

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

**DANIEL STOLZ,**

**Case No. 2015-0628**

**Plaintiff-Respondent,**

**vs.**

**J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC., et al.**

**Defendants-Petitioners.**

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: On a Certified Question of State Law  
: from the U.S. District Court, Southern  
: District of Ohio, Western Division

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: Case No. 1:14-cv-44  
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**PETITIONERS D.A.G. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. AND TRIVERSITY  
CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC'S MERIT BRIEF**

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## STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

In January of 2012, a floor collapse occurred during construction of the Horseshoe Casino in Cincinnati ("Casino Project"). The general contractor of the Casino Project was Messer Construction, Co. ("Messer"). Respondent Daniel Stolz alleges that he was injured while working as a concrete finisher on the floor for subcontractor Jostin Construction, Inc. ("Jostin"). Petitioners D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. ("D.A.G.") and TriVersity Construction Co., LLC ("TriVersity"), as well as fellow Petitioner J & B Steel Erectors, Inc. ("J & B Steel"), were other subcontractors on the Casino Project. On January 14, 2014, Respondent Daniel Stolz filed an action alleging negligence and punitive damages claims in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against D.A.G., TriVersity, J & B Steel, and others for injuries allegedly sustained on the jobsite.

Prior to the accident, Messer obtained authority from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") to self-administer the Workers' Compensation program for the Casino Project. A copy of the certificate issued by the BWC granting Messer authority to self-administer the Workers' Compensation program for the Casino Project is attached to the Guenther affidavit as Exhibit 1. Respondent's employer, Jostin, was an enrolled subcontractor participating in Messer's Workers' Compensation program under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC to Messer. D.A.G. Construction Company, Inc. ("D.A.G.") and TriVersity Construction Company, LLC ("TriVersity") were enrolled subcontractors participating in Messer's Workers' Compensation program under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC to Messer. The Respondent received Workers' Compensation benefits through the self-insured Workers' Compensation Program that Messer administered on behalf of all of the subcontractors enrolled in the Wrap-up Agreement.

It is undisputed that TriVersity and D.A.G. were enrolled subcontractors that were specifically listed under the certificate issued by the BWC to Messer. It is undisputed that the injured employee, Mr. Stolz, was covered by workers' compensation insurance. Therefore, in accordance with the promise of immunity to enrolled subcontractors provided by the statute, TriVersity and D.A.G. argue that claims brought by an employee of another subcontractor should fail against them. In contrast, Mr. Stolz argues that immunity applies only to his own employer.

### ARGUMENT

#### **Proposition of Law:**

**Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers' Compensation self-insurance plan from tort claims made by employees of other enrolled subcontractors injured while working on a self-insured project.**

#### **A. The Statutory Scheme of Ohio Rev. Code §4123.35 (O) Shows an Intent to Provide Blanket Immunity.**

Generally contractors and subcontractors provide their own liability and workers' compensation insurance coverage for construction operations. In those situations, only the direct employer of the injured employee has statutory immunity from an injury suffered by its employee. However, Ohio Rev. Code §4123.35 (O) sets forth an arrangement in which subcontractors on large jobs are relieved of the responsibility of purchasing workers' compensation for their employees. Instead of each subcontractor purchasing its own workers' compensation, the general contractor takes over the responsibility of securing coverage for everyone working on the job site and confirms insurance for each of the subcontractors by listing them on a document commonly referred to as a "wrap-up" agreement.

One of the obvious benefits and important aspects of the statute is that it creates a centralized safety program that the self-insuring employer is responsible for overseeing. The statute streamlines the process of verifying insurance for every employee of every subcontractor

on large jobs by allowing the general contractor to create one list of all subcontractors on a job and manage workers' compensation insurance for all of the employees. Wrap-up insurance eliminates the risks associated with requiring multiple contractors and subcontractors to maintain their own insurance on large numbers of workers. The statute is designed to avoid piecemeal insurance policies from many different employers, which may leave gaps in coverage for some employees. This statutory scheme is only available for general construction projects that are scheduled for completion within six years after the date the project begins, and the total cost of which is estimated to exceed one hundred million dollars or for general construction projects whose cost is estimated to exceed fifty million dollars. Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O). The benefits available in accordance with the statute for those large projects are purposefully different than the immunity that is available for smaller construction projects pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.74.

The statute is referred to in the Ohio Revised Code 4123.74, which sets forth the following:

Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

The pertinent sections of Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) state the following:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section.

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The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project.

As set forth above, wrap-up insurance ensures that all employees of the enrolled contractors and subcontractors listed on the Certificate are entitled to insurance protection for injuries that arise out of the course and scope of employment of the Project. Additionally, all contractors and subcontractors listed on the Certificate are entitled to the protections provided by Ohio Workers' Compensation Statute as set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O). No distinction is made with regard to which subcontractor employs an injured employee. The purpose of a wrap-up agreement is to provide encompassing protection to all of the entities listed on the Certificate and to their employees.

The respondent has claimed that the statute provides immunity only to the general contractor and the injured employee's own employer. If that were the case, the only provision providing protection in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) would be the one covering the self-insuring employer. The provision regarding protections for contractors and subcontractors exists in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) because they are specifically being excluded from the general rule. All are entitled to statutory immunity from the tort claims of any injured employees of a contractor or subcontractor.

