

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

EMMILIE K. RADCLIFF

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v

STEEN ELECTRIC., et al.

Defendants/Appellees.

CASE NO. 07-2107

ON APPEAL FROM THE  
COURT OF APPEALS  
NINTH APPELLATE  
DISTRICT

CASE NO. C.A. NO. 23460

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APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION


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**1. EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST.**

Emmilie Radcliff was the office manager for Steen Electric, Inc., an Akron based electrical contractor until her employment was terminated. Mrs. Radcliff was forced to retire from her job as a result of a “pranking” incident on her last day before a scheduled leave of absence. Her employer Robert and William Steen along with their friend, Theodore Goumas, a non-employee, orchestrated a “prank” on Mrs. Radcliff and her gay son, Kenny, when Mr. Goumas simulated a penis with a rotten banana found in the Company’s conference room and asked Mrs. Radcliff and her son, “do you want this for a snack on your way home”. Mrs. Radcliff and her son testified in court that Mr. Goumas also exposed his penis.

After the episode, Mrs. Radcliff, told the owners of Steen Electric, Inc. what occurred. The owners, Robert Steen and his brother, William, denied prior knowledge of the exact nature of the prank but knew that something outrageous was forthcoming. Their friend, Ted Goumas, filed a claim for defamation against Mrs. Radcliff’s based on her report to the Steen brothers of what occurred. The court awarded damages in favor of Mr. Goumas and against Mrs. Radcliff in the amount of \$70,490.00 including compensatory, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial District affirmed the judgment on September 28, 2007.

Workplaces including Steen Electric, Inc., are supposed to encourage employees to openly and frankly disclose circumstances and problems which arise at work and to give notice of circumstances creating a hostile environment. Sometimes the circumstances include embarrassing and hurtful episodes like the one that occurred at Steen Electric costing Mrs. Radcliff her job. This case is of great and substantial public interest and value to address the problem of employees being sued for defamation simply because their employer

and a jury later rejected their claim of a hostile work environment. Mr. Goumas was a virtual stranger to Mrs. Radcliff and her son prior to this episode and throughout these proceedings. Mrs. Radcliff had no ax to grind and did nothing to maliciously injure Mr. Goumas. This case is of great and substantial interest because claimants like Mrs. Radcliff are entitled to immunity from prosecution under these circumstances. Ohio public policy should encourage such frank disclosures from employees to their employers about potential harassment in the workplace without fear of devastating consequences. If employees run the risk of being prosecuted for defamation, no victim of harassment will seek redress in court. Mrs. Radcliff is the unjust victim of the lower courts failure to protect these rights. By accepting this case on appeal this court has the opportunity to make clear that there will be not future victims of these failures. Appellant, Radcliff respectfully requests that this court exercise its discretion and accept this appeal for consideration on the merits.

**2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS.**

This Appeal presents a question of compelling importance to both employers and employees in Ohio. Can an employee who complains to his employer about harassment in the workplace and later files a lawsuit for constructive discharge based upon such harassment be subject to a claim for defamation by the alleged harasser for comments made to the employer and claims asserted in a lawsuit for constructive discharge? Both the trial court and the court of appeals in Summit County answered these questions in the affirmative. The harassment victim, Plaintiff, Emmilie Radcliff, now has a judgment against her on a counterclaim for defamation brought by the alleged harasser, Theodore Goumas in the amount of \$70,490.00 which includes \$36,600.00 in compensatory damages, \$5,000.00 in

punitive damages and award of attorney's fees in the amount of \$28,890.00. A judgment lien has been placed on her home, the only property that she owns. Mrs. Radcliff, now 65 years old and a widow, is retired and of modest means. The background of this protracted litigation follows.

Plaintiff, Emmilie K. Radcliff was employed by defendant, Steen Electric, Inc. for almost 27 years until her employment was terminated on August 23, 2002 at the age of 60. Plaintiff was the office manager at Steen Electric, Inc., handling bookkeeping, accounts receivable, accounts payable and related functions for the company.

