

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State of Ohio *ex rel.*
Woodrow L. Fox, *et al.*,

Relators,

v.

Gary Walters
Clerk of Court for the Court of Common
Pleas, Licking County, Ohio, *et al.*,

Respondents.

Case No. 2013-0364

Original Action in Mandamus

REPLY BRIEF OF RELATORS WOODROW L. FOX
AND WOODY FOX BAIL BONDS, LLC

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Newark City Law Director and the Licking County Municipal Court agree with Relator -- whenever a court imposes a cash bond as a condition of release under Crim.R. 46(A), a clerk of court must accept a surety bond to secure the defendant's release, provided the sureties thereon are otherwise sufficient and solvent.¹ Yet instead of joining their contemporaries, Respondents and the the Amicus are advocating to keep indigent Ohio citizens in jail pending trial. They are ignoring the long-standing practice in the criminal justice system of posting bail through a surety bonding company. Not only is it a long standing practice, but also a well-established practice that boasts the highest return-to-court rate of criminal defendants.

Respondents and the Amicus completely disregard the public policy behind surety bail bonds and the fundamental role that bail bonding companies play in the criminal justice system. Their briefs are redundant and riddled with factual inaccuracies (as evidenced by their own attached documents²), and present a substandard analysis of the history of Criminal Rule 42 in conjunction with the Ohio Constitution and the codified laws. Further, they stray from industry terms in an to attempt dilute the substantive issues.³ In addition, they quote portions of Relators' brief out of context and

¹ See "Agreed Resolution," *State of Ohio ex rel. Fox, Sr. v. Phelps*, 2011-2009 (Ohio Sup.Ct.)

² Relator claims that the Licking County Sheriff arrested Carl Flannagan, yet this is not accurate. The Motion to Release Surety plainly states that Relators made the arrest. This is but one example that goes to the issues of reliability and credibility.

³ *E.g.*, a bond set under Crim.R. 46) (A)(2) is commonly known among criminal law practitioners as a "10% Bond." Yet, Respondents substitute this with the term "Appearance Bond," which fundamentally describes all bonds set under Crim.R. 46(A).

“defend” arguments that Relators never made.⁴ But in the words of our 33rd President, “If you can’t convince them, confuse them.” And that is exactly what Respondents and the Amicus Curiae are trying to do, because they have no other credible arguments.

II. REPLY

A. CASH IS CASH

This could not be more simple. It is well established that a bail bond that must be paid in cash only is unconstitutional. *Smith v. Leis*, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005 Ohio 5125; *State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon*, 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 609 N.E.2d 541. A 10% Bond under Criminal Rule 46(A)(2) requires a payment in cash only. Ergo, when the Licking County Court orders a 10% Bond and refused to accept anything but cash, the court has ordered an unconstitutional cash only bond.

Moreover, if Crim.R. 46(A) and its predecessor, Crim.R. 46(C)(3), were never intended to be cash-only bonds then it is true that defendants always have the option to satisfy bail with a surety bail bond. That is the only way the system works. It satisfies the Ohio Constitution, as well as the underlying policy of not unduly detaining a person who is innocent until proven guilty, as well as the intent of bail -- to ensure the appearance of the person at the next court proceeding.

B. THIS IS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT HAS NEVER OPINED OR CONSIDERED WHETHER CRIMINAL RULE 46(A)(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Relators and the Amicus rely on *dicta* out of the Eleventh District that is mere conjecture about this Court’s intent in drafting Crim.R. 46(A)(2). See *State ex rel. William v. Fankhauser*, 11th Dist. No. 2006-P-0006, 2006 Ohio 1170. As it is pure

⁴ For example, Relators have NEVER argued that a defendant has the right to choose the type of bail under Crim.R. 46(A)(1), (2) and (3).

speculation, it bears no weight in this matter. The bottom line: this Court has neither opined nor considered whether a 10% Bond is an impermissible cash-only bond. This Court has only addressed bail under subsection (A)(3) and its predecessor. See *Smith v. Leis*, 106 Ohio St.3d. 309, 2005 Ohio 5125; *State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon*, 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 609 N.E.2d 541.

C. RELATORS AGREE -- "THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 9 ARTICLE I IS TO ENSURE THAT DEFENDANTS ARE PROTECTED FROM EXCESSIVE BAIL AND HAVE THE MEANS TO POST THAT BAIL."⁵

While bail may be a source of revenue for both Relators and Respondents, Relators agree that the Ohio electorate did not vote to amend Section 9, Article I so that either the courts or the insurance companies could profit. Yet, that is not the issue. Instead, at the crux is the practical application of the terms "excessive" and "means," and the impact upon Ohio citizens' rights to not be unduly imprisoned while awaiting trial.

Respondents admit that unlike Relators, they do not provide any options for bail to be satisfied other than cash. Therefore, no matter the amount due, a person accused of a crime will be detained in a county jail unless he has enough cash to satisfy the 10% Bond. Though another person may deposit the cash, this person is required by law to certify that he or she is both capable of paying the full amount of the bail if the defendant fails to appear in court and willing to undertake such liability. That is a tall order. Thus more often than not, a 10% Bond results in the defendant spending unnecessary time in jail.

⁵ Respondents' Merit Brief, p.14.

Take for example, *State v. Andrew Miller*, case number 2012 CR 316 (Licking County CP). [Respondents' Merit Brief, Attachment II]. The Court issued a 10% Bond of \$10,000. Mr. Miller did not have \$1,000, and he could not find another person who would make the deposit and assume liability for his appearance. Mr. Miller stayed in jail for three months because the Respondents refused to accept a surety bail bond from Relator.

Another example, *State v. Carl Flanagan*, case number 2011 CR 166 (Licking County CP). [Respondents' Merit Brief, Attachment I]. On July 8, 2011, Relators posted a surety bail bond for the original bail of \$15,000. Thereafter, Mr. Flanagan skipped bail. As the system is geared to work, he was apprehended by Relators on September 14, 2011 and turned over to the Licking County Sheriff's Department.⁶ Instead of revoking the \$15,000 bond and issuing a new bail order, Respondent Branstool added an additional \$10,000 to the 10% Bond and thereafter refused to allow Realtors to post a surety bail bond for the increased amount. Accordingly, Mr. Flanagan stayed in jail until September 30, 2011, because his girlfriend, Meredith Hatfield, had to pawn her personal property to raise the \$1,000 for his bail. Thus, because Relators were prohibited from issuing the surety bail bond, Mr. Flanagan was unduly detained for 16 days in the county jail.

Miller and Flanagan are but two examples of the many problems with Relators' practices, and demonstrate several points.⁷ First, whether it is one day or three months,

⁶ See FN1, which should also put in question, Respondents' narrative summaries marked as "A-1" in the Appendix to their Merit Brief.

⁷ See Appendix to Relators' Merit Brief. Each of these individuals were unduly incarcerated, because Relator was not permitted to post a surety bail bond. To wit, Jenny Markle, 2 days; Melissa Canterbury, 5 days; Sara Caw, 12 days; Abigail Hunt, 22

a bond that may be satisfied only in cash results in detainment beyond what is reasonable.

Second, "excessive bail" is a relative term. On its face, a cash payment of \$500 or even \$1,000 may seem reasonable. However, to people like Mr. Miller and Mr. Flanagan, \$500 might as well be \$5 Million.

Third, bail bonding agents play an essential role in the criminal justice system. Clearly, there was someone who was willing to make a financial arrangement with Relator so that a surety bail bond could be posted for their releases. However, because Respondents would only accept cash, both were unduly jailed.

Fourth, a person who has to pawn personal property to raise \$1,000 is not a sufficient surety.

Fifth, *Flanagan* is the perfect example of how a court can abuse its power. Though Mr. Flanagan proved to be a flight risk, Respondents are not permitted to deny Mr. Flanagan the right to a sufficient surety. Yet, that is exactly what happened. Instead of permitting Relators to post the surety bail bond for the additional \$10,000, Respondents knowingly caused Mr. Flanagan to remain in jail until cash funds could be raised. This was completely unnecessary, particularly because Relators had just proven the reliability of the surety bail bonding system by apprehending Mr. Flanagan on September 14, 2011.

D. THERE IS NO LOGICAL REASON TO PROHIBIT THE POSTING OF A SURETY BAIL BOND

days; Brittani Hill 54 days; Ralph Lawyer 10 days. Nevertheless, these individuals are just the tip of the iceberg and are identified by Relators as non-inclusive evidence of the problems with the 10% Bonds in Licking County.

There is no better “sufficient surety” than a bail bonding company. The very model upon which it operates comports with the purpose of bail. It has resources dedicated solely to hunting down and capturing those individuals who “skip bail” and making sure that they appear in court (just as in the *Flanagan* case). Furthermore, a bail bonding company offers a “100% money-back guarantee.” If a defendant skips bail, the entire amount of the bail is paid.

In fact, the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics deemed that commercial bail was the most effective method of release pending trial. [Exhibit A, “Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Court.”] According to the study (Table 7, page 9), surety bail bonds have the lowest fugitive rate, whereas cash deposited bail is over double the rate. The study clearly suggests that defendants released on a cash deposited bail are not incentivized to return to court by the return of their deposit.

Closer to home, the Justice Department’s study rings true. Public records show that during the period August 1, 2012 to August 1, 2013, there were 361 defendants who were released upon the posting of a surety bail bond issued by the Franklin County Municipal Court. [Exhibit B – Affidavit of Woodrow L. Fox.]⁸ Out of the 361, every defendant was either apprehended (by the bondsman or law enforcement) or the bond was paid in full by the bonding company. In the same period, there were 768 defendants who were released under a 10% Bond and failed to appear in court. Out of these 768 cases, less than 9% of the bond was collected.

E. RULE 46(A)(2) IS CONGRUENT WITH THE SUFFICIENT SURETIES CLAUSE

⁸ Because the public record is used only as a demonstrative, Relator has opted not to include the actual, as it exceeds 200 pages. However, the documents are available for review by contacting Relators’ counsel or the Franklin County Municipal Court Clerk.

Contrary to Respondents' contentions, Relators are not asking the Court to narrowly define the term "surety." Quite the opposite – Relators are actually seeking a clarification of the definition of surety that would definitively encompass bail bonding companies, so that when bail is ordered under Criminal Rule 46(A)(2), the defendant retains his constitutional right to have a sufficient surety post bail on his behalf. After all, the purpose of a 10% Bond is not to keep individuals in jail; it is to incentivize them to return to court.

F. A BAIL BONDING COMPANY IS PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM POSTING A CASH BOND

Ohio law absolutely prohibits a bail bonding company from depositing actual cash on behalf of a criminal defendant. R.C. § 3805.932. Revised Code § 3805.932(G)(2) does not mean that a bail bonding company can pay a 10% Bond. Rather, under this subsection, a bail bonding company may only do two things: (1) use cash to pay court fees (a/k/a reparation fees), and (2) take a ten percent assignment upon a refund of cash that the clerk of court may issue to a defendant or his unlicensed surety. R.C. § 3805.932(G)(1),(2).

Moreover, a licensed bail bonding agent – only in his capacity as a private citizen – may post a cash deposit on behalf of a defendant. Though unlike an ordinary private citizen, the bail bonding agent is required to maintain records that reflect he has deposited the cash in his capacity as a private citizen and that neither he nor his bail bonding agency has profited from the transaction. § 3805.932(G)(3). And because the agent is acting as a private citizen, neither he nor his bail bonding agency is permitted to pursue the defendant in the event he skips bail.

G. DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS' CONDUCT IS WILLFUL AND WANTON

As demonstrated by the August 28, 2012 letter from Kenneth Oswalt (Complaint for Mandamus, Exhibit B; Stipulation of Evidence, No. 2), Relators purposefully ignored the Court's previous rulings that deemed a cash only bail is unconstitutional. See *Hale v. Vance*, 267 F.Supp.2d 725 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Their bad faith is further evidenced by the individual cases cited by Relators wherein they were not permitted to post a surety bail bond.

Moreover, Respondent fails to provide any evidentiary analysis for their proposition that Relators' damages are barred by the doctrine of laches as set forth in *State ex rel. Crumbley v. City of Cleveland*, 185 Ohio App.3d 82, 2009 Ohio 6100 (8th Dist.). Perhaps this is because there is no evidence. *Crumbley* states that laches is an affirmative defense based upon a failure to assert a right for an unreasonable length of time and identifies the elements as: (1) delay in asserting a right; (2) absence of an excuse for the delay; (3) actual or constructive knowledge of an injury or wrong; and (4) prejudice to the other party. *Id.* at 92 (citations omitted).

In the case at hand, Relators' problem with Respondents began around the time of the new regime in 2010. Recalling that they had already successfully addressed the same issue with the Licking County Municipal Clerk of Courts, Relators attempted to resolve the same with Respondents extra-judicially, but of course to no avail. Nevertheless, the doctrine of laches is inapposite here, because until such time Respondents are directed to change their practices, Relators' damages are on-going.

III. CONCLUSION

In Ohio, it is unconstitutional to condition a person's release from jail upon the payment of cash only or otherwise deny a person the right to post a surety bail bond that is issued by a licensed bail agent before he or she will be released from jail. Accordingly, the Court should issue a Writ of Mandamus against all Respondents ordering them to accept a surety bail bond whenever bail is set pursuant to Criminal Rule 46(A)(2).

Respectfully submitted,


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 6, 2013, I sent Relators' Reply Brief to Amy Brown Thompson, Kristopher J. Armstrong, and Gregory P. Barwell via email.



Kendra L. Carpenter (0074219)

APPENDIX


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State of Ohio ex rel., Fox, Sr.	:	
	:	
Plaintiff-Relator	:	Case No. 11-1009
	:	
Vs	:	
	:	
Phelps, Clerk	:	
	:	
Defendant-Respondent	:	


AGREED RESOLUTION

Subject to approval by the Court and as a final resolution of this matter, the parties, Woodrow Fox, Sr. and Marjia J. Phelps, Licking County Municipal Court Clerk, agree as follows:

1. Whenever a Judge of the Licking County Municipal Court imposes a cash bond as a condition of release under Criminal Rule 46(A), The Respondent Clerk of the Licking County Municipal Court shall accept a surety bond to secure the defendant's release, provided the sureties thereon are otherwise sufficient and solvent, in conformity with the mandate of *State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon*, Judge (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 115 and consistent with the ruling in *Smith v. Leis, Sheriff*, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125.
2. Plaintiff Fox waives any claim for damages and is to pay the court costs herein.



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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, LICKING COUNTY, OHIO

CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMON PLEAS COURT

State of Ohio

Plaintiff,

vs.

Carl G. Flanagan

Defendant.

Case No. 2011-CR-166
2011 DEC -9 P 3:03

FILED
GARY R. WALTERS
JUDGE BRANSTOOL

MOTION TO RELEASE SURETY

Now comes the surety, Woody Fox Bail Bonds, and respectfully moves the court for an order granting release from the bond for Carl G. Flanagan. On December 7, 2011, the defendant was apprehended by the surety and returned to the Licking County Jail. The defendant is now in the custody of the Licking County Sheriff.

Therefore, the surety respectfully request to be released from the bond.


Respectfully submitted,



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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the Office of the Licking County Prosecutor, via hand delivery to their mailbox in the office of the Clerk of Courts, on this 9th day of December, 2011.



THIS IS A TRUE and CERTIFIED
COPY OF ORIGINAL ON FILE
KAREN HELD PHIPPS (0076282)
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Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report

November 2007, NCJ 214994

State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2004

Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts

By Thomas H. Cohen, Ph.D.
and Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.
BJS Statisticians

Between 1990 and 2004, 62% of felony defendants in State courts in the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case. Beginning in 1998, financial pretrial releases, requiring the posting of bail, were more prevalent than non-financial releases. This increase in the use of financial releases was mostly the result of a decrease in the use of release on recognizance (ROR), coupled with an increase in the use of commercial surety bonds. These findings are from a multi-year analysis of felony cases from the biennial State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) program, sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.


Among defendants detained until case disposition, 1 in 6 had been denied bail and 5 in 6 had bail set with financial conditions required for release that were not met. The higher the bail amount set, the lower the probability of release. About 7 in 10 defendants secured release when bail was set at less than \$5,000, but this proportion dropped to 1 in 10 when bail was set at \$100,000 or more.

Murder defendants were the least likely to be released pretrial. Defendants charged with rape, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft also had release rates lower than the overall average. The highest release rate was for defendants charged with fraud.

