

ORIGINAL

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State ex rel. SAINT TORRANCE : CASE NO. 09-1721

Relator :

vs. : ORIGINAL ACTION IN
MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION AND
PROCEDENDO

Hon. JEROME J. METZ,
Judge, Court of Common Pleas,
Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. :

Respondents

RECEIVED
OCT 12 2009
CLERK OF COURT
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

RESPONDENTS', MAGISTRATE MICHAEL L. BACHMAN, AND PATRICIA M. CLANCY,
MOTION TO DISMISS,
MOTION TO FIND RELATOR A VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR AND IMPOSE
SACTIONS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS

Saint Torrance, Pro Se
3182 Werk Road, Apt. #2
Cincinnati, Ohio 45211

RELATOR

JOSEPH T. DETERS
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

Christian J. Schaefer, 0015494
Charles W. Anness, 0082194
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
230 E. Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati OH 45202 2174
DDN: (513) 946-3041 (Schaefer)
(513) 946-3273 (Anness)
FAX: (513) 946-3018

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

FILED
OCT 12 2009
CLERK OF COURT
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE #</u>
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	-ii-
APPENDIX.....	-iii-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	-3-
ARGUMENT	-4-
 PROPOSITION OF LAW I - A petition for a Writ of Mandamus must be dismissed unless a relator demonstrates that (1) the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.	 -4-
 PROPOSITION OF LAW II -In order for a Writ of Prohibition to be issued, the relator must prove that (1) the lower court is about to exercise judicial authority, (2) the exercise authority is not authorized by law, and (3) the relator either possesses no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law if the writ of prohibition is denied or the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court is patent and unambiguous	 -5-
 PROPOSITION OF LAW III - In order for a Writ of Procedendo to be issued, the relator must prove that either (1) the court has refused to render a judgment or (2) the a court has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.	 -7-
 PROPOSITION OF LAW IV -The Ohio Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear requests for original actions for injunctive and declaratory relief.	 -8-
 PROPOSITION OF LAW V - The Respondents hereby move for the Court to find the Relator a vexatious litigator in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV, Section 5(A) and impose any and all sanctions the Court considers just.	 -9-
CONCLUSION	-10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	-11-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

AUTHORITIES CITED:

R.C. 2505.02	4
<i>State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd.</i> (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 151.....	4
<i>State ex rel. Tubbs Jones, Pros. Atty. v. Suster, Judge, et al.</i> , (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 701 N.E.2d 1002	5
<i>State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna</i> , (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 652 N.E.2d 742.....	7
<i>State ex rel. Sevayega v. McMonagle</i> (2009) 122 Ohio St.3d 54, 907 N.E.2d 1180.....	7
Article IV, Section 2(B)(1) of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.....	8
S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(5)(B).....	9

APPENDIX

S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5)A-1

S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(5)A-2

R.C. 2505.02A-3

Article IV, Section 2(B)(1) of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.....A-5

List of pending cases of Saint Torrance in the Supreme CourtA-6


**IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO**

State ex rel. SAINT TORRANCE	:	CASE NO. 09-1721
Relator	:	
vs.	:	ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS
Hon. JEROME J. METZ	:	
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, et al.	:	<u>RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS</u>
Respondents	:	

Now come Respondents', Magistrate Michael L. Bachman, and Patricia M. Clancy, through counsel, who move that this original action be dismissed in accordance with S. Ct. R. X, Section 5.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH T. DETERS
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO



Christian J. Schaefer, 0015494
Charles W. Anness, 0082194
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
230 E. Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2174
513/946-3031 (Schaefer)
513/946-3273 (Anness)
FAX 513/946-3018

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS


IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State ex rel. SAINT TORRANCE	:	CASE NO. 09-1721
Relator	:	
vs.	:	ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS
	:	
Hon. JEROME J. METZ	:	
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, et al.	:	<u>RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO FIND RELATOR TO BE A VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR AND IMPOSE SANCTIONS</u>
	:	
Respondents	:	

Now come Respondents', Magistrate Michael L. Bachman, and Patricia M. Clancy, through counsel, who move that this Court find Relator to be a vexatious litigator and impose sanctions under S. Ct. R. XIV, Section 5.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH T. DETERS
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO



Christian J. Schaefer, 0015404
Charles W. Anness, 0082194
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
230 E. Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2174
513/946-3031 (Schaefer)
513/946-3273 (Anness)
FAX 513/946-3018

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM

A. Statement of the Case

This Original Action in Mandamus, Prohibition and Procedendo complains that the Court of Common Pleas and others committed some sort of error in the proceedings below.

The case started with the Complaint of Saint Torrance against Angel Hill and William Aleu being filed in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The Court later separated these claims as they were found to be improperly joined.