With the prior knowledge and consent of her employer, Steen Electric, Inc. ("Steen Electric") and its owners, Robert and William Steen (the Steen defendants"), defendant, Theodore Goumas appeared at the premises of Steen Electric on August 23 for the alleged purpose of "pranking" plaintiff and her son, Ken Forrer who was on the premises to pick-up his mother from work. At the time, defendants were aware that Mr. Forrer was gay.

According to plaintiff and her son, Goumas appeared in plaintiff's doorway at work and exposed his penis outside of his work overalls. Later, Goumas pulled a banana out of his overalls which he had used to simulate a penis asking, "do you want this for a snack on your way home?" Goumas admits that he was "pranking" Kenny and his mother by simulating a penis with a banana but denies exposing his genitalia. As a result, plaintiff left her job never to return again.

Plaintiff sued her former employer Steen Electric, Robert Steen and William Steen as well as Mr. Goumas on five (5) separate counts: (1) wrongful termination of employment based upon hostile work environment; (2) negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) age discrimination; (4) negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and

(5) civil assault. The Steen defendants filed a counterclaim alleging frivolous conduct. Goumas counterclaimed for frivolous conduct and defamation.

**A. Trial I**

The case proceeded on September 21, 2004 on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Goumas and for assault against Defendant Robert Steen and on Defendant Goumas' counterclaim for defamation. On September 24, 2004, verdicts were returned in favor of Defendants on the Complaint. Defendant Goumas' counterclaim was bifurcated for a later trial.

On November 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth District, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The decision is reported in **Radcliff v. Steen Electric, Inc.**, 164 Ohio App. 3d 161 (9<sup>th</sup> App. Dist. 2005). In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals reinstated Plaintiff's claim for constructive discharge based upon hostile work environment and reinstated Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Steen Defendants, reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on these claims. **Id.** at 172, 175. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's bifurcation of Defendant Goumas counterclaim for defamation.

**Id.** at 177.

**B. Trial II on Remand**

The case proceeded to a second trial on remand beginning on October 21, 2006. On August 24, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Steen Defendants on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and in favor of Defendant Theodore Goumas and against Plaintiff on Goumas' claim for defamation. Prior to instructing the jury, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the Steen Defendants on Plaintiff's claim for constructive discharge based upon a hostile work environment.

On August 31, 2006, the Court entered judgment in favor of Goumas on his Counterclaim in the amount of \$70,490.00, including the sum of \$28,890.00 in attorney's fees. The balance of \$41,600.00 consists of \$36,600.00 in compensatory damages and \$5,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict of Mr. Goumas' counterclaim.

Finally, on October 4, 2006, the trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Mr. Goumas' counterclaim and the award of damages on that claim. Plaintiff's notice of appeal followed on October 31.

**C. Appeal II**

On September 28, The Court of Appeals Ninth Judicial District issued its Decision and Journal Entry affirming in part and reversing in part the trial courts final judgment of August 31, 2006. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Goumas on the defamation claim and reversed for a new trial the claims for wrongful termination against the Steen defendants.

In affirming the defamation award the Court of Appeals concluded that statements alleging that Mr. Goumas exposed his penis in the workplace were false and defamatory *per*

se and that they imputed a crime to Mr. Goumas pursuant to O.R.C. § 2907.09 (A)(1) which prohibits public indecency. The Court of Appeals held that it was irrelevant that in fact no criminal charges were actually filed against Mr. Goumas. (¶17 at 8). Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected Appellants arguments that these were privileged communications. The court in its decision stated:

While Appellant argues that her statements were privileged because they were made in legal pleadings, this ignores the remaining evidence. Appellant admitted during her testimony that she told friends that Goumas exposed himself. Both Robert Steen and Inez Cames, employees of Steen Electric, Inc., testified that Appellant told them that Goumas had exposed his penis to her. Accordingly, uncontroversial evidence before the trial indicated that Appellant had published false statements about Goumas. (¶16 at 7).

