

i  
ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

CASE NO. 2014-0563

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

-vs-

EDWARD A. SOUTH

Appellant

\* ON APPEAL FROM THE SUMMIT  
\* COUNTY COURT OF APPEALS,  
\* NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

\* COURT OF APPEALS  
\* CASE NO. CA 26967

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MERIT BRIEF OF APPELLEE  
EDWARD A. SOUTH

---

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RECEIVED  
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FILED  
AUG 04 2014  
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When a defendant is convicted of a R.C. § 2941.1413 specification, does Ohio’s OVI statute, R.C. § 4511.19 prevail so that a five year sentence can be imposed for a third degree felony OVI or does R.C. § 2929.14(A) require that the maximum sentence that can be imposed is three years?	
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**STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS**

As stated by Appellant in its Statement of Facts and Case, Appellee was charged with OVI, R.C. § 4511.19(A)(11)(a); OVI R.C. § 4511.19(A)(1)(d); Driving Under Suspension and a traffic violation of Failure to Control.

Appellee had been convicted of five or more OVI offenses within twenty years, in violation of R.C. § 2941.1413, which specification was attached to the OVI counts.

He was found guilty by jury. The trial court sentenced him to a total of eight years, merging the two OVI offenses for a five year term and a mandatory 3 years on the specification (R.C. §2941.1413).

Appellee appealed, claiming his sentence was contrary to law. The Ninth District agreed and remanded the case. The Ninth District also certified a conflict.

This Court determined there was a conflict and ordered briefs on the following issue:

When a defendant is convicted of a R.C. § 2941.1413 specification, does Ohio's OVI statute, R.C. § 4511.19 prevail so that a five year sentence can be imposed for a third degree felony OVI or does R.C. § 2929.14(A) require that the maximum sentence that can be imposed is three years?

Appellee files the following brief pursuant to this Court's Order.

PROPOSITION OF LAW I

When a defendant is convicted of a R.C. § 2941.1413 specification, Ohio's sentencing statute, R.C. § 2929.14(A) precludes any sentence above three years.

It is Appellee's position that R.C. § 2929.14(A) trumps R.C. § 4511.19 and prohibits any sentence beyond the three year maximum.

The Appellee was convicted of a third degree felony R.C. § 4511.19A)(1)(a).

R.C. § 2929.14(A)(3)(a) provides for a third degree felony that is a violation of Sections:

2903.06  
 2903.08  
 2907.03  
 2907.04  
 2907.05  
 2911.02 (with two prior convictions)  
 2911.12 (with two prior convictions)

the prison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months. All of these offenses appear to be violent offenses.

R.C. § 2929.14(A)(3)(b) provides that for a third degree felony that is not listed in section (a) the prison term shall be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.

Clearly, no R.C. § 4511.19 violations are listed in § 2929.14(A)(3)(a). Appellant contends that R.C. § 4511.19(A) and R.C. § 4511.19(G)(1)(e)(ii), which permits a five year sentence is not in conflict with R.C. § 2929.14(A)(3). Appellee feels there is an obvious conflict; if the legislature meant to exclude a R.C. § 4511 violation from the three year maximum, it should have listed the § 4511 violation among the exceptions enumerated in § 2929.14(A)(1)(3)(a). The legislature did not do so.

Appellee agrees that statutes should be read together if possible to give effect to the intent of the legislation. However, it is likewise true that if the meaning of the statute is unambiguous

and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary. *State, ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School District*, 74 O.S.3d 543, 545 (1996). How much more definite and unambiguous can the legislature be when it provides that, only in certain violations, is a five year sentence for a third degree felony authorized; and a R.C. § 4511 violation is not a listed exception. It appears that the intent of the legislature is clear, an OVI conviction is limited to a three year prison term.

At least part of Appellant's justification for its position that these statutes are not in conflict is its reading R.C. § 2919.14(B)(4) (see page 4 of Appellant's Merit Brief). In that section the legislature indicated that if an offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony, the Court shall impose a mandatory prison term in accordance with Chapter 2929. However, the statute goes on to indicate that the total of the additional prison term imposed under R.C. § 2919.14(B)(4) shall equal one of the authorized prison terms specified in R.C. § 2929.14(A)(3). The legislature clearly indicates again that a three year cap is imposed. It is therefore not clear as Appellant suggests that R.C. § 2929.14(B)(4) authorizes a five year prison term.

Two courts have jointed the Ninth District in stating that these statutes are irreconcilable. In *State v. Owen*, 11<sup>th</sup> Dist., Lake No. 2012-L-102, 2013-Ohio-2824, the Court held that these two are in irreconcilable conflict with one another. The Court noted that the OVI statute in question here R.C. § 4511.19 was effective September 23, 2011 and the sentencing statute R.C. § 2929.14 was effective September 30, 2011, and found that to be significant. The *Owens* Court also found that both statutes are specific in nature; the Court found the statutes to be irreconcilable and thus applied R.C. §1.52 which provides "if statutes are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails."

In *State v. May*, 2d Dist. No. 25359, 2014-Ohio-1542, the Second District followed *Owen*, supra in finding that these two statutes are irreconcilable and held that each statute was specific in nature and thus, applied R.C. § 1.52 and held that the three year mandatory sentence was appropriate.