Defendants were less likely to be released if they had a prior arrest or conviction or an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest (such as those on probation or parole). A history of missed court appearances also reduced the likelihood that a defendant would be released.

About a third of released defendants were charged with one or more types of pretrial misconduct. Nearly a fourth had a bench warrant issued for failing to appear in court, and about a sixth were arrested for a new offense. More than half of these new arrests were for felonies.

Since 1998, most pretrial releases of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties have been under financial conditions requiring the posting of bail



Logistic regression analyses that controlled for factors such as offense and criminal history found that Hispanics were less likely than non-Hispanic defendants to be released, and males were less likely than females to be released.

Logistic regression was also used to calculate the probability of pretrial misconduct for defendants with a given characteristic, independent of other factors. Characteristics associated with a greater probability of being rearrested while on pretrial release included being under age 21, having a prior arrest record, having a prior felony conviction, being released on an unsecured bond, or being part of an emergency release to relieve jail crowding.

Compared to release on recognizance, defendants on financial release were more likely to make all scheduled court appearances. Defendants released on an unsecured bond or as part of an emergency release were most likely to have a bench warrant issued because they failed to appear in court. The probability of failing to appear in court was higher among defendants who were black or Hispanic, had an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest, or had a prior failure to appear.

About 3 in 5 felony defendants in the 75 largest counties were released prior to case disposition

From 1990 to 2004, an estimated 62% of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case (table 1). Defendants were about as likely to be released on financial conditions requiring the posting of bail (30%) as to be granted a non-financial release (32%). Among the 38% of defendants detained until case disposition, about 5 in 6 had a bail amount set but did not post the financial bond required for release.

Table 1. Type of pretrial release or detention for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004

Detention-release outcome	State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties	
	Number	Percent
Total	424,252	100%
Released before case disposition	264,604	62%
Financial conditions	125,650	30%
Surety bond	86,107	20
Deposit bond	23,168	6
Full cash bond	12,348	3
Property bond	4,027	1
Non-financial conditions	136,153	32%
Personal recognizance	85,330	20
Conditional release	32,882	8
Unsecured bond	17,941	4
Emergency release	2,801	1%
Detained until case disposition	159,647	38%
Held on bail	132,572	32
Denied bail	27,075	6

Note: Counts based on weighted data representing 8 months (the month of May from each even-numbered year). Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

From 1990 to 2004, surety bond (33%) and release on recognizance (32%) each accounted for about a third of all releases. Other release types that accounted for at least 5% of releases during this period were conditional release (12%), deposit bond (9%), unsecured bond (7%), and full cash bond (5%). (See box on page 3 for definitions of release types.)

Type of pretrial release	Percent of all releases, 1990-2004
Financial conditions	48%
Surety bond	33
Deposit bond	9
Full cash bond	5
Property bond	2
Non-financial conditions	51%
Recognizance	32
Conditional	12
Unsecured bond	7
Emergency release	1%
Number of releases	264,604

Since 1998 a majority of pretrial releases have included financial conditions

Except for a decline to 57% in 2004, the percentage of defendants released each year varied only slightly, from 62% to 64%. A more pronounced trend was observed in the type of release used (figure 1). From 1990 to 1998, the percentage of released defendants under financial conditions rose from 24% to 36%, while non-financial releases dropped from 40% to 28%.

Detention-release outcomes for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004




Figure 1

Surety bond surpassed release on recognizance in 1998 as the most common type of pretrial release

The trend away from non-financial releases to financial releases was accompanied by an increase in the use of surety bonds and a decrease in the use of release on recognizance (ROR) (figure 2). From 1990 through 1994, ROR accounted for 41% of releases, compared to 24% for surety bond. In 2002 and 2004, surety bonds were used for 42% of releases, compared to 23% for ROR.

Type of pretrial release of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004




Figure 2

Types of pretrial release used in State courts

Type of release	Defendant	Financial liability for failure to appear	Liable party
Financial			
Surety bond	Pays fee (usually 10% of bail amount) plus collateral if required, to commercial bail agent.	Full bail amount	Bail agent
Deposit bond	Posts deposit (usually 10% of bail amount) with court, which is usually refunded at successful completion of case.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Full cash bond	Posts full bail amount with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Property bond	Posts property title as collateral with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Non-financial			
Release on recognizance (ROR)	Signs written agreement to appear in court (includes citation releases by law enforcement).	None	N/A
Conditional (supervised) release	Agrees to comply with specific conditions such as regular reporting or drug use monitoring.	None	N/A
Unsecured bond	Has a bail amount set, but no payment is required to secure release.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Emergency release	Released as part of a court order to relieve jail crowding.	None	N/A

Two-thirds of defendants had financial conditions required for release in 2004, compared to half in 1990

Including both released and detained defendants, the percentage required to post bond to secure release rose from 53% in 1990 to 68% in 2004 (not shown in table). Overall, about half (48%) of defendants required to post bail for release did so. From 1998 through 2004, 51% posted bail, compared to 45% in prior years.

The higher the bail amount the lower the probability of pretrial release

The median bail amount for detained defendants (\$15,000) was 3 times that of released defendants (\$5,000); the mean amount was about 5 times higher (\$58,400 versus \$11,600) (not shown in table). For all defendants with a bail amount set, the median bail amount was \$9,000 and the mean was \$35,800.

There was a direct relationship between the bail amount and the probability of release. When the bail was under \$10,000, most defendants secured release, including 7 in 10 defendants with bail under \$5,000 (figure 3). The proportion released declined as the bail amount increased, dropping to 1 in 10 when bail was \$100,000 or higher.

Defendants arrested for violent offenses or who had a criminal record were most likely to have a high bail amount or be denied bail

Courts typically use an offense-based schedule when setting bail. After assessing the likelihood that a defendant, if released, will not appear in court and assessing any danger the defendant may present to the community, the court may adjust the bail higher or lower. In the most serious cases, the court may deny bail altogether. The use of a high bail amount or the denial of bail was most evident in cases involving serious violent offenses. Eighty percent of defendants charged with murder had one of these conditions; with rape, 34%; and with robbery, 30% (table 2).

Bail amount and release rates for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004




Figure 3

Table 2. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties with bail set at \$50,000 or more or denied bail, 1990-2004

Characteristic	Percent of defendants	
	Bail \$50,000 or more	Denied bail
Most serious arrest charge		
Murder	35%	45%
Rape	25	9
Robbery	20	10
Assault	13	7
Non-violent offenses	7	6
Criminal justice status at arrest		
Active	13%	13%
None	8	3
Prior felony conviction		
Yes	13%	10%
No	7	4

Defendants who had an active criminal justice status (13%) were about 4 times as likely as other defendants (3%) to have bail denied. Defendants with 1 or more prior felony convictions (10%) were more than twice as likely as those without such a conviction (4%) to have bail denied.

Commercial bail and pretrial release


An estimated 14,000 commercial bail agents nationwide secure the release of more than 2 million defendants annually, according to the *Professional Bail Agents of the United States*. (See *Methodology* for other sources on bail and pretrial release.) Bond forfeiture regulations and procedures vary by jurisdiction, but most States regulate commercial bail and license bail agents through their departments of insurance. Four States do not allow commercial bail: Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Also, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Nebraska have little commercial bail activity.

Bail agents generally operate as independent contractors using credentials of a surety company when posting appearance bond for their client. For a fee, the surety company allows the bail agent to use its financial standing and credit as security on bonds. In turn, the bail agent charges the defendant a fee (usually 10% of the bail amount) for services. In addition, the bail agent often requires collateral from the defendant.

A bail agent usually has an opportunity to recover a defendant if they fail to appear. If the defendant is not returned, the agent is liable to the court for the full bail amount. Most jurisdictions permit revocation of the bond, which allows the agent to return the defendant to custody before the court date, freeing the agent from liability. The agent may be required to refund the defendant's fee in such cases. Courts can also set aside forfeiture judgments if good cause is shown as to why a defendant did not appear.

Commercial bail has been a target of critics since the 1960s. Some organizations, such as the American Bar Association and the National District Attorney's Association, have recommended its abolishment. Some critics have succeeded in obtaining reforms in the release process, beginning with the Manhattan Bail Project in 1961.