An Entry of Default Judgment was granted to Duke Energy. Relator, Saint Torrance, appealed the default judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed Relator's appeal as being not timely. Relator also filed approximately a dozen motions with the trial court over the three months following the default judgment, including Motions to Reconsider, Motions to Set Aside the Judgment, and Motions to Disqualify Hon. Judge Allen. The trial court denied these motions and declared the matter adjudicated.

Relator Saint Torrance filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief and Writ of Mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied Relator's motion.

Rather than file a discretionary appeal to this Court, Relator filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Prohibition and Procedendo.

ARGUMENT

Proposition of Law I

A petition for a Writ of Mandamus must be dismissed unless a relator demonstrates that (1) the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.

For a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Ohio Assn. Of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 151.

In this case, Relator has not shown that a clear legal duty has been violated by any Respondent. Those involved in the Hamilton County Municipal Court have no clear legal duty to grant a Motion to Set Aside a Judgment or grant a Motion to Reconsider. Similarly, Relator has no legal right to disqualify a presiding Judge after a final judgment has been rendered.

The request for Mandamus should therefore be denied as it relates to the Hamilton County Municipal Court.

With regard to the interlocutory appeal, the same is true. The appeal of a denial of a Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition are not final appealable orders as defined by *R.C. 2505.02*. Since appellate jurisdiction is limited to judgments and final orders, Relator had no legal right to have the Court of Appeals hear his case. Similarly, a Court of Appeals has no clear legal duty to hear an appeal from a non-final order.

Based upon the above, Relator is not entitled to a Writ of Mandamus.

Proposition of Law II

In order for a Writ of Prohibition to be issued, the relator must prove that (1) the lower court is about to exercise judicial authority, (2) the exercise of authority is not authorized by law, and (3) the relator either possesses no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law if the Writ of Prohibition is denied or the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court is patent and unambiguous.

In *State ex rel. Tubbs Jones, Pros. Atty. v. Suster, Judge, et al.*, (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 701 N.E.2d 1002, the Supreme Court set out the following standards for the granting of a writ of prohibition:

In order for a writ of prohibition to be issued, the relator must prove that (1) the lower court is about to exercise judicial authority, (2) the exercise of authority is not authorized by law, and (3) the relator possesses no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law if the writ of prohibition is denied. *State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese* (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178, 631, N.E.2d 119, 121.

The Court in *State ex rel Tubbs Jones v. Suster*, supra, went on to explain:

Prohibition will not lie to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment. *State ex rel. Heimann v. George* (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 231, 232, 74, O.O.2d 376, 344 N.E.2d 130, 131. However, we have created a limited exception in cases where there appears to be a total lack of jurisdiction of the lower court to act. Early cases referred to a “total want of jurisdiction” or to the court’s being “without jurisdiction whatsoever to act.” *State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler* (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 329, 59 Ohio Op.2d 387, 388, 285 N.E.2d 22, 24, and paragraph two of the syllabus. Later cases defined this exception as a “patent and unambiguous’ lack of jurisdiction to hear a case.” *Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv., Office of Collective Bargaining v. State Emp. Relations Bd.* (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 48, 51, 562 N.E.2d 125, 129; *State ex rel. Tollis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Appeals* (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 145, 148, 532 N.E.2d 727, 729.

Therefore, in order for this Court to grant a writ of prohibition, this Court must find that (1) respondent is about to exercise jurisdiction; (2) the exercise of authority is not authorized by law; and, (3) relators have no adequate remedy at law or the Respondent’s lack of jurisdiction is “patent and unambiguous,” and these elements must be shown by relator “beyond doubt.”

In this case, Relator does not seek to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction. Instead, he brought this original action because the Court of Appeals chose not to exercise

jurisdiction over the case. Similarly, Relator invoked the jurisdiction of the Hamilton County Municipal Court when he filed his various motions in that court.

In short, no improper exercise of jurisdiction is alleged. Therefore, Relator is not entitled to a Writ of Prohibition.

Proposition of Law III

In order for a Writ of Procedendo to be issued, the relator must prove that either (1) the court has refused to render a judgment or (2) the a court has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.

In *State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna*, (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 652 N.E.2d 742, the Supreme Court declared,

A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. *State ex rel. Doe v. Tracy* (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 198, 200, 555 N.E.2d 674, 677, citing *State ex rel. Wallace v. Tyack* (1984), 13 Ohio St.3d 4, 13 OBR 379, 469 N.E.2d 844. A writ of procedendo will issue requiring a judge to proceed to final judgment where the judge erroneously stayed the proceeding based on a pending case which has no effect on jurisdiction to proceed. See *State ex rel. Davey v. Owen* (1937), 133 Ohio St. 96, 105-106, 10 O.O. 102, 106, 12 N.E.2d 144, 149.

