

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

ROBERT L. HILLMAN

APPELLANT,

-VS-

STATE OF OHIO

APPELLEE.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN
COUNTY COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT.

08-1163

COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO.

06AP-1230 AND 07AP-728

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION
OF APPELLANT ROBERT L. HILLMAN

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


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<u>PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1</u>	

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL FOR (1) TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE PRE-TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL MOTIONS. A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, AND THE TESTIMONY RESULTING THEREFROM. (2) WHEN COUNSEL ALLOWED, AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURED TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE STATE WITNESSES. (3) FOR FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY OBJECTIONS TO THE IMPROPER AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTION DURING TRIAL, AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) WHEN COUNSEL AIDED IN EXCLUDING EXCLUPATORY EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT FROM BEING PLACED INTO EVIDENCE, (5) FOR NOT REQUESTING THE LESSER INCLUDED DEGREE OF BURGLARY INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE HAD NOLLIED THE THEFT OFFENSE. (6) FOR FAILING TO REQUEST AN EYEWITNESS EXPERT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE. (7) FOR NOT FILING A AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF COURT COST BEING IMPOSED..... 1-- 2

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

CAN COUNSEL BE EFFECTIVE WHEN COUNSEL NEVER INVESTIGATES THE CASE OR FILE PRE-TRIAL OR POST-TRIAL MOTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENT, AND AID THE PROSECUTION BY EXCLUDING FAVORABLE EVIDENCE FROM THE JURY EVEN OVER THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO SAID EVIDENCE BEING EXCLUDED.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 2

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED HIM OF HIS 5TH, 6TH, 13TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN (1) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED FALSE MATERIAL EVIDENCE, (2) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY ALLOWED AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURY/FALSE TESTIMONY BY STATE WITNESSES (3) THE PROSECUTOR REPEATEDLY MADE IMPROPER, AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS TO THE JURY DURING TRIAL, AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY CONCEALED FAVORABLE EVIDENCE FROM THE DEFENSE IN IT'S DISCOVERY, AND THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS, AND FAILED TO PRESERVE EX-CLUPATORY EVIDENCE..... 2--3

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

HOW FAR CAN A PROSECUTOR ACTMALLY GO IN HIS ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE WHEN HE ADMITS THAT THE STATE HAS NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, AND NO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION TO TRY AN PROVE A CASE, SIMPLY BECAUSE "HE BELIEVES" ONE TO BE GUILTY BASED UPON A DEFENDANTS PAST ?

PROPOSITION OF ,LAW NO.3

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HIS CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF BURGLARY UNDER STATUTE 2911.12 (A)(2) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH DENIED HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN THE STATE RELIEVES ITSELF OF HAVING TO PROVE EACH ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE.....

3-- 4

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

CAN THE STATE NOLLE PROSEQUI AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY JUST PRIOR TO JURY DELIBERATIONS, AND STILL PROVE EACH ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF BURGLARY WITHOUT PLACING THE DEFENDANT IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY OR, LOSS PROCEDURAL AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ?

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO 4

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR ON SIX OCCASSIONS IN TNIS CASE (1) WHEN IT RULED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATES CASE. (2) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S AND DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DELIBERATE EXCLUSION OF THE POLICE REPORT WHICH WAS EXCLUPATORY TO THE APPELLANT. (3) FOR NOT INCLUDING A LESSER DEGREE OF BURGLARY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE HAD NOLLIED THE THEFT OFFENSE WHICH WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE (A)(2) BURGLARY. (4) FOR NOT MAKING AN OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL AND PROSECUTOR HAD CONSPIRED TO CONVICT APPELLANT. (5) WHEN TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE STATE TO PROCEED TO PROSECUTE WVEN AFTER THE ALLEGED VICTIM FAILED TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT AS BEING THE SUSPECT IN VIOLATION OF EVIDENCE RULE 901. (6) FOR ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO BE CONVICTED ON A DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOLLE PROSEQUI HAD OCCURED.....

4-- 5

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

CAN THE TRIAL COURT IGNORE THE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE, AND ALLOW THE JURY TO CONVICT WITHOUT ABUSING IT'S DISCRETION ?

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO 5

THE APPELLANT STATES THAT HIS CONVICTION AS DEFINED BY O.R.C. SECTION 2911.12 (A)(2) WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONS.....

6-- 7

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

CAN A DEFENDANT BE LEGALLY CONVICTED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHEN NO ONE EVER STATES THAT HE HAS COMMITTED A CRIME, BUT STATES HE'S MERELY BUILT LIKE THE SUSPECT, AND NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE EXIST ?

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 6

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE STATE OF OHIO LACKED PROCEDURAL AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO PLACE APPELLANT ON TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF CONST, AMEND 6 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 10 RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 3

7--7

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

CAN A DEFENDANT'S INDICTMENT BY THE GRAND JURY BE ALTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT BY BOTH AMENDING, AND NOLLE PROSEQUI, AND NOT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANTS OHIO AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND RIGHTS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY ?

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO.7

THE APPELLANT CONTENTS THAT THE APPELLATE COURT DENIED HIM DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN (4) INSTANCES, AND THUS VIOLATED HIS 1ST,6TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNDER STATES CONSTITUTIONS..... 7-11

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS,

CAN THE APPELLATE COURT NOT MAKE A FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW ON SOME OF THE APPELLANT'S ASSIGNED ERRORS, AND ADD TO TESTIMONY WORDS THAT DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE RECORDS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY AFFIRMING A CONVICTION.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 8

DOES THE APPELLATE COURT DENIE THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT IGNORES THE APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING THAT OF THE STATES, AND AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING, WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT KNOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDING IN WHICH TO MAKE IT'S DETERMINATION, AND VIOLATED O.R.C. SECTION 2953.21 (C)..... 11-12

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS,

CAN A APPELLANT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE RECIEVED DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT GOES OUTSIDE THE STATUTES AND RULES IN MAKING IT'S RULINGS ?

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 9

THE APPELLANT CONTENTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THUS DENYING PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION..... 12-12

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS

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OPINION OF THE FRANKLIN COUNTY COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED MAY 15,2008..... 1-28

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL
INTEREST, AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.

THIS CASE SHOULD BE HEARD BECAUSE IT PUTS INTO QUESTION SEVERAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE LEGAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE IN OHIO, AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THATS BEING APPLIED IN THE STATE COURTS, COMPARED TO THE TRUE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING.

IT ALSO BRINGS INTO QUESTION WHAT THE LIMITATIONS AND BOUNDARIES THE PROSECUTOR MUST STAY WITHIN WHILE CONDUCTING HIS PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION IN TRIAL PROCEEDINGS.

THIS CASE PUTS INTO QUESTION THE COMPARISON BETWEEN ASSUMING GUILT THROUGH INFERENCES AND LEGALLY PROVING GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT BASED UPON EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL.

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THIS CONVICTION IS IN ESSENCE ONE THAT INVOKES THE SO-CALLED NO-EVIDENCE RULE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE CONCEPTS OF THE 4TH, 5TH, 6TH, 8TH, 13TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

THIS CONVICTION CHALLENGES THE INTEGRITY AND IMAGINATION OF THE COURT TO QUESTION HOW CAN ANY INDIGENT BLACK OR WHITE CITIZEN IN 2008 FEEL THAT SLAVERY IN AMERICA HAS TRUELY BEEN ABOLISHED IF THE STATE CAN JUST TAKE A MAN OFF THE STREETS , PLACE HIM IN PRISON FOR SEVEN YEARS FOR A CRIME IN WHICH NO ONE HAS EVER SAID HE HAS ACTUALLY COMMITTED, SIMPLY TO OBTAIN FEDERAL FUNDS. THIS APPEAL ENCOURAGES THIS COURT TO LOOK AT THE HARSH REALITY THAT THIS SYSTEM EXISTING IN OHIO HAS NOT ABOLISHED SLAVERY BUT, HAS MERELY DISGUISED IT IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, OR BEING TOUGH ON CRIME.

THE APPELLANT HAS ARGUED FROM THE DAY OF HIS ARREST THAT HE IS INNOCENT OF THE CHARGE IN WHICH HE HAS BEEN CONVICTED, AND THE STATE HAS OPENLY ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE LINKING THE APPELLANT TO ANY CRIME. PLUS AN ALLEGED VICTIM WHO COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE APPELLANT AS BEING THE SUSPECT BY FACE, SKIN-COLOR, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, HAIR, ARE ANYTHING ELSE BUT, MERELY STATES THAT THE APPELLANT IS BUILT LIKE THE SUSPECT HE THINKS HE WITNESSED LEAVING HIS HOME FROM APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AWAY IN THE DARK, AND TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY THIS PERSON WEARS GLASSES, YET THIS WAS CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT A RELIABLE IDENTIFICATION, AND CONDEMED BY THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

THE APPELLANT WAS ARRESTED ON MAY 7, 2006 WITHIN FRANKLIN COUNTY OHIO ON ONE COUNT OF BURGLARY, AND ONE COUNT OF THEFT. THE APPELLANT WENT TO A JURY TRIAL AND DURING THE JURY DELIBERATIONS THE PROSECUTOR ENTERED A NOLLE PROSEQUI TO THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT IN THE THEFT OFFENSE WHICH WAS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE (F-2) BURGLARY CHARGE UNDER STATUTE 2911.12 (A)(2). HOWEVER THE NOLLIED OFFENSE WAS STILL GIVEN TO THE JURY IN THE COURTS INSTRUCTION VIOLATING APPELLANT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY, AS UNDER OHIO LAW THE ENTRY OF A NOLLE BY THE PROSECUTOR COMPLETELY TERMINATES THE PROSECUTION. ON NOVEMBER 2007 THE APPELLANT FILED HIS MERIT BRIEF IN THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT.