Commercial bail agents are active in almost every State



This project showed that defendants could be successfully released pretrial without the financial guarantee of a surety bail agent if verified information concerning their stability and community ties were presented to the court.

The success of the Manhattan Bail Project resulted in a wide range of pretrial reforms in the Federal system, culminating in the Bail Reform Act of 1966. This Act created a presumption in favor of release for most non-capital defendants and led to the creation of non-surety release options, such as refundable deposit bail and conditional release. Many States followed the Federal system and created such release options. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 set forth new procedures which allowed the pretrial detention of defendants believed to be a danger to the community in addition to a flight risk.

Pros and cons of commercial bail

Issue	Proponents:	Critics:
Jail crowding	Reduces jail population by providing a means for defendants to obtain pretrial release.	Increases jail population because indigent defendants can't afford commercial bail services. Others are passed over because they are seen as a flight risk.
Private enterprise	Provides pretrial release and monitoring services at no cost to taxpayers.	A private, for-profit entity should not be involved in the detention-release decision process.
Performance incentives	Creates an incentive that results in the majority of defendants being returned to court because the bail agent is liable for defendants who fail to appear.	Bail agents don't always have their bonds forfeited or actively pursue absconders.
Value of service	Provides the opportunity for many defendants to secure their freedom while awaiting disposition of their case.	The fee and collateral are typically more than indigent defendants can afford. Defendants who have the money would be better off spending it on legal representation.

Financial releases took longer on average than non-financial releases

About half of all pretrial releases occurred within 1 day of arrest, and about three-fourths within 1 week. Non-financial releases (59%) were more likely to occur within a day of arrest than financial releases (45%). For all release types, more than 90% occurred within 1 month of arrest. Among defendants released under financial conditions, the amount of time from arrest to release increased with bail amounts, ranging from a mean of 8 days for those with a bail amount of less than \$5,000 to 22 days for bail amounts of \$50,000 or more (not shown in table).

	Cumulative percent of releases occurring within —		
	1 day	1 week	1 month
All releases	52%	78%	92%
Financial	45	76	92
Non-financial	59	80	93

About a quarter of released defendants had failed to appear in court during a prior case

A majority (61%) of the defendants released into the community to await disposition of their case had been arrested previously (table 3). This included 27% who had failed to appear in court during a prior case. About half had 1 or more prior convictions (48%), and nearly a third (30%) had at least one prior felony conviction. About 1 in 4 released defendants had an active criminal justice status from a prior case at the time of their arrest.

Table 3. Criminal history of released and detained State court felony defendants in 75 largest counties, 1990-2004

Criminal history	Released defendants	Detained defendants
Prior arrest	61%	83%
With at least 1 failure-to-appear	27	44
Prior conviction	48%	75%
Felony	30	57
Violent felony	7	15
Active criminal justice status	27%	51%

The role of pretrial services programs in the release process

According to a BJA nationwide study, about 300 pretrial services programs were operating in the U.S. during 2001.* More than two-thirds of the programs had begun since 1980 and nearly half since 1990. The programs operated in a variety of administrative settings, including probation offices, courts, sheriffs' offices, independent agencies, and private non-profit organizations.

Pretrial programs play an important role in the release process. Standards published by the American Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies have specified core functions a model pretrial program should provide.

Information gathering and assessment

An important function of a pretrial program is to conduct a pretrial investigation to assist judicial officers in making release decisions. Prior to the initial court appearance, the pretrial program gathers information about the defendant, primarily through voluntary interviews and records checks. Some defendants may not be eligible for pretrial release because of the severity of the charged offense or an existing criminal justice status such as parole, probation, or an outstanding warrant.

*John Clark and D. Alan Henry, *Pretrial Services Programming at the Start of the 21st Century: A Survey of Pretrial Services Programs*, Washington D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance, July 2003 (NCJ 199773).

Information collected from the pretrial investigation typically includes:

- residency
- employment status
- community ties
- criminal record
- court appearance record
- criminal justice status
- mental health status
- indications of substance abuse

Often a risk assessment tool is used to incorporate the information from the pretrial investigation into a score that guides the release decision. Periodic validation of the instrument ensures that it provides an accurate, unbiased measure of a defendant's potential for misconduct if released.

Supervision and follow-up

Pretrial services programs provide supervision and monitoring of a defendant's compliance with release conditions, such as testing for drug or alcohol use and electronic monitoring of defendants confined to a restricted area. These programs also assist with locating and returning defendants who fail to appear in court. Such assistance may include providing information to law enforcement officials or working directly with defendants to persuade them to return.

Pretrial programs may regularly review the status of detained defendants for changes in their eligibility for release and facilitate their release where appropriate.

Prior criminal activity was more prevalent among pretrial detainees. About half had a criminal justice status at the time of arrest. A large majority had prior arrests (83%) and convictions (75%). More than half (57%) had a prior felony conviction, including 15% with a conviction for a violent felony. Nearly half (44%) had a prior failure to appear.

Many factors influence the pretrial release decision

SCPS collects information on some of the factors courts consider when making pretrial release decisions, such as arrest offenses, criminal justice status, prior arrests, prior court appearance record, and prior convictions. It does not collect data on residency, employment status, community ties, mental health status, or substance abuse history.

The unique contribution of the factors collected in SCPS to the release decision can be assessed using logistic regression techniques. Logistic regression produces nonlinear estimations for each independent variable which can be transformed into predicted probabilities (table 4). In the case of pretrial release, the logistic regression analyses yielded patterns similar to that of the bivariate results. (See *Methodology* for more information on the logistic regression techniques).

Murder defendants (19%) had the lowest probability of being released, followed by those charged with robbery (44%), burglary (49%), motor vehicle theft (49%), or rape (53%). Defendants charged with fraud (82%) were the most likely to be released.

Male and Hispanic defendants less likely to be released than females and whites

Female defendants (74%) were more likely than males (60%) to be released pretrial. By race and Hispanic origin, non-Hispanic whites (68%) had a higher probability of release than Hispanics (55%). Pretrial detention rates for Hispanics may have been influenced by the use of immigration holds to detain those illegally in the U.S.

Defendants with a prior criminal record less likely to be released than those without a prior arrest

Defendants on parole (26%) or probation (43%) at the time of their arrest for the current offense were less likely to be released than those without an active criminal justice status (70%). Defendants who had a prior arrest, whether they had previously failed to appear in court (50%) or not (59%), had a lower probability of release than those without a prior arrest (79%).

Defendants with a prior conviction (51%, not shown in table) had a lower probability of being released than those without a conviction (77%). This was true even if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors only (63%). The effect of a conviction record on release was more pronounced if the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction (46%).

Table 4. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties released prior to case disposition, 1990-2004

Variable	Percent released	Predicted probability of release
Most serious arrest charge		
Murder	19%	11%**
Rape	53	44**
Robbery	44	36**
Assault	64	59*
Burglary	49	49**
Motor vehicle theft	49	50**
Larceny/theft	68	66
Forgery	72	67
Fraud	82	76**
Drug sales (reference)	63	63
Other drug (non-sales)	68	70*
Weapons	67	65
Driving-related	73	76**
Age at arrest		
Under 21 (reference)	68%	64%
21-29	62	63
30-39	59	60**
40 or older	62	60**
Gender		
Male (reference)	60%	60%
Female	74	69**
Race/Hispanic origin		
White non-Hispanic (reference)	68%	66%
Black non-Hispanic	62	64
Other non-Hispanic	65	63*
Hispanic, any race	55	51**
Criminal justice status at arrest		
No active status (reference)	70%	67%
Released on pending case	61	63
On probation	43	49**
On parole	26	37**
Prior arrest and court appearance		
No prior arrests (reference)	79%	65%
Prior arrest record without FTA	59	62*
Prior arrest record with FTA	50	58*
Most serious prior conviction		
No prior convictions (reference)	77%	70%
Misdemeanor	63	64**
Felony	46	51**

Note: Logistic regression (predicted probability) results exclude the year 1990 because of missing data. Asterisks indicate category differed from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\leq .05$, ** $\leq .01$. Not all variables in the model are shown. See *Methodology* on page 11 for more information.

About 1 in 5 detained defendants eventually had their case dismissed or were acquitted

Sixty percent of released defendants were eventually convicted — 46% of a felony and 14% of a misdemeanor (table 5). Conviction rates were higher for detained defendants, with 78% convicted, including 69% of a felony.

