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**EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC
OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND INVOLVES
A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION**

This Court previously recognized that a trial court may not base its decision to grant permanent custody to a county agency solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents. *In re D.A.* (2007), 113 Ohio St.3d 88, syllabus.

In the instant case, the trial court and the county agency (Summit County SCCS) were faced with just that same issue.

During cross-examination, the SCCS worker in charge of the case testified that the mother had completed her entire case plan; however, that fact did not matter. The agency was basing its entire decision to take the child and to seek permanent custody on the cognitive abilities of the mother.

This Court should grant jurisdiction and rule in favor of the mother and order the trial court to return legal custody of the child to the mother. Otherwise, the trial and appellate court decisions will stand—in direct contravention of this Court’s mandate in *In re D.A.*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

For the purposes of this jurisdictional appeal, the Appellant will present a much shortened statement of the case and facts than that presented in her appellate court brief.

On October 25, 2006, Summit County Children Services (SCCS) filed a complaint alleging that the seventeen month old child of Jessica Lamtman, J.E. was a dependent child and an Ex Parte Order of Emergency Temporary Custody to SCCS was granted by the Magistrate of Summit County Juvenile Court. The allegations centered on the ability of Ms. Lamtman to care for and to provide for the basic needs of J.E. based upon her cognitive delays. A Shelter Care hearing on the matter was held on October 26, 2006. The Magistrate continued the Emergency Temporary Custody to SCCS, ordered the appointment of an Attorney/GAL for Ms. Lamtman and a CASA/GAL for J.E. and genetic testing to establish paternity. The adjudicatory hearing on November 20, 2006 found J.E. to be a dependent child.

On December 5, 2006, SCCS filed a Motion for Reasonable Efforts Determination; Motion for Permanency Plan Review Hearing. The opposed SCCS's Motion. On April 6, 2007, SCCS filed a Motion for Legal Custody. On April 23, 2007, the Court granted the motion of SCCS and found that SCCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of J.E. from his home nor was SCCS required to make reasonable efforts to return J.E. to his mother's care.

The Permanent Custody Trial was held on July 10 and 11, 2007. On July 31, 2007, the trial court granted Permanent Custody of J.E. to SCCS. The mother, Jessica Lamtman appeals this decision.

This is a case of a mother who had her parental rights terminated based upon her cognitive abilities as well as her past history. (TOP at 8, 199). Mom is mildly mentally retarded (TOP at 13) and, previously, lost permanent custody of another child J.L. (TOP at 8, 199). The initial complaint was filed on October 25, 2006, five months after the birth of J.E. During the five months, the mother of J. E., Mom worked with SCCS voluntarily and agreed

to work a voluntary case plan. (TOP at 10).

During these five months, Mom made sure that J.E. got to his doctor's appointments, bathed him, fed him and made sure that his basic needs were met. (TOP at 15). Yet SCCS removed J.E. from his mother's care. The doctor, making accommodations for her disability, wrote down his instructions for her (TOP at 12). Mom had never shown an unwillingness to take J.E. to his doctor's appointments (TOP at 338). Yet, when Mom failed to schedule an appointment for an EKG, thinking that the doctor's office scheduled the appointment for her, SCCS filed for Emergency Temporary Custody of J.E. (TOP at 12).

J.E. continued in the Temporary Custody of SCCS. During that time, Mom worked on her case plan and did everything that was ordered in the case plan, except for the parenting classes (TOP at 315). Mom followed through with Help Me Grow, although she hated Help Me Grow and distrusted them based on her past history with the agency (TOP at 310). Mom completed her parenting evaluation at Blick Clinic (TOP at 316). Mom remedied her housing situation (TOP at 326-327). Mom's house was safe for general habitation (TOP at 287). Mom was assessed at the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation (TOP at 321). Mom receives Social Security. (TOP at 296). In short, Mom made significant progress with regards to her case plan goals. (TOP at 250).