3. **ARGUMENT AND SUPPORT OF PROPOSITONS OF LAW**

**Proposition of Law No. I:**

**Statements made in good faith by an employee to her employer claiming harassment in the workplace are privileged and cannot support a claim for defamation by the alleged harasser.**

Theodore Goumas' counterclaim for defamation alleged as follows:

**COUNTERCLAIM II**

41. Plaintiff has no basis in law or fact for any of her claims or causes of action in her complaint
42. Plaintiff has filed this action in order to slander Defendant and circulate these falsehoods.
43. By virtue of Plaintiff's various acts, Defendants have suffered and continue to suffer damages in terms of attorneys fees and costs incurred to defend this action.
44. Defendants are entitled to the recovery of the reasonable attorneys fees incurred to defend this action against Plaintiff and/or her attorney.

### COUNTERCLAIM III

45. Plaintiff has no basis in law or fact for any of her claims or causes of action in her Complaint.
46. Plaintiff has filed this action in order to libel Defendant and circulate and publish these falsehoods.
47. By virtue of Plaintiff's various acts, defendants have suffered and continue to suffer damages in terms of attorneys fees and costs incurred to defend this action.
48. Defendants are entitled to the recovery of the reasonable attorneys fees incurred to defend this action against Plaintiff and/or her attorney.

Claims made by a party in a lawsuit or pleadings are absolutely privileged and are not subject to an action for defamation where the statement relates to the proceedings in which the appear. **Surace v. Wuliger**, 25 Ohio St. 3d 229 (1986). Alleged defamatory testimony by a witness in trial or pretrial proceedings is absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for a claim for defamation when the testimony is material to the issue in the case. This is true even when the testimony is given maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity. **Stoll v. Kennedy**, 38 Ohio App. 3d 102 (9<sup>th</sup> App Dist. Wayne Cty. 1987) (the giving of perjured testimony in a judicial proceeding does not give rise to a civil action for damages from such testimony either against the litigant alleged to have given the perjured testimony or against the attorney alleged to have suborned the perjured testimony). **See, also, American Express Travel Related Service Co., Inc. v. Mandailakis**, 111 Ohio App. 3d 160 (8<sup>th</sup> App. Dist. Cuyahoga Cty. 1986).

The Court of Appeals states that Appellant also told her friends that Mr. Goumas exposed himself in the workplace and told her employer of the incident. (§16 at 7). In other words, the very same claims made in the lawsuit that are subject to a privilege have resulted in a judgment against Appellant because they were also published to her employer and a friend.

However, Ohio law protects such communications provided they are made in good faith and without actual malice. Smith v. Kline, 23 Ohio App. 3d 146 (8<sup>th</sup> App. Dist. 1985). No such finding was made against Mrs. Radcliff. No interrogatories were submitted to the jury on the question as to whether such extrajudicial statements were made with actual malice. The Court of Appeals simply concluded that the statements of Mrs. Radcliff were false, without evidence to support such conclusion and completely ignored the failure of Mr. Goumas to demonstrate “actual malice” in support of his defamation claim. The finding that Mrs. Radcliff repeated this claim to her friend after the lawsuit was filed is completely irrelevant. Her statements to her friend were exactly those contained in the litigation. In the absence of actual malice these statements are privileged and as a matter of law are non-defamatory.

Appellant submits that subjecting an employee to damages for defamation as the result of statements made to the employer and others about sexual harassment in the workplace are privileged and in the absence of actual malice are non-defamatory.

4.

**CONCLUSION**

For the reasons discussed above, this case involves matters of public and great general interest. Appellant respectfully requests that this Court grant jurisdiction so that these important and relevant issues will be reviewed on the merit.

Respectfully submitted,



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Emmilie K. Radcliff

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Memorandum in Support of  
Jurisdiction was sent via regular U.S. mail this 12 day of November, 2007 to:

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Attorney for Appellees  
Steen Electric, Inc., Robert and William Steen

Attorney for Appellee  
Theodore Goumas

## **APPENDIX**

**A. DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2007 A**

STATE OF OHIO )

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

EMMILIE K. RADCLIFF )

Appellant

v.

STEEN ELECTRIC, INC., et al.

