuit is two years from the date of injury. In August 2005 Joshua’s father, Randy Eppley, filed a wrongful death complaint seeking damages from the school district for alleged negligence in allowing Joshua to leave the school premises as a passenger in Jenkins’ car without first obtaining his parents’ permission. Eppley voluntarily dismissed his original complaint on Sept. 15, 2005. He refiled it on Sept. 7, 2006.
After both sides submitted written briefs, Tri-Valley moved for a dismissal based on the pleadings. The school district argued that because Eppley’s suit asserted a wrongful death claim, it was subject to a specific provision of state law, R.C. 2125.04, requiring that when a wrongful death claim is voluntarily dismissed before the statutory deadline for filing such a claim has expired, the complaint must be refiled by the original deadline date. Applying R.C. 2125.04 to this case, they argued that because Eppley’s original complaint was dismissed before the two-year statute of limitations expired on Nov. 26, 2005, he was required to refile his claim no later than Nov. 26, 2005, even though he would have had until Sept. 15, 2006 to refile it under the state’s general “saving statute” for other types of civil actions. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Tri-Valley dismissing Eppley’s claim, but did not state a reason for the dismissal.
Eppley appealed. The 5th District Court of Appeals vacated the trial court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its opinion, the court of appeals held that, as applied in this case, the different refiling deadline set by R.C. 2125.04 violated Eppley’s constitutional right to equal protection of the law because no legitimate state interest is served by giving wrongful death claimants less time to refile their dismissed claims than is afforded to other civil litigants under the state’s general saving statute. Tri-Valley sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 5th District’s rulings.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice Lanzinger noted that before 2000 both Ohio’s general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), and R.C. 2125.04 contained a “malpractice trap” by requiring that claims dismissed before the original statute of limitations for filing such a complaint had expired must be refiled by the original deadline date, while claims dismissed after the statutory filing date had passed could be refiled within one year after the date of dismissal. She pointed out, however, that in 2004 the General Assembly amended the general saving statute by “permitting a plaintiff to refile within one year after dismissal or within the time remaining under the statute of limitations, whichever is longer. The General Assembly, however, did not similarly amend the saving statute pertaining to wrongful death actions.”
In this case, she wrote, “In making its determination that R.C. 2125.04, rather than R.C. 2305.19, applies, the court of appeals noted that the specific statute takes precedence over a general statute. ... Since the wrongful death saving statute is the specific statute, R.C. 2125.04 applies, and the complaint was untimely filed. The fatal accident occurred November 26, 2003, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on September 15, 2005. Under R.C. 2125.04, Eppley’s refiling deadline was not extended to September 15, 2006. Because the action was dismissed before the two-year statute of limitations ran, Eppley still had only two years from the date of the accident, until November 26, 2005, to bring suit. The question then is whether R.C. 2125.04 violates the right to equal protection.”
Because Eppley is not a member of a protected class of litigants and his wrongful death claim did not implicate a fundamental right, Justice Lanzinger wrote that applying the more restrictive refiling deadline in R.C. 2125.04 “does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. ... Eppley argues that there is no rational basis for the General Assembly to extend the general saving statute in R.C. 2305.19 but not to do so in R.C. 2125.04, and that the different language is a drafting error. This argument is speculative at best. The General Assembly explained that it amended R.C. 2125.04, and other portions of the Revised Code, to further the state’s ‘rational and legitimate ... interest in making certain that Ohio has a fair, predictable system of civil justice that preserves the right of those who have been harmed by negligent behavior, while curbing the number of frivolous lawsuits.’”
“The school board suggests several differences between general tort claims and wrongful death claims that provide a rational basis for a different wrongful death saving statute,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “General tort claims are direct actions, while wrongful death claims are derivative in nature, brought on behalf of the decedent’s next of kin; wrongful death claims are statutory, while claims for personal injury are common-law claims; the proceeds in wrongful death claims are recovered for distribution to the beneficiaries designated under the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, whereas personal injury awards are made directly to the injured party; and although damages in general tort actions have been limited by R.C. 2323.24, damages recoverable in wrongful death claims cannot be limited.”
“We find these last two differences to be persuasive. Resolving claims expeditiously is a legitimate government interest. Unlike the general saving statute, the wrongful death saving statute prevents a plaintiff who has dismissed his or her claim before the expiration of the initial statutory period from refiling after expiration and thereby extinguishes the claim. The more restrictive wrongful death saving statute prevents delaying the timely disbursement of the estate of the deceased when damages are recovered for distribution to the beneficiaries of the estate. It also protects defendants against claims that cannot be limited statutorily. R.C. 2125.04 is therefore constitutional because it is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of resolving cases expeditiously. It applies equally to all who are similarly situated and does not violate equal protection.”
Justice Lanzinger’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Paul E. Pfeifer wrote that he preferred to believe the legislature’s 2004 action amending the general saving statute but leaving in place a potentially more restrictive refiling time limit for wrongful death actions was inadvertent. He wrote that the majority’s attempt to attribute rationality to the General Assembly’s unintentional act caused the General Assembly to emerge worse than if it were merely mistaken: “If the General Assembly’s inaction in failing to make the same change to R.C. 2125.04 was purposeful, that is more disturbing than a mistake.”
Justice Pfeifer wrote that there could be no rational basis to distinguish between wrongful death plaintiffs and other plaintiffs in regard to fixing the malpractice trap: “If the General Assembly’s aim is to speed along wrongful-death claims, as the majority posits, it has not adopted a rational method to achieve that end. Wrongful-death plaintiffs still have the ability to extend the lives of their claims, as long as they wait to dismiss their claims until the statute of limitations has passed. To encourage prompt dismissals and refilings, the General Assembly should have made the same amendment to R.C. 2125.04 as it made to R.C. 2305.19(A). If the General Assembly’s aim was to perpetuate a malpractice trap only for wrongful-death plaintiffs in order to limit overall damages awarded in wrongful-death cases, that would constitute an illegitimate attempt to limit the damages recoverable in wrongful-death claims and would violate Section 19a, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.”
Contacts
John W. Gold, 440.442.6677, for Randy Eppley.
Michael E. Stinn, 216.503.5063, for the Tri-Valley Local School District.