The statute provides that all of the employees on a job site are to be considered employees of the general contractor. In this case, that means that all of the employees of the various subcontractors on the Casino Project are considered to be employees of Messer. In accordance with the fellow servant rule, if the employee of one enrolled subcontractor on the job injures the employee of another enrolled subcontractor on the job, the injured employee is barred

from bringing suit against the other employee. The same applies to the employee's true employer, the subcontractor.

**B. A Close Examination of Ohio Rev. Code §4123.35 (O) is Warranted.**

An examination of each of the phrases contained in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) reveals its intended meaning:

The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this Chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project.

The first phrase is, "The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this Chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code. . . ." By its stated terms, this phrase describes who is entitled to the protections, which include immunity. It grants the protections to all enrolled contractors and subcontractors that are listed on the certificate. It does not state that protection is afforded only to the enrolled contractor or subcontractor that employed the injured worker. If the intention of the drafters of the statute was to limit protection only to the employer of the injured employee, the drafters would have specifically included such limiting language.

The next phrase states, "with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of this certificate. . . ." This second phrase describes which employees are subject to the protections afforded by the statute and defines them as only those employees of an enrolled contractor or subcontractor that actually worked on the project. In other words, if a subcontractor has employees that did not work on the Horseshoe Casino project, those employees are not covered by the wrap-up or by this section of the statute. Their employers have to provide other workers' compensation insurance for their

protection. The phrase is identifying only the employees of an enrolled contractor or subcontractor, and only those employees that worked on the project. The singular possessive form is used because the phrase only defines the qualifying employees of an enrolled contractor or subcontractor. The first phrase defines the contractors and subcontractors entitled to the statutory protection, not the second or third phrase.

The last phrase, "for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project" describes the type of claims subject to the statute's protections. For instance, if an employee of an enrolled subcontractor working on the Horseshoe Casino project suffered an injury or death not related to the work he or she was doing, a claim for that injury would not be covered under this statute.

To read the paragraph at issue in subsection "O" in a manner that does not encompass all subcontractors puts it in direct conflict with the preceding subsection, "P," which states the following:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section. . . .

This provision indicating that all employees are to be treated as if they are employees of the self-insured employer shows the simple and clear intent of the entire statute. The intent is to have blanket protection for all enrolled contractors and subcontractors on large construction projects, in which all of the employees on the entire project are to be treated as employees of the self-insuring employer. This effectively eliminates all organizational walls or barriers and provides benefits and protections of the workers' compensation statute to everyone involved in

the project. Under the respondent's theory, every employee on the project is immune from the tort claims of every injured employee on the project; but only some of the employers of the protected employees are immune from the tort claims of injured employees; and only some of the employers of the protected employees are subject to tort claims. This result would be completely contrary to the obvious intent and purpose of Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35.

**C. *Quid Pro Quo* Exists in Self-insured Projects.**

If, *arguendo*, *quid pro quo* is necessary to earn immunity, it is undeniably present in this case. There is no free lunch for subcontractors. D.A.G. negotiated with Messer the rates to be paid for the employees of D.A.G. working on the Cincinnati Horseshoe Casino Project. The rates paid for D.A.G. employees working on the project were negotiated down based on an agreement that Messer, and not D.A.G., would pay all premiums for insurance associated with the work at the Cincinnati Horseshoe Casino Project site subject to the Wrap-Up Agreement and Manual. Messer paid lower negotiated rates to subcontractors in exchange for paying all of the premiums for the Wrap-up coverage. This is the very essence of *quid pro quo*. The statutory arrangement ensures that all workers on a large job site are covered by insurance by putting one entity – the general contractor – in charge of securing the insurance. The general contractor passes on the cost of insurance to its subcontractors by paying them a lower rate than it would pay if they were securing their own insurance.

The respondent does not deny that he was covered by workers' compensation insurance. The insurance was procured by Messer, and the cost was reflected in Messer's payments to its subcontractors.

**D. Other Jurisdictions that Have Provided Blanket Coverage.**

In a similar case in Texas, an appeals court reached the same conclusion. *See Etie v. Walsh & Albert Co., Ltd.*, 135 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2004). Etie was employed by a

subcontractor on a large construction project that was governed by a statutory wrap-up agreement in which the general contractor purchased workers' compensation for all employees of subcontractors that worked on the job. Etie was injured by the negligence of another subcontractor on the job. Like the Ohio statute, the Texas statute at issue deemed employees of the subcontractors to be employees of the general contractor for purposes of the workers' compensation act. *Id.* at 767. The *Etie* court held that the statutory immunity applied to all subcontractors enrolled in the wrap-up insurance program. The court stated "The employer/employee relationship extends throughout all tiers of subcontractors when the general contractor purchases workers' compensation insurance that covers all of the workers on the site. All said participating employers/subcontractors are thus immune from suit." *Id.* at 768. As a result of the court's decision, the third-party subcontractor was immune from Etie's negligence claim because it was included in the workers' compensation plan arranged by the general contractor for the project.

Both the Texas statute and Ohio Rev. Code §4123.35(O) consider all of the employees of the contractors and subcontractors enrolled under the Plan to be employees of the self-insured employer for purposes of Workers' Compensation. Like Etie, the respondent is considered a fellow servant of the employees of the other enrolled subcontractors on the Casino Project. As in *Etie*, all subcontractors on the Casