

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State of Ohio, :  
 :  
 :  
 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 2011-1501  
 :  
 :  
 v. : On certified conflict from the Stark  
 : County Court of Appeals,  
 : Fifth Appellate District  
 Donald Billiter (aka Billeter), : Case No. 2010C400292  
 :  
 :  
 Defendant-Appellant. :

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**Reply Brief of Appellant Donald Billiter**

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
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## Summary of Argument

The cases say you didn't commit the crime. And perhaps you didn't commit the crime, but we don't care. A year ago we said you were guilty. You're stuck with that. Finish your prison term.

That is, in essence, the State's position on res judicata. The State disputes that Mr. Billiter has proven his innocence, but the State also argues that his innocence doesn't matter. The State also fails to cite a single case from any jurisdiction holding that res judicata bars substantial claims of actual innocence. That's because the position makes little, if any sense.

The State then moves on to an argument that seeks to avoid the certified question that this Court accepted, which involves only the application of res judicata to void postrelease control:

Where a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty to escape, does res judicata bar the defendant from arguing his plea is void due to a post release control sentencing violation?

In its attempt to evade the certified question, the State seeks to relitigate an issue that is not part of the question and that it properly lost below. Specifically, the State argues that Mr. Billiter's postrelease control was valid, despite the fact that the entry imposed a facially illegal sentence—imposing three years of postrelease control where five was required. But the court of appeals applied this Court's settled law and found the postrelease control portion of Mr. Billiter's sentence was void. Opinion at ¶13:

Here, Appellant was not properly advised of the terms of post-release control when he was sentenced on the aggravated burglary and domestic violence charges; therefore, that part of his sentence imposing post control release is void. Because Appellant had already served the prison term of the sentence, he could not then

be resentenced to properly impose the correct terms of post-release control.

The court of appeals' decision is correct because this Court has ruled that "in the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing postrelease control, the parole board's imposition of postrelease control cannot be enforced." *State v. Bloomer*, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, at ¶71. The State is grasping at a straw man.

### **Argument**

#### **Certified Question:**

**Where a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty to escape, does res judicata bar the defendant from arguing his plea is void due to a post release control sentencing violation?**

#### **Answer to Certified Question:**

**No.**

#### **I. Res judicata does not bar a demonstrated claim of innocence.**

The State does not cite a single case that holds that res judicata can bar a claim of innocence. Mr. Billiter's brief contains references to this Court's decisions that create public policy exceptions to res judicata, as well as to decisions from state and federal courts holding that substantial claims of actual innocence create an exception to the doctrine of res judicata. The State presents only citations to the general rule of res judicata, as well as to an exception Mr. Billiter does not argue. State's Brief at 11, n.15. But the State provides no authority concerning the innocence exception to the doctrine.

In theory, the innocence exception could undermine finality of a judgment, but trial courts are quite capable of policing the exception. As this

Court held in *State v. Davis*, 131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, ¶37, when discussing new trial motions, “[t]he trial court acts as the gatekeeper for these motions and, using its discretion, can limit the litigation to viable claims only.” The same logic applies equally to plea withdrawal motions.

**II. A decision of this Court subsequent to the court of appeals decision in Mr. Billiter’s pro se appeal creates an exception to res judicata.**

**A. “[I]n the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing postrelease control, the parole board’s imposition of postrelease control cannot be enforced.” *State v. Bloomer*, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, ¶71.**

*Bloomer* departed from *Watkins v. Collins*, 111 Ohio St. 3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, because in *Bloomer*, this Court held that a court must *properly* order the imposition of postrelease control *in the judgment entry* for the executive branch to have authority to enforce the sanction:

[I]n the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing postrelease control, the parole board’s imposition of postrelease control cannot be enforced.

*Bloomer* at ¶71. This Court also specified that the separation of powers required that a court must actually *impose* postrelease control before the executive branch can enforce the sanction:

Imposition of punishment is a function of the judicial branch of government. *Ex parte United States* (1916), 242 U.S. 27, 41-42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (“Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws, and, upon conviction, to impose the punishment provided by law, is judicial \* \* \*”). See also *Woods*, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 2000-Ohio-171, 733 N.E.2d 1103. In *Woods*, we held that because postrelease control is part of the original judicially imposed sentence, the parole board’s discretionary ability to impose postrelease control sanctions does not impede the function of the judicial branch and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. *Id.* at 512. This

is so because the sentencing court made the decision to impose the penalty of postrelease control and the executive officers carried out that judgment.

Finally, this Court emphasized that a court must “order[]” postrelease control for the executive branch to have power to enforce the sanction:

Nothing in [R.C. 2929.14], however, provides that the executive branch may impose postrelease control if the sentencing court has not ordered it, nor does its language conflict with our precedent.

\* \* \*

Thus, the court failed to satisfy the most basic requirement of R.C. 2929.191 and our existing precedent -- that it notify the offender of the mandatory nature of the term of postrelease control and the length of that mandatory term and incorporate that notification into its entry.

*Bloomer* at ¶68-9. *Bloomer*’s rule that “in the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing postrelease control, the parole board’s imposition of postrelease control cannot be enforced[,]” *id.* at ¶71, was a clear departure from the decision in *Watkins* that even improper “sentencing entries are sufficient to afford notice to a reasonable person that the courts were authorizing postrelease control as part of each petitioner’s sentence.” *Watkins*, 2006-Ohio-5082, at ¶51.

The distinction between *Watkins* and *Bloomer* (as well as between other writ and non-writ cases) may reflect the fact that many claims that are cognizable in cases brought in the due course of law are not cognizable in an extraordinary writ. For example, this Court has denied a writ that demanded that the APA cease enforcing postrelease control without a court order, but noted that a declaratory judgment action appeared to be in order. *State ex rel.*

*McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.*, 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, ¶6.

The petitioner who lost the writ later won release from postrelease control on a declaratory judgment action. *McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.*, Cuyahoga App. No. 84362, 2004-Ohio-6114.

**B. This Court’s holding in *Bloomer* is consistent with the doctrine that, because a court speaks through its journal, an oral notice or pronouncement is inchoate until journalized.**

The State’s repeated emphasis on “notice” of postrelease control does not change the fact that no court properly *imposed* postrelease control. So while it is true that when “notification of postrelease control was properly given at the sentencing hearing, the essential purpose of notice has been fulfilled[.]” *State v. Qualls*, Slip. Op. 2012-Ohio-1111, at ¶24, *notice* is not sufficient to actually *impose* a criminal punishment. Otherwise, a court that imposed a proper sentence at the sentencing hearing could send a defendant to prison for life based on an entry that sentenced the defendant to prison with no mention of any term. Then, the executive branch would have to determine the lawful punishment or order a copy of the sentencing transcript.

This Court has ruled for more than 100 years that a “court’s oral pronouncement of its finding and its sentence [is] inchoate” until journalized. *State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed*, 63 Ohio St. 3d 597, 600 (1992). *See also Eldridge & Higgins Co. v. Barrere*, 74 Ohio St. 389, 395 (1906) (“The requirement that all judgments must be entered on the journal carries the implication that until that is done the judgment is inchoate only, it is incomplete. Though possessing the character of potentiality it lacks the character of actuality, and

hence is without probative force.”); *Coe v. Erb*, 59 Ohio St. 259, 263 (1898) (“The requirement that all judgments must be entered on the journal carries the implication that until that is done the judgment is inchoate only; it is incomplete.”).

The remedy of discharge for a vague sentence is also consistent with the principle that a sentence requiring executing interpretation cannot be enforced. *In re Moore*, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 576,<sup>1</sup> 14 Ohio C.C. 237 (1897), cited with approval in *Hamilton v. State*, 78 Ohio St. 76, 85-6 (1908):

A sentence in a criminal case must be so complete as . . . to need no construction of a court to ascertain its import. It must be so complete, as that [a defendant] may not have to look between the lines for its meaning, and it cannot be supplemented by a non-judicial or ministerial officer.

In other words, a man who is compelled to have a law-suit to get into jail, ought not, by reason of uncertainty of his sentence, be compelled to have another law-suit to get out.

(Paragraph break supplied.)

The executive branch does not have authority to punish a person without a clear, lawful court order. Here, without objection or appeal by the State, the original trial court failed to impose lawful postrelease control. As a result, the sanction was void and unenforceable, and therefore could not be the basis for an “escape” conviction.

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<sup>1</sup> West’s Ohio Digest lists the citation as “7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 575,” but Lexis lists the citation as “7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 576.”

**III. Res judicata principles apply equally to the State and the defense.**

**A. Res judicata is not Latin for “the State wins.”**

The State asserts that the res judicata principles in *Fischer* apply only against the defendant. “Res judicata principles would not bar the defendant from raising issues pertaining to the reimposition of post-release control; res judicata, however, would act to bar the defendant from raising all other claims.” State’s Brief at 8, citing no particular language in *Fischer*. But a judgment is either void or it is not. A judgment cannot be void as to one party but not the other.

**B. For res judicata to apply, there must be a “judicata.”**

Res judicata means a “matter adjudged.” *Blacks Law*, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, p. 1305 (1990). By definition, for a matter to be adjudged, there has to be a *judgment*. But as this Court recognized in *State v. Fischer*, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶30, improper postrelease control is void, so that portion of the “sentence may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.”

**C. State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94 (1978), did not bar the trial court from granting relief.**

As this Court has held, *Special Prosecutors* does not bar a defendant from raising a claim “on grounds not resolved in the previous appeal.” *State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall*, 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, ¶35. In this case, the first ruling of the court of appeals did not address the argument that Mr. Billiter’s postrelease control was void under *Bloomer* because that case did

not yet exist. *State v. Billeter*, Stark App. No. 2008-CA-00198, 2009-Ohio-2709. As this Court also held in *Cordray*, “new arguments are barred by the [non-jurisdictional] res judicata portion of the law-of-the-case doctrine[.]” And as explained above, this case falls squarely within well-accepted exceptions to res judicata.

#### **IV. Diligent prosecutors can correct illegal sentences.**

In its brief, the State appears to argue that Mr. Billiter should have appealed his void postrelease control. State’s Brief at 8 (“Billiter did not challenge the validity of his criminal sentence.”) But as this Court has noted, a defendant without enforceable postrelease control has no reason to appeal. *Compare State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.*, 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, ¶5, n.1 (holding that the defendant “did not have an adequate remedy by appealing his convictions and sentence because he does not challenge his trial court’s sentence. Instead, he challenges the APA’s alleged action in imposing postrelease control.”) Many prosecutors and lower court judges did not take the duty to impose postrelease control seriously until this Court held that, as a matter of the separation of powers, “unless a trial court includes postrelease control in its sentence, the Adult Parole Authority is without authority to impose it.” *State v. Jordan*, 104 Ohio St. 3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶19. *Jordan* was not the first warning prosecutors received. As this Court noted in *Jordan*, that decision merely “reaffirm[ed]” the holding of *Woods v. Telb*, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512, 2000-Ohio-171 (“post-release control is part of the original judicially imposed sentence.”) In *Jordan*, this Court also

explained that in *Woods*, this Court “detailed the constitutional significance of a trial court including postrelease control in its sentence. We stated that because the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes the executive branch of government from impeding the judiciary's ability to impose a sentence, the problem of having the Adult Parole Authority impose postrelease control at its discretion is remedied by a trial court incorporating postrelease control into its original sentence.” *Jordan* at ¶19. In addition, R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.19 have required trial courts to impose postrelease control in both the sentencing hearing and sentencing entry since 1996.

Despite the clear statutory requirement and despite this Court’s ruling in *Woods*, few prosecutors objected when trial courts failed to properly impose postrelease control. The failure of prosecutors to pay attention at the sentencing hearing, to read sentencing entries, and to appeal incorrect decisions has caused a decade of confusion as courts try to fix problems that should never have happened.

In this case, the State, not Mr. Billiter, sat on its hands and said nothing when the trial court failed to impose enforceable postrelease control in the underlying case. The State failed to appeal, and the State never sought to correct the judgment.

Like Mr. McGrath, Mr. Billiter “does not challenge his trial court’s sentence. Instead, he challenges the APA’s alleged action in imposing postrelease control.” *McGrath* at ¶5, n.1. Like Mr. McGrath, Mr. Billiter had no duty to file an appeal simply to force the trial court to impose a higher

sentence. It was the State's job to timely challenge the unenforceable postrelease control. See R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) (providing an appeal of right for the state to challenge any sentence that is "contrary to law.")


### **Conclusion**

Mr. Billiter initially challenged his escape conviction in a "Motion to Suspend Further Execution of Sentence," which he filed pro se. The State is asking this Court to hold a legally innocent man in prison simply because that man lost a pro se motion based on no applicable rule and on case law that did not directly apply to his case. Mr. Billiter later obtained counsel and filed a proper motion to withdraw his plea under the correct case law. This Court should conclude that motion was meritorious and should have been granted.

And even if this Court concludes that res judicata can bar a motion challenging a void sentence, actual innocence is an "injustice" that exempts a claim from a res judicata defense. This Court should apply the exception to this case and discharge Mr. Billiter.

Respectfully submitted,

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**Certificate of Service**

I certify that on April 20, 2012, the foregoing was sent via regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to Ronald Mark Caldwell, Assistant Stark County Prosecutor, Stark County Prosecutor's Office, 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510, Canton, Ohio 44702.



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**Appendix to**

**Reply Brief of Appellant Donald Billiter**

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Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated:  
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Current through Legislation passed by the 129th Ohio General Assembly  
 and filed with the Secretary of State through File 88  
 \*\*\* Annotations current through January 9, 2012 \*\*\*

TITLE 29. CRIMES -- PROCEDURE  
 CHAPTER 2929. PENALTIES AND SENTENCING  
 PENALTIES FOR FELONY

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*ORC Ann. 2929.14 (2012)*

§ 2929.14. Basic prison terms

(A) Except as provided in division (B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3), (B)(4), (B)(5), (B)(6), (B)(7), (B)(8), (E), (G), (H), or (J) of this section or in division (D)(6) of *section 2919.25 of the Revised Code* and except in relation to an offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment is to be imposed, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant to this chapter, the court shall impose a definite prison term that shall be one of the following:

(1) For a felony of the first degree, the prison term shall be three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years.

(2) For a felony of the second degree, the prison term shall be two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years.

(3) (a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of *section 2903.06, 2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, or 2907.05 of the Revised Code* or that is a violation of *section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of the Revised Code* if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty in two or more separate proceedings to two or more violations of *section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, or 2911.12 of the Revised Code*, the prison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.

(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.

(4) For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.

(5) For a felony of the fifth degree, the prison term shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.

(B) (1) (a) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.141, 2941.144, or 2941.145 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose on the offender one of the following prison terms:

(i) A prison term of six years if the specification is of the type described in *section 2941.144 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with having a firearm that is an automatic firearm or that was equipped with a firearm muffler or silencer on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the felony;

(ii) A prison term of three years if the specification is of the type described in *section 2941.145 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and displaying the firearm, brandishing the firearm, indicating that the offender possessed the firearm, or using it to facilitate the offense;

(iii) A prison term of one year if the specification is of the type described in *section 2941.141 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the felony.

(b) If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section, the prison term shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2967.19, section 2929.20, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. Except as provided in division (B)(1)(g) of this section, a court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction.

(c) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of *section 2923.161 of the Revised Code* or to a felony that includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another, also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.146 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the violation of *section 2923.161 of the Revised Code* or for the other felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of five years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section relative to an offense, the court also shall impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) of this section relative to the same offense, provided the criteria specified in that division for imposing an additional prison term are satisfied relative to the offender and the offense.

(d) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense of violence that is a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1411 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with wearing or carrying body armor while

committing the felony offense of violence, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of two years. The prison term so imposed, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of *section 2967.19 of the Revised Code*, shall not be reduced pursuant to *section 2929.20*, *section 2967.19*, *section 2967.193*, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(d) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section, the court is not precluded from imposing an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(d) of this section.

(e) The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of *section 2923.12* or *2923.123 of the Revised Code*. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) or (b) of this section upon an offender for a violation of *section 2923.122* that involves a deadly weapon that is a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance, *section 2923.16*, or *section 2923.121 of the Revised Code*. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of *section 2923.13 of the Revised Code* unless all of the following apply:

(i) The offender previously has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or any felony of the first or second degree.

(ii) Less than five years have passed since the offender was released from prison or post-release control, whichever is later, for the prior offense.

(f) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that includes, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm at a peace officer as defined in *section 2935.01 of the Revised Code* or a corrections officer, as defined in *section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code*, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of seven years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to *section 2929.20*, *section 2967.19*, *section 2967.193*, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies that include, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(f) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(f) of this section for each of two of the specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(f) of this section relative to an offense, the court shall not impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section relative to the same offense.

(g) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to

a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.

(2) (a) If division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not apply, the court may impose on an offender, in addition to the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense, an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.149 of the Revised Code* that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense that is not life imprisonment without parole.

(iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (D)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (D)(1) or (3) of this section are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under *section 2929.12 of the Revised Code* indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.

(v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (D)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (D)(1) or (3) of this section are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense, because one or more of the factors under *section 2929.12 of the Revised Code* indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense are present, and they outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating that the offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

(b) The court shall impose on an offender the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense and shall impose on the offender an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.149 of the Revised Code* that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offender within the preceding twenty years has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more offenses described in division (CC)(1) of *section 2929.01 of the Revised Code*, including all offenses described in that division of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty in the current prosecution and all offenses described in that divi-

sion of which the offender previously has been convicted or to which the offender previously pleaded guilty, whether prosecuted together or separately.

(iii) The offense or offenses of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(c) For purposes of division (B)(2)(b) of this section, two or more offenses committed at the same time or as part of the same act or event shall be considered one offense, and that one offense shall be the offense with the greatest penalty.

(d) A sentence imposed under division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. The offender shall serve an additional prison term imposed under this section consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.

(e) When imposing a sentence pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section, the court shall state its findings explaining the imposed sentence.

(3) Except when an offender commits a violation of *section 2903.01* or *2907.02 of the Revised Code* and the penalty imposed for the violation is life imprisonment or commits a violation of *section 2903.02 of the Revised Code*, if the offender commits a violation of *section 2925.03* or *2925.11 of the Revised Code* and that section classifies the offender as a major drug offender and requires the imposition of a ten-year prison term on the offender, if the offender commits a felony violation of *section 2925.02, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.36, 3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 3719.161, 4729.37, or 4729.61, division (C) or (D) of section 3719.172, division (C) of section 4729.51, or division (J) of section 4729.54 of the Revised Code* that includes the sale, offer to sell, or possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance, with the exception of marihuana, and the court imposing sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code* charging that the offender is a major drug offender, if the court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of the first degree, or if the offender is guilty of an attempted violation of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code* and, had the offender completed the violation of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code* that was attempted, the offender would have been subject to a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole for the violation of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose upon the offender for the felony violation a ten-year prison term that, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of *section 2967.19 of the Revised Code*, cannot be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code.

(4) If the offender is being sentenced for a third or fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code*, the sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term in accordance with that division. In addition to the mandatory

prison term, if the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense, the court, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of this section, may sentence the offender to a definite prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months, and if the offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony OVI offense, the sentencing court may sentence the offender to an additional prison term of any duration specified in division (A)(3) of this section. In either case, the additional prison term imposed shall be reduced by the sixty or one hundred twenty days imposed upon the offender as the mandatory prison term. The total of the additional prison term imposed under division (D)(4) of this section plus the sixty or one hundred twenty days imposed as the mandatory prison term shall equal a definite term in the range of six months to thirty months for a fourth degree felony OVI offense and shall equal one of the authorized prison terms specified in division (A)(3) of this section for a third degree felony OVI offense. If the court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(4) of this section, the offender shall serve the additional prison term after the offender has served the mandatory prison term required for the offense. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory and additional prison term imposed as described in division (B)(4) of this section, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction under *section 2929.16 or 2929.17 of the Revised Code*, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(1) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code* and the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, the court may impose a prison term as described in division (A)(1) of that section.

(5) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2903.06 of the Revised Code* and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1414 of the Revised Code* that charges that the victim of the offense is a peace officer, as defined in *section 2935.01 of the Revised Code*, or an investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation, as defined in *section 2903.11 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of five years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of *section 2967.19 of the Revised Code*, shall not be reduced pursuant to *section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code*. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(6) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2903.06 of the Revised Code* and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code* that charges that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more violations of division (A) or (B) of *section 4511.19 of the Revised Code* or an equivalent offense, as defined in *section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code*, or three or more violations of any combination of those divisions and offenses, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of three years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of *section 2967.19 of the Revised Code*, shall not be reduced pursuant to *section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code*. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(7) (a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2905.01, 2905.02, 2907.21, 2907.22, or 2923.32, division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2907.323, or division (B)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of *section 2919.22 of the Revised Code* and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1422 of the Revised Code* that charges that the offender knowingly committed the offense in furtherance of human trafficking, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is one of the following:

(i) If the offense is a felony of the first degree, a definite prison term of not less than five years and not greater than ten years;

(ii) If the offense is a felony of the second or third degree, a definite prison term of not less than three years and not greater than the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*;

(iii) If the offense is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, a definite prison term that is the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*.

(b) Subject to divisions (C) to (I) of *section 2967.19 of the Revised Code*, the prison term imposed under division (B)(7)(a) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(7)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act, scheme, or plan.

(8) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of *section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code* and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1423 of the Revised Code* that charges that the victim of the violation was a woman whom the offender knew was pregnant at the time of the violation, notwithstanding the range of prison terms prescribed in division (A) of this section for felonies of the same degree as the violation, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is either a definite prison term of six months or one of the prison terms prescribed in *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code* for felonies of the same degree as the violation.

(C) (1) (a) Subject to division (C)(1)(b) of this section, if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of this section for having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing a felony, if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(c) of this section for committing a felony specified in that division by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, or if both types of mandatory prison terms are imposed, the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term imposed under either division consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under either division or under division (B)(1)(d) of this section, consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony pursuant to division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(b) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(d) of this section for wearing or carrying body armor while committing an offense of violence that is a felony, the offender shall serve the mandatory term so imposed consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under that division or under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section, consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony under division (A),

(B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(c) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(f) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term so imposed consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(d) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(7) or (8) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term so imposed consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under that division or under any other provision of law and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(2) If an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential detention facility violates *section 2917.02, 2917.03, or 2921.35 of the Revised Code* or division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2921.34 of the Revised Code*, if an offender who is under detention at a detention facility commits a felony violation of *section 2923.131 of the Revised Code*, or if an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential detention facility or is under detention at a detention facility commits another felony while the offender is an escapee in violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2921.34 of the Revised Code*, any prison term imposed upon the offender for one of those violations shall be served by the offender consecutively to the prison term or term of imprisonment the offender was serving when the offender committed that offense and to any other prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(3) If a prison term is imposed for a violation of division (B) of *section 2911.01 of the Revised Code*, a violation of division (A) of *section 2913.02 of the Revised Code* in which the stolen property is a firearm or dangerous ordnance, or a felony violation of division (B) of *section 2921.331 of the Revised Code*, the offender shall serve that prison term consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to *section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code*, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

(5) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(5) or (6) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2903.06 of the Revised Code* pursuant to division (A) of this section or *section 2929.142 of the Revised Code*. If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(5) of this section, and if a mandatory prison term also is imposed upon the offender pursuant to division (B)(6) of this section in relation to the same violation, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term imposed pursuant to division (B)(5) of this section consecutively to and prior to the mandatory prison term imposed pursuant to division (B)(6) of this section and consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of *section 2903.06 of the Revised Code* pursuant to division (A) of this section or *section 2929.142 of the Revised Code*.

(6) When consecutive prison terms are imposed pursuant to division (C)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) or division (H)(1) or (2) of this section, the term to be served is the aggregate of all of the terms so imposed.

(D) (1) If a court imposes a prison term for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person, it shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control after the offender's release from imprisonment, in accordance with that division. If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to include a post-release control requirement in the sentence pursuant to this division does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of post-release control that is required for the offender under division (B) of *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code*. *Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code* applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to include in the sentence pursuant to this division a statement regarding post-release control.

(2) If a court imposes a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (D)(1) of this section, it shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control after the offender's release from imprisonment, in accordance with that division, if the parole board determines that a period of post-release control is necessary. *Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code* applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to include in the sentence pursuant to this division a statement regarding post-release control.

(3) If a court imposes a prison term on or after the effective date of this amendment for a felony, it shall include in the sentence a statement notifying the offender that the offender may be eligible to earn days of credit under the circumstances specified in *section 2967.193 of the Revised Code*. The statement also shall notify the offender that days of credit are not automatically awarded under that section, but that they must be earned in the manner specified in that section. If a court fails to include the statement in the sentence, the failure does not affect the eligibility of the offender under *section 2967.193 of the Revised Code* to earn any days of credit as a deduction from the offender's stated prison term or otherwise render any part of that section or any action taken under that section void or voidable. The failure of a court to include in a sentence the statement described in this division does not constitute grounds for setting aside the offender's conviction or sentence or for granting postconviction relief to the offender.

(E) The court shall impose sentence upon the offender in accordance with *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*, and Chapter 2971. of the Revised Code applies regarding the prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon the offender and the service of that term of imprisonment if any of the following apply:

(1) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, and, in relation to that offense, the offender is adjudicated a sexually violent predator.

(2) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code* committed on or after January 2, 2007, and either the court does not impose a sentence of life without parole when authorized pursuant to division (B) of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code*, or division (B) of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code* provides that the court shall not sentence the offender pursuant to *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*.

(3) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code*.

(4) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of *section 2905.01 of the Revised Code* committed on or after January 1, 2008, and that section requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*.

(5) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder committed on or after January 1, 2008, and division (A)(2)(b)(ii) of *section 2929.022*, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C)(2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E)(1)(d) of *section 2929.03*, or division (A) or (B) of *section 2929.06 of the Revised Code* requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*.

(6) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder committed on or after January 1, 2008, and division (B)(2) of *section 2929.02 of the Revised Code* requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*.

(F) If a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony is sentenced to a prison term or term of imprisonment under this section, sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the *Revised Code*, *section 2929.142 of the Revised Code*, *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*, or any other provision of law, *section 5120.163 of the Revised Code* applies regarding the person while the person is confined in a state correctional institution.

(G) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that is an offense of violence also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.142 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with having committed the felony while participating in a criminal gang, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional prison term of one, two, or three years.

(H) (1) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder, murder, or a felony of the first, second, or third degree that is an offense of violence also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.143 of the Revised Code* that charges the offender with having committed the offense in a school safety zone or towards a person in a school safety zone, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional prison term of two

years. The offender shall serve the additional two years consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.

(2) (a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of *section 2907.22, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code* and to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1421 of the Revised Code* and if the court imposes a prison term on the offender for the felony violation, the court may impose upon the offender an additional prison term as follows:

(i) Subject to division (H)(2)(a)(ii) of this section, an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, or six months;

(ii) If the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more felony or misdemeanor violations of *section 2907.22, 2907.23, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code* and also was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1421 of the Revised Code* regarding one or more of those violations, an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.

(b) In lieu of imposing an additional prison term under division (H)(2)(a) of this section, the court may directly impose on the offender a sanction that requires the offender to wear a real-time processing, continual tracking electronic monitoring device during the period of time specified by the court. The period of time specified by the court shall equal the duration of an additional prison term that the court could have imposed upon the offender under division (H)(2)(a) of this section. A sanction imposed under this division shall commence on the date specified by the court, provided that the sanction shall not commence until after the offender has served the prison term imposed for the felony violation of *section 2907.22, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code* and any residential sanction imposed for the violation under *section 2929.16 of the Revised Code*. A sanction imposed under this division shall be considered to be a community control sanction for purposes of *section 2929.15 of the Revised Code*, and all provisions of the Revised Code that pertain to community control sanctions shall apply to a sanction imposed under this division, except to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable. The offender shall pay all costs associated with a sanction imposed under this division, including the cost of the use of the monitoring device.

(I) (1) At the time of sentencing, the court may recommend the offender for placement in a program of shock incarceration under *section 5120.031 of the Revised Code* or for placement in an intensive program prison under *section 5120.032 of the Revised Code*, disapprove placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison of that nature, or make no recommendation on placement of the offender. In no case shall the department of rehabilitation and correction place the offender in a program or prison of that nature unless the department determines as specified in *section 5120.031 or 5120.032 of the Revised Code*, whichever is applicable, that the offender is eligible for the placement.

If the court disapproves placement of the offender in a program or prison of that nature, the department of rehabilitation and correction shall not place the offender in any program of shock incarceration or intensive program prison.

If the court recommends placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or in an intensive program prison, and if the offender is subsequently placed in the recommended pro-

gram or prison, the department shall notify the court of the placement and shall include with the notice a brief description of the placement.

If the court recommends placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or in an intensive program prison and the department does not subsequently place the offender in the recommended program or prison, the department shall send a notice to the court indicating why the offender was not placed in the recommended program or prison.

If the court does not make a recommendation under this division with respect to an offender and if the department determines as specified in *section 5120.031* or *5120.032 of the Revised Code*, whichever is applicable, that the offender is eligible for placement in a program or prison of that nature, the department shall screen the offender and determine if there is an available program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison for which the offender is suited. If there is an available program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison for which the offender is suited, the department shall notify the court of the proposed placement of the offender as specified in *section 5120.031* or *5120.032 of the Revised Code* and shall include with the notice a brief description of the placement. The court shall have ten days from receipt of the notice to disapprove the placement.

(L) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of division (A)(1) of *section 2903.06 of the Revised Code* and division (B)(2)(c) of that section applies, the person shall be sentenced pursuant to *section 2929.142 of the Revised Code*.

#### **HISTORY:**

146 v S 2 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v S 269 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v H 88 (Eff 9-3-96); 146 v H 445 (Eff 9-3-96); 146 v H 154 (Eff 10-4-96); 146 v S 166 (Eff 10-17-96); 146 v H 180 (Eff 1-1-97); 147 v H 151 (Eff 9-16-97); 147 v H 32 (Eff 3-10-98); 147 v S 111 (Eff 3-17-98); 147 v H 2 (Eff 1-1-99); 148 v S 1 (Eff 8-6-99); 148 v H 29 (Eff 10-29-99); 148 v S 107 (Eff 3-23-2000); 148 v S 22 (Eff 5-17-2000); 148 v S 222 (Eff 3-22-2001); 149 v H 485 (Eff 6-13-2002); 149 v H 327 (Eff 7-8-2002); 149 v H 130. Eff 4-7-2003; 149 v S 123, § 1, eff. 1-1-04; 150 v H 12, §§ 1, 3, eff. 4-8-04\*; 150 v H 52, § 1, eff. 6-1-04; 150 v H 163, § 1, eff. 9-23-04; 150 v H 473, § 1, eff. 4-29-05; 151 v H 95, § 1, eff. 8-3-06; 151 v H 137, § 1, eff. 7-11-06; 151 v H 137, § 3, eff. 8-3-06; 151 v S 260, § 1, eff. 1-2-07; 151 v S 281, § 1, eff. 1-4-07; 151 v H 461, § 1, eff. 4-4-07; 152 v S 10, § 1, eff. 1-1-08; 152 v S 184, § 1, eff. 9-9-08; 152 v S 220, § 1, eff. 9-30-08; 152 v H 280, § 1, eff. 4-7-09; 152 v H 130, § 1, eff. 4-7-09; 2011 HB 86, § 1, eff. Sept. 30, 2011.

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Current through Legislation passed by the 129th Ohio General Assembly  
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 \*\*\* Annotations current through January 9, 2012 \*\*\*

TITLE 29. CRIMES -- PROCEDURE  
 CHAPTER 2929. PENALTIES AND SENTENCING  
 PENALTIES FOR FELONY

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*ORC Ann. 2929.19 (2012)*

§ 2929.19. Sentencing hearing

(A) The court shall hold a sentencing hearing before imposing a sentence under this chapter upon an offender who was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony and before resentencing an offender who was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony and whose case was remanded pursuant to *section 2953.07 or 2953.08 of the Revised Code*. At the hearing, the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the victim's representative in accordance with *section 2930.14 of the Revised Code*, and, with the approval of the court, any other person may present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. The court shall inform the offender of the verdict of the jury or finding of the court and ask the offender whether the offender has anything to say as to why sentence should not be imposed upon the offender.

(B) (1) At the sentencing hearing, the court, before imposing sentence, shall consider the record, any information presented at the hearing by any person pursuant to division (A) of this section, and, if one was prepared, the presentence investigation report made pursuant to *section 2951.03 of the Revised Code* or *Criminal Rule 32.2*, and any victim impact statement made pursuant to *section 2947.051 of the Revised Code*.

(2) Subject to division (B)(3) of this section, if the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the following:

(a) Impose a stated prison term and, if the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notify the offender that the prison term is a mandatory prison term;

(b) In addition to any other information, include in the sentencing entry the name and section reference to the offense or offenses, the sentence or sentences imposed and whether the sentence or sentences contain mandatory prison terms, if sentences are imposed for multiple counts whether the sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively, and the name and section ref-

erence of any specification or specifications for which sentence is imposed and the sentence or sentences imposed for the specification or specifications;

(c) Notify the offender that the offender will be supervised under *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code* after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the first degree or second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person. If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(2)(c) of this section on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(c) of this section that the offender will be supervised under *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code* after the offender leaves prison or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision that is required for the offender under division (B) of *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code*. *Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code* applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(2)(c) of this section and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(c) of this section regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence a statement regarding post-release control.

(d) Notify the offender that the offender may be supervised under *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code* after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(2)(c) of this section. *Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code* applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in division (B)(2)(d) of this section and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of this section regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence a statement regarding post-release control.

(e) Notify the offender that, if a period of supervision is imposed following the offender's release from prison, as described in division (B)(2)(c) or (d) of this section, and if the offender violates that supervision or a condition of post-release control imposed under division (B) of *section 2967.131 of the Revised Code*, the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender. If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(e) of this section that the parole board may impose a prison term as described in division (B)(2)(e) of this section for a violation of that supervision or a condition of post-release control imposed under division (B) of *section 2967.131 of the Revised Code* or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the authority of the parole board to so impose a prison term for a violation of that nature if, pursuant to division (D)(1) of *section 2967.28 of the Revised Code*, the parole board notifies the offender prior to the offender's release of the board's authority to so impose a prison term. *Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code* applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(e) of this section regarding the possibility of the parole board imposing a prison term for a violation of supervision or a condition of post-release control.

(f) Require that the offender not ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse and submit to random drug testing as provided in *section 341.26, 753.33, or 5120.63 of the Revised Code*, which ever is applicable to the offender who is serving a prison term, and require that the results of the

drug test administered under any of those sections indicate that the offender did not ingest or was not injected with a drug of abuse.

(g) Include in the offender's sentence a statement notifying the offender of the information described in division (F)(3) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code* regarding earned credits under *section 2967.193 of the Revised Code*.

(3) (a) The court shall include in the offender's sentence a statement that the offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender, and the court shall comply with the requirements of *section 2950.03 of the Revised Code* if any of the following apply:

(i) The offender is being sentenced for a violent sex offense or designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense that the offender committed on or after January 1, 1997, and the offender is adjudicated a sexually violent predator in relation to that offense.

(ii) The offender is being sentenced for a sexually oriented offense that the offender committed on or after January 1, 1997, and the offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender relative to that offense.

(iii) The offender is being sentenced on or after July 31, 2003, for a child-victim oriented offense, and the offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender relative to that offense.

(iv) The offender is being sentenced under *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code* for a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code* committed on or after January 2, 2007.

(v) The offender is sentenced to a term of life without parole under division (B) of *section 2907.02 of the Revised Code*.

(vi) The offender is being sentenced for attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and a specification of the type described in *section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code*.

(vii) The offender is being sentenced under division (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code* for an offense described in those divisions committed on or after January 1, 2008.

(b) Additionally, if any criterion set forth in divisions (B)(3)(a)(i) to (vii) of this section is satisfied, in the circumstances described in division (E) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose sentence on the offender as described in that division.

(4) If the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a community control sanction should be imposed and the court is not prohibited from imposing a community control sanction, the court shall impose a community control sanction. The court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, if the offender commits a violation of any law, or if the offender leaves this state without the permission of the court or the offender's probation officer, the court may impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term on the offender and shall indicate the specific prison term that may be imposed as a sanction for the violation, as selected by the court from the range of prison terms for the offense pursuant to *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*.

(5) Before imposing a financial sanction under *section 2929.18 of the Revised Code* or a fine under *section 2929.32 of the Revised Code*, the court shall consider the offender's present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine.

(6) If the sentencing court sentences the offender to a sanction of confinement pursuant to *section 2929.14 or 2929.16 of the Revised Code* that is to be served in a local detention facility, as defined in *section 2929.36 of the Revised Code*, and if the local detention facility is covered by a policy adopted pursuant to *section 307.93, 341.14, 341.19, 341.21, 341.23, 753.02, 753.04, 753.16, 2301.56, or 2947.19 of the Revised Code* and *section 2929.37 of the Revised Code*, both of the following apply:

(a) The court shall specify both of the following as part of the sentence:

(i) If the offender is presented with an itemized bill pursuant to *section 2929.37 of the Revised Code* for payment of the costs of confinement, the offender is required to pay the bill in accordance with that section.

(ii) If the offender does not dispute the bill described in division (B)(6)(a)(i) of this section and does not pay the bill by the times specified in *section 2929.37 of the Revised Code*, the clerk of the court may issue a certificate of judgment against the offender as described in that section.

(b) The sentence automatically includes any certificate of judgment issued as described in division (B)(6)(a)(ii) of this section.

(7) The failure of the court to notify the offender that a prison term is a mandatory prison term pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) of this section or to include in the sentencing entry any information required by division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not affect the validity of the imposed sentence or sentences. If the sentencing court notifies the offender at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is mandatory but the sentencing entry does not specify that the prison term is mandatory, the court may complete a corrected journal entry and send copies of the corrected entry to the offender and the department of rehabilitation and correction, or, at the request of the state, the court shall complete a corrected journal entry and send copies of the corrected entry to the offender and department of rehabilitation and correction.

(C) (1) If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(1) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose the mandatory term of local incarceration in accordance with that division, shall impose a mandatory fine in accordance with division (B)(3) of *section 2929.18 of the Revised Code*, and, in addition, may impose additional sanctions as specified in *sections 2929.15, 2929.16, 2929.17, and 2929.18 of the Revised Code*. The court shall not impose a prison term on the offender except that the court may impose a prison term upon the offender as provided in division (A)(1) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code*.

(2) If the offender is being sentenced for a third or fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code*, the court shall impose the mandatory prison term in accordance with that division, shall impose a mandatory fine in accordance with division (B)(3) of *section 2929.18 of the Revised Code*, and, in addition, may impose an additional prison term as specified in *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may impose a

community control sanction on the offender, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(D) The sentencing court, pursuant to division (I)(1) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*, may recommend placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration under *section 5120.031 of the Revised Code* or an intensive program prison under *section 5120.032 of the Revised Code*, disapprove placement of the offender in a program or prison of that nature, or make no recommendation. If the court recommends or disapproves placement, it shall make a finding that gives its reasons for its recommendation or disapproval.

**HISTORY:**

146 v S 2 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v S 269 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v S 166 (Eff 10-17-96); 146 v H 180 (Eff 1-1-97); 148 v S 107 (Eff 3-23-2000); 148 v S 22 (Eff 5-17-2000); 148 v H 349 (Eff 9-22-2000); 149 v H 485 (Eff 6-13-2002); 149 v H 327 (Eff 7-8-2002); 149 v H 170. Eff 9-6-2002; 149 v H 490, § 1, eff. 1-1-04; 149 v S 123, § 1, eff. 1-1-04; 150 v S 5, § 1, Eff 7-31-03; 150 v S 5, § 3, eff. 1-1-04; 150 v H 163, § 1, eff. 9-23-04; 150 v H 473, § 1, eff. 4-29-05; 151 v H 137, § 1, eff. 7-11-06; 151 v S 260, § 1, eff. 1-2-07; 151 v H 461, § 1, eff. 4-4-07; 152 v S 10, § 1, eff. 1-1-08; 152 v H 130, § 1, eff. 4-7-09; 2011 HB 86, § 1, eff. Sept. 30, 2011.

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Current through Legislation passed by the 129th Ohio General Assembly  
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 \*\*\* Annotations current through January 9, 2012 \*\*\*

TITLE 29. CRIMES -- PROCEDURE  
 CHAPTER 2953. APPEALS; OTHER POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

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*ORC Ann. 2953.08 (2012)*

§ 2953.08. Grounds for appeal by defendant or prosecutor of sentence for felony; appeal cost oversight committee

(A) In addition to any other right to appeal and except as provided in division (D) of this section, a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the defendant on one of the following grounds:

(1) The sentence consisted of or included the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of *section 2929.14* or *section 2929.142 of the Revised Code*, the maximum prison term was not required for the offense pursuant to Chapter 2925. or any other provision of the Revised Code, and the court imposed the sentence under one of the following circumstances:

(a) The sentence was imposed for only one offense.

(b) The sentence was imposed for two or more offenses arising out of a single incident, and the court imposed the maximum prison term for the offense of the highest degree.

(2) The sentence consisted of or included a prison term, the offense for which it was imposed is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree or is a felony drug offense that is a violation of a provision of Chapter 2925. of the Revised Code and that is specified as being subject to division (B) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code* for purposes of sentencing, and the court did not specify at sentencing that it found one or more factors specified in divisions (B)(1)(a) to (i) of *section 2929.13 of the Revised Code* to apply relative to the defendant. If the court specifies that it found one or more of those factors to apply relative to the defendant, the defendant is not entitled under this division to appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the offender.

(3) The person was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, was adjudicated a sexually violent predator in relation to that offense, and was sentenced pursuant to division (A)(3) of *section 2971.03 of the Revised Code*, if the minimum term of the indefinite term imposed pursuant to division (A)(3) of *section 2971.03*

of the Revised Code is the longest term available for the offense from among the range of terms listed in *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*. As used in this division, "designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense" and "violent sex offense" have the same meanings as in *section 2971.01 of the Revised Code*. As used in this division, "adjudicated a sexually violent predator" has the same meaning as in *section 2929.01 of the Revised Code*, and a person is "adjudicated a sexually violent predator" in the same manner and the same circumstances as are described in that section.

(4) The sentence is contrary to law.

(5) The sentence consisted of an additional prison term of ten years imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*.

(B) In addition to any other right to appeal and except as provided in division (D) of this section, a prosecuting attorney, a city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, or the attorney general, if one of those persons prosecuted the case, may appeal as a matter of right a sentence imposed upon a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or, in the circumstances described in division (B)(3) of this section the modification of a sentence imposed upon such a defendant, on any of the following grounds:

(1) The sentence did not include a prison term despite a presumption favoring a prison term for the offense for which it was imposed, as set forth in *section 2929.13* or *Chapter 2925* of the Revised Code.

(2) The sentence is contrary to law.

(3) The sentence is a modification under *section 2929.20 of the Revised Code* of a sentence that was imposed for a felony of the first or second degree.

(C) (1) In addition to the right to appeal a sentence granted under division (A) or (B) of this section, a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may seek leave to appeal a sentence imposed upon the defendant on the basis that the sentencing judge has imposed consecutive sentences under division (C)(3) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code* and that the consecutive sentences exceed the maximum prison term allowed by division (A) of that section for the most serious offense of which the defendant was convicted. Upon the filing of a motion under this division, the court of appeals may grant leave to appeal the sentence if the court determines that the allegation included as the basis of the motion is true.

(2) A defendant may seek leave to appeal an additional sentence imposed upon the defendant pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code* if the additional sentence is for a definite prison term that is longer than five years.

(D) (1) A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.

(2) Except as provided in division (C)(2) of this section, a sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(b) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*. Except as otherwise provided in this division, a defendant retains all rights to appeal as provided under this chapter or any other provision of the Revised Code. A defendant has the right to appeal under this chapter or any other provision of the Revised Code the court's application of division (B)(2)(c) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*.

(3) A sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to *sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code* is not subject to review under this section.

(E) A defendant, prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or chief municipal legal officer shall file an appeal of a sentence under this section to a court of appeals within the time limits specified in *Rule 4(B) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure*, provided that if the appeal is pursuant to division (B)(3) of this section, the time limits specified in that rule shall not commence running until the court grants the motion that makes the sentence modification in question. A sentence appeal under this section shall be consolidated with any other appeal in the case. If no other appeal is filed, the court of appeals may review only the portions of the trial record that pertain to sentencing.

(F) On the appeal of a sentence under this section, the record to be reviewed shall include all of the following, as applicable:

(1) Any presentence, psychiatric, or other investigative report that was submitted to the court in writing before the sentence was imposed. An appellate court that reviews a presentence investigation report prepared pursuant to *section 2947.06 or 2951.03 of the Revised Code or Criminal Rule 32.2* in connection with the appeal of a sentence under this section shall comply with division (D)(3) of *section 2951.03 of the Revised Code* when the appellate court is not using the presentence investigation report, and the appellate court's use of a presentence investigation report of that nature in connection with the appeal of a sentence under this section does not affect the otherwise confidential character of the contents of that report as described in division (D)(1) of *section 2951.03 of the Revised Code* and does not cause that report to become a public record, as defined in *section 149.43 of the Revised Code*, following the appellate court's use of the report.

(2) The trial record in the case in which the sentence was imposed;

(3) Any oral or written statements made to or by the court at the sentencing hearing at which the sentence was imposed;

(4) Any written findings that the court was required to make in connection with the modification of the sentence pursuant to a judicial release under division (I) of *section 2929.20 of the Revised Code*.

(G) (1) If the sentencing court was required to make the findings required by division (B) or (D) of *section 2929.13* or division (I) of *section 2929.20 of the Revised Code*, or to state the findings of the trier of fact required by division (B)(2)(e) of *section 2929.14 of the Revised Code*, relative to the imposition or modification of the sentence, and if the sentencing court failed to state the required findings on the record, the court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall remand the case to the sentencing court and instruct the sentencing court to state, on the record, the required findings.

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for re-sentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of *section 2929.20 of the Revised Code*, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

(H) A judgment or final order of a court of appeals under this section may be appealed, by leave of court, to the supreme court.

(I) (1) There is hereby established the felony sentence appeal cost oversight committee, consisting of eight members. One member shall be the chief justice of the supreme court or a representative of the court designated by the chief justice, one member shall be a member of the senate appointed by the president of the senate, one member shall be a member of the house of representatives appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one member shall be the director of budget and management or a representative of the office of budget and management designated by the director, one member shall be a judge of a court of appeals, court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court, one member shall be the state public defender or a representative of the office of the state public defender designated by the state public defender, one member shall be a prosecuting attorney appointed by the Ohio prosecuting attorneys association, and one member shall be a county commissioner appointed by the county commissioners association of Ohio. No more than three of the appointed members of the committee may be members of the same political party.

The president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the chief justice of the supreme court, the Ohio prosecuting attorneys association, and the county commissioners association of Ohio shall make the initial appointments to the committee of the appointed members no later than ninety days after July 1, 1996. Of those initial appointments to the committee, the members appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives and the Ohio prosecuting attorneys association shall serve a term ending two years after July 1, 1996, the member appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court shall serve a term ending three years after July 1, 1996, and the members appointed by the president of the senate and the county commissioners association of Ohio shall serve terms ending four years after July 1, 1996. Thereafter, terms of office of the appointed members shall be for four years, with each term ending on the same day of the same month as did the term that it succeeds. Members may be reappointed. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner provided for original appointments. A member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which that member's predecessor was appointed shall hold office as a member for the remainder of the predecessor's term. An appointed member shall continue in office subsequent to the expiration date of that member's term until that member's successor takes office or until a period of sixty days has elapsed, whichever occurs first.

If the chief justice of the supreme court, the director of the office of budget and management, or the state public defender serves as a member of the committee, that person's term of office as a member shall continue for as long as that person holds office as chief justice, director of the office of budget and management, or state public defender. If the chief justice of the supreme court designates a representative of the court to serve as a member, the director of budget and management designates a representative of the office of budget and management to serve as a member, or the

state public defender designates a representative of the office of the state public defender to serve as a member, the person so designated shall serve as a member of the commission for as long as the official who made the designation holds office as chief justice, director of the office of budget and management, or state public defender or until that official revokes the designation.

The chief justice of the supreme court or the representative of the supreme court appointed by the chief justice shall serve as chairperson of the committee. The committee shall meet within two weeks after all appointed members have been appointed and shall organize as necessary. Thereafter, the committee shall meet at least once every six months or more often upon the call of the chairperson or the written request of three or more members, provided that the committee shall not meet unless moneys have been appropriated to the judiciary budget administered by the supreme court specifically for the purpose of providing financial assistance to counties under division (I)(2) of this section and the moneys so appropriated then are available for that purpose.

The members of the committee shall serve without compensation, but, if moneys have been appropriated to the judiciary budget administered by the supreme court specifically for the purpose of providing financial assistance to counties under division (I)(2) of this section, each member shall be reimbursed out of the moneys so appropriated that then are available for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of official duties as a committee member.

(2) The state criminal sentencing commission periodically shall provide to the felony sentence appeal cost oversight committee all data the commission collects pursuant to division (A)(5) of *section 181.25 of the Revised Code*. Upon receipt of the data from the state criminal sentencing commission, the felony sentence appeal cost oversight committee periodically shall review the data; determine whether any money has been appropriated to the judiciary budget administered by the supreme court specifically for the purpose of providing state financial assistance to counties in accordance with this division for the increase in expenses the counties experience as a result of the felony sentence appeal provisions set forth in this section or as a result of a postconviction relief proceeding brought under division (A)(2) of *section 2953.21 of the Revised Code* or an appeal of a judgment in that proceeding; if it determines that any money has been so appropriated, determine the total amount of moneys that have been so appropriated specifically for that purpose and that then are available for that purpose; and develop a recommended method of distributing those moneys to the counties. The committee shall send a copy of its recommendation to the supreme court. Upon receipt of the committee's recommendation, the supreme court shall distribute to the counties, based upon that recommendation, the moneys that have been so appropriated specifically for the purpose of providing state financial assistance to counties under this division and that then are available for that purpose.

#### **HISTORY:**

146 v S 2 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v S 269 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v H 180 (Eff 1-1-97); 147 v H 151 (Eff 9-16-97); 148 v S 107 (Eff 3-23-2000); 148 v H 331. Eff 10-10-2000; 150 v H 473, § 1, eff. 4-29-05; 151 v H 95, § 1, eff. 8-3-06; 151 v H 461, § 1, eff. 4-4-07; 152 v H 130, § 1, eff. 4-7-09; 2011 HB 86, § 1, eff. Sept. 30, 2011.