Yet, just five months after J.E. was adjudicated a dependent child, SCCS filed a Motion for Permanent Custody. The Motion for Reasonable Efforts Determination was filed two months after J.E. was removed from his mother's care. In a short period of time, Mom significantly complied with her case plan and remedied the conditions that brought J.E. into SCCS's custody (TOP at 250). SCCS removed this child based upon the past history of Mom with regards to the sibling of J.E., J.L.. (TOP at 8-10, 257-258) and Mom's cognitive disabilities (TOP at 10-14, 258). The Blick Clinic's parenting evaluation identified Mom's parental strengths— independence in self-care skills, ability to cook and maintain a household identification of potential safety issues in the home, love and concern for her son and a support

system in her fiancé (Ex. #1). The Blick Clinic made recommendations as to the supports that J.E. needed when Mom regained custody of her son—continued, active involvement with Help Me Grow and Developmental Therapy services, additional parenting classes with strategies for social interaction, play and discipline, enrollment of J.E. in a full- day developmental day care, as well as a psychiatric evaluation and BVR assessment for Mom. (Ex. # 1). However, Mom was not given a chance to complete the recommendations.

Mom has religiously maintained visitation with her son. She loves her son.

Tanya Vanderveen, the protective social worker with SCCS, testified that Mom had to follow all of the trial court's orders, but SCCS did not. Further, Vanderveen admitted that Mom had a psychological and a parenting assessment, and that ultimately, she did everything on the case plan other than the parenting classes. (TOP at 315). This is completely different than the prior case (involving her prior child) in which Mom had done very little.

testimony to the court in misleading the court as to what Mom had done and not done.

On cross-examination, Vanderveen admitted that there was nothing that would ever satisfy her sufficiently for Mom to regain custody of her child.

“Q. What could she do to satisfy you to get custody of her child?

A. I'm not sure that she can do anything. I said yesterday that her own disability, her cognitive limitations prevent her from doing things that we all want to see her doing with Joseph, and I said that this is not her fault, and I feel badly about that for her.”

(TOP at 325).

In short, the evidence presented at trial was that Mom had done everything—or nearly everything—asked/ordered of her. In contrast SCCS failed to follow court orders, including one in which the court had ordered SCCS to work with Mom in her own home, where she was more comfortable.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW

Proposition of Law No. I:

A county agency and a trial court cannot base their decisions to seek and obtain permanent custody on the limited cognitive abilities of one or more of the parents.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights of parents to make decisions as to the care, custody and control of their children. *Tryell v. Granville* (2000), 560 U.S. 57, 77, 120 S.Ct. 2054.

“The fundamental liberty interests of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”

Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388.

The Fourteenth Amendment did not limit these fundamental rights to parents with average or above average IQs. These rights exist for all parents. No entity, governmental or otherwise should interfere these rights based solely on one intellectual quotient.

The Supreme Court said as much in its recent decision. This Court *In re: D.A.* (2007), 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1005 held:

“Due to the emphasis placed in D.A.’s parents mentalretardation (sic) and lack of clear and convincing evidence that their limited abilities have caused of threatened to cause harm to him we conclude that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2151.414 and that the termination of parentalrights (sic) was not in D.A.’s best interest.”

In Re D.A. 115, Ohio St.3d 88, 96. 2007, Ohio 1105.

The facts in J.E.’s case are similar to that of D.A. The parents in D.A. and the mother of J.E. have limited cognitive abilities. The mother of D.A. had children removed from her custody in prior years. Mrs. Lamtman had her parental rights terminated with regards to a previous child (Exhibit 3). Also, in both J.E. and D.A., there was no clear and convincing evidence that the limited abilities of the parents had ever threatened to harm the children.

In the instant matter, there is testimony that Ms. Lamtman's cognitive disability was a major factor in the loss of Ms. Lamtman's parental rights. The Summit County Children's Services social worker testified that Ms. Lamtman had made significant progress with regards to her case plan goals, with the exception of parenting classes (Top at 250) yet this same social worker testified that because Ms. Lamtman had no support system in place, it would be unlikely that Ms. Lamtman could handle the needs when she needs someone to help her. (Top at 250).