On average, released defendants waited nearly 3 times longer than detainees for case adjudication

Released defendants waited a median of 127 days from time of arrest until adjudication, nearly 3 times as long as those who were detained (45 days). For those released, the average time from release to adjudication was nearly 1 month longer for those on financial release (125 days) than for those released under non-financial conditions (101 days) (table 6). By specific release type, defendants released on recognizance had the shortest wait (98 days), while those released on property bond had the longest (140 days).

Table 5. Adjudication outcomes for released and detained State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004

	Released defendants	Detained defendants
Adjudication outcome		
Convicted	60%	78%
Felony	46	69
Misdemeanor	14	9
Not convicted	40%	22%
Dismissal/acquittal	31	19
Other outcome	9	2
Median number of days from arrest to adjudication		
	127 days	45 days

Note: Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

Table 6. Time from pretrial release until adjudication of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004

Type of release	Average time	
	Mean	Median
All types	112 days	90 days
Financial releases		
Surety bond	125	106
Full cash bond	122	100
Deposit bond	126	108
Property bond	140	120
Non-financial releases		
Recognizance	98	72
Conditional	103	75
Unsecured bond	110	86

Incidents of pretrial misconduct increased with length of time in release status

The number of defendants charged with pretrial misconduct increased with the length of time spent in a release status. About a third (32%) of failure-to-appear bench warrants were issued within a month of release and about two-thirds (68%) within 3 months. The pattern was similar for rearrests, with 29% occurring within 1 month of release and 62% within 3 months.

	Cumulative percent of pretrial misconduct occurring within —			
	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
Any type	9%	32%	67%	88%
Failure to appear	9	32	68	89
Rearrest	8	29	62	85

A third of released defendants were charged with pretrial misconduct within 1 year after release

From 1990 through 2004, 33% of defendants were charged with committing one or more types of misconduct after being released but prior to the disposition of their case (figure 4). A bench warrant for failure to appear in court was issued for 23% of released defendants. An estimated 17% were arrested for a new offense, including 11% for a felony.

Pretrial misconduct rates for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004




Figure 4

Pretrial misconduct rates stable from 1990-2004

Overall misconduct rates varied only slightly from 1990 through 2004, ranging from a high of 35% to a low of 31% (figure 5). For failure to appear, the range was from 21% to 24%, and the fugitive rate ranged from 5% to 8%. Overall rearrest rates ranged from 13% to 21%, and felony rearrest rates from 10% to 13%.




Figure 5

Pretrial misconduct rates highest for emergency releases

About half (52%) of the 1% of defendants released under an emergency order to relieve jail crowding were charged with some type of misconduct (table 7). Pretrial misconduct rates for other types of releases ranged from 27% to 36%.

After emergency release (45%), the highest failure-to-appear rate was for defendants released on unsecured bond (30%). Property bond (14%), which also accounted for just 1% of releases, had the lowest failure-to-appear rate followed by surety bond (18%).

About 1 in 4 defendants who failed to appear in court were fugitives at end of a 1-year study period

By type of release, the percent of the defendants who were fugitives after 1 year ranged from 10% for unsecured bond releases to 3% of those released on surety bond.

Overall, 28% of the defendants who failed to appear in court and had a bench warrant issued for their arrest were still fugitives at the end of a 1-year study period. This was 6% of all defendants released pretrial (not shown in table).

Compared to the overall average, the percentage of absconded defendants who remained a fugitive was lower for surety bond releases (19%).

Type of release	Number of defendants failing to appear after 1 year	Percent still a fugitive after 1 year
All types	54,485	28%
Surety bond	13,411	19%
Emergency	1,168	22
Conditional	6,788	27
Property bond	490	30
Recognizance	20,883	30
Deposit	4,548	31
Unsecured bond	5,018	33
Full cash bond	2,179	36

Likelihood of pretrial misconduct lower for defendants released after being charged with murder or rape

Defendants released after being charged with murder (19%) or rape (18%) had misconduct rates that were about half that for defendants charged with motor vehicle theft (39%), drug trafficking (39%), or burglary (37%).

Younger, male, black, and Hispanic defendants more likely to be charged with pretrial misconduct

Released defendants age 20 or younger (33%) had higher misconduct rates than those age 40 or older (28%). This pattern also existed for rearrest and failure-to-appear rates. Male defendants (34%) had a higher misconduct rate than females (28%). Black (36%) and Hispanic (34%) defendants had a higher misconduct rate than whites (28%).

Prior criminal activity associated with greater probability of pretrial misconduct

Defendants who had an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest — such as pretrial release (48%), parole (47%), or probation (44%) — had a higher misconduct rate than those who were not on a criminal justice status (27%). This difference was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest.

Defendants with a prior failure to appear (49%) had a higher misconduct rate than defendants who had previously made all court appearances (30%) or had never been arrested (23%). Defendants with a prior failure to appear (35%) were about twice as likely to have a bench warrant issued for failing to appear during the current case than other defendants (18%).

Defendants with at least one prior felony conviction (43%) had a higher rate of pretrial misconduct than defendants with misdemeanor convictions only (34%) or no prior convictions (27%).



Table 7. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties charged with pretrial misconduct, 1990-2004

Variable	Number of defendants	Percent of released defendants charged with pretrial misconduct			
		Any type	Rearrest	Failure to appear	Fugitive
Type of pretrial release					
Release on recognizance	80,865	34%	17%	26%	8%
* Surety bond	78,023	29	16	18	3*
Conditional release	31,162	32	15	22	6
* Deposit bond	20,993	30	14	22	7*
Unsecured bond	17,001	36	14	30	10
Full cash bond	11,190	30	15	20	7
Property bond	3,649	27	17	14	4
Emergency release	2,656	52	17	45	10
Most serious arrest charge					
Murder	741	19%	12%	9%	1%
Rape	3,481	18	9	10	2
Robbery	12,947	35	21	21	6
Assault	32,931	23	12	14	4
Burglary	18,377	37	19	25	6
Larceny/theft	26,667	33	16	25	7
Motor vehicle theft	6,415	39	20	29	7
Forgery	8,374	33	15	24	7
Fraud	9,094	21	8	15	5
Drug trafficking	47,182	39	21	27	8
Other drug	50,547	37	18	29	8
Weapons	8,574	27	13	17	5
Driving-related	8,148	28	14	18	5
Age at arrest					
20 or younger	55,505	33%	20%	21%	5%
21-29	90,768	34	17	24	7
30-39	71,049	33	16	24	7
40 or older	44,701	28	13	20	6
Gender					
Male	211,386	34%	18%	23%	6%
Female	52,291	28	12	21	6
Race/Hispanic origin					
Black, non-Hispanic	96,348	36%	19%	25%	7%
White, non-Hispanic	64,571	28	14	19	4
Hispanic, any race	49,544	34	17	25	8
Other, non-Hispanic	5,165	23	13	14	3
Criminal justice status at arrest					
On parole	6,012	47%	25%	32%	7%
On probation	25,765	44	26	30	6
Released pending prior case	25,955	48	30	30	7
No active status	167,227	27	12	19	6
Prior arrests and FTA history					
Prior arrest record with FTA	59,468	49%	27%	35%	8%
Prior arrest record, no FTA	75,806	30	17	18	5
No prior arrests	85,366	23	8	18	7
Most serious prior conviction					
Felony	75,187	43%	25%	28%	6%
Misdemeanor	44,989	34	19	23	5
No prior convictions	129,975	27	12	19	7

Logistic regression analysis of pretrial misconduct

Logistic regression was used to assess the impact of given characteristics independent of other factors on the probability of a released defendant being charged with pretrial misconduct. The predicted probabilities generated from these analyses are presented in the adjacent table. (See *Methodology* for more information on logistic regression).

Type of release

Predicted overall misconduct rates were higher for unsecured bond (42%) and emergency (56%) releases. This was also the case for rearrest and failure to appear rates. Property (17%), surety (20%), deposit (20%), and full cash (20%) bonds all had lower predicted failure-to-appear rates than recognizance (24%). The percent of released defendants predicted to be fugitives after 1 year was lowest for property (3%) and surety bonds (4%). Emergency release and property bonds each accounted for 1% of all releases, compared to about 30% each for surety bonds and recognizance. (See table 7 for the number of defendants accounted for by each type of pretrial release).