Appellant argues to this Court that neither *Owens*, nor *May*, supra, addressed the specific language of R.C. § 4511.19(G)(1) which authorizes the Court to sentence a defendant for a violation of § 4511.19 to the exclusion of R.C. § 2929. Appellee does not agree with the language of Appellant in its brief that § 4511.19(G)(1) allows a court to sentence an OVI defendant to the exclusion of R.C. § 2929. The statute actually states: “The court shall sentence the offender for either offense under Chapter 2929 of the Revised Code, except as otherwise authorized or required by divisions (G)(1)(a) to (e) of this section.” However, most importantly, Appellant ignores the fact that at the time of the enactment of R.C. § 4511.19 (September 23, 2011), the maximum penalty for a third degree felony was in fact five years (not three, until September 30, 2011). Therefore, on September 23, 2011, these two statutes were not irreconcilable, the three year maximum was not in effect; however, the statutes are irreconcilable now, since HB 86 revised Ohio sentencing statutes.

The 12<sup>th</sup> District, in *State v. Sturgil*, 12<sup>th</sup> Dist. Nos. CA 2013-01-002, CA 2013-01-003, 2013-Ohio-4648 held that the two statutes are not in conflict and can be read together to permit a five year maximum penalty.

Of course, the Ninth District, in this case, held that a five year sentence in this case exceeded the thirty-six month maximum allowed by R.C. § 2929.14(A)(3)(b).

Finally, the Tenth District in *State v. Mercier*, 10<sup>th</sup> Dist. No. 13AP-906, 2014-Ohio-2910 failed to follow the reasoning of *Owen*, *May*, supra agreeing that the statutes were not

ambiguous, but did not agree that the statutes were in conflict. The court took on the Appellant's position that R.C. § 4511.19 allowed for a sentence to the exclusion of Chapter 2929. However, neither Appellant nor Mercier, supra recognized that at the time of the enactment of R.C. § 4511.19, a third degree felony was punishable for up to five years.

CONCLUSION

Appellee urges that this Court adopt the reasoning of the Ninth, Second, and Eleventh Districts and for the reasons stated above, find that the statutes are irreconcilable and thus the trial court was not authorized to sentence Appellee in excess of three years for a violation of R.C. § 4511.19 and find that the sentence imposed herein is contrary to law and order that this case be remanded for resentencing consistent with that finding.

Respectfully submitted,




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PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed by regular U.S. Mail this 30 day of July, 2014, to Heaven DiMartino, Assistant Prosecutor, 53 University Avenue, Akron, Ohio 44308.




---

LAWRENCE J. WHITNEY  
Attorney for Defendant

APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

DANIEL M. HERRIGAN

THE STATE OF OHIO

2013 MAY 31 PM 2: 11 Case No. CR 13 01 008130

vs.

SUMMIT COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURTS

EDWARD A. SOUTH

JOURNAL ENTRY

THIS DAY, to-wit: The 23<sup>rd</sup> day of May, A.D., 2013, the Defendant's sentencing hearing was held pursuant to O.R.C. 2929.19. Prosecuting Attorney, BRIAN STANO, and Defense Counsel, CHARLES ALTWIES, were present as was the Defendant, EDWARD A. SOUTH, who was afforded all rights pursuant to Crim. R. 32. The Court has considered the record, oral statements, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under O.R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors under O.R.C. 2929.12.

Heretofore on May 8, 2013 a Jury was duly empanelled and sworn, and the trial commenced. Thereafter, the trial not being completed, adjourned and reconvened on May 10, 2013 until 12:38 P.M., at which time the Jury having heard the testimony adduced by both parties hereto, the arguments of counsel and the charge of the Court, retired to their room for deliberation. And thereafter, on May 13, 2013 at 11:58 said Jury came again into the Court and returned their verdict in writing finding said Defendant GUILTY of the crime of OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS, as contained in Count 1 of the Indictment, with PRIOR CONVICTION SPECIFICATION ONE TO COUNT ONE, Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third (3<sup>rd</sup>) degree; GUILTY of the crime of OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS, as contained in Count 2 of the Indictment, Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.19(A)(1)(d), a felony of the third (3<sup>rd</sup>) degree; GUILTY of the crime of DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, as contained in Count 3 of the Indictment, Ohio Revised Code Section 4510.11, a misdemeanor of the first (1<sup>st</sup>) degree; and the Court found the Defendant GUILTY of the crime of FAILURE TO CONTROL, as contained in Count 4 of the Indictment, Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.202, a minor misdemeanor.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts 1 and 2 be MERGED for sentencing purposes.

Thereupon, the Court inquired of the said Defendant if he had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced against him; and having nothing but what he had already said and showing no good and sufficient cause why judgment should not be pronounced:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THIS COURT, that the Defendant, EDWARD A. SOUTH, be committed to the OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION for for an actual **Three (3) mandatory sentence for Prior Conviction Specification One to Count One** a definite term of Five (5) years, which is a mandatory term pursuant to O.R.C. 2929.13(F), 2929.14(D)(3), or 2925.01, for punishment of the crime of OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS, Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third (3<sup>rd</sup>) degree; and that he serve a period of Six (6) months in the Summit County Jail for punishment of the crime of DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, Ohio Revised Code Section 4510.11, a misdemeanor of the first (1<sup>st</sup>) degree, to be served at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction; that the Defendant pay a fine in the amount of \$50.00 for punishment of the crime of FAILURE TO CONTROL, Ohio Revised Code Section, 4511.202, a minor misdemeanor, and that the said Defendant pay the costs of this prosecution for which execution is hereby awarded; said monies to be paid to the Summit County Clerk of Courts, Courthouse, 205 South High Street, Akron, Ohio 44308-1662.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to the above sentence, that the Defendant be conveyed to the Lorain Correctional Institution at Grafton, Ohio, to commence the prison intake procedure.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 3 year mandatory prison sentence imposed for Prior Conviction Specification One to Count One be served CONSECUTIVELY and not concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count 1.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed in Count 1 be served CONCURRENTLY and not consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count 3.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant is to serve a total of 8 years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