Appellees

COURT OF APPEALS  
DANIEL M. HORRIGAN

2007 SEP 28 AM 8:01

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SUMMIT COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURTS

C. A. No. 23460

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT  
ENTERED IN THE  
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO  
CASE No. CV 2002 11 6330

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 28, 2007

This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:

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BAIRD, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Emmilie Radcliff, has appealed from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas which granted directed verdicts to Appellees. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

I.

{¶2} Though this Court thoroughly laid out the underlying facts of this action in the first appeal of this matter, see *Radcliff v. Steen Elec., Inc.* ("Radcliff I"), 9th Dist. No. 22407, 2005-Ohio-5503, we reiterate the pertinent facts herein for ease of reference.

{¶3} Appellant worked as a bookkeeper at Appellee, Steen Electric, Inc. (“Steen Electric”), for twenty-seven years before ending her employment on August 23, 2002. During the late afternoon of that day, Appellant’s adult son, Kenny Forrer, came to Steen Electric to pick up Appellant and drive her home. Appellee Theodore Goumas, a personal friend and business associate of Appellees Robert and William Steen (“the Steen brothers”), was on Steen Electric premises at the time Forrer entered the premises to pick up Appellant. At that time, a series of incidents took place, which precipitated Appellant’s filing of her complaint on November 7, 2002.

{¶4} In her complaint, Appellant alleged that Mr. Goumas exposed his penis to her and to others; that Mr. Goumas used a banana to simulate a penis; and that Mr. Goumas asked Appellant whether she wanted the banana “for a snack on your way home.” Appellant further alleged that Mr. Goumas acted with the prior knowledge and consent of and at the direction of Steen Electric and the Steen brothers.

{¶5} Based on these allegations, Appellant alleged five counts in her complaint, to wit: Count One: wrongful termination of employment, i.e., constructive discharge premised on Appellees’ maintenance of a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment in the workplace; Count Two: negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count Three: age

discrimination; Count Four: negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and Count Five: assault.

{¶6} Steen Electric and the Steen brothers filed an answer and a single counterclaim, alleging that Appellant's claims were frivolous pursuant to R.C. 2323.51. Theodore Goumas filed an answer and three counterclaims, alleging that Appellant's claims were frivolous (without specific reference to R.C. 2323.51) and that Appellant's claims were filed for the purpose of slandering and libeling Goumas.

{¶7} Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on each of the counterclaims. Additionally, Steen Electric and the Steen brothers filed a motion for summary judgment on their behalf and purportedly on Mr. Goumas' behalf in relation to Appellant's claims. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment as to Count One (wrongful termination), Count Two (negligent infliction of emotional distress), Count Two (intentional infliction of emotional distress) as to all Steen defendants, Count Three (age discrimination), Count Four (negligent hiring, retention and supervision), and Count Five (assault) as to Steen Electric and William Steen. The trial court denied Appellees' motion for summary judgment as to Count Two (intentional infliction of emotional distress) as to Theodore Goumas, and Count Five (assault) as to Robert Steen. Appellant's final two claims were set for trial. The trial court also granted summary judgment in Appellant's favor on the claims of frivolous conduct. The

trial court, however, did not grant summary judgment on Goumas' claim for defamation.

{¶8} This Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Appellant's claims of wrongful discharge through sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress as to the Steen defendants. While that appeal was pending, a jury trial was held on Appellant's claim of assault against Robert Steen and on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Goumas. At the conclusion of that trial, the jury found for both defendants.

{¶9} The trial court then proceeded with a jury trial on Appellant's claim of wrongful discharge due to a hostile work environment and her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress as to the Steen defendants. The trial also included Goumas' claim for defamation. At the conclusion of the trial, Appellees moved for directed verdicts on each of Appellant's claims. The trial court granted a directed verdict on those claims. As a result, Appellant's remaining claims were dismissed. Goumas' claim for defamation was submitted to the jury, and the jury awarded him \$70,490 for his defamation claim. Appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that motion was denied by the trial court. Appellant has timely appealed the trial court's judgment, raising two assignments of error for review.