ON MAY 15, 2008 THE APPELLATE COURT RENDERED IT'S DECISION.

HOWEVER

ON OCTOBER 15, 2007 THE APPELLANT FILED CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST FRANKLIN COUNTY PROSECUTOR MR. BRIAN SIMMS FOR TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, FALSIFICATION, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER O.R.C. SECTION 2935.09 AND 2935.10 AND CRIMINAL RULE (3).

ON OCTOBER 31, 2007 APPELLANT FILED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST FRANKLIN COUNTY PROSECUTOR MS. JENNIFER MALOON FOR TAMPERING WITH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, EVIDENCE, FALSIFICATION, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " BOTH CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS HAVE NOT BEEN HEARD BUT ARE BEING HIDDEN BY THE SYSTEM.

ON JANUARY 18, 2008 THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT CONSOLIDATED APPELLANT'S POST-CONVICTION APPEAL WITH HIS DIRECT APPELLANT HAS CASE NUMBERS 06AP-12-1230 AND 07AP-728

ON MAY 15 THE APPEALS COURT RENDERED ITS DECISION AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION

ON MAY 19, 2008 SAID DECISION WAS JOURNALIZED AND RECEIVED BY APPELLANT PRO SE

ON JUNE 12 TH 2008 THE APPELLANT SENT THIS HONORABLE COURT HIS NOTICE OF APPEAL A COPY OF SAID DECISION BY THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT, AND HIS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.

(BUT FIRST THE APPELLANT ON MAY 22, 2008 SENT BACK TO THE APPEALS COURT A MOTION UNDER APP RULE 26 (A) RECONSIDERATION, BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS ALL THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND BASED IT OPINION ON FALSIFIED INFORMATION, AND A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE STATES WITNESSES.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 1 : THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL FOR (1) TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE PRE-TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL MOTIONS. A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, AND THE TESTIMONY RESULTING THEREFROM. (2) WHEN COUNSEL ALLOWED, AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURED TESTIMONY/FALSIFICATION GIVEN BY STATE WITNESSES. (3) FOR FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY OBJECTIONS TO THE IMPROPER AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTION DURING TRIAL, AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) WHEN COUNSEL AIDED IN EXCLUDING EXCLUPATORY EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT FROM BEING PLACED INTO EVIDENCE. (5) FOR NOT REQUESTING THE LESSER INCLUDED DEGREE OF BURGLARY INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE HAD NOLLIED THE THEFT OFFENSE. (6) FOR FAILING TO REQUEST AN EYEWITNESS EXPERT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE. (7) FOR NOT FILING A AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF COURT COST BEING IMPOSED.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT.

APPELLANT SUBMITS THAT WHENEVER COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL FAILS TO CONDUCT PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATIONS, FILE PRE-TRIAL OR POST-TRIAL MOTIONS ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT, THE DEFENDANT IS UNDOUBTABLY DENIED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW THAT IS GUARANTEED BY THE 6st AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. IN THE CASE AT BAR, DEFENSE COUNSEL DENIED APPELLANT A ADEQUATE DEFENSE BY FAILING TO FILE A PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE IDENTIFICATION MADE BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM WHO WEARS GLASSES, AND MADE SUCH IDENTIFICATION FROM APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AWAY IN THE DARK AT THE REQUEST OF THE COLUMBUS POLICE. AND THE ALLEGED VICTIM WHO TESTIFIED THAT HE NEVER SAW THE SUSPECTS FACE (TR 39) AND THAT TO THE BEST THAT HE COULD MAKE OUT THE SUSPECT WAS WEARING ALL DARK COLOR, WITH A WHITE HAT ON (TR 29) HOWEVER DO TO THE LACK OF INVESTIGATION , AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS THIS MATTER WENT TO TRIAL WHERE THE DEFENBE COUNSEL ALLOWED THIS WITNESS TO FALSELY TESTIFY. IN THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S CONVERSATION WITH THE 911 OPERATOR ON THE NIGHT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME THE ALLEGED VICTIM TOLD THE OPERATOR THAT HE WAS SLEEP AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND WAS AWAKEN BY THE SOUND OF SOMEONE WALKING AROUND IN HIS HOUSE (SEE APPENDIX PAGE 37) HOWEVER AT TRIAL THIS SAME WITNESS TESTIFIED

THAT HE WAS NEVER SLEEP BUT WAS UP ALL NIGHT WATCHING T.V. (TR 23)

SEE STRICKLAND AT 680 QUOTING ROSE-VS-LUNDY 455 U.S. 509 WHICH STATES ;

THE COURTS HAS ALMOST ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THAT COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE KEY EVIDENCE OR TO MAKE A REASONABLE DECISION THAT A PARTICULAR INVESTIGATION IS NOT NECESSARY CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AN THUS PRECLUDES ANY ARGUMENT THAT COUNSEL'S COURSE OF ACTION WAS BASED UPON A LEGIMATE TRIAL STRATEGIC CHOICE, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCONCERN A STRATEGY IN COUNSEL'S OMISSION, ONLY NEGLIGENCE.

ALSO SEE MANSON-VS-ARIJON 504 F.2d 1345-1351 (9TH CIR 1974). ** IN THE CASE AT BAR DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND REQUEST AN EXPERT WITNESS (EYE-WITNESS) DENIED APPELLANT ANY FORM OF DEFENSE, AS THE DEFENSE WAS MISTAKEN IDENTITY. IN THE CASE AT BAR THE STATES ENTIRE CASE WAS BASED UPON THE IDENTIFICATION MADE BY A YOUNG ADMITEDLY FEARFUL COLLAGE STUDENT WHO WEARS GLASSES (TR 26) FROM APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AWAY (TR 41) IN THE DARK (TR 55) AND ALLEGEDLY BASED UPON CLOTHING THAT HE TESTIFIED HE TOLD POLICE HE THINKS HE SAW THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT (TR 42) APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT IT IS A MATTER OF DUE PROCESS THAT A INDIGENT DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECIEVE THE "RAW MATERIALS" AND BASIC TOOLS" OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE, SEE STATE-VS-SARGENT CITED AT 864 NE.2d 155 (2006-OHIO-6823)(OHIO 1DIST). APPELLANT REQUEST THIS COURTS PERMISSION TO FILE A MERIT BRIEF ON THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO 2,

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED HIM OF HIS 5TH,6TH,13TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN (1). THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED FALSE MATERIAL EVIDENCE/FALSE TESTIMONY BY STATE WITNESSES (2) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY ALLOWED AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURY/FALSE TESTIMONY BY STATE WITNESSES (3) THE PROSECUTOR REPEATEDLY MADE IMPROPER, AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS TO THE JURY DURING TRIAL, AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY CONCEALED FAVORABLE EVIDENCE FROM THE DEFENSE IN IT'S DISCOVERY, AND THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS, AND FAILED TO PRESERVE EXCLUPATORY EVIDENCE.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IS ALWAYS DENIED A DEFENDANT WHEN A PROSECUTOR ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW, AND KNOWINGLY ALLOWS FALSE TESTIMONY AND USE FALSE DOCUMENTS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A CONVICTION.

THE APPELLANT STATES THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED A FALSE ARREST REPORT CONCERNING THE APPELLANT'S ARREST WEIGHT ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION TO AID THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION . THE PROSECUTOR ALLOWED THE ALLEGED VICTIM TO FALSELY TESTIFY THAT ON THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT THAT HE WAS NEVER SLEEP BUT WAS WATCHING T.V. AT THE TIME IN ORDER TO ADD CREDIBILITY TO HIS IDENTIFICATION (SEE APPENDIX PAGE 37) AND TR PAGE 23)

THE PROSECUTOR THAN ALLOWED THE COLUMBUS POLICE OFFICER SGT SHINAVER TO FALSELY TESTIFY THAT HE WITNESSED THE APPELLANT THROW A WHITE BAG (TR 85) DESPITE THIS EVENT NEVER BEING DOCUMENTED IN THE OFFICER'S POLICE REPORT MADE OUT ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION. SEE APPENDIX PAGE 38).

THE PROSECUTOR FURTHER ALLOWED THE STATE WITNESS MS. AMY HANES TO FALSELY TESTIFY THAT SOMEONE BY THE NAME OF HARRIET HILL CAME TO THE FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL TO GETHER APPELLANT'S CLOTHES BEFORE THE PROSECUTION COULD GETHER THEM FOR EVIDENCE, WHICH WAS COMPLETELY UNTRUE, AS NO ONE BY THAT NAME EVER CAME TO VISIT APPELLANT, AND THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT MAKE SUCH A ATTEMPT TO GET APPELLANT'S ARREST CLOTHES UNTIL AFTER THE APPELLANT HAD TOLD HIS ATTORNEY THAT THE VICTIM HAD STATED THE WRONG COLORS OF THE CLOTHING THE DAY BEFORE TRIAL, THIS IS SIGNIFICANT, BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR GAVE THE JURY THE IMPRESSION THAT APPELLANT WAS ATTEMPTING TO HIDE THE CLOTHES OPPOSE TO SIMPLY GETTING READY FOR TRIAL. SEE APPENDIX PAGES (39-40). APPELLANT REQUEST THIS COURTS PERMISSION TO SUBMIT A ACTUAL BRIEF ON THIS MATTER, AND ASK THIS COURT TO SEE NAPUE-VS-ILLINOIS (1959) 369 U.S. 264,79 S.CT. 1173, 3 L.Ed 2d 1217 AqURS SUPRA AT 427 U.S. AT 103, 96 S.CT AT 2397; AND STATE-VS-DEFRONZO CITED AT 394 NE.2d 1027 AT (10) AND (12).