As part of the sentence in this case, the Defendant *shall* be supervised on post-release control by the Adult Parole Authority for a **mandatory** period of **3 years** after being released from prison. If the Defendant violates the terms and conditions of post-release control, the Adult Parole Authority may impose a residential sanction that may include a prison term of up to nine months, and the maximum cumulative prison term for all violations shall not exceed one-half of the stated prison term. If the Defendant pleads guilty to, or is convicted of, a new felony offense while on post-release control, the sentencing court may impose a prison term for the new felony offense as well as an additional consecutive prison term for the post-release control violation of twelve months or whatever time remains on the Defendant's post-release control period, whichever is greater.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Continue Bond Pending Appeal herein is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the mandatory fine in this case be WAIVED for the reason that the Defendant is in indigent circumstances.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's driver's license and all driving privileges be SUSPENDED for the Defendant's **lifetime**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant is to enter into an alcohol and drug addiction program while confined in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

Thereupon, the Court informed the Defendant of his right to appeal pursuant to Rule 32A2, Criminal Rules of Procedure, Ohio Supreme Court, and further the Court will appoint counsel to represent the said Defendant for purposes of appeal due to said Defendant's indigency.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be granted credit for 64 days served in Summit County Jail as of the date of sentencing, May 23, 2013, as agreed to by all parties.

APPROVED:  
May 31, 2013  
md

  
TAMMY O'BRIEN, Judge  
Court of Common Pleas  
Summit County, Ohio

cc: Prosecutor Brian Stano  
Attorney Lawrence Whitney  
Court Convey  
Warrants  
Criminal Assignment  
Adult Probation Department  
OBMV - CERTIFIED  
Registrar's Office

STATE OF OHIO

COURT OF APPEALS  
DANIEL M. HORTON

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)ss:  
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STATE OF OHIO

SUMMIT COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURTS

C.A. No. 26967

Appellee

v.

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT  
ENTERED IN THE  
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO  
CASE No. CR 13 01 0081

EDWARD A. SOUTH

Appellant

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: February 5, 2014

WHITMORE, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Edward South, appeals from his convictions in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

I

{¶2} Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on December 26, 2012, Brittany Washburn heard a loud crash outside her house. The crash was the result of a car hitting a pole on the opposite side of the street. Washburn called 911 to report the accident in case anyone was injured. Before the police arrived, however, Washburn observed someone exit the car, walk to the back of the car, bend over at the back of the car for a brief period, and walk away. Washburn believed that the person had the car's license plate in his hand as he walked away. Washburn then called 911 again to tell the operator that the person in the accident had left the scene. Washburn's second call was received at 9:58 p.m.

{¶6} South now appeals and raises two assignments of error for our review.

## II

### Assignment of Error Number One

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO LITIGATE, PRIOR TO TRIAL, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BAC DATAMASTER RESULTS AND THUS APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.

{¶7} In his first assignment of error, South argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to seek the suppression of the BAC results the State introduced. We disagree.

{¶8} To prove an ineffective assistance claim, South must show two things: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that "counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate prejudice, South must prove that "there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." *State v. Bradley*, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus. "An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." *Strickland* at 691. Furthermore, this Court need not address both *Strickland* prongs if an appellant fails to prove either one. *State v. Ray*, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22459, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10.

{¶9} The "failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel." (Alteration omitted.) *State v. Madrigal*, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), quoting *Kimmelman v. Morrison*, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). "However, the failure to file a

According to Snyder, “[a] hearing on a motion to suppress could have been used to flesh out the impact this [.003] plus or minus factor had as it relates to the time of the consumption of the alcohol, and whether or not this error factor had any relevance at all to this case.”

{¶12} Officer Snyder specifically testified that the BAC Datamaster is incapable of determining exactly when a person drank or how much they drank. He testified that BAC varies from person to person and is affected by a variety of factors such as whether a person has eaten, whether the person regularly drinks, and the type of alcohol at issue. He admitted that he did not know when South had consumed alcohol or how much alcohol he had consumed. He testified, however, that the .087 result he received when he performed South’s test was an accurate result and that the BAC Datamaster was regularly calibrated for accuracy. When asked what he would do if he ever performed a breathalyzer test that resulted in a .08 result, he testified that “[he] would charge the person with prohibitive BAC.”

{¶13} South has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. Officer Snyder never testified that the “internal standard check” the BAC Datamaster uses to self-calibrate means that the results that issue from the machine are inaccurate. In fact, he testified that he would charge someone with a prohibitive BAC if the BAC Datamaster indicated that the person had a concentration of exactly the legal limit. Officer Snyder specifically testified that the BAC Datamaster self-calibrates and also undergoes weekly maintenance at the police department. There is nothing in the record to even suggest the BAC Datamaster was improperly calibrated. Moreover, even if an error rate of .003 was applied to South’s BAC result, his BAC would have been .084; a concentration still in excess of the legal limit.

{¶17} South was convicted of a third-degree felony OVI as well as a specification under R.C. 2941.1413 for previously having been convicted of five or more OVI offenses within twenty years of his current offense. His sentence, therefore, had to consist of a one to five year mandatory prison term on his specification. R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(e)(i). Additionally, the court could impose a prison term on South's underlying OVI offense. *Id.*; R.C. 2929.14(B)(4). The mandatory prison term on the specification would be run "consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense." R.C. 2929.13(G)(2). The length of the prison term imposed on the underlying offense could be "of any duration specified in division (A)(3) of [R.C. 2929.14]." R.C. 2929.14(B)(4). South actually received a mandatory term of three years on his specification, as well as a five-year prison term on his underlying OVI offense.