This testimony was contrary to what was stated in the parenting evaluation done by Blick Clinic and entered into evidence at the trial court level. (Exhibit 1). The evaluation found that Ms. Lamtman could independently take care of her personal needs. Ms. Lamtman can independently maintain a household (clean, dust, etc.), cook meals, pays bills, and goes grocery shopping with assistance. With regards to Ms. Lamtman's parental strengths, Ms. Lamtman was able to express love and concern for J.E. and has a fiancé who assists and supports her. The evaluation Recommended support services that could be put in place when J.E. returned home. The SCCS worker testified that if Ms. Lamtman had support and someone who lived with her and J.E. for the majority of the time, then it was possible that J.E.'s return to her mother could work. (TOP at 240).

Mrs. Lamtman had the support with her fiancé Ronald Eick. Ronald was not the biological father of J.E. but did give the child his last name. Mr. Eick considered himself J.E.'s dad. (TOP at 372). Mr. Eick was with Ms. Lamtman throughout her pregnancy and delivery and provided financial support. (TOP at 372). Both Mr. Eick and Ms. Lamtman properly prepared their home for J.E.'s return. (TOP at 385-387).

In addition, Ms. Lamtman has the support of Mr. Eick's sister, Melissa Kay McClain and her fiancé, Matthew Murphy. Ms McClain and Mr. Murphy provided transportation for doctor's appointments for J.E. and Ms. Lamtman, helped her with J.E. during the five months

J.E. was in his mother's custody, provided financial help when needed, and any other help that was needed. (TOP at 436).

Ms. Lamtman had the supports in place to make J.E.'s return to Ms. Lamtman work. Yet SCCS filed for permanent custody and the real reason was stated by the SCCS social worker in her testimony that Ms. Lamtman's cognitive disabilities would prevent her for parenting J.E. full time. (TOP at 258). She reiterated this position upon cross-examination when she stated that she had concerns about Mom's ability to parent J.E. because of her cognitive disabilities, in spite of the significant progress that Mom made on her case plan. (TOP at 332).

Thereafter, no matter what Ms. Lamtman did, SCCS was determined to terminate her parental rights due to her cognitive disabilities. This violates the decision made by this Court in *In re: D.A.* and therefore the decision to terminate the parental rights of Jessica Lamtman should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this case involves matters of public and great general interest and substantial constitutional questions. The Appellant hereby requests that this Court grant jurisdiction and allow this case so that these important issues presented in this case will be reviewed on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

MAISTROS & LOEPP, LTD.




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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent, via Regular United States Mail postage pre-paid, on March ____, 2008 to:

Richard Kasay
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Akron, OH 44308



THOMAS C. LOEPP (#0046629)
Attorney for Appellee

APPENDIX

APP.

Decision of the Court of Appeals—Ninth Appellate District

A

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STATE OF OHIO)

COUNTY OF SUMMIT)

IN RE: J.E.

COURT OF APPEALS
 DANIEL M. HOFFMAN
)
) 2008 FEB -5 AM 7:57
)
) THE COURT OF APPEALS
) NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
)
) SUMMIT COUNTY A. No. 23865
) CLERK OF COURTS

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
 ENTERED IN THE
 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
 CASE No. DN 06-10-1078

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: February 6, 2008

This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Jessica Lamtman, appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights to her minor child and placed the child in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board ("CSB"). This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Ms. Lamtman is the natural mother of J.E., born May 29, 2006. The father of the child is not a party to this appeal. J.E. was removed from the home when he was five months old, and was later adjudicated a dependent child, due to

concerns that the child was developmentally delayed and Ms. Lamtman was unable to care for him due to her own cognitive limitations.

{¶3} Similar concerns had caused the juvenile court to terminate Ms. Lamtman's parental rights to J.E.'s older sibling, J.L., in 2001. In that case, CSB had become involved with the family after Ms. Lamtman took J.L. to the hospital with a severe skin rash. J.L. was later diagnosed with eczema and multiple food allergies, conditions that required J.L.'s caregiver to monitor his diet and home environment and to maintain regular contact with his allergist. Ms. Lamtman did not seem to understand how to deal with J.L.'s medical needs. CSB was also concerned about Ms. Lamtman's failure to interact or express affection with J.L. and her inability to comfort him when he cried.

{¶4} Throughout this case and the prior case involving J.L., CSB's concerns focused on Ms. Lamtman's limited cognitive ability, her inability to understand how to care for and stimulate her children, and her failure to interact or bond with them, particularly given that each child had special needs. CSB saw almost no improvement in Ms. Lamtman's parenting ability throughout the two cases.

{¶5} According to the guardian ad litem in this case, what was most noticeable to her was the lack of emotional connection and lack of eye contact between Ms. Lamtman and J.E. Several witnesses had observed that Ms. Lamtman spoke very little to J.E., except to keep saying his name; she did not sing

or read to him or play with him; she did not face him when she spoke to him; and she spoke in a flat tone, with no emotion in her voice and without facial expression. In this case, unlike the prior case involving J.L., the agency had the added concern that J.E. was developmentally delayed in both his fine motor skills and gross motor skills. Although it had not yet been determined whether J.E.'s delays were caused by his environment, one witness explained that a lack of face-to-face contact with a young child will negatively impact the child's development of language and cognitive skills.

{¶6} Ms. Lamtman had also failed to achieve any stability in her life throughout the two cases. She was unemployed, she did not drive, and she was dependent on others for transportation. Further, she had lived in seven different places during an 18-month period. She was apparently unable to work, as she had recently qualified for Social Security Disability benefits due to her mental retardation. Several witnesses explained that Ms. Lamtman seemed to be unable to care for her own needs, let alone those of her child, and she continued to be dependent on others and sometimes exercised poor judgment by trusting people who were not trustworthy.

{¶7} Although Ms. Lamtman was often willing to take direction from CSB workers and other service providers when they attempted to correct her inappropriate behavior, she appeared to be unable to retain what she had been told, but would continue to display the same inappropriate behavior. CSB believed that

Ms. Lamtman would not be able to care for J.E. and that she did not understand or appreciate the significance of the child's developmental delays. J.E. was in need of a caregiver who would stimulate him and follow through with regular physical and occupational therapy, as he will need extensive therapy throughout his childhood.

{¶8} Although CSB developed a case plan and initially worked toward reunification of Ms. Lamtman and J.E., the agency later sought and obtained a determination by the trial court that it was not required to make reasonable efforts to work toward reunification of the family because Ms. Lamtman's parental rights to a sibling of J.E. had been involuntarily terminated. See R.C. 2151.419 (A)(2)(e).

{¶9} CSB moved for permanent custody of J.E. and Ms. Lamtman moved for a six-month extension of temporary custody. Following a hearing on both motions, the trial court found that J.E. could not be returned to Ms. Lamtman's custody within a reasonable time or should not be returned to her and that permanent custody was in J.E.'s best interest. Consequently, it terminated Ms. Lamtman's parental rights and placed J.E. in the permanent custody of CSB.

{¶10} Ms. Lamtman appeals and raises four assignments of error, which will be consolidated and rearranged for ease of discussion.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DETERMINATION TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB] UPON THE LIMITED COGNITIVE ABILITIES OF JESSICA LAMTMAN, AS STATED IN *IN RE D.A.*”

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [CSB’S] MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY BECAUSE [CSB] FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRING CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE WITH REGARDS THAT J.E. CAN NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE REUNITED WITH MS. LAMTMAN. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

{¶11} Through her first and third assignments of error, Ms. Lamtman contends that the trial court’s permanent custody decision was not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.

{¶12} Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent custody of a child, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of the prior 22 months, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under

R.C. 2151.414(D). See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see, also, *In re William S.* (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 99. Ms. Lamtman does not challenge the trial court's best interest finding but argues only that the trial court's finding on the first prong of the permanent custody test was erroneous.

{¶13} The trial court found that the first prong of the test was satisfied because J.E. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them. See R.C. 2151.414(E). When determining whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to each of the child's parents.

{¶14} The trial court supported its finding that J.E. cannot be placed with Ms. Lamtman within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her with two factors under R.C. 2151.414(E): R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), which required the trial court to find the following conditions:

“(2) Chronic *** mental retardation *** of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code;

“***

“(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child.”

If the court finds that any of the conditions enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) exist, the statute mandates that the court enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. *In re Higby* (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 466, 469.

{¶15} Ms. Lamtman challenges the trial court's finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that her chronic mental retardation was so severe that it prevented her from providing an adequate permanent home for J.E. She does not dispute, however, that there was ample evidence before the trial court to support its finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) that her parental rights to a sibling of J.E. had been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding. That alternate finding was sufficient to support the trial court's permanent custody decision, even if the court's finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) was in error.

{¶16} To demonstrate reversible error, Ms. Lamtman has the burden to demonstrate error as well as prejudice resulting from that error. *Lowry v. Lowry* (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 184, 190, citing *Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co.* (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 15, 28. "A prejudicial error is defined as one which affects or presumptively affects the final results of the trial." *Miller v. Miller*, 5th Dist. No. 06 CA 3, 2006-Ohio-7019, at ¶12 (Citations omitted). Because Ms. Lamtman does not dispute that the court's finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) was supported by the evidence presented at the permanent

custody hearing and was sufficient to support the court's finding on the first prong of the permanent custody test, she cannot demonstrate reversible error.

{¶17} Moreover, although Ms. Lamtman has asserted that her inability to parent J.E. is not her fault, the focus of R.C. 2151.414(E) is on the demonstrated ability or inability of the parent to provide a suitable home for the child. When a juvenile court determines, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), whether a child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them, the court is not required to find parental fault. Instead, the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (12). R.C. 2151.414(E) implicitly recognizes that the existence of certain circumstances in a child's home, regardless of parental fault, demonstrates an inability of the parents to provide for the child's basic needs.

{¶18} Because Ms. Lamtman has not demonstrated any error by the trial court in its permanent custody decision, her first and third assignments of error are overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT [CSB] WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT J.E.'S CONTINUED REMOVAL FROM THE HOME ALLOWING [CSB] TO FILE FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY AT THE INITIAL DISPOSITION HEARING."

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

“[MS. LAMTMAN] WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH COMPETENT TRIAL COUNSEL.”

{¶19} Next, Ms. Lamtman asserts that the trial court erred in granting CSB’s motion for a reasonable efforts bypass and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise this issue in the trial court.

{¶20} Initially, this Court will note that the trial court did not rule on CSB’s reasonable efforts bypass motion until six months after CSB filed its dependency complaint. During the six months prior to the trial court’s ruling, CSB had developed a case plan for Ms. Lamtman, with a goal of reunification, and the agency had implemented reunification services. Thus, even though the trial court later excused CSB from working toward reunification, it does appear that the agency did make such efforts prior to the trial court’s order.

{¶21} Because Ms. Lamtman’s parental rights to J.E.’s siblings had been involuntarily terminated in a prior case, R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e) provided that the trial court “shall make a determination that the agency is not required to make reasonable efforts” to prevent the continued removal of the child or to return the child home.

{¶22} Ms. Lamtman maintains that some courts have held that the trial court has the authority to override this statutory mandate. See, e.g., *In re Nicholas P.*, 169 Ohio App.3d 570, 2006-Ohio-6213, at ¶36 (construing the language of R.C. 2151.419(A)(3) as giving the trial court discretion to override R.C.

2151.419(A)(2)(e)). Even if this court were to follow that reasoning and hold that the trial court had the discretion to deny CSB's request for a reasonable efforts bypass, despite the mandate of R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e), Ms. Lamtman would still have the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to do so, or that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue below.

{¶23} The reasonable efforts bypass issue was determined by a magistrate, and that decision was adopted by the trial court. Ms. Lamtman filed no objections to the magistrate's decision and no transcript was prepared of the hearing before the magistrate. Juv. R. 40(E)(3)(b)(iv) provides that, except in the case of plain error, a party may not assign as error on appeal the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's findings and conclusions unless that party has filed timely written objections in compliance with Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). Ms. Lamtman does not contend that the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision was plain error. Moreover, because there is no transcript of the evidence and arguments that were before the magistrate, this Court has no ability to consider the propriety of the magistrate's decision that it was appropriate in this case to excuse CSB from further reasonable efforts toward reunification of Ms. Lamtman and J.E.

{¶24} Ms. Lamtman has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court's decision to grant a reasonable efforts bypass or that her trial counsel was deficient

for failing to challenge the magistrate's decision below. The second and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

III.

{¶25} Ms. Lamtman's four assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.



CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT

SLABY, J.
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

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