Arrest offense

Drug trafficking defendants (38%) had higher predicted rates of overall misconduct, rearrest and failure-to-appear than defendants charged with murder (19%), rape (21%), assault (26%), fraud (29%), or a weapons offense (31%).

Demographic characteristics

Defendants age 20 or younger (39%) had a higher predicted misconduct rate than those ages 21 to 39 (35%) or age 40 or older (30%). This pattern held for rearrest, but for court appearance record only defendants age 40 or older were predicted to perform better than those under age 21.

Male defendants (35%) were predicted to have a higher misconduct rate than females (32%). Hispanic (37%) and black (36%) defendants were predicted to be charged with misconduct more often than whites (32%). This difference also existed for failure to appear, but not rearrest.

Criminal history

Defendants with an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest, such as parole (42%), probation (39%), or pretrial release (42%), had higher predicted misconduct rates than those without such a status (33%). This difference was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest.

Compared to those without prior arrests (29%), defendants with an arrest record were predicted to be charged with misconduct more often, especially if they had previously failed to appear in court (47%). This pattern was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest. Defendants with prior felony convictions (39%) had a higher predicted misconduct rate than other defendants (33%). This pattern also existed for rearrest, but not failure to appear.

Predicted probability of being charged with pretrial misconduct

Variable	Predicted probability of being charged with pretrial misconduct			
	Any type	Rearrest	Failure to appear	Fugitive
Type of pretrial release				
Recognizance (reference)	34%	17%	24%	6%
Surety bond	33	19	20**	4**
Conditional release	37	18	24	6
Deposit bond	32	18	20*	5
Unsecured bond	42**	21*	28*	8
Full cash bond	34	19	20*	6
Property bond	31	18	17**	3**
Emergency release	56**	26**	39*	8
Most serious arrest charge				
Drug trafficking (reference)	38%	20%	24%	6%
Murder	19**	11*	8**	1
Rape	21**	11**	10**	2**
Robbery	32**	18	19**	5
Assault	26**	15**	14**	3**
Burglary	37	19	23	5*
Larceny/theft	37	19	25	6
Motor Vehicle theft	39	20	27*	5
Forgery	38	19	27	6
Fraud	29**	15**	18**	4**
Other drug	42**	21	29**	7
Weapons	31**	16**	19**	4**
Driving-related	33**	16**	22	6
Age at arrest				
20 or younger (reference)	39%	24%	22%	4%
21-29	35**	19**	23	5**
30-39	35**	17**	23	6**
40 or older	30**	14**	20**	5**
Gender				
Male (reference)	35%	19%	22%	5%
Female	32**	16**	22	5
Race/Hispanic origin				
White, non-Hispanic (reference)	32%	18%	20%	4%
Black, non-Hispanic	36**	19	23**	5**
Other, non-Hispanic	27*	16	16*	3
Hispanic, any race	37**	19	25**	7**
Criminal justice status at arrest				
No active status (reference)	33%	17%	21%	5%
Released pending prior case	42**	24**	26**	5
On probation	39**	22**	25**	5
On parole	42**	20	29**	6
Prior arrests and FTA history				
No prior arrests (reference)	29%	13%	20%	5%
Prior arrest record with FTA	47**	26**	31**	6*
Prior arrest record, no FTA	33**	20**	19	4**
Most serious prior conviction				
No prior convictions (reference)	33%	17%	22%	6%
Misdemeanor	33	17	21	4**
Felony	39**	22**	23	4**

Note: Asterisks indicate category differed from reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\leq .05$, ** $\leq .01$. Not all variables in model are shown. See *Methodology* on page 11 for more information. /Murder defendants were excluded from the fugitive analysis.

Methodology

Data utilized

This report analyzed data from the State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) series, covering felony cases filed in May of even-numbered years from 1990 through 2004. SCPS is a biennial data collection series that examines felony cases processed in a sample of 40 of the Nation's 75 most populous counties. The counties included in the sample have varied over time to account for changing national population patterns. For a year-by-year summary of the counties participating in SCPS, see Appendix table 1. For more information on the SCPS methodology see the BJS report *Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2002* at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fdluc02.htm>.

Each SCPS data collection tracks approximately 15,000 felony cases for up to one year, with the exception of murder defendants who are followed for up to two years. In addition to defendant demographic characteristics and criminal history, SCPS also obtains data on a variety of felony case processing factors, including the types of arrest charges filed, conditions of pretrial release such as bail amount and type of release, and instances of pretrial misconduct including failure to appear in court, rearrest while on pretrial release, and other violations that resulted in the revocation of release. Adjudication and sentencing outcomes are also recorded.

Using multivariate statistical techniques

This report analyzes pretrial release and misconduct through both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques. While the bivariate statistics provide a descriptive overview of pretrial release and misconduct among felony defendants in the 75 most populous counties, multivariate analysis can help disentangle the impacts that independent variables such as demographic characteristics, prior criminal history, severity of arrest charges, and release type have on dependent variables such as the probability of pretrial release and misconduct. Logistic regression models were used to estimate the probability of pretrial release and misconduct. This is one widely accepted method for analyzing the effects of multiple independent factors on dichotomous or binomial outcomes.

The regression analyses excluded data from 1990 because of the large number of cases missing data on race or Hispanic origin. The regression models also excluded cases that had missing data on either the independent or dependent variables. This resulted in reductions in the number of cases analyzed. From 1992 through 2004, 99,899 felony defendants were either released or detained, but when missing data were excluded from the regression models, the number of cases analyzed declined to 71,027.

To determine the impact of missing data, logistic regression models excluded certain independent factors to increase the number of analyzed cases. Since the results from these

analyses did not differ appreciably from the full model, missing data did not affect the results.

SCPS data are drawn from a sample and weighted to represent cases processed in the 75 most populous counties during the month of May. When the regressions used these weighted data, the large number of weighted cases resulted in statistical significance for nearly all the variables in the model. Effect weighting was employed to address this issue. Through effect weighting, the SCPS data were weighted to the number of cases actually sampled rather than the number of cases in the universe represented by the sample.

Generalized estimating equation techniques

One primary assumption of binary logistic regression is that all observations in the dataset are independent. This assumption is not necessarily appropriate for the SCPS series because the data are collected on a county basis. The county-based nature of SCPS creates a presumption of clustered data. In clustered datasets, "the data can be grouped into natural or imposed clusters with observations in the same clusters tending to be more alike than observations in different clusters." The clustered nature of the SCPS data was handled by utilizing generalized estimating equation (GEE) techniques. Logistic regression modeling with generalized estimating equation (GEE) techniques provides for more efficient computation of regression coefficients and more robust standard error estimates.

Interpreting logistic regression probabilities

Logistic regression produces nonlinear estimations for each independent variable that can be difficult to interpret. In this report, the logistic regression coefficients are made interpretable by transforming them into predicted probabilities (see table 4 and box on page 10). The predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all independent variables to their mean levels, setting the independent variable of interest to a value of one, multiplying the means of each independent variable by their respective logistic regression parameter estimates, taking the exponential function of the summed product of means and parameter estimates, and then calculating the probability of that exponential function.

Limitations of models

The logistic regression analyses were limited and intended to reflect the effects of only selected factors that were available in the SCPS data. Other factors could potentially be related to pretrial release and misconduct. Examples of these include: defendants' residence, employment status, community ties, mental health status, and substance abuse. If data on these variables were available, the logistic regression results could be altered.

*Paul D. Allison, 2001. *Logistic Regression Using the SAS System: Theory and Application*, Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute Inc., page 179.

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Additional sources on bail and pretrial release include:

Demuth, Stephen, "Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees." *Criminology*: 41(3): 873 (2003).

Feeley, Malcolm M., "Bail Reform," chap. 2 in *Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1983, pp. 40-79).

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Helland, Eric and Alexander Tabarrok, "Public versus Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from Bail Jumping." *Journal of Law and Economics*: (47): pp. 93-122 (2004).

Kennedy, Spurgeon and D. Alan Henry. *Commercial Surety Bail: Assessing Its Role in the Pretrial Release and Detention Decision* <<http://www.pretrial.org/publications.html>> (1996).

Watson, Jerry W. and L. Jay Labe, "Bail Bonds," chap. 8 in *The Law of Miscellaneous and Commercial Surety Bonds*. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2001, pp. 127-142.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics is the statistical agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Jeffrey L. Sedgwick is the director.

This Special Report was written by Thomas H. Cohen, Ph.D., and Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D. William J. Sabol, Ph.D. provided technical assistance. Tracey Kyckelhahn provided verification. Tina Dorsey produced and edited the report, under the supervision of Doris J. James. Jayne Robinson prepared the report for final printing.

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This report in portable document format and in ASCII and its related statistical data and tables are available at the BJS World Wide Web Internet site: <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/prfdsc.htm>>.

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Appendix table 1. State Court Processing Statistics, participating jurisdictions, 1990-2004

County or equivalent	Number of cases		Year of participation							
	Unweighted	Weighted	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
Jefferson (AL)	1,517	6,612								
Maricopa (AZ)	4,245	13,848								
Pima (AZ)	2,655	7,588								
Alameda (CA)	1,941	8,471								
Contra Costa (CA)	817	2,043								
Los Angeles (CA)	10,419	41,676								
Orange (CA)	2,984	9,964								
Riverside (CA)	1,646	5,926								
Sacramento (CA)	1,898	6,786								
San Bernardino (CA)	3,061	9,909								
San Diego (CA)	1,529	6,604								
San Francisco (CA)	1,327	5,675								
San Mateo (CA)	526	1,315								
Santa Clara (CA)	2,840	9,552								
Ventura (CA)	576	1,901								
New Haven (CT)	238	1,047								
Washington (DC)	263	1,315								
Broward (FL)	2,155	7,095								
Duval (FL)	387	1,935								
Miami-Dade (FL)	4,355	17,420								
Hillsborough (FL)	1,415	4,515								
Orange (FL)	1,367	5,938								
Palm Beach (FL)	1,154	4,255								
Pinellas (FL)	1,687	6,290								
Fulton (GA)	1,748	6,992								
Honolulu (HI)	890	2,692								
Cook (IL)	5,738	22,952								
DuPage (IL)	463	1,528								
Marion (IN)	2,878	9,908								
Jefferson (KY)	310	1,240								
Essex (MA)	546	2,004								
Middlesex (MA)	657	2,168								
Suffolk (MA)	1,546	5,753								
Baltimore (MD)	1,006	2,515								
Baltimore (city) (MD)	1,542	4,108								
Montgomery (MD)	1,216	3,494								
Macomb (MI)	644	1,610								
Wayne (MI)	2,030	8,120								
Jackson (MO)	999	3,297								
St. Louis (MO)	1,582	5,447								
Essex (NJ)	2,636	11,947								
Bronx (NY)	3,713	15,404								
Erie (NY)	1,048	4,134								
Kings (NY)	3,893	15,988								
Monroe (NY)	1,124	3,874								
Nassau (NY)	772	1,930								
New York (NY)	2,801	11,204								
Queens (NY)	2,058	7,943								
Suffolk (NY)	778	2,567								
Westchester (NY)	980	2,450								
Franklin (OH)	618	2,719								
Hamilton (OH)	1,188	4,970								
Allegheny (PA)	502	1,516								
Montgomery (PA)	567	2,225								
Philadelphia (PA)	4,043	15,952								
Shelby (TN)	2,837	11,332								
Dallas (TX)	2,169	8,676								
El Paso (TX)	949	2,373								
Harris (TX)	3,661	14,644								
Tarrant (TX)	1,526	6,941								
Travis (TX)	660	2,904								
Salt Lake (UT)	1,212	4,981								
Fairfax (VA)	1,158	4,670								
King (WA)	1,324	5,591								
Milwaukee (WI)	1,542	5,161								

Appendix table 2. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial release decision

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
Most serious arrest charge			
Murder	0.0084	-2.6575**	0.2412
Rape	0.0142	-0.7846**	0.1173
Robbery	0.0588	-1.1088**	0.1004
Assault	0.1222	-0.1821*	0.0785
Other violent	0.0401	-0.1755	0.1173
Burglary	0.0870	-0.5562**	0.0817
Larceny	0.0888	0.1313	0.0805
Motor vehicle theft	0.0342	-0.5281**	0.0997
Forgery	0.0279	0.1781	0.1052
Fraud	0.0274	0.6323**	0.1660
Other property	0.0411	0.3007	0.1655
Other drug	0.1995	0.3023*	0.1384
Weapons	0.0272	0.1001	0.1074
Driving-related	0.0276	0.6147**	0.1306
Other public order	0.0294	0.0926	0.1332
Age at arrest			
21-29	0.3423	-0.0544	0.0357
30-39	0.2871	-0.1700**	0.0451
40 or older	0.1884	-0.1713**	0.0456
Gender			
Female	0.1735	0.4031**	0.0393
Race/Hispanic origin			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4456	-0.1274	0.0690
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0229	-0.1592*	0.0734
Hispanic, any race	0.2432	-0.6488**	0.1122
Criminal justice status at arrest			
Other status	0.0283	-0.9417**	0.1509
Released pending prior case	0.1057	-0.1758	0.1325
On probation	0.1605	-0.7471**	0.0686
On parole	0.0610	-1.2450**	0.1671
Prior arrest and FTA history			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.3050	-0.3144*	0.1468
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4205	-0.1597*	0.0749
Most serious prior conviction			
Felony	0.4156	-0.8396**	0.0756
Misdemeanor	0.1746	-0.2886**	0.0847
Study year			
1992	0.0940	0.2802	0.1513
1994	0.1212	0.1664	0.1515
1996	0.1332	0.3148*	0.1512
1998	0.1276	0.1924	0.1475
2000	0.1731	0.1250	0.1190
2002	0.1795	0.1576	0.1069
Intercept	1.0000	1.4228	0.1652
Number of observations	71,027		
Log likelihood	-41377.1132		

Note: Logistic regression figures derived from generalized estimating equation (GEE) methods. GEE logistic regression procedures were an appropriate technique because of the clustered nature of the felony case processing data. The regression estimates were transformed into predicted probabilities in the report by setting all independent variables at their mean levels, setting the independent variable of interest to a value of one, and then calculating the probability of the dependent measure outcome for that particular independent variable. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\geq .05$, ** $\geq .01$.

Appendix table 3. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial misconduct

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
Most serious arrest charge			
Murder	0.0019	-0.9339**	0.2569
Rape	0.0118	-0.8203**	0.1123
Robbery	0.0329	-0.2552**	0.0930
Assault	0.1212	-0.5577**	0.0584
Other violent	0.0414	-0.5564**	0.0829
Burglary	0.0684	-0.0368	0.0745
Larceny	0.0985	-0.0148	0.0585
Motor vehicle theft	0.0270	0.0616	0.0888
Forgery	0.0318	0.0264	0.0884
Fraud	0.0373	-0.3690**	0.1076
Other property	0.0472	-0.1442*	0.0624
Other drug	0.2255	0.1666**	0.0544
Weapons	0.0273	-0.2932**	0.0635
Driving-related	0.0327	-0.1878**	0.0694
Other public order	0.0290	-0.4768**	0.1095
Age at arrest			
21-29	0.3403	-0.1352**	0.0251
30-39	0.2737	-0.1736**	0.0428
40 or older	0.1865	-0.3842**	0.0399
Gender			
Female	0.2148	-0.1258**	0.0390
Race/Hispanic origin			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4449	0.1695**	0.0317
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.2248*	0.0897
Hispanic, any race	0.2021	0.2163**	0.0334
Criminal justice status at arrest			
Other status	0.0177	0.1061	0.1047
Released pending prior case	0.0943	0.4042**	0.0561
On probation	0.1105	0.2764**	0.0475
On parole	0.0239	0.3778**	0.1046
Prior arrest and FTA history			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2371	0.7565**	0.0540
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4111	0.1756**	0.0438
Most serious prior conviction			
Felony	0.3034	0.2417**	0.0496
Misdemeanor	0.1807	-0.0071	0.0482
Type of pretrial release			
Surety bond	0.3714	-0.0570	0.0682
Full cash bond	0.0352	-0.0408	0.1078
Deposit bond	0.0957	-0.0963	0.1114
Property bond	0.0118	-0.1435	0.1249
Conditional release	0.1443	0.1107	0.0850
Unsecured bond	0.0647	0.3188**	0.1036
Emergency release	0.0105	0.8663**	0.1830
Study year			
1992	0.1007	-0.2136	0.1483
1994	0.1199	-0.1810	0.1237
1996	0.1378	-0.2908	0.1746
1998	0.1171	-0.3394*	0.1588
2000	0.1797	-0.2050	0.1332
2002	0.1828	-0.1417	0.1146
Intercept	1.0000	-0.6608	0.1264
Number of observations	40,179		
Log likelihood	-23469.1617		

Note. See note on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\geq .05$, ** $\geq .01$.