{¶18} Although Former R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) allowed for a prison term of one to five years on all third-degree felonies, the statute was amended effective September 30, 2011. *See* Am.H.B. No. 86, 2011 Ohio Laws File 29. The amended version of the statute, as well as the current version of the statute (effective September 28, 2012), bifurcates third-degree felonies into two subsets for purposes of sentencing. *Compare* Former R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) *with* R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a)-(b). Because the current version of R.C. 2929.14 is applicable here, South's third-degree OVI felony was subject to a maximum of 36 months in prison. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). By sentencing South to five years on his underlying OVI conviction, the court issued a sentence that was contrary to law. *See State v. Vitt*, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0071-M, 2012-Ohio-4438, ¶ 21 ("Although neither party raised this issue below or on appeal, we raise it *sua sponte* because [the appellant's] sentence \* \* \* is contrary to law.").

{¶19} "No court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law." *State v. Fischer*, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 23. "R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to both parties.

  
BETH WHITMORE  
FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.  
MOORE, J.  
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

LAWRENCE J. WHITNEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.

COURT OF APPEALS  
DANIEL M. MORGAN  
2014 JUN -5 PM 1:11

# The Supreme Court of Ohio

FILED

MAY 28 2014

CLERK OF COURT  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

SUMMIT COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURTS

State of Ohio

Case No. 2014-0563

v.

ENTRY


Edward A. South

This cause is pending before the court on the certification of a conflict by the Court of Appeals for Summit County. On review of the order certifying a conflict, it is determined that a conflict exists. The parties are to brief the issue stated at page 1 of the court of appeals' Judgment Entry filed March 17, 2014, as follows:

"When a defendant is convicted of a R.C. 2941.1413 specification, does Ohio's OVI statute, R.C. 4511.19 prevail so that a five year sentence can be imposed for a third degree felony OVI or does R.C. 2929.14(A) require that the maximum sentence that can be imposed is three years?"

It is ordered by the court that the clerk shall issue an order for the transmittal of the record from the Court of Appeals for Summit County.

(Summit County Court of Appeals; No. 26967)



Maureen O'Connor  
Chief Justice

I certify this to be a true copy of the original  
Daniel M. Morgan, Clerk of Courts.  
Deputy

**1.52 Irreconcilable statutes; amendments to same statute, one without reference to the other; amendments to be harmonized**

(A) If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails.

(B) If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are substantively irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails. The fact that a later amendment restates language deleted by an earlier amendment, or fails to include language inserted by an earlier amendment, does not of itself make the amendments irreconcilable. Amendments are irreconcilable only when changes made by each cannot reasonably be put into simultaneous operation.

*(1971 H 607, eff. 1-3-72)*

**2929.14 DEFINITE PRISON TERMS.**

(A) Except as provided in division (B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3), (B)(4), (B)(5), (B)(6), (B)(7), (B)(8), (E), (G), (H), or (J) of this section or in division (D)(6) of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code and except in relation to an offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment is to be imposed, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant to this chapter, the court shall impose a definite prison term that shall be one of the following:

(1) For a felony of the first degree, the prison term shall be three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years.

(2) For a felony of the second degree, the prison term shall be two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years.

(3)

(a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section 2903.06 , 2903.08 , 2907.03 , 2907.04 , or 2907.05 of the Revised Code or that is a violation of section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of the Revised Code if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty in two or

more separate proceedings to two or more violations of section 2911.01 , 2911.02 , 2911.11 , or 2911.12 of the Revised Code, the prison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.

(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.

(4) For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.

(5) For a felony of the fifth degree, the prison term shall be six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.

(B)

(1)

(a) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141 , 2941.144 , or 2941.145 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender one of the following prison terms:

(i) A prison term of six years if the specification is of the type described in section 2941.144 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm that is an automatic firearm or that was equipped with a firearm muffler or silencer on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the felony;

(ii) A prison term of three years if the specification is of the type described in section 2941.145 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and displaying the firearm, brandishing the firearm, indicating that the offender possessed the firearm, or using it to facilitate the offense;

(iii) A prison term of one year if the specification is of the type described in section 2941.141 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the felony.

(b) If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section, the prison term shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2967.19 , section 2929.20 , section 2967.193 , or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. Except as provided in division (B)(1)(g) of this section, a court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction.

(c) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or to a felony that includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another, also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.146 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or for the other felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of five years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20 , section 2967.19 , section 2967.193 , or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section relative to an offense, the court also shall impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) of this section relative to the same offense, provided the criteria specified in that division for imposing an additional prison term are satisfied relative to the offender and the offense.

(d) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense of violence that is a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1411 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with wearing or carrying body armor while committing the felony offense of violence, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of two years. The prison term so imposed, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20 , section 2967.19 , section 2967.193 , or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(d) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section, the court is not precluded from imposing an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(d) of this section.

(e) The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.12 or 2923.123 of the Revised Code. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) or (b) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.122 that involves a deadly weapon that is a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance, section 2923.16 , or section 2923.121 of the Revised Code. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.13 of the Revised Code unless all of the following apply:

(i) The offender previously has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or any felony of the first or second degree.

(ii) Less than five years have passed since the offender was released from prison or post-release control, whichever is later, for the prior offense.

(f) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that includes, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm at a peace officer as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code or a corrections officer, as defined in section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of seven years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies that include, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(f) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(f) of this section for each of two of the specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(f) of this section relative to an offense, the court shall not impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section relative to the same offense.

(g) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.