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO.3

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HIS CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF BURGLARY UNDER STATUTE 2911.12 (A)(2) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH DENIED HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN THE STATE RELIEVES ITSELF OF HAVING TO PROVE EACH ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT.

THE APPELLANT SUBMITS TO THIS COURT THAT HIS CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS WHERE THE STATE IS ALLOWED TO USE FALSE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE. FURTHER APPELLANT STATES THAT IN THIS CASE SUBJUDICE , AND OHIO AGREES , THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO DIRECT EVIDENCE LINKING THE APPELLANT TO THE CRIME (TR 117-118) THE STATES ENTIRE CASE RESTED ON A HIGHLY SUGGESTIVE AND IMPROPER SHOW-UP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY COLUMBUS POLICE. SAID IDENTIFICATION HOWEVER RENDERED THE FOLLOWING TESTIMONY BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM. (1) THAT THE APPELLANT MATCHES THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON I THONKHT I SAW ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION, AND I TOLD THE DETECTIVE THAT THAT NIGHT (TR 42) SEE SLAIVAN-VS-LOUISIANA 508 U.S. 275,277-278,113 S.CT 2078-2080,124 L.Ed 2d 162 ¶ 1993); TOMLINØVS-MYERS 30 F2d 1235,1241 (9TH CIR 1986);MARDEN-VS-MOORE 847 F.2d 1536,1546 (11TH CIR 1988); RAHEEM-VS-KELLY 257 F.3d 122,139 (2nd CIR 2001) AND RE WINSHIP 397 U.S. 358,371-372, 90 S.CT 1068 25, L.Ed 2d 368. THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT A DEFENDANT CAN NOT BE FOUND GUILTY BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF REASONABLE DOUBT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHEN THERES NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, NO CORROBERATING WITNESS, AND THE SOLE EYEWITNESS DEMONSTRATES A ZERO DEGREE OF CERTAINTY AS TO THE APPELLANT ACTUALLY BEING THE SUSPECT. (TR 42)(51) APPELLANT REQUEST THIS COURTS PERMISSION TO SUBMIT HIS ARGUMENT ON THIS ISSUE IN A BRIEF.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO# 4.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DØCRETION AND COMMITTED PLAIN EROR ON SIX OCCASSIONS IN THIS CASE (1) WHEN IT RULED AGAINST THE APPELLANTS CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATES CASE. (2) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S AND DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DELIBERATE EXCLUSION OF THE POLICE REPORT WHICH WAS EXCLUPATORY TO APPELLANT. (3) FOR NOT INCLUDING A LESSER DEGREE OF BURGLARY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE HAD NOLLIED THE THEFT OFFENSE WHICH WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT TO THE (A)(2) BURGLARY. (4) FOR NOT MAKING AN OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL AND PROSECUTOR HAD CONSPIRED TO CONVICT APPELLANT, (5)

WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE STATE TO PROCEED TO PROSECUTE EVEN AFTER THE ALLEGED VICTIM FAILED TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT AS BEING THE SUSPECT IN VIOLATION OF EVIDENCE RULE 901. (6) FOR ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO BE CONVICTED ON A DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOLLE PROSEQUI HAD OCCURED.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT.

APPELLANT CONTENDS THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW, BY VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND STATUTES . IN THE CASE AT BAR THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO DIRECT EVIDENCE LINKING APPELLANT TO THE CRIME (TR 117-118), AND LISTENED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM TESTIFY THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE APPELLANT WAS THE PERSON HE SAW THAT NIGHT BECAUSE HE NEVER SAW THE SUSPECTS FACE, BUT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS MERELY BUILT LIKE THE PERSON HE THOUGHT HE SAW LEAVING HIS HOME ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION, AND HE TOLD THE DETECTIVE THAT THAT NIGHT (TR 42), AND THE TRIAL COURT STILL OVERRULED THE DEFENSE CRIM RULE 29 MOTION (2) THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RULE ON DEFENDANT MOTION (EXCUSE ME) OBJECTION TO THE POLICE REPORT BEING EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE, DESPITE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REASONS FOR NOT WANTING THE POLICE REPORT ADMITTED, THE DEFENDANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO OFFER HIS OWN EVIDENCE TO THE COURT, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT APPELLANT HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCUSED DEFENSE COUNSEL WITH HAVING CONSPIRED WITH THE PROSECUTION TO PRODUCE THE CONVICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE. (TR 123-124) (3) THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LESSER DEGREE OF BURGLARY AFTER THE PROSECUTION NOLLIED THE THEFT CHARGE, BECAUSE IT WAS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT TO THE F-2 BURGLARY CHARGE, AND CONLD NOT BE REINSERTED BACK INTO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS IF THE NOLLE HAD NEVER TAKEN PLACE, WITHOUT DOUBLE JEOPARDY. (4) FOR NOT MAKING A OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE, MERELY ASKING IF ITS TRUE IS NOT A INQUIRY (5) WHEN THE VICTIM FAILED TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION VIOLATING EVIDENCE Rule 901 IN LIGHT OF THE FACT HE NEVER MADE A POSITIVE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION (6) WHEN IT ALLOWED APPELLANT TO BE CONVICTED ON THE F-2 AFTER THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE WAS NOLLIED.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO 5.

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HIS CONVICTION AS DEFINED BY O.R.C. SECTION 2911.12 (A)(2) WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT.

THE APPELLANT ARGUES TO THIS COURT THAT THIS CONVICTION DEFILES THE CONCEPT BEHIND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW, AS WELL AS THE MEANING OF GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS WAS DISCUSSED IN PROPOSITION OF LAW NUMBER THREE.

ONLY HERE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ARGUMENT TURNS TO A QUESTION OF LAW, AND LEGAL EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.**** LEGAL EVIDENCE IS DEFINED BY BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY AS; ALL ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BOTH ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY OF SUCH CHARACTER THAT IT "PROVES A FACT" AT ISSUE RATHER THEN MERELY RASIES SUSCIPION OR CONJECTURE. *** IN THE CASE AT BAR THERE WAS NO LEGAL EVIDENCE AS THE TRIAL COURT AGREED WHEN IT STATED ON THE RECORDS (TR 117-118) THAT THERES CERTAINLY NO DIRECT EVIDENCE LINKING THE DEFENDANT TO THE CRIME, AND THE IDENTIFICATION IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL. THEREFORE, THIS CONVICTION INVOKES THE NO EVIDENCE RULE, AS THERE WAS NO FINGERPRINTS, CRIMINAL TOOLS, OR CORROBERATING WITNESS TO THE EVENT IN QUESTION. JUST THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM WHICH STATED THAT APPELLANT MATCHES THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON HE THOUGHT HE SAW (TR 42) SEE SPEIGNER-VS-JAGO 603 F.2d 1208, (1979) DISCUSSING IN RE WINSHIP 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.CT. 1068, 25 L.ED 2d 368 (1970). APPELLANT REQUEST PERMISSION TO SUBMIT A MERIT BRIEF AND FULLY ARGUE THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO HAS ADOPTED THE FEDERAL COURTS STANDARD FOR REVIEW, SET FORTH IN U.S.-VS-COLLON, 426 F.2d 939 (6TH CIR 1970); AND STATE-VS-HANCOCK 48 OHIO ST.2d 147, 151-152, 358 NE.2d 273,276 (1976); AND U.S.-VS-RAVICH 421 F.2d 1190, 1204 n 10 (2nd CIR) CERT DEN'D 400 U.S. 834, 91 S.CT 69,27 L.Ed 2d 66 (1970). THE APPELLANT STATES THAT ANYTIME A ALLEGED VICTIM TO A CRIME STATES IN HIS TESTIMONY THAT HE NEVER SAW THE SUSPECTS FACE (TR 39) AND THAT HE WEARS GLASSES (TR 45) AND THAT HIS IDENTIFICATION WAS DONE FROM APPROXIMATELY 100

YARDS AWAY (TR 52) IN THE DARK (TR 55) AND THAT THE APPELLANT MERELY MATCHED THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON HE THOUGHT HE SAW THAT NIGHT, AND HE TOLD THE DETECTIVE THAT THAT NIGHT (TR 42) THERE CANNOT BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BY LAW TO CONVICT, AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS NOT OF SUCH CHARACTER TO JUSTIFY A JURY'S FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, BASED ON INFERENCES DRAWN FROM OTHER INFERENCES, AND NO FACTS.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO:6

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE STATE OF OHIO LACKED PROSEDURAL, AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO PLACE APPELLANT ON TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF CONST, AMEND 6 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 19 10 RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCED- URES RULE 3.

IN THE CASE AT BAR THE APPELLANT WENT TO TRIAL ON ONE COUNT OF BURGLARY, AND ONE COUNT OF THEFT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE SAME EVENT. DURING THE JURY TRIAL, AND JURT PRIOR TO DELIBERATIONS, THE PROSECUTOR REQUESTED THAT A NOLLE PROSEQUI BE ENTERED ON THE THEFT OFFENSE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE APPELLANT, THE NOLLE WAS NOT DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRIMINAL RULE 48 (A) (b) OR 2941,33 WHICH MANDATES THAT SUCH BE DONE IN OPEN COURT, WITH GOOD CAUSE SHOWN BY THE PROSECUTOR, AND THAT SAID REASONS BE PLACED IN THE RECORDS, ALSO THE COURT REASONS FOR EXCEPTING OR REJECTING SAID REQUEST MUST ALSO APPEAR. A NOLLE ENTERED CONTRARY TO THESE SECTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW, AND ARE INVALID. FURTHER A NOLLE COMPLETELY TERMINATES THE PROSECUTION, AND A DEFENDANT MAYNOT BE FOUND GUILTY IN THAT SAME PROCEEDING. FURTHER WAS THE NOLLE ILLEGALLY ENTERED, AND EXCEPTED BY THE COURT, AND THAN ILLEGALLY USED AS THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT CAUSING THE APPELLANT TO HAVE SUFFERED DOUBLE JEOPARDY. STATE-VS-SUTTON 64 OHIO APP,105,411 NE.2d 818 (1980); STATE-VS-FISCHER 20 OHIO APP.3d 50, 484 NE.2d 221. APPELLANT REQUEST THIS COURTS PERMISSION TO SUBMIT A BRIEF ARGUING THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO: 7

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE APPELLANTE COURT DENIED HIM DUE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN (4) SEPERATE INSTANCES, AND THUS VIOLATED HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT.

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

THE APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT THE APPELLATE COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY DENYING THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW APPELLATE COUNSEL IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THUS VIOLATING EVERY CONCEIVABLE PROCEDURAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THATS AFFORDED TO A INDIGENT APPELLANT WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT KNEW THAT THERE WAS A VERY SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN COUNSEL AND APPELLANT, BUT STILL FORCED APPELLANT WHO HAS VERY LIMITED EDUCATION TO PROCEED IN PRO SE, THAN SUCCESSFULLY ELIMINATED THE PROCESS OF ORAL ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED. APPELLANT HAD FILED COUNTLESS COMPLAINTS WITHIN THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS REQUESTING THAT NEW COUNSEL BE APPOINTED STARTING AS FAR BACK AS 11/30/2006 UP UNTIL 06/19/2007 WHICH THE APPELLATE COURT PROMPTLY, AND REPEATEDLY DENIED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION. THE APPELLATE COURT STATED THAT "IF" THEY WERE TO DISMISS APPELLATE COUNSEL APPELLANT WOULD HAVE TO PROCEED IN PRO SE, ACCORDING TO PRUITT AT 57, 18 OBR AT 170, 480 NE.2d AT 507 AND BROWN-VS-CRAVEN (C.A.9 1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 ; AND UNITED STATES-VS-YOUNG (C.A.5, 1973) 482 F.2d 993 995 IT STATES IN PERTINENT PART;

THE GROUNDS FOR OBTAINING NEWLY APPOINTED COUNSEL EXIST ONLY UPON "A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE" SUCH AS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNICATION, OR A IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT WHICH LEADS TO AN APPARRENT UNJUST RESULT.

ON JUNE 5TH 2007 APPELLATE COUNSEL SUBMITTED A MEANINGLESS MERIT BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT WHICH STATED (6) MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS CONCERNING THE EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY GIVEN AT THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL. THE APPELLANT HAD FILE COMPLAINTS WITH THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION, AND A LAW SUIT AGAINST THIS ATTORNEY, BUT YET THE APPEALS COURT REFUSED TO REPLACE COUNSEL AND THE FAILURE OF THE APPEALS COURT TO HONOR THE APPELLANT'S TIMELY REQUESTS AMOUNTED TO A COMPLETE DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, AND TO DUE PROCESS, AS SUCH WAS A ABUSE OF DISCRETION. HOW CAN A UNEDUCATED APPELLANT BE EXSPECTED TO LEARN THE RULE OF APPEAL PROCEDURES AND ARGUE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS THAT OCCURED TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT? THE APPELLANT INFORMED THE COURT SUBSEQUENT TO IT RULING BEING

MADE ON HIS VERY FIRST MOTION.

ON JUNE 15, 2008 THE APPELLANT FILED A MOTION TO APPOINT NEW COUNSEL OR, AND CLEARLY STATED THAT THE TRANSCRIPTS SHALL BE KEPT OR DELIEVERED TO THE CLERK OF COURTS OFFICE UNTIL THE APPELLATE COURT DECIDED TO APPOINT NEW COUNSEL OR " FORCE " THE APPELLANT TO PROCEED IN PRO SE" THERE WAS OR IS NOTHING AMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE APPELLANT'S DESIRE TO HAVE NEW COUNSEL APPOINTED, YET THE APPELLATE COURT TWISTED THE MOTIONS INTENT AND LATER SAID THAT IT IS BECAUSE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED COUNSEL THAT APPELLANT NO LONGER HAD A RIGHT TO ORAL ARGUMENTS.

INSTANCE OF ABUSE NUMBER TWO

THE APPELLANT SUBMITS THAT THE APPELLATE COURT DENIED OR DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO STRIKE THE APPELLEE'S RESPONSE BRIEF DENIED HIM A FULL AND FAIR APPELLATE REVIEW. ON JUNE 8, 2007 AND ON OCTOBER 23, 2007 THE APPELLEE FOR THE STATE OF OHIO MS. JENNIFER MALOON FILED BRIEFS IN WHICH MIS-STATE THE EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY GIVEN AT THE ACTUAL JURY TRIAL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD THE APPELLATE COURT. THEREFORE ON OCTOBER 26, 2007 AND AGAIN ON DECEMBER 31, 2007, THE APPELLANT BROUGHT FORTH THOSE MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT THROUGH HIS MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEE'S BRIEFS.

APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS WERE PROMPTLY DENIED WITHOUT EXPLANATION DESPITE SAID OBJECTION BEING MADE ACCORDING TO RULE, AND WITH JUSTIFYING REASONS AS TO THE NEED TO BE STRIKEN. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPEAL PROCESS BECAUSE WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENTS, THE APPELLATE COURT WAS ALLOWED THE OPPORTUNITY TO MISINTERPRET, ALTER, AND REDEFINE THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE GIVEN AT TRIAL AND BASE THEIR DECISION UPON THAT FALSIFIED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY APPELLEE, THIS IN ESSENCE VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S 1ST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND ALSO VIOLATED APP. RULE 12) AS THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT RULE OR ADDRESS EACH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. BY THIS ACTION, THE APPEALS PROCESS BECAME JUST A MEANINGLESS RITUAL.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE/ OR APPEAL YOU HAVE A PERSON WHO CLAIMED HE IS ACTUALLY INNOCENT OF THE CRIME BEING DENIED EVERY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN THE WORLD, AND EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE IT.

APPELLANT CAN DO NO MORE THAN ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES AND STILL HIS

OBJECTIONS WERE BEING DENIED, AND HIS PROOF IGNORED THAT HIS CONVICTION WAS BASED UPON FALSIFICATION ON EACH LEVEL OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. SEE HASSEN-VS-PROGRESSIVE INS CO. 142 OHIO APP.3d 671, 756 NE.2d 745 OHIO APP TENTH DISTRICT 2001). THE APPELLANT / APPEALS COURT OBVIOUSLY IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE HAS FAILED TO PERFORM SUCH A DUTY AS TO DETECT AND DISREGARD THE FALSE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT APPELLANT'S TRIAL, AND SUCH DERELICTION OF DUTY IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW UNDER BOTH THE OHIO AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS. FOR THE ABOVE STATED REASONS APPELLANT REQUESTS THIS HONORABLE COURT TO REVERSE THE APPELLATE COURT'S RULING AND GRANT A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER.

IN THE THIRD INSTANCE OF APPELLATE COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION

THE APPELLANT SUBMITS THAT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRORED IN RULING UPON THE ISSUE THAT THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS NOT AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. ***** APPELLANT STATES THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE LOWER APPELLATE COURT TO WEIGH THE EVIDENCE IN WHICH WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL, AND NOT TO MERELY RELINQUISH THAT ASPECT OF REVIEW, BY STATING OR, USING THE EXCUSE THAT THE JURY IS THE SOLE DETERMINATORS OF THE FACTS BECAUSE THEY WERE THERE, AND WITNESSED THE Demeanor OF THE WITNESS, BECAUSE A WITNESS STILL CAN LIE, AND BE CONVINCING DOING SO. SEE TANZI-VS-NEW YORK CENTRAL R.R. CO 155 OHIO ST.149,98 NE.2d 39,24 ALR.2d 1151,44 O.O. 140 OHIO, MARCH 21, 1951; AND WARD-SUGAR-VS-COLLINS WL 3030981, 2006-OHIO-5589, OHIO APP 8TH DIST (NO.87546). APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT WHEN A APPELLATE COURT DELIBERATELY IGNORES THE FALSEHOOD THATS PRESENTED TO IT WITHIN THE BRIEF AND TRANSCRIPTS OF APPELLEE IT SHOWS NOT JUST AN INCORRIGIBLE DEFIANCE TOWARDS THE VERY CONCEPT OF JUSTICE BUT, IT DENIES APPELLANT'S A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. CLEARLY THERE WAS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL LINKING APPELLANT TO THE CRIME WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE TRIAL COURT (TR 117 118) BUT THERE WAS ALSO NO LEGAL, CREDIBLE, RELIABLE EVIDENCE OR CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION MADE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS THE SUSPECT. THE USE OF MORAL CERTAINTY TO CONVICT OFFENDS THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. THE APPELLATE COURT IN INSTANCE NO FOUR, ** ERRORED IN IT'S RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK PROCEDURAL AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AS WELL AS THE ISSUE OF DOUBLE

JEOPARDY. CRIM R. 48 (A)(B) AND 2941.33 SPECIFICALLY MANDATES THAT A ~~NOLLE~~ NOLLE PROSEQUI MAY BE ENTERED BY THE PROSECUTOR "BEFORE JEOPARDY HAS ATTACHED, WITH GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, "IN OPEN COURT"". A NOLLE PROSEQUI ENTERED CONTRARY TO THESE SECTIONS IS INVALID.

CLEARLY IN THE CASE AT BAR A NOLLE WAS ENTERED BY THE PROSECUTION JUST PRIOR TO THE JURY DELIBERATING ON THE CASE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE APPELLANT, AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO OPEN COURT EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE PROSECUTOR DECIDED TO NOLLE THE SECOND COUNT. VIOLATING RULES AND STATUTES***

FURTHER APPELLANT STATE THAT A NOLLE PROSEQUI ENTERED BY THE PROSECUTOR TERMINATES THE PROSECUTION OF A CASE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE APPELLANT'S CASE THE TRIAL COURT LOST PROCEDURAL AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO PROCEED WITH THE JURY TRIAL WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING REINDICTMENT.

THE APPELLATE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE MAYNOT INFER WHY THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT WAS NOLLIED BY THE PROSECUTOR OR, EXCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COURTS ACTIONS IN THE RECORDS.*** GOOD CAUSE SHOWN IS DEFINED AS A SUBSTANTIAL REASON AND ONE THAT AFFORDS A LEGAL EXCUSE SEE STATE-VS-BROWN 1988 (38 OHIO ST.3d 305,308.

APPELLANT SUBMITS THAT HE SUFFERED DOUBLE JEOPARDY ON THE THEFT BECAUSE, THE THEFT WAS VOLUNTEERILY DISMISSED BY THE PROSECUTION AND THAN ILLEGALLY REINSERTED BACK INTO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY CHARGE. THIS IS PROSECUTORIAL MANIPULATION AND A ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION WHEN NIEGTHETTER HAD THE AUTHORITY TO NOLLE A CHARGE AT THAT POINT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

FOR THE ABOVE STATED REASONS THE APPELLANT REQUEST THAT THIS COURT REVERSE HIS CONVICTION AND FIND THIS ERROR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE VARIOUS GROUNDS SET FORTH.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO. 8

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION WAS A ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND VIOLATED APPELLANTS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DELIBERATELY IGNORED PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS, AND EVIDENTARY PROOF THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWING USED FALSE EVID, AND TESTIMONY, AND WHEN THE TRIAL COURT RULES ON A PEWITION WITHOUT REVIEWING THE COMPLETE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS IN VIOLATION OF O.R.C. SECTION 2953.21 (C).

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT WHENEVER A TRIAL COURT FAILS TO ADHERE TO THE RULES OF COURT, OR STATUTES REQUIREMENTS, THAT COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION. IN THE CASE AT BAR THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON ~~MMF~~ AUGUST 10, 2007. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RECIEVE THE OPENING AND CLOSING PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPTS UNTIL NOVEMBER 2007 BECAUSE THE TRANSCRIPTS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY TRANSCRIBED UNTIL THAN AS CAN BE VERIFIED BY THE TENTH DISTRICT APPELLANE COURT, WHO ARRANGED FOR THE TRANSCRIPTS. THE TRIAL COURT COMPLETELY IGNORED THE AFFIDAVITS SENT IN WHICH WERE MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE'S UPON WHICH THE PETITION FOR RELIEF WAS BASED, AND THE NO COUNTER AFFIDAVIT WERE FILED BY THE PROSECUTIONS. THIS VIOLATED CRIM R. 2953.21 (C) SEE STATE-VS-EPPINGER 91 OHIO ST.3d 158,166, 2001-OHIO-247,743 NE.2d 881. AND THE APPELLANT WISHES TO BRIEF THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE TO THIS COURT, AND RESERVE FOR FEDERAL REVIEW.

PROPOSITION OF LAW NO 9

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THUS DENYING PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE STATE OF OHIO MAYNOT REST UPON GENERAL DENIALS OF A PETITIONER ALLEGATIONS WHEN PETITIONER REQUEST A COURT FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, THE STATE MUST SEND EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT THE MOVING PARTIES CLAIMS, AFFIDAVITS, AND EVIDENCE. SEE REYNOLDSBUGH-VS-MURPHY (OHIO 1992) 65 OHIO ST.3d 356,604 NE.2d 138 STATING THAT A MANDATORY DUTY ON THE TRIAL COURT IS PLACED TO THOROUGHLY EXAMINE ALL APPROPREATE MATERIAL FILED BY THE PARTIES****FAILURE TO COMPLY IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. IN THE CASE AT BAR THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH TO DETERMINE THE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS, THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANTS RIGHTS TO LITEGATE MEANINGFULLY, AND APPELLANT'S CONSTIUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.

CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT

THE APPELLANT SUBMITS TO THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT THE UNITED STATES NOR THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONS CAN HOLD ANY MEANING "IF" THE LOWER COURTS AREN'T MADE TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS WHO COMES BEFORE IT, AND ARE ALLOWED TO IGNORE RULES OF COURT, STATUTES, AND EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN OR, JUSTIFY AFFIRMING CONVICTIONS. IN THE CASE AT BAR, THERE WAS NO LEGAL EVIDENCE IN WHICH TO BASE A CONVICTION ON, LESS KNOWING EVIDENCE TO AFFIRM A CONVICTION. A REVIEWING COURT IS NOT SUPPOSE TO BE A COURT THAT RUBBER STAMPS THE ERRORS OR DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT. " IF " THAT WERE THE CASE WHY HAVE AN APPEALS COURT ? THE APPELLATE COURTS PRIMARY REASONS FOR AFFIRMING THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS, (1) THE ALLEGED VICTIM ABSOLUTELY IDENTIFIED APPELLANT AS THE PERSON HE SAW LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE WITH A WHITE BAG (TR 32) YET ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS. THE ALLEGED VICTIM REPEATEDLY STATED THAT HE NEVER SAW THE SUSPECTS FACE (TR 39) TO THE BEST THAT HE COULD ~~REMEMBER~~* TELL THE SUSPECT HAD ON ALL DARK COLORS (TR 51) AND THAT IT WAS VERY DARK OUTSIDE THAT NIGHT (TR 55) THAT HIS IDENTIFICATION WAS DONE AT A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AWAY ~~MAYBE~~ A LITTLE LESS (TR 41) THAT HE WEARS GLASSES (TR 45) THAT HE WAS AFFRAID AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (TR 26) AND THAT HE NEVER GAVE A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE SUSPECT UNTIL 40 MINUTES AFTER HE HAD TALKED TO THE POLICE THAT NIGHT. THIS ALLEGED VICTIM FALSIFIED TESTIMONY. (1) HE TOLD THE 911 OPERATOR THAT HE WAS SLEEP BUT AWAKEN BY THE SOUNDS OF SOMEONE WALKING AROUND INSIDE HIS HOME (APPENDIX PAGE 37) BUT TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS NEVER SLEEP (TR 23) HE TESTIFIED THAT HE TOLD THE COLUMBUS POLICE THAT NIGHT THAT THE SUSPECT WAS 6 FEET 6'1 INCHES TALL (TR 42) HOWEVER THIS WAS ONLY AFTER SEEING THE APPELLANT IN THE COURTROOM, BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM ALSO TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS NEVER ASKED ABOUT THE SUSPECTS WEIGHT OR HEIGHT (TR 50), AND THIS INFORMATION IS NOWHERE IN THE POLICE REPORT, OR THE 911 TRANSCRIBED ~~ON~~ PHONE CONVERSATION. THE COLUMBUS POLICE, HE TESTIFIED THAT HE WITNESSED SEEING APPELLANT THROW A BIG WHITE BAG FULL OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES(TR 78) YET HE COULD NOT SAY THAT THE BAG HE SAW APPELLANT THROW HAD THE ITEMS FROM THE RESIDENCE HOME (TR 85) THERE WERE SO MANY LIES BEING TOLD THAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS PARTICULAR TRIAL CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED RELIABLE, NOR JUST, AND THE APPELLANT URGES THIS COURT TO REVERSE THIS CONVICTION .

CERIFICATE OF SERVICE/PROOF OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A TRUE COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE OF APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION WAS SENT TO THE FRANKLIN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE LOCATED AT 373 SOUTH HIGH STREET, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215 IN CARE OF MS. JENNIFER MALDON FRANKLIN COUNTY ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ON THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2008 BY REGULAR U.S. MAIL SERVICE.

FURTHER;

APPELLANT SUBMITS THAT A TRUE COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE OF APPEAL, AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT WAS SENT TO THE OHIO SUPREME COURTS CLERKS OFFICE ALONG WITH A NOTORIZED AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY, SIGNED BY THE CHILlicothe CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION IN WHICH THE APPELLANT RESIDES ON THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2008 BY REGULAR U.S. MAIL LOCATED AT 65 SOUTH FRONT STREET, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215.

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
2008 MAY 15 PM 1:52
CLERK OF COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:	
	:	
v.	:	Nos. 06AP-1230 and
	:	07AP-728
	:	(C P C No. 06CR-3798)
Robert L. Hillman,	:	
	:	(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant.	:	

O P I N I O N

Rendered on May 15, 2008

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and *Jennifer Maloon*, for appellee.

Robert L. Hillman, pro se.

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

McGRATH, P. J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert Hillman ("appellant"), appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12 entered pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty to the same. Appellant's direct appeal was filed through counsel. Thereafter, appellant filed a supplemental brief, pro se, based upon "inaccurate trial transcripts." Appellant also filed, pro se, an appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief without

a hearing. This appeal was consolidated with the direct appeal from his conviction, and the consolidated appeals are now before the court for review.

{¶2} The charge herein stems from a burglary that occurred on May 7, 2006, at 186 East 16th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio. The following facts were adduced at trial. Derek Haggerty lived at 186 E 16th Avenue (hereafter "E. 16th"). At 2 a.m. on May 7, 2006, Mr Haggerty's roommates were out of town, and he was lying in his bedroom watching television when he heard "footsteps" and "a lot of walking back and forth." (Tr. at 22.) After hearing the back door to the house open from the inside, Mr. Haggerty looked outside and saw a man exiting the house through the back door carrying a white bag.

{¶3} Mr Haggerty called 9-1-1, gave a description of the man he saw, and told the dispatcher to tell the police to go to the back of the house. While on the phone with the dispatcher, Mr. Haggerty told her the suspect was walking towards 17th Avenue, wearing dark clothing, carrying a white bag and wearing a white hat. Mr. Haggerty then saw a police officer arrive and begin looking for the suspect with a flashlight. Mr. Haggerty went outside, losing sight of the suspect for approximately "20 seconds." Id. at 31. Mr. Haggerty told the police officer the suspect went towards 17th Avenue, whereupon Mr Haggerty and the officer observed a person in front of a dumpster wearing "dark clothing and a light colored hat, a whitish colored hat." Id. at 32. The hat was described by Mr. Haggerty as "a toboggan type cap." Id. at 39. When asked if the person at the dumpster matched the description of the person he saw going into and out of his residence, Mr Haggerty replied "absolutely." Id. Mr. Haggerty identified the property in

the bag as belonging to him and his roommates.¹ Mr. Haggerty also noted after the burglary that a window to the residence was opened, though it was closed when he went to bed. Mr. Haggerty testified that no one gave this individual permission to be in the house that night or to take the property.

{¶4} Sergeant Steve Shinaver of the Columbus Police Department testified he was dispatched to a burglary call at E. 16th Avenue when he was seven or eight blocks from the scene. Upon arriving at the scene, Sgt. Shinaver saw appellant standing in front of a dumpster near E. 16th matching the description given by the 9-1-1 dispatcher, i.e., a black male wearing a white hat, dark clothing, and holding a white bag. When appellant saw Sgt. Shinaver, appellant threw the bag on the ground. When he approached appellant, Sgt. Shinaver observed a white bag containing miscellaneous items, such as CDs and DVDs, and a dark green blanket with video games and food items wrapped inside it. Sgt. Shinaver apprehended appellant for identification purposes. Thereafter, the victim, Mr. Haggerty, identified appellant. Mr. Haggerty also identified the items in the bag and the blanket as belonging to him and his roommates. A light gray cap with the letter "P" on the front and black trim was taken from appellant. Sgt. Shinaver also testified appellant was wearing a "dark green sweater or sweatshirt and a darker colored shirt underneath." *Id.* at 83.

{¶5} Detective Ronald Love of the Columbus Police Department testified that appellant did not live near E. 16th at the time of the burglary. Based on the victim's identification of appellant, Det. Love explained he did not find it necessary to attempt to

¹ The property consisted of two gaming systems, video games, DVDs, CDs, and miscellaneous food items

obtain fingerprints. Also, Det. Love explained he attempted to get the clothing appellant was wearing the night of his arrest, but was informed by the Franklin County jail that the clothing appellant had been wearing that night had been traded for clothing appellant needed for court. Therefore, the clothing appellant was wearing the night of his arrest was not available as evidence.

{¶6} On May 16, 2006, appellant was indicted on one count of burglary and one count of theft. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on August 2, 2006. A nolle prosequi was entered as to the theft count. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty of burglary. A pre-sentence investigation was ordered, and on August 17, 2006, appellant was sentenced to a seven-year determinate sentence.

{¶7} Through counsel, appellant asserts one assignment of error for our review:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶8} In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant asserts the following six assignments of error for our review:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL FOR (1) TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE PRE-TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL MOTION. A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE OUT OF COURT AND IN COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM AND, THE TESTIMONY RESULTING THEREFROM (2) WHEN COUNSEL ALLOWED AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURED TESTIMONY GIVEN BY STATE WITNESSES. (3) FOR FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY OBJECTIONS TO IMPROPER AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR DURING TRIAL

AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) WHEN COUNSEL AIDED IN EXCLUDING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT FROM BEING PLACED INTO EVIDENCE. (5) FOR NOT REQUESTING THE LESSER-INCLUDED DEGREE OF BURGLARY INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE NOLLE PROSECUTED THE THEFT ELEMENT. (6) FOR FAILING TO REQUEST AN EYEWITNESS EXPERT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE. (7) FOR NOT FILING AN AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF COURT COST BEING IMPOSED.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED HIM OF HIS 5TH, 6TH, 13TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN (1) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED FALSE MATERIAL EVIDENCE. (2) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY ALLOWED AND CONTRIBUTED TO PERJURED TESTIMONY BY STATE WITNESSES. (3) THE PROSECUTOR REPEATEDLY MADE IMPROPER AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS TO THE JURY DURING TRIAL AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS. (4) THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY CONCEALED FAVORABLE EVIDENCE FROM THE DEFENSE IN ITS DISCOVERY AND FROM THE JURY DELIBERATIONS AND FAILED TO PRESERVE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THIS CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF BURGLARY UNDER OHIO'S STATUTE 2911.12(A)(2) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE VIOLATING THE 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION AND, COMMITS PLAIN ERROR IN FIVE INSTANCES. (1) WHEN IT RULES AGAINST THE

APPELLANT'S CRIM. RULE 29 MOTION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE. (2) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILS TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DELIBERATE EXCLUSION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF THE POLICE REPORT. (3) FOR NOT INCLUDING IN ITS * * * INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AFTER THE STATE NOLLIED THE THEFT OFFENSE, WHICH WAS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT AND UNDERLINING OFFENSE OF THE BURGLARY (4) FOR NOT MAKING AN OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL AND PROSECUTOR HAD CONSPIRED TO PRODUCE THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT BY SHARING INFORMATION AND, COVERING UP THE CONSPIRACY. (5) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE STATE TO PROCEED TO PROSECUTE APPELLANT EVEN AFTER THE ALLEGED VICTIM FAILED TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION IN VIOLATION OF EVIDENCE RULE 901.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HIS CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF BURGLARY UNDER SECTION 2911.12(A)(2) WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 13TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE OHIO AND U S. CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE STATE OF OHIO LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO PLACE APPELLANT ON TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF CONST. AMEND 6, CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1§ 10 RULE OF CRIM PROC. RULE 3.

{9} During the pendency of his direct appeal, appellant filed on November 30, 2006, a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 On August 10, 2007,

the trial court denied appellant's postconviction petition. Appellant appealed this denial and brings the following three assignments of error for our review:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF HIS POST CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION WAS AN ABSOLUTE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND THUS VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND WHEN TRIAL COURT DELIBERATELY IGNORE PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS AND PROOF THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED FALSE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AND DENIES PETITION WITHOUT A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THUS VIOLATING THE APPELLANT'S 1ST AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND, THE RIGHTS TO BE HEARD BEFORE AN UNBIAS COURT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GRANTING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER CIVIL RULE 55 THUS VIOLATING THE APPELLANT'S 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR IS INCORPORATED INTO ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE WHICH IS THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED HIM HIS 5TH, 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS [sic] AND THAT SUCH ACTIONS WERE AN INFRINGEMENT OF SUCH NATURE THAT THEY WARRANTED POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

**AND WOULD CAUSE THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE AND
CONVICTION TO BE VOID OR VOIDABLE**

{¶10} For ease of discussion, we will first consider the seven assignments of error raised in appellant's direct appeal.

{¶11} In his assignment of error made through counsel, and his third and fifth assignments of error made pro se, appellant challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence pertaining to his conviction

{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio described the role of an appellate court presented with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in *State v. Jenks* (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus:

An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt (*Jackson v. Virginia* [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S Ct 2781, 61 L.Ed 2d 560, followed.)

{¶13} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient is a question of law, not fact. *State v. Thompkins* (1997), 78 Ohio St 3d 380, 386 In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must give "full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." *Jackson v. Virginia* (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S Ct. 2781. Consequently, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues primarily determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Yarbrough*, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, at ¶179, *State v. Thomas* (1982), 70 Ohio St 2d 79, 80 Thus,

a jury verdict will not be disturbed unless, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is apparent that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. *State v. Treesh* (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484; *Jenks, supra*.

{¶14} A manifest weight argument is evaluated under a different standard. "The weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered in a trial to support one side of the issue rather than the other." *State v. Brindley*, Franklin App. No. 01AP-926, 2002-Ohio-2425, at ¶16, citation omitted. In order for a court of appeals to reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must disagree with the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. *Thompkins, supra*, at 387. The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. *Id.*, quoting *State v. Martin* (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175.

{¶15} A defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was presented at trial. *State v. Raver*, Franklin App. No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, at ¶21. The determination of weight and credibility of the evidence is for the trier of fact. *State v. DeHass* (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. The rationale is that the trier of fact is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along

with the witnesses' manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses' testimony is credible. *State v. Williams*, Franklin App. No. 02AP-35, 2002-Ohio-4503, at ¶58; *State v. Clarke* (Sept. 25, 2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-194. The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony. *State v. Jackson* (Mar. 19, 2002), Franklin App. No. 01AP-973; *State v. Sheppard* (Oct. 12, 2001), Hamilton App. No. C-000553. Consequently, although an appellate court must act as a "thirteenth juror" when considering whether the manifest weight of the evidence requires reversal, it must give great deference to the fact finder's determination of the witnesses' credibility. *State v. Covington*, Franklin App. No. 02AP-245, 2002-Ohio-7037, at ¶22, *State v. Hairston*, Franklin App. No. 01AP-1393, 2002-Ohio-4491, at ¶17.

{¶16} While this case turns on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "[a] conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone." *State v. Franklin* (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 124, citing *State v. Nicely* (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 154-155. In fact, circumstantial evidence may "be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence." *State v. Ballew* (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 249, quoting *State v. Lott* (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 167, quoting *Michalic v Cleveland Tankers, Inc.* (1960), 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6, 11

{¶17} Appellant was convicted of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12, which provides in relevant part:

(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following.

(1) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the

structure or in the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense;

(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any criminal offense;

(3) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, with purpose to commit in the structure or separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense,

(4) Trespass in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present.

{¶18} Appellant argues there is no physical evidence linking him to the crime at issue, and this is merely a case of mistaken identity. However, we find, if believed, the testimony and circumstantial evidence presented here supports each element of the offense for which appellant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

{¶19} As described above, the testimony established on May 7, 2006, a person gained entry to Mr. Haggerty's residence at 186 E. 16th Avenue. At approximately 2 a.m., Mr. Haggerty heard footsteps in the residence and looked outside to see a man who had no permission to be there leaving the residence through the back door carrying a white bag. Mr. Haggerty called 9-1-1 and watched the suspect as he walked away toward 17th Avenue. When a police officer arrived, Mr. Haggerty went outside and walked with the officer in the direction the suspect had gone, whereupon they saw a man standing in front of a dumpster. Though Mr. Haggerty testified he lost sight of the suspect for about 20 seconds, Mr. Haggerty stated the person at the dumpster was "absolutely" the person he

saw leaving his residence Mr. Haggerty also identified the items on the ground by appellant as those belonging to him and his roommates.

{¶20} Sgt. Shinaver testified he was seven or eight blocks away when he received the dispatch to a burglary at 186 E. 16th Avenue. As he approached the scene, he saw an individual, later identified as appellant, matching the description of the suspect standing near a dumpster and carrying a white bag. Upon seeing the officer, appellant threw down the white bag. The contents of the white bag and those wrapped in a green blanket next to appellant were identified by Mr. Haggerty as belonging to him and his roommates.

{¶21} Based on the evidence and the testimony of the witnesses viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of burglary proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we cannot conclude there is insufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction.

{¶22} Similarly, we cannot say that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The basis for appellant's manifest weight challenge is primarily the lack of direct evidence linking appellant to the burglary at issue. While appellant asserts the lack of direct evidence in this matter requires a reversal of his conviction, we note that a conviction is "not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury believed the prosecution testimony." *State v. Rippey*, Franklin App. No. 04AP-960, 2005-Ohio-2639, discretionary appeal not allowed by 106 Ohio St 3d 1530, 2005-Ohio-5146, at ¶18, quoting *State v. Moore*, Montgomery App. No. 20005, 2004-Ohio-3398, quoting *State v. Gilliam* (Aug 12, 1998), Lorain App. No 97CA006757

{¶23} We have reviewed the entire record and weighed the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and have considered the credibility of the witnesses. After review of the record, we conclude that there is nothing to indicate that the jury clearly lost its way or that appellant's conviction creates a manifest miscarriage of justice. Consequently, we cannot say that appellant's conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶24} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third, appellant's fifth, and his counsel's single assignment of error.

{¶25} For coherency, we will address appellant's remaining assignments of error out of order. In his second assignment of error, appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, appellant asserts the prosecutor used false evidence, elicited perjured testimony, made improper closing arguments, and concealed favorable evidence.

{¶26} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights. *State v. Smith* (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-15; *State v. Thompson*, 161 Ohio App.3d 334, 341, 2005-Ohio-2508, at ¶30. Generally, prosecutorial misconduct is not a basis for overturning a criminal conviction, unless, on the record as a whole, the misconduct can be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial. *Lott*, supra, at 166. The focus of that inquiry is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. *State v. Bey* (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 495.

{¶27} The false evidence according to appellant is the prosecutor's use of a falsely documented weight of appellant. Appellant asserts the prosecutor used a

previous arrest sheet of appellant stating appellant's weight was 180 pounds when at the time of his arrest appellant weighed only 149 pounds, and at the time of trial he weighed 189 pounds. In order to meet the test for prosecutorial misconduct under these circumstances, appellant must show that: (1) the statement was false, (2) the statement was material, and (3) the prosecutor knew it was false. *Columbus v Joyce* (Nov. 29, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1486. Even if a prosecutor engaged in such misconduct, an appellate court should not reverse a conviction if the error was harmless. *Id.*

{¶28} Initially, we note the record contains no evidence that the prosecutor knew the weight of appellant was "false," if in fact it was. Secondly, there was no objection to the above testimony at trial; therefore, appellant has waived all but plain error. *State v. Keenan* (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133; *State v. Santiago*, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1094, 2003-Ohio-2877. Plain error does not exist unless it can be said that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly have been otherwise. *State v. Moreland* (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58. "Notice of plain error under Crim R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." *State v. Long* (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, syllabus paragraph three. Given the evidence in the record establishing appellant was arrested in close proximity to the scene with the victim's property, and the victim positively identified appellant, we cannot find an instance of plain error, such that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the alleged error.

{¶29} Appellant also asserts the prosecutor elicited false testimony because the witnesses gave inconsistent testimony regarding the color of pants appellant was wearing the night of his arrest. To the extent it can be said any of the witnesses gave inconsistent

testimony in this matter, there is nothing in the record to suggest it was the result of the prosecutor's actions. As discussed previously, the determination of weight and credibility of the evidence is for the trier of fact. *DeHass*, supra. The rationale is that the trier of fact is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the witnesses' manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses' testimony is credible. *Williams*, supra. The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony. *Jackson*, supra.

{¶30} Appellant next asserts the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during closing arguments. In general, prosecutors are given considerable latitude in opening statement and closing argument. *Ballew*, supra, at 255. In closing argument, a prosecutor may freely comment on " 'what the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom.' " *Lott*, supra, at 165, quoting *State v. Stephens* (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 82. Appellant did not object during the prosecutor's closing argument. The failure to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct waives all but plain error. *State v. LaMar*, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, at ¶126; *State v. Loch*, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1065, 2003-Ohio-4701, at ¶43. After reviewing the transcripts, we find the prosecutor was summarizing the evidence as was adduced at trial, and we find no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct here.

{¶31} Lastly, appellant asserts the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence; namely, the police report made the night of appellant's arrest. To the extent this can be construed as an alleged violation of *Brady v. Maryland* (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, appellant must establish: (1) the prosecutor suppressed information; (2) the information was favorable to the defense; and (3) the information was material. The

record is barren that any such evidence was kept from him. The police report used to refresh the officer's recollection at trial was available to the defendant, and his counsel cross-examined the officer about the report, wherein she elicited the fact that the testifying officer did not write the report. Moreover, there is no evidence the police report contained anything favorable to appellant as his counsel stated "the things that were written in that report are not helpful to Mr. Hillman." (Tr. at 125.)

{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error.

{¶33} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant suggests the trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion made at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. "The standard of review applied to a denied motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 is virtually identical to that employed in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence." *State v. Turner*, Franklin App No. 04AP-364, 2004-Ohio-6609, at ¶8, appeal not allowed 106 Ohio St. 3d 1547, 2005-Ohio-5343, citing *State v. Ready* (2001), 143 Ohio App 3d 748, 759. We have already determined there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction, therefore, we find no merit to this argument.

{¶34} Appellant next contends the trial court erred in not ruling on his objection to exclude the police report. According to appellant, Sgt. Shinaver testified that he saw appellant throw a white bag, and that appellant was wearing "light" pants when arrested, but neither of these statements appear in the police report. With respect to admissibility of police reports, it is well-established that police reports are generally inadmissible hearsay, unless offered by the defendant, unless the source of information or other

circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Evid.R. 803; *State v. Williams*, Trumbull App. No. 2005-T-0123, 2006-Ohio-6689, citing *State v. Leonard*, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235. Appellant did not offer the police report into evidence, and there is no evidence of a "lack of trustworthiness" in the matter before us, therefore, there is nothing to suggest the police report would be admissible in the matter herein. Further, when appellant raised this issue to the trial court, i.e., that the police officer gave false testimony and that his counsel shared confidential exculpatory information with the prosecutor, his counsel stated:

Thank you. Just for the record I deny, and I want to state for the record that I absolutely deny in any shape or form that I shared any information whatsoever with the prosecutor as to the police reporting question.

Your Honor, there has not been any information shared and your Honor, the police report has not been entered into evidence, that's number one. And also the police officer who actually wrote that report was not here, and the things that were written in that report are not helpful to Mr. Hillman. And that is one of the reasons why I did not want to have that come into evidence.

(Tr. at 125.)

{¶35} Appellant next argues the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on a "lesser degree of burglary under 2911.12(A)(4) after the trial court illegally allowed the prosecutor to nolle prosequi the theft offense just prior to jury deliberations." (Nov 27, 2007 Brief at 24.) Such instruction was not requested at trial, and, therefore, appellant has waived all but plain error. *State v. Dennis*, Franklin App. No. 04AP-595, 2005-Ohio-1530.

{¶36} An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser-included offense. *Id.*, at ¶15, citing *State v. Thomas* (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, paragraph two of the syllabus. As we discussed in our disposition of appellant's previous assignments of error, appellant was convicted of burglary under R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), and we have determined there was sufficient evidence to support this conviction and that this conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we find no merit to appellant's argument that he was entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense.

{¶37} Appellant next contends the trial court did not inquire into his allegation that his trial counsel and the prosecutor "had conspired by sharing information and allowing state witnesses to commit perjury" (Nov. 27, 2007 Brief at 25.) However, we find the transcript clearly refutes appellant's position. In addition to appellant's counsel's comments cited above, the prosecutor stated:

Your Honor, I take offense to that. The bottom line here is Sgt. Shinaver testified to his clothing and said that his pants were lighter in color, not light gray pants or anything like that. He just was making a color contrast statements, but all of this is an issue for the jury to decide.

(Tr at 124.)

{¶38} Additionally, the trial court stated.

All right, the court had the benefit of Mr. Hillman's statement, and we are now ready to proceed with closing arguments; and also the court wants to put on the record that I have found no prosecutorial misconduct, and the court further finds that [appellant's counsel] is to continue to represent Mr. Hillman, and that [appellant's counsel] has conducted herself most professionally and effectively and has continued to do that

throughout this trial, and we are now ready to begin with closing arguments.

Id. at 126.