## II.

{¶10} In both of her assignments of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting directed verdict on her claims and by denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Goumas' defamation claim. Accordingly, we first detail our standard of review.

{¶11} Pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a trial court is authorized to grant a directed verdict only when:

“[A]fter construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, [the court] finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.”

When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the court considers the sufficiency of the evidence. *Wagner v. Roche Laboratories* (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, reversed on other grounds (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 457.

“When a motion for a directed verdict is entered, what is being tested is a question of law; that is, the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury. This does not involve weighing the evidence or trying the credibility of witnesses; it is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence and assumes the truth of the evidence supporting the facts essential to the claim of the party against whom the motion is directed, and gives to that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that evidence.” *Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co.* (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68; see, also *Strother v. Hutchinson* (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284-85.

{¶12} If the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict fails to present evidence on one or more of the essential elements of a claim, a directed verdict is

proper. *Hargrove v. Tanner* (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 693, 695. However, where evidence is presented such that reasonable minds could come to differing conclusions, the court should deny the motion. *Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel, Inc.* (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275. Under the “reasonable minds” portion of Civ.R. 50(A)(4), the court is only required to consider whether there exists any evidence of probative value in support of the elements of the non-moving party’s claim. See *Coleman v. Excello-Textron Corp.* (1989), 60 Ohio App.3d 32, 40; *Ruta*, 69 Ohio St.2d at 69. This Court applies the same standard when evaluating a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. *Rondy, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 9th Dist. No. 21608, 2004-Ohio-835, at ¶5.

#### ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT THEODORE GOUMAS FOR DEFAMATION.”

{¶13} In her first assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Goumas’ claim for defamation. We disagree.

{¶14} For Goumas to prevail on his claim of defamation, the evidence must establish (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning him, (2) publication of the statement, (3) fault, and (4) harm. *Earl v. Nelson*, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008622, 2006-Ohio-3341, at ¶24, citing *Williams v. Gannett Satellite*

*Information Network, Inc.*, 1st Dist. No. C-040635, 2005-Ohio-4141, at ¶5. Where the complaint alleges defamation per se, damages are presumed. *Williams* at ¶7. In order to establish a claim of defamation per se, Goumas was required to show that the words used in Appellant's statements fell into one of three categories, the relevant category being "the imputation of a charge of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment[.]" *Id.* at ¶8.

{¶15} Prior to this trial, Appellant's claim for assault against Goumas was resolved by a jury trial which resulted in a verdict in favor of Goumas. As a result of that trial, the trial court held that issue preclusion prevented Appellant from arguing that Goumas had exposed his penis to her. On appeal, Appellant has not challenged that ruling by the trial court. Accordingly, we accept as true that Goumas did not expose himself to Appellant.

{¶16} Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that Appellant told others that Goumas had exposed himself to her. While Appellant argues that her statements were privileged because they were made in legal pleadings, this ignores the remaining evidence. Appellant admitted during her testimony that she told friends that Goumas exposed himself. Both Robert Steen and Inez Cames, employees of Steen Electric, testified that Appellant told them that Goumas had exposed his penis to her. Accordingly, uncontroverted evidence before the trial court indicated that Appellant had published false statements about Goumas.

{¶17} Moreover, the statements made by Appellant fit within the classic definition of defamation per se as they impute a crime to Goumas. R.C. 2907.09(A)(1) prohibits public indecency and provides as follows: “No person shall recklessly do any of the following, under circumstances in which the person’s conduct is likely to be viewed by and affront others who are in the person’s physical proximity and who are not members of the person’s household: \*\*\* Expose the person’s private parts[.]” Appellant’s statements directly and falsely imputed this crime to Goumas. Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, it is irrelevant to our analysis that charges were not filed against Goumas based upon Appellant’s statements. As noted above, the elements of defamation per se do not require charges to be filed.

{¶18} Finally, as Goumas established that Appellant’s statements were defamatory per se, damages are presumed. Additionally, on appeal, Appellant has not challenged the amount of the damages awarded to Goumas. Accordingly, the evidence presented in the trial court established that Appellant published false statements about Goumas which imputed the crime of public indecency. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Goumas’ claim for defamation.

### ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS STEEN ELECTRIC, INC., ROBERT STEEN AND WILLIAM

STEEN ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE."

{¶19} In her second assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on her claim of wrongful termination. This Court agrees.

{¶20} Initially, we note, as the trial court did, that it is unclear what type of claim Appellant alleged in her complaint. On appeal, Appellant argues that her claim was a "statutory constructive discharge claim." In her complaint, Appellant alleged that the Steen brothers were employers as defined in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2). Appellant then captioned her count as "Wrongful Termination of Employment." Moreover, within that count, Appellant averred that the Steen brothers maintained a hostile work environment which constituted "unlawful sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of law and Ohio public policy." Appellant's complaint, therefore, appears to have combined two separate claims: a claim under R.C. 4112.02 or R.C. 4112.99 for sexual harassment *and* a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. However, this Court has previously "construe[d] her complaint within the context of R.C. Chapter 4112." *Radcliff I* at ¶16. Accordingly, the trial court was bound to construe the complaint in the same manner.

{¶21} The type of claim raised by Appellant is of vital importance to our analysis. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, at-will employment is not a requirement to filing suit under R.C. Chapter 4112. A thorough review of case

law indicates that the at-will requirement only arises in a claim for wrongful discharge based upon public policy. In contrast, all employees are protected by the anti-discrimination regulations contained in R.C. Chapter 4112. As such, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Appellant could not maintain this action due to her failure to prove and plead that she was an at-will employee.

{¶22} As this Court previously determined that Appellant's complaint invoked R.C. Chapter 4112, we review the propriety of the trial court's directed verdict under that statutory scheme.

{¶23} This Court previously determined that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding Appellant's claim. *Radcliff I* at ¶16-38. With respect to her initial burden of demonstrating an intentional discriminatory practice, this Court previously held that Appellant "presented evidence of a collaborative effort between the Steen brothers and Goumas to subject appellant to \*\*\* sexually explicit conduct and conversations soon before she was to have taken a leave of absence from Steen Electric." *Id.* at ¶22. This evidence was introduced at trial as well. In fact, Goumas admitted at trial that he had used a banana to simulate a penis and had discussed his prank with the Steen brothers prior to performing it.

This Court went on to hold that:

"[A]n employee's exposure to a penis, as well as another object used to simulate a penis, in the workplace, constitutes the type of harassment which would make an employee's resignation reasonably foreseeable.

“This court finds that this may be especially true when that conduct is perpetrated by a nonemployee with the tacit consent of the employer. In addition, appellant has presented evidence to demonstrate that the working conditions were so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign.” Id. at ¶¶26-27.

{¶24} This Court recognizes that the trial court herein established as a matter of law that Goumas did not expose himself to Appellant. As such, the facts presented herein differ slightly from when we reviewed *Radcliff I*. However, our directed verdict standard of review is nearly identical in nature to our summary judgment review. We must only determine whether there exists any evidence of probative value in support of the elements of the non-moving party’s claim. As noted above, Appellant presented evidence of discriminatory intent. Moreover, this Court previously determined that Appellant had provided evidence on each of the prongs of her claim of a hostile work environment. See *Radcliff I* at ¶¶31-37. This same evidence was presented at trial through Appellant’s testimony. Accordingly, the trial court had before it the same evidence that had been presented at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. This Court determined that such evidence was sufficient to present to a jury. The trial court’s directed verdict ignores that conclusion. The trial court, therefore, erred in directing a verdict on Appellant’s claim. Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.

## III.

{¶25} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. Appellant's second assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment affirmed in part,  
reversed in part,  
and cause remanded.

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The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to Emmilie Radcliff and the Steen defendants (Steen Electric, Inc., Robert Steen, and William Steen)

  
WILLIAM R. BAIRD  
FOR THE COURT

MOORE, P. J.  
DICKINSON, J.  
CONCUR

(Baird, J., retired, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to, §6(C), Article IV, Constitution.)

APPEARANCES:

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IDA MACDONALD, Attorney at Law, for Appellee, Theodore Goumas.