(2)

(a) If division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not apply, the court may impose on an offender, in addition to the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense, an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the

court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense that is not life imprisonment without parole.

(iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of this section are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.

(v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of this section are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense, because one or more of the factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense are present, and they outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating that the offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

(b) The court shall impose on an offender the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense and shall impose on the offender an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offender within the preceding twenty years has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more offenses described in division (CC)(1) of section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, including all offenses described in that division of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty in the current prosecution and all offenses described in that division of which the offender previously has been convicted or to which the offender previously pleaded guilty, whether prosecuted together or separately.

(iii) The offense or offenses of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(c) For purposes of division (B)(2)(b) of this section, two or more offenses committed at the same time or as part of the same act or event shall be considered one offense, and that one offense shall be the offense with the greatest penalty.

(d) A sentence imposed under division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. The offender shall serve an additional prison term imposed under this section consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.

(e) When imposing a sentence pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section, the court shall state its findings explaining the imposed sentence.

(3) Except when an offender commits a violation of section 2903.01 or 2907.02 of the Revised Code and the penalty imposed for the violation is life imprisonment or commits a violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code, if the offender commits a violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised Code and that section classifies the offender as a major drug offender, if the offender commits a felony violation of section 2925.02, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.36, 3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 3719.161, 4729.37, or 4729.61, division (C) or (D) of section 3719.172, division (C) of section 4729.51, or division (J) of section 4729.54 of the Revised Code that includes the sale, offer to sell, or possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance, with the exception of marihuana, and the court imposing sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a specification of the type described in section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code charging that the offender is a major drug offender, if the court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of the first degree, or if the offender is guilty of an attempted violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and, had the offender completed the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code that was attempted, the offender would have been subject to a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole for the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the offender for the felony violation a mandatory prison term of the maximum prison term prescribed for a felony of the first degree that, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, cannot be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code.

(4) If the offender is being sentenced for a third or fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, the sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term in accordance with that division. In addition to the mandatory prison term, if the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense, the court, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of this section, may sentence the offender to a definite prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months, and if the offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony OVI offense, the sentencing court may sentence the offender to an additional prison term of any duration specified in division (A)(3) of this section. In either case, the additional prison term imposed shall be reduced by the sixty or one hundred twenty days imposed upon the offender as the mandatory prison term. The total of the additional prison term imposed under division (B)(4) of this section plus the sixty or one hundred twenty

days imposed as the mandatory prison term shall equal a definite term in the range of six months to thirty months for a fourth degree felony OVI offense and shall equal one of the authorized prison terms specified in division (A)(3) of this section for a third degree felony OVI offense. If the court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(4) of this section, the offender shall serve the additional prison term after the offender has served the mandatory prison term required for the offense. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory and additional prison term imposed as described in division (B)(4) of this section, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction under section 2929.16 or 2929.17 of the Revised Code, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code and the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, the court may impose a prison term as described in division (A)(1) of that section.

(5) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1414 of the Revised Code that charges that the victim of the offense is a peace officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code, or an investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation, as defined in section 2903.11 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of five years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(6) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more violations of division (A) or (B) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or an equivalent offense, as defined in section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code, or three or more violations of any combination of those divisions and offenses, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of three years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(7)

(a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2905.01, 2905.02, 2907.21, 2907.22, or 2923.52, division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2907.323, or division (B)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or

pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1422 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender knowingly committed the offense in furtherance of human trafficking, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is one of the following:

(i) If the offense is a felony of the first degree, a definite prison term of not less than five years and not greater than ten years;

(ii) If the offense is a felony of the second or third degree, a definite prison term of not less than three years and not greater than the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code;

(iii) If the offense is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, a definite prison term that is the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.

(b) Subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, the prison term imposed under division (B)(7)(a) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20 , section 2967.19 , section 2967.193 , or any other provision of Chapter 2967. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(7)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act, scheme, or plan.

(8) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2903.11 , 2903.12 , or 2903.13 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1423 of the Revised Code that charges that the victim of the violation was a woman whom the offender knew was pregnant at the time of the violation, notwithstanding the range of prison terms prescribed in division (A) of this section for felonies of the same degree as the violation, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is either a definite prison term of six months or one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for felonies of the same degree as the violation.

Amended by 129th General Assembly File No.131, SB 337, §1, eff. 9/28/2012.

Amended by 129th General Assembly File No.29, HB 86, §1, eff. 9/30/2011.

Effective Date: 04-08-2004; 06-01-2004; 09-23-2004; 04-29-2005; 07-11-2006; 08-03-2006; 01-02-2007; 01-04-2007; 04-04-2007; 2007 SB10 01-01-2008; 2008 SB184 09-09-2008; 2008 SB220 09-30-2008; 2008 HB280 04-07-2009; 2008 HB130 04-07-2009

**2941.1413 MANDATORY ADDITIONAL PRISON TERM FOR FELONY OVI VIOLATION PRECLUDED UNLESS CHARGING INSTRUMENT SPECIFIES PRIOR CONVICTIONS.**

(A) Imposition of a mandatory additional prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years upon an offender under division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code is precluded unless the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging a felony violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code specifies that the offender, within twenty years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more equivalent offenses. The specification shall be stated at the end of the body of the indictment, count, or information and shall be stated in substantially the following form:

"SPECIFICATION (or, SPECIFICATION TO THE FIRST COUNT).

The Grand Jurors (or insert the person's or the prosecuting attorney's name when appropriate) further find and specify that (set forth that the offender, within twenty years of committing the offense, previously had been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more equivalent offenses)."

(B) As used in division (A) of this section, "equivalent offense" has the same meaning as in section 4511.181 of the Revised Code.