{¶39} Lastly, under this assignment of error, appellant contends his sentence is contrary to law because the jury's verdict was based on a defective indictment. Because his sixth assignment of error concerns the indictment, we will address this last argument in our disposition of appellant's sixth assignment of error.

{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's fourth assignment of error.

{¶41} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on a defective indictment. It is well-established that a common pleas court has original jurisdiction in felony cases and its jurisdiction is invoked by the return of an indictment. *Click v. Eckle* (1962), 174 Ohio St. 88, 89. Further, as argued by appellee, an indictment is proper pursuant to Crim.R. 7(B) when it is signed and contains a statement that the defendant has committed a public offense specified in the indictment. In this case, count one of the indictment contained the crime charged under R.C. 2911.12, set forth the requisite statutory language, and clearly put appellant on notice of the crime of which he was charged. Contrary to appellant's assertions, the indictment was not amended. Rather, a nolle prosequi was entered pertaining to the theft charge contained in count two of the indictment. Upon review, we find the indictment in the matter before us was not defective, and, therefore, overrule appellant's sixth assignment of error.

{¶42} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." *Strickland v Washington* (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S Ct. 2052. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was so deficient that it was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. *Id.* at 687. The defendant must then establish that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Id.* at 698.

{¶43} According to *Strickland*

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687

{¶44} "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." *Id.* at 689, quoting *Michel v. Louisiana* (1955), 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158. A verdict adverse to a criminal defendant is not of itself indicative that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. *State v. Hester* (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 75.

{¶45} Appellant contends his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to file a motion to suppress; (2) allowing and contributing to perjured testimony; (3) failing to object during trial and closing arguments; (4) aiding in excluding exculpatory evidence from trial; (5) not requesting a lesser-included degree of burglary; and (6) failing to request an eyewitness expert

{¶46} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the victim's identification of him. It is appellant's position the identification should have been suppressed because it was made at the "highly suggestive show-up" and the victim's identification of appellant was unreliable. The "[f]ailure to file a motion to suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only if, based on the record, the motion would have been granted." *State v. Shipley*, Franklin App. No. 05AP-385, 2006-Ohio-950, at ¶15, quoting *State v. Randall*, Franklin

App. No. 03AP-352, 2003-Ohio-6111, at ¶15 Trial counsel is not required to file futile motions See *State v. McDonall* (Dec. 16, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 75245.

{¶47} A "show-up" is inherently suggestive. See, e.g., *Ohio v Barnett* (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 760. However, the "admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process." *Neil v. Biggers* (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375. A defendant is entitled to the suppression of eyewitness identification of the defendant at a show-up only if the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification *Id.*, *Simmons v United States* (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967; *State v. Madison* (1980), 64 Ohio St 2d 322, 331; *State v. Butler* (1994), 97 Ohio App 3d 322, 325, appeal dismissed (1995), 71 Ohio St 3d 1464 The factors to consider when "evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation." *Neil*, at 199

{¶48} Here, Mr Haggerty testified he viewed a man exit the house with a white bag in his hands. Mr Haggerty described the individual as a black male wearing dark clothing and a white hat. Mr Haggerty watched the man exit the back of the house and walk toward 17th Avenue. Mr. Haggerty stated he lost sight of the person for approximately 20 seconds until he and a police officer turned a corner and saw the individual standing in front of a dumpster. Mr. Haggerty testified appellant was absolutely the man he saw leaving his residence with the white bag Further, items from Mr.

Haggerty's house were found on the ground by appellant, some contained in a white bag, others wrapped in a dark colored blanket.

{¶49} Given the victim's opportunity to view appellant as he was exiting the residence, the victim's description of appellant, the very short time between the commission of the crime and the victim's identification of appellant, we cannot say that the show-up identification procedure created a substantial likelihood of misidentification such that a defense counsel's motion to suppress the victim's identification of appellant at the scene would have been granted.

{¶50} Appellant next claims his counsel permitted the prosecutor to present perjured testimony. This allegation, as discussed under appellant's prior assignments of error, stems from Sgt. Shinaver's testimony. We have already found no evidence in the record to support appellant's blanket assertion regarding perjured testimony. To the extent appellant asserts Sgt. Shinaver's testimony was inconsistent, such is a matter within the purview of the jury's determination.

{¶51} Appellant also contends his counsel was ineffective because she tried to bully him into taking a plea and she did not prepare for trial. The record, including the trial court's finding of appropriate and professional conduct by appellant's counsel, clearly refutes appellant's position. (Tr. at 126.)

{¶52} Appellant asserts Sgt. Shinaver's testimony, that he saw appellant throw a white bag later determined to contain items from Mr. Haggerty's residence, was prejudicial and should not have been admitted. However, appellant provides, and we find no basis for this assertion.

{¶53} Appellant also contends the police report was withheld from him, and his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing arguments. As we have already discussed, there is no evidence the police report was withheld from appellant, and his counsel cross-examined the officer who used the report to refresh his recollection during trial. Further, we have determined there was no basis for appellant's prosecutorial misconduct claim pertaining to the prosecutor's closing arguments. Therefore, we are not able to find error in trial counsel's alleged failure to object.

{¶54} Appellant contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on a lesser-included offense. Again, we have already determined that appellant was not entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense in this case. Further, trial counsel's failure to request instructions on lesser-included offenses is a matter of trial strategy and does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. *Dennis*, supra.

{¶55} Lastly, appellant contends under this assignment of error that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an "eyewitness expert." However, *State v. Madrigal* (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, disposes of this argument. In *Madrigal*, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to find ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to employ an eyewitness identification expert because the argument was purely speculative since "nothing in the record indicates what kind of testimony an eyewitness identification expert could have provided. Establishing that would require proof outside the record, such as affidavits demonstrating the probable testimony. Such a claim is not appropriately considered on a direct appeal." *Id.* at 390-391

{¶56} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error

{¶57} We now address appellant's assignments of error pertaining to the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief.

{¶58} On November 30, 2006, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 and asserted several allegations. Appellant amended his petition leaving only his claim for prosecutorial misconduct for review. On August 10, 2007, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein the trial court denied appellant's postconviction petition. The trial court found appellant failed to establish relief under *Maryland*, supra, because appellant failed to specify what exculpatory evidence was excluded, how such evidence was exculpatory, or how appellee failed to provide full discovery. Further, the trial court found appellant failed to present sufficient operative facts as to how appellee presented false evidence or to establish prosecutorial misconduct.

{¶59} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant's right to postconviction relief arises from R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), which provides:

Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States * * * may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.

{¶60} "A petition for postconviction relief is a statutory vehicle designed to correct the violation of a defendant's constitutional rights." *State v. Hessler*, Franklin App. No.

01AP-1011, 2002-Ohio-3321, at ¶22. Though designed to address alleged constitutional violations, the postconviction relief process is a civil collateral attack on a criminal judgment, not an appeal of that judgment. *State v. Calhoun* (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281; *State v. Steffan* (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 400 It is a means to reach constitutional issues which would otherwise be impossible to reach because the evidence supporting those issues is not contained in the record of the petitioner's criminal conviction. *Id.* at ¶23, citing *State v. Murphy* (Dec. 26, 2000), Franklin App. No. 00AP-233 Appellant does not have a constitutional right of postconviction review *Calhoun*, at 281 Rather, postconviction relief is a narrow remedy that affords appellant no rights beyond those granted by statute *Id.* A postconviction relief petition does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his or her conviction. *Hessler, supra*

{¶61} A petitioner who seeks to challenge his conviction through a petition for postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to a hearing *State v Jackson* (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 "Pursuant to R C 2953 21(C), a trial court properly denies a defendant's petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing where the petition, the supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief" *Calhoun*, at 291. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a postconviction petition without a hearing. *State v Campbell*, Franklin App. No 03AP-147, 2003 Ohio 6305, citing *Calhoun*, at 284 An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it entails a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable *Blakemore v. Blakemore* (1983), 5 Ohio St 3d 217, 219. "Postconviction review is a narrow remedy

since *res judicata* bars any claim that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." *Steffan, supra*, at 410.

{¶62} Appellant argues there were multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct that affected his right to a fair trial. The misconduct alleged includes procuring false testimony and making inappropriate closing arguments. The instances complained of, however, are contained in the record and, as demonstrated above, have been raised, and addressed, in appellant's direct appeal. Therefore, we find appellant's postconviction collateral attack on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct is barred by *res judicata*. *State v. Sowell*, Franklin App. No. 07AP-809, 2008-Ohio-1518.

{¶63} Appellant also raises arguments pertaining to the "deliberate exclusion" of the police report from evidence and asserts such conduct constitutes a *Brady* violation. This argument, however, is also barred by *res judicata* as the matter complained of is contained in the record and was raised, and addressed, in appellant's direct appeal. Thus, we find no error in the dismissal of appellant's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing as appellant failed to set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.

{¶64} In his second and third assignments of error, appellant makes an argument pertaining to Civ.R. 56 and 55. Specifically, appellant contends the trial court should have granted his motion for summary judgment and the trial court should have granted default judgment in his favor because appellee did not respond to his motion for summary judgment. The judgment entry appealed from concerns the trial court's denial of appellant's postconviction petition relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. "When a trial court

fails to rule on a pre-trial motion, it may ordinarily be presumed that the court overruled it " *State ex rel The V. Cos. v. Marshall* (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469. Thus, by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief, the trial court effectively denied both his motions filed pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and 55. We have already determined under the previous assignment of error that the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's postconviction petition. Therefore, we find, regardless of any other potential procedural deficiencies, there is no basis for appellant's contention he was entitled to summary judgment and/or a default judgment on his claims. As such, we overrule appellant's second and third assignments of error

{¶65} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's ten assignments of error are overruled, and the judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas are hereby affirmed.

Judgments affirmed.

BRYANT and TYACK, JJ., concur.