Appendix table 4. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial rearrest for new offense

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
Most serious arrest charge			
Murder	0.0018	-0.7451*	0.3078
Rape	0.0119	-0.7720**	0.1070
Robbery	0.0329	-0.1737	0.0987
Assault	0.1215	-0.3368**	0.0670
Other violent	0.0415	-0.3810**	0.0955
Burglary	0.0685	-0.0593	0.0708
Larceny	0.0986	-0.0569	0.0584
Motor vehicle theft	0.0270	-0.0229	0.0790
Forgery	0.0320	-0.1010	0.0875
Fraud	0.0377	-0.3578**	0.1238
Other property	0.0471	-0.1260	0.0752
Other drug	0.2233	0.0585	0.0604
Weapons	0.0275	-0.3018**	0.1159
Driving-related	0.0329	-0.3122**	0.0842
Other public order	0.0292	-0.3861**	0.0949
Age at arrest			
21-29	0.3407	-0.3505**	0.0338
30-39	0.2731	-0.4504**	0.0399
40 or older	0.1870	-0.6585**	0.0472
Gender			
Female	0.2155	-0.2279**	0.0344
Race/Hispanic origin			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4468	0.0653	0.0430
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.1297	0.1010
Hispanic, any race	0.1999	0.0705	0.0468
Criminal justice status at arrest			
Other status	0.0177	0.2058*	0.0979
Released pending prior case	0.0953	0.4476**	0.0485
On probation	0.1099	0.3147**	0.0501
On parole	0.0240	0.1713	0.1054
Prior arrest and FTA history			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2370	0.6455**	0.0701
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4136	0.4895**	0.0578
Most serious prior conviction			
Felony	0.3049	0.3581**	0.0617
Misdemeanor	0.1807	0.0471	0.0552
Type of pretrial release			
Surety bond	0.3747	0.1077	0.0611
Full cash bond	0.0350	0.0991	0.1273
Deposit bond	0.0969	0.0600	0.1089
Property bond	0.0119	0.0404	0.1462
Conditional release	0.1453	0.0640	0.0842
Unsecured bond	0.0655	0.2473*	0.1160
Emergency release	0.0104	0.5156**	0.1371
Study year			
1992	0.0981	-0.5280**	0.1859
1994	0.1145	-0.3974	0.2419
1996	0.1378	-0.4183	0.2615
1998	0.1152	-0.4412*	0.1998
2000	0.1836	-0.3840**	0.1466
2002	0.1866	-0.2230	0.1244
Intercept	1.0000	-1.3631	0.1478
Number of observations	39,209		
Log Likelihood	-15735.4776		

Note. See not on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\geq .05$, ** $\geq .01$.

Appendix table 5. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial failure to appear

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
Most serious arrest charge			
Murder	0.0019	-1.3123**	0.3566
Rape	0.0118	-1.0242**	0.1934
Robbery	0.0329	-0.2917**	0.0810
Assault	0.1212	-0.6787**	0.0599
Other violent	0.0413	-0.7196**	0.0721
Burglary	0.0683	-0.0595	0.0690
Larceny	0.0987	0.0527	0.0667
Motor vehicle theft	0.0271	0.1741*	0.0895
Forgery	0.0319	0.1358	0.0897
Fraud	0.0374	-0.3719**	0.1115
Other property	0.0471	-0.0572	0.0756
Other drug	0.2245	0.2330**	0.0586
Weapons	0.0275	-0.2747**	0.0660
Driving-related	0.0328	-0.0964	0.0710
Other public order	0.0289	-0.4888**	0.1249
Age at arrest			
21-29	0.3404	0.0299	0.0296
30-39	0.2737	0.0363	0.0471
40 or older	0.1869	-0.1253**	0.0415
Gender			
Female	0.2150	-0.0300	0.0380
Race/Hispanic origin			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4450	0.2006**	0.0377
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.2509*	0.1023
Hispanic, any race	0.2019	0.2970**	0.0459
Criminal justice status at arrest			
Other status	0.0177	0.0778	0.1026
Released pending prior case	0.0947	0.2711**	0.0570
On probation	0.1103	0.2347**	0.0556
On parole	0.0238	0.4306**	0.1076
Prior arrest and FTA history			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2376	0.5902**	0.0646
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4106	-0.0505	0.0458
Most serious prior conviction			
Felony	0.3036	0.0494	0.0603
Misdemeanor	0.1805	-0.0439	0.0414
Type of pretrial release			
Surety bond	0.3712	-0.2713**	0.0890
Full cash bond	0.0353	-0.2444*	0.1047
Deposit bond	0.0962	-0.2307*	0.1193
Property bond	0.0117	-0.4271**	0.1499
Conditional release	0.1447	-0.0119	0.0958
Unsecured bond	0.0650	0.2051*	0.1063
Emergency release	0.0106	0.6762*	0.2823
Study year			
1992	0.1003	0.0228	0.0958
1994	0.1202	-0.0754	0.0906
1996	0.1356	-0.0846	0.0849
1998	0.1180	-0.0251	0.0864
2000	0.1801	-0.0041	0.0903
2002	0.1836	0.0413	0.1050
Intercept	1.0000	-1.3378	0.1278
Number of observations	39,838		
Log likelihood	-19756.0265		

Note. See not on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: *>=.05, **>=.01.

Appendix table 6. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial fugitive status

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
Most serious arrest charge			
Rape	0.0118	-1.2836**	0.2824
Robbery	0.0330	-0.3058	0.1690
Assault	0.1215	-0.8666**	0.1170
Other violent	0.0414	-0.8022**	0.1352
Burglary	0.0684	-0.2789*	0.1133
Larceny	0.0988	0.0044	0.0817
Motor vehicle theft	0.0271	-0.2829	0.1506
Forgery	0.0320	-0.1446	0.1210
Fraud	0.0375	-0.5742**	0.2041
Other property	0.0471	-0.2003	0.1418
Other drug	0.2250	0.0861	0.1021
Weapons	0.0275	-0.3852**	0.1358
Driving - related	0.0329	-0.0587	0.1268
Other public order	0.0289	-0.6688**	0.1355
Age at arrest			
21-29	0.3404	0.3634**	0.0885
30-39	0.2739	0.3892**	0.0556
40 or older	0.1870	0.2437**	0.0700
Gender			
Female	0.2153	-0.1027	0.0717
Race/Hispanic origin			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4449	0.2836**	0.0767
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.1648	0.1917
Hispanic, any race	0.2020	0.6593**	0.0905
Criminal justice status at arrest			
Other status	0.0177	0.0222	0.1925
Released pending prior case	0.0949	0.0150	0.0744
On probation	0.1103	0.0332	0.0738
On parole	0.0236	0.2334	0.1520
Prior arrest and FTA history			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2379	0.1558*	0.0732
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4104	-0.3075**	0.0742
Most serious prior conviction			
Felony	0.3037	-0.2730**	0.1048
Misdemeanor	0.1806	-0.2527**	0.0663
Type of pretrial release			
Surety bond	0.3710	-0.6047**	0.1126
Full cash bond	0.0353	-0.0503	0.1600
Deposit bond	0.0962	-0.3515	0.3069
Property bond	0.0116	-0.7676**	0.2294
Conditional release	0.1448	-0.0633	0.1156
Unsecured bond	0.0650	0.1997	0.1726
Emergency release	0.0106	0.2469	0.2407
Study year			
1992	0.1002	0.3370**	0.1208
1994	0.1201	0.1748	0.1116
1996	0.1357	0.1633	0.0965
1998	0.1180	0.2129	0.1388
2000	0.1802	0.2684**	0.0908
2002	0.1835	0.1906	0.1112
Intercept	1.0000	-2.9223	0.1845
Number of observations	39,752		
Log Likelihood	-8391.7631		

Note. See not on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: * $\geq .05$, ** $\geq .01$.