Effective Date: 09-23-2004

**4511.19 OPERATING VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS - OVI.**

(A)

(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.

(b) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one per cent or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

- (c) The person has a concentration of ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent or more but less than two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.
- (d) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.
- (e) The person has a concentration of eleven-hundredths of one gram or more but less than two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.
- (f) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.
- (g) The person has a concentration of two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.
- (h) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.
- (i) The person has a concentration of two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.
- (j) Except as provided in division (K) of this section, the person has a concentration of any of the following controlled substances or metabolites of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds any of the following:
- (i) The person has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.
- (ii) The person has a concentration of cocaine in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.
- (iii) The person has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.
- (iv) The person has a concentration of heroin in the person's urine of at least two thousand nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin in the

person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(v) The person has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vi) The person has a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's urine or a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vii) The person has a concentration of marihuana in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least two nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(viii) Either of the following applies:

(I) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, and, as measured by gas chromatography mass spectrometry, the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least fifteen nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(II) As measured by gas chromatography mass spectrometry, the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least thirty-five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ix) The person has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(x) The person has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(xi) The state board of pharmacy has adopted a rule pursuant to section 4729.041 of the Revised Code that specifies the amount of salvia divinorum and the amount of salvinorin A that constitute concentrations of salvia divinorum and salvinorin A in a person's urine, in a person's whole blood, or in a person's blood serum or plasma at or above which the person is impaired for purposes of operating any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, the rule is in effect, and the person has a concentration of salvia divinorum or salvinorin A of at least that amount so specified by rule in the person's urine, in the person's whole blood, or in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(2) No person who, within twenty years of the conduct described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this division, a violation of division (A)(1) or (B) of this section, or any other equivalent offense shall do both of the following:

(a) Operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them;

(b) Subsequent to being arrested for operating the vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley as described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, being asked by a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test or tests under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, and being advised by the officer in accordance with section 4511.192 of the Revised Code of the consequences of the person's refusal or submission to the test or tests, refuse to submit to the test or tests.

(B) No person under twenty-one years of age shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(1) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one per cent but less than eight-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(2) The person has a concentration of at least three-hundredths of one per cent but less than ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(3) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one gram but less than eight-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(4) The person has a concentration of at least twenty-eight one-thousandths of one gram but less than eleven-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(C) In any proceeding arising out of one incident, a person may be charged with a violation of division (A)(1)(a) or (A)(2) and a violation of division (B)(1), (2), or (3) of this section, but the person may not be convicted of more than one violation of these divisions.

(D)

(1)

(a) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A)(1)(a) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the result of any test of any blood or urine withdrawn and analyzed at any health care provider, as defined in section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, may be admitted with expert testimony to be considered with any other relevant and competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the defendant's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged violation. The three-hour time limit specified in this division regarding the admission of evidence does not extend or affect the two-hour time limit specified in division (A) of section 4511.192 of the Revised Code as the maximum period of time during which a person may consent to a chemical test or tests as described in that section. The court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or a combination of them as described in this division when a person submits to a blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance test at the request of a law enforcement officer under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code or a blood or urine sample is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Only a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical technician-intermediate, an emergency medical technician-paramedic, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist shall withdraw a blood sample for the purpose of determining the alcohol, drug, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination content of the whole blood, blood serum, or blood plasma. This limitation does not apply to the taking of breath or urine specimens. A person authorized to withdraw blood under this division may refuse to withdraw blood under this division, if in that person's opinion, the physical welfare of the person would be endangered by the withdrawing of blood.

The bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.

(c) As used in division (D)(1)(b) of this section, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) In a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, if there was at the time the bodily substance was withdrawn a concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified in divisions (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section or less than the applicable concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance specified for a violation of division (A)(1)(j) of this section, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This division does not limit or affect a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to that division.

(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the chemical test shall be made available to the person or the person's attorney, immediately upon the completion of the chemical test analysis.

If the chemical test was obtained pursuant to division (D)(1)(b) of this section, the person tested may have a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist of the person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests, at the person's expense, in addition to any administered at the request of a law enforcement officer. If the person was under arrest as described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the arresting officer shall advise the person at the time of the arrest that the person may have an independent chemical test taken at the person's own expense. If the person was under arrest other than described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the form to be read to the person to be tested, as required under section 4511.192 of the Revised Code, shall state that the person may have an independent test performed at the person's expense. The failure or inability to obtain an additional chemical test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the chemical test or tests taken at the request of a law enforcement officer.

(4)

(a) As used in divisions (D)(4)(b) and (c) of this section, "national highway traffic safety administration" means the national highway traffic safety administration established as an administration of the United States department of transportation under 96 Stat. 2415 (1983), 49 U.S.C.A. 105.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:

(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

(c) Division (D)(4)(b) of this section does not limit or preclude a court, in its determination of whether the arrest of a person was supported by probable cause or its determination of any other matter in a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding of a type described in that division, from considering evidence or testimony that is not otherwise disallowed by division (D)(4)(b) of this section.

