Damaging Single Phone Violates ‘Disrupting Public Service’ Law If Conduct Substantially Impairs Emergency Response
2008-1942 and 2008-2170. State v. Robinson, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5937.
Union App. No. 14-07-20, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160. Certified question answered in the affirmative, judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and judgment of the trial court reinstated.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-5937.pdf 
View oral argument video of this case.
(Nov. 18, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.
The Court’s 7-0 decision, authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor, reversed a ruling by the 3rd District Court of Appeals.
Raynell Robinson of Marysville was convicted of the fourth-degree felony of disrupting a public service in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) for seizing and smashing a personal cell phone while it was being used by his nephew, Antonio Robinson, to summon emergency assistance after Raynell had assaulted Antonio following a late-night confrontation between the men.
On review, the 3rd District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and vacated Robinson’s conviction. In its decision, the court of appeals held that: 1) the legislative intent underlying the disrupting public services statute was to prohibit tampering with or damaging communications equipment serving large numbers of people, and the law did not apply to the damaging of a single private telephone; and 2) even if destroying a single telephone could qualify as disruption of public services under the statute, the evidence at trial had not established the additional element that Raynell Robinson’s conduct had “substantially impaired” the ability of police and emergency medical personnel to find and treat Antonio because the officers arrived within a few minutes after receiving Antonio’s aborted 911 call. The 3rd District subsequently certified that its ruling on the applicability of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) to the destruction of a single phone was in conflict with rulings by the 2nd, 5th and 8th District courts of appeals. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case upon the State’s discretionary appeal and to resolve the conflict among appellate districts.
In today’s decision, the Court reversed the ruling of the 3rd District and reinstated Robinson’s conviction.
Justice O’Connor wrote that the 3rd District unnecessarily analyzed the legislative history of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), because the plain language of the statute unambiguously makes it applicable to the conduct for which Robinson was charged and convicted in this case.
“The language in R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is clear in that it prohibits (1) conduct that substantially impairs the ability of emergency-services personnel, (2) to either respond to an emergency or protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm,” she wrote. “The statute unambiguously specifies that in order for one to disrupt public services under R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), the conduct involved must be the knowing damaging or tampering with any property. ... [A] private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes property as the word is used in R.C. 2909.04(A). Therefore, the destruction of a private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes damaging or tampering with property under R.C. 2909.04(A). The plain language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) does not limit its application to the interference with public emergency systems and utilities on a large scale, as the Third District found. Division (A)(3) of R.C. 2909.04 does not contain any reference to the words ‘public emergency systems’ or ‘utilities.’ Thus, the Third District’s interpretation that the statute does not apply to the destruction of a single private telephone or cellular telephone is not a sound reading of the plain language.”
In also rejecting the 3rd District’s finding that Robinson’s conduct did not “substantially impair” emergency responders from finding and treating Antonio, Justice O’Connor wrote: “Both the appellate court and Robinson focused on the fact that the officers arrived on the scene within minutes of being dispatched as being dispositive of whether the officers’ ability to respond was substantially impaired. R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), however, does not require proof of a substantial impairment of the officers’ response time. The pertinent inquiry is directed toward their ability to respond.”
“Antonio was only able to tell the 9-1-1 dispatcher that he was at the Meadows and that his face had been injured. When Robinson smashed the phone and disconnected the call, the dispatcher was attempting to elicit a more specific location from Antonio. The importance of emergency-services personnel knowing a caller’s exact location is critical so that police and medical responders can reach the location as quickly as possible. This is especially true in the case of a suspected assault, when the officers must reach the scene of the incident and clear it before they can allow emergency medical personnel to attend to the victim’s injuries. It is additionally important for emergency personnel to reach the victim immediately to prevent further harm to the victim.”
“... As a result of the negligible information that Antonio was able to provide to the 9-1-1 dispatcher before Robinson destroyed the cell phone, the police could not go directly to the scene of the incident. Rather, the police had to search a large apartment complex and question bystanders before locating Antonio. While the police were attempting to respond to Antonio’s request for help, Robinson continued to strike Antonio. Also during this time frame, Robinson threatened physical harm if anyone called police, which the jury found sufficient to sustain an additional conviction for intimidation of a victim. Once Officer Bartholomew eventually found Antonio, it took an additional few moments for him to call for back up and assess the situation before he was able to call for an ambulance. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to determine that the delay in locating Antonio substantially impaired the officers’ ability to respond to Antonio’s call.”
Contacts
Melissa A. Chase, 937.645.4190, for the Union County prosecutor’s office.
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for the Ohio Attorney General’s Office.
Stephen P. Hardwick, 514.466.5394, for Raynell Robinson.
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