The Court, in *State ex rel. Sevayega v. McMonagle* (2009) 122 Ohio St.3d 54, 907 N.E.2d 1180, further stated, “[a] writ of procedendo will not issue to compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed.” *State ex rel. Howard v. Skow*, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-Ohio-3652, 811 N.E.2d 1128, ¶ 9.

In this case, Relator does not seek the lower courts to render a judgment. Relator does not allege that the court has refused to render a judgment or that the court has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. Judgment has been rendered in the Municipal Court as well as in the Court of Appeals.

As there is no matter awaiting judgment before the Court of Appeals or the Municipal Court, Relator is not entitled to a Writ of Procedendo.

Proposition of Law IV

The Ohio Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear requests for original actions for injunctive and declaratory relief

The balance of Relator's pleading requests injunctive and declaratory relief. Article IV, Section 2(B)(1) of the Constitution of the State of Ohio provides this Court with the following original jurisdiction:

- (B)(1) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in the following:
 - (a) Quo warranto;
 - (b) Mandamus;
 - (c) Habeas corpus;
 - (d) Prohibition;
 - (e) Procedendo;
 - (f) In any cause on review as may be necessary to its complete determination;
 - (g) Admission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law.

Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the other matters raised by Relator.

PROPOSITION OF LAW V

The Respondents hereby move for the Court to find the Relator a vexatious litigator in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV, Section 5(A) and impose any and all sanctions the Court considers just.

The Supreme Court Practice Rule XIV, Section 5 provides for the handling of matters of frivolous actions, sanctions, and vexatious litigators. SCt R XIV Section 5(B) states:

If a party habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct under section 5(A) of this rule, the Supreme Court may, *sua sponte* or on motion by a party, find the party to be a vexatious litigator. If the Supreme Court determines that a party is a vexatious litigator under this rule, the Court may impose filing restrictions on the party. The restrictions may include prohibiting the party from continuing or instituting legal proceedings in the Supreme Court without first obtaining leave, prohibiting the filing of actions in the Supreme Court without a filing fee or security for costs required by S.Ct.Prac.R. XV, or any other restriction the Supreme Court considers just.


The Court has an inherent right to protect its docket to avoid wasting the Court's time and judicial resources. Relator has filed sixteen original actions of Mandamus, Prohibition, and Procedendo in this Court since August of this year. Respondents have attached a list of Relator's pending cases before the Court as "Exhibit A." Respondents contend Relator's frivolous filings qualify him for "vexatious litigator" status. The Respondents pray the Court finds Relator a vexatious litigator and imposes whichever restrictions and sanctions the Court deems just.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint for a Writ of Mandamus, Writ of Prohibition and Writ of Procedendo should be dismissed. This Court should also dismiss the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief because these matters cannot for the basis for an original action before this Court. As well, this Court should find Relator a vexatious litigator and impose an appropriate sanction on Relator.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH T. DETERS
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO




Christian J. Schaefer, 0015494
Charles W. Anness, 0082194
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
230 E. Ninth Street, Suite 4000
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2174
513/946-3031 (Schaefer)
513/946-3273 (Anness)
FAX 513/946-3018

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by regular U.S. Mail this 9th day
of October, 2009 on:

Saint Torrance
3182 Werk Road, Apt #2
Cincinnati OH 45211



Christian J. Schaefer, 0015494
Charles W. Anness, 0082194
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys

S.Ct.PracR.X(5)

Section 5. Response to Complaint; Court Action.

The respondent shall file an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss within 21 days of service of the summons and complaint. If an amended complaint is filed under S.Ct.Prac.R. VIII, Section 7, and Civ.R. 15(A), the respondent shall file an answer to the amended complaint or a motion to dismiss within 21 days of the filing of the amended complaint. The respondent may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings at the same time an answer is filed. The relator may not file a response to an answer. The relator may file a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings within ten days of the filing of the motion. Neither party may file a motion for summary judgment. After the time for filing an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court will either dismiss the case or issue an alternative or a peremptory writ, if a writ has not already been issued.

S.Ct.PracR.XIV(5)

Section 5. Frivolous Actions; Sanctions; Vexatious Litigators.

(A) If the Supreme Court, *sua sponte* or on motion by a party, determines that an appeal or other action is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose, it may impose, on the person who signed the appeal or action, a represented party, or both, appropriate sanctions. The sanctions may include an award to the opposing party of reasonable expenses, reasonable attorney fees, costs or double costs, or any other sanction the Supreme Court considers just. An appeal or other action shall be considered frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

(B) If a party habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct under section 5(A) of this rule, the Supreme Court may, *sua sponte* or on motion by a party, find the party to be a vexatious litigator. If the Supreme Court determines that a party is a vexatious litigator under this rule, the Court may impose filing restrictions on the party. The restrictions may include prohibiting the party from continuing or instituting legal proceedings in the Supreme Court without first obtaining leave, prohibiting the filing of actions in the Supreme Court without the filing fee or security for costs required by S.Ct.Prac.R. XV, or any other restriction the Supreme Court considers just.

2505.02 Final orders.

(A) As used in this section:

(1) "Substantial right" means a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.

(2) "Special proceeding" means an action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.

(3) "Provisional remedy" means a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, suppression of evidence, a prima-facie showing pursuant to section 2307.85 or 2307.86 of the Revised Code, a prima-facie showing pursuant to section 2307.92 of the Revised Code, or a finding made pursuant to division (A)(3) of section 2307.93 of the Revised Code.

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action;

(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly, including the amendment of sections 1751.67, 2117.06, 2305.11, 2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02, 2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 2711.22, 2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16, 3923.63, 3923.64, 4705.15, and 5111.018, and the enactment of sections 2305.113, 2323.41, 2323.43, and 2323.55 of the Revised Code or any changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, including the amendment of sections 2125.02, 2305.10, 2305.131, 2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code;

(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.

(C) When a court issues an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial, the court, upon the request of either party, shall state in the order the grounds upon which the new trial is granted or the judgment vacated or set aside.

(D) This section applies to and governs any action, including an appeal, that is pending in any court on July 22, 1998, and all claims filed or actions commenced on or after July 22, 1998, notwithstanding any provision of any prior statute or rule of law of this state.

Effective Date: 07-22-1998; 09-01-2004; 09-02-2004; 09-13-2004; 12-30-2004; 04-07-2005; 2007 SB7 10-10-2007

ARTICLE IV: JUDICIAL

ARTICLE IV: JUDICIAL

JUDICIAL POWER VESTED IN COURT.

§1 The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may from time to time be established by law.

(1851, am. 1883, 1912, 1968, 1973)

ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT.

§2 (A) The Supreme Court shall, until otherwise provided by law, consist of seven judges, who shall be known as the chief justice and justices. In case of the absence or disability of the chief justice, the judge having the period of longest total service upon the court shall be the acting chief justice. If any member of the court shall be unable, by reason of illness, disability or disqualification, to hear, consider and decide a cause or causes, the chief justice or the acting chief justice may direct any judge of any court of appeals to sit with the judges of the Supreme Court in the place and stead of the absent judge. A majority of the Supreme Court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to render a judgment.

(B)(1) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in the following:

- (a) Quo warranto;
- (b) Mandamus;
- (c) Habeas corpus;
- (d) Prohibition;
- (e) Procedendo;
- (f) In any cause on review as may be necessary to its complete determination;
- (g) Admission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as follows:

- (a) In appeals from the courts of appeals as a matter of right in the following:
 - (i) Cases originating in the courts of appeals;
 - (ii) Cases in which the death penalty has been affirmed;
 - (iii) Cases involving questions arising under the constitution of the United States or of this state.
- (b) In appeals from the courts of appeals in cases of

felony on leave first obtained.

- (c) In direct appeals from the courts of common pleas or other courts of record inferior to the court of appeals as a matter of right in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.
- (d) Such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers or agencies as may be conferred by law;
- (e) In cases of public or great general interest, the Supreme Court may direct any court of appeals to certify its record to the Supreme Court, and may review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment of the court of appeals;
- (f) The Supreme Court shall review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment in any case certified by any court of appeals pursuant to section 3(B)(4) of this article.

(3) No law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

(C) The decisions in all cases in the Supreme Court shall be reported together with the reasons therefor.

(1851, am. 1883, 1912, 1944, 1968, 1994)

ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS.

§3 (A) The state shall be divided by law into compact appellate districts in each of which there shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges. Laws may be passed increasing the number of judges in any district wherein the volume of business may require such additional judge or judges. In districts having additional judges, three judges shall participate in the hearing and disposition of each case. The court shall hold sessions in each county of the district as the necessity arises. The county commissioners of each county shall provide a proper and convenient place for the court of appeals to hold court.

(B)(1) The courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in the following:

- (a) Quo warranto;
- (b) Mandamus;
- (c) Habeas corpus;
- (d) Prohibition;
- (e) Procedendo
- (f) In any cause on review as may be necessary to its complete determination.

(2) Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify,

The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System

Clerk's Office
65 South Front Street, 8th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3431
800.826.9010
614.387.9530

Kristina D. Frost
Clerk of Court

Search Results: Party Last Name = torrance, First Name = saint

Party Name Search Criteria
Party Last Name: torrance
Party First Name: saint

Records 1 to 17 of 17

View Case	Case Number	Party Name	Party Type	Case Type
View Case	2009-1497	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1518	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus
View Case	2009-1529	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1538	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1709	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1710	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1711	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1712	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1713	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1714	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1720	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1721	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1722	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1723	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1749	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1750	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition
View Case	2009-1810	Torrance, Saint	Relator	Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition

Records 1 to 17 of 17