(E)

(1) Subject to division (E)(3) of this section, in any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j) or (B)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to any of those divisions, a laboratory report from any laboratory personnel issued a permit by the department of health authorizing an analysis as described in this division that contains an analysis of the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance tested and that contains all of the information specified in this division shall be admitted as prima-facie evidence of the information and statements that the report contains. The laboratory report shall contain all of the following:

(a) The signature, under oath, of any person who performed the analysis;

(b) Any findings as to the identity and quantity of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a controlled substance, a metabolite of a controlled substance, or a combination of them that was found;

(c) A copy of a notarized statement by the laboratory director or a designee of the director that contains the name of each certified analyst or test performer involved with the report, the analyst's or test performer's employment relationship with the laboratory that issued the report, and a notation that performing an analysis of the type involved is part of the analyst's or test performer's regular duties;

(d) An outline of the analyst's or test performer's education, training, and experience in performing the type of analysis involved and a certification that the laboratory satisfies appropriate quality control standards in general and, in this particular analysis, under rules of the department of health.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding the admission of evidence, a report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section is not admissible against the defendant to whom it pertains in any proceeding, other than a preliminary hearing or a grand jury proceeding, unless the prosecutor has served a copy of the report on the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant has no attorney, on the defendant.

(3) A report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section shall not be prima-facie evidence of the contents, identity, or amount of any substance if, within seven days after the defendant to whom the report pertains or the defendant's attorney receives a copy of the report, the defendant or the defendant's attorney demands the testimony of the person who signed the report. The judge in the case may extend the seven-day time limit in the interest of justice.

(F) Except as otherwise provided in this division, any physician, registered nurse, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical technician-paramedic, or qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist who withdraws blood from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, and any hospital, first-aid station, or clinic at which blood is withdrawn from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, is immune from criminal liability and civil liability based upon a claim of assault and battery or any other claim that is not a claim of malpractice, for any act performed in withdrawing blood from the person. The immunity provided in this division also extends to an emergency medical service organization that employs an emergency medical technician-intermediate or emergency medical technician-paramedic who withdraws blood under this section. The immunity provided in this division is not available to a person who withdraws blood if the person engages in willful or wanton misconduct.

As used in this division, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(G)

(1) Whoever violates any provision of divisions (A)(1)(a) to (i) or (A)(2) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them. Whoever violates division (A)(1)(j) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance. The court shall sentence the offender for either offense under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, except as otherwise authorized or required by divisions (G)(1)(a) to (e) of this section:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, and the court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of three consecutive days. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. The court may sentence an offender to both an intervention program and a jail term. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the three-day mandatory jail term or intervention program. However, in no case shall the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense exceed six months.

The court may suspend the execution of the three-day jail term under this division if the court, in lieu of that suspended term, places the offender under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code and requires the offender to attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program certified under section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. The court also may suspend the execution of any part of the three-day jail term under this division if it places the offender under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code for part of the three days, requires the offender to attend for the suspended part of the term a drivers' intervention program so certified, and sentences the offender to a jail term equal to the remainder of the three consecutive days that the offender does not spend attending the program. The court may require the offender, as a condition of community control and in addition to the required attendance at a drivers' intervention program, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted

pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose on the offender any other conditions of community control that it considers necessary.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory jail term of at least three consecutive days and a requirement that the offender attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program that is certified pursuant to section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. If the court determines that the offender is not conducive to treatment in a drivers' intervention program, if the offender refuses to attend a drivers' intervention program, or if the jail at which the offender is to serve the jail term imposed can provide a driver's intervention program, the court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory jail term of at least six consecutive days.

The court may require the offender, under a community control sanction imposed under section 2929.25 of the Revised Code, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services, in addition to the required attendance at drivers' intervention program, that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose any other conditions of community control on the offender that it considers necessary.

(iii) In all cases, a fine of not less than three hundred seventy-five and not more than one thousand seventy-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class five license suspension of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(5) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within six years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or one other equivalent offense is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days. The court shall impose the ten-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the ten-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction services provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days. The court shall impose the twenty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the twenty-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction service provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than five hundred twenty-five and not more than one thousand six hundred twenty-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class four license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, immobilization of the vehicle involved in the offense for ninety days in accordance with section 4503.233 of the Revised Code and impoundment of the license plates of that vehicle for ninety days.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within six years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to two violations of division (A) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days. The court shall impose the thirty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the thirty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days. The court shall impose the sixty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than eight hundred fifty and not more than two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class three license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(3) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within six years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four violations of division (A) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses or an offender who,

within twenty years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more violations of that nature is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the one hundred twenty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand three hundred fifty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(vii) In all cases, if the court sentences the offender to a mandatory term of local incarceration, in addition to the mandatory term, the court, pursuant to section 2929.17 of the Revised Code, may impose a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring. The term shall not commence until after the offender has served the mandatory term of local incarceration.

(e) An offender who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section that was a felony, regardless of when the violation and the conviction or guilty plea occurred, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a sixty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a one hundred twenty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand three hundred fifty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(2) An offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section and who subsequently seeks reinstatement of the driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege suspended under this section as a result of the conviction or guilty plea shall pay a reinstatement fee as provided in division (F)(2) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(3) If an offender is sentenced to a jail term under division (G)(1)(b)(i) or (ii) or (G)(1)(c)(i) or (ii) of this section and if, within sixty days of sentencing of the offender, the court issues a written finding on the record that, due to the unavailability of space at the jail where the offender

is required to serve the term, the offender will not be able to begin serving that term within the sixty-day period following the date of sentencing, the court may impose an alternative sentence under this division that includes a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(b)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to five consecutive days in jail and not less than eighteen consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the five consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The five consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(b)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to ten consecutive days in jail and not less than thirty-six consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the ten consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The ten consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to fifteen consecutive days in jail and not less than fifty-five consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the fifteen consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed one year. The fifteen consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to thirty consecutive days in jail and not less than one hundred ten consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the thirty consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed one year. The thirty consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

(4) If an offender's driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under division (G) of this section and if section 4510.13 of the Revised Code permits the court to grant limited driving privileges, the court may grant the limited driving privileges in accordance with that section. If division (A)(7) of that section requires that the court impose as a condition of the privileges that the offender must display on the vehicle that is driven subject to the privileges restricted license plates that are issued under section 4503.231 of the Revised Code, except as provided in division (B) of that section, the court shall impose that

condition as one of the conditions of the limited driving privileges granted to the offender, except as provided in division (B) of section 4503.231 of the Revised Code.

(5) Fines imposed under this section for a violation of division (A) of this section shall be distributed as follows:

- (a) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), thirty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), one hundred twenty-three dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and two hundred ten dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be paid to an enforcement and education fund established by the legislative authority of the law enforcement agency in this state that primarily was responsible for the arrest of the offender, as determined by the court that imposes the fine. The agency shall use this share to pay only those costs it incurs in enforcing this section or a municipal OVI ordinance and in informing the public of the laws governing the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the dangers of the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and other information relating to the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
- (b) Fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) of this section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section and was confined as a result of the offense prior to being sentenced for the offense but is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, the fifty dollars shall be paid to the political subdivision that paid the cost of housing the offender during that period of confinement. The political subdivision shall use the share under this division to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs of any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.
- (c) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) and fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the county or municipal indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund under the control of that court, as created by the county or municipal corporation under division (F) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.
- (d) One hundred fifteen dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred seventy-seven dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and four hundred forty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. The political subdivision shall use this share to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs for any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.

(e) Fifty dollars of the fine imposed under divisions (G)(1)(a)(iii), (G)(1)(b)(iii), (G)(1)(c)(iii), (G)(1)(d)(iii), and (G)(1)(e)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the special projects fund of the court in which the offender was convicted and that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, to be used exclusively to cover the cost of immobilizing or disabling devices, including certified ignition interlock devices, and remote alcohol monitoring devices for indigent offenders who are required by a judge to use either of these devices. If the court in which the offender was convicted does not have a special projects fund that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, the fifty dollars shall be deposited into the indigent drivers interlock and alcohol monitoring fund under division (I) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(f) Seventy-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), one hundred twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and five hundred dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be transmitted to the treasurer of state for deposit into the indigent defense support fund established under section 120.08 of the Revised Code.

(g) The balance of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), (b)(iii), (c)(iii), (d)(iii), or (e)(iii) of this section shall be disbursed as otherwise provided by law.

(6) If title to a motor vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under division (G)(1)(c), (d), or (e) of this section is assigned or transferred and division (B)(2) or (3) of section 4503.234 of the Revised Code applies, in addition to or independent of any other penalty established by law, the court may fine the offender the value of the vehicle as determined by publications of the national automobile dealers association. The proceeds of any fine so imposed shall be distributed in accordance with division (C)(2) of that section.

(7) In all cases in which an offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section, the offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, the court, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense for which the offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section.

(8) As used in division (G) of this section, "electronic monitoring," "mandatory prison term," and "mandatory term of local incarceration" have the same meanings as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(H) Whoever violates division (B) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle after underage alcohol consumption and shall be punished as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (H)(2) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class six suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(6) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(2) If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more violations of division (A) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(3) If the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1416 of the Revised Code and if the court imposes a jail term for the violation of division (B) of this section, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional definite jail term pursuant to division (E) of section 2929.24 of the Revised Code.

(4) The offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, then, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, the court may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the violation of division (B) of this section.

(I)

(1) No court shall sentence an offender to an alcohol treatment program under this section unless the treatment program complies with the minimum standards for alcohol treatment programs adopted under Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services.

(2) An offender who stays in a drivers' intervention program or in an alcohol treatment program under an order issued under this section shall pay the cost of the stay in the program. However, if the court determines that an offender who stays in an alcohol treatment program under an order issued under this section is unable to pay the cost of the stay in the program, the court may order that the cost be paid from the court's indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund.

(J) If a person whose driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under this section files an appeal regarding any aspect of the person's trial or sentence, the appeal itself does not stay the operation of the suspension.

(K) Division (A)(1)(j) of this section does not apply to a person who operates a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley while the person has a concentration of a listed controlled substance or a

listed metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds the amount specified in that division, if both of the following apply:

(1) The person obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs.

(2) The person injected, ingested, or inhaled the controlled substance in accordance with the health professional's directions.

(L) The prohibited concentrations of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance listed in division (A)(1)(j) of this section also apply in a prosecution of a violation of division (D) of section 2923.16 of the Revised Code in the same manner as if the offender is being prosecuted for a prohibited concentration of alcohol.

(M) All terms defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code apply to this section. If the meaning of a term defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code conflicts with the meaning of the same term as defined in section 4501.01 or 4511.01 of the Revised Code, the term as defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code applies to this section.

(N)

(1) The Ohio Traffic Rules in effect on January 1, 2004, as adopted by the supreme court under authority of section 2937.46 of the Revised Code, do not apply to felony violations of this section. Subject to division (N)(2) of this section, the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to felony violations of this section.

(2) If, on or after January 1, 2004, the supreme court modifies the Ohio Traffic Rules to provide procedures to govern felony violations of this section, the modified rules shall apply to felony violations of this section.

Amended by 130th General Assembly File No. 25, HB 59, §101.01, eff. 9/29/2013.

Amended by 129th General Assembly File No. 25, HB 5, §1, eff. 9/23/2011.

Amended by 128th General Assembly File No. 50, SB 58, §1, eff. 9/17/2010.

Effective Date: 01-01-2004; 09-23-2004; 08-17-2006; 04-04-2007; 2008 SB209 03-26-2008; 2008 SB17 09-30-2008; 2008 HB215 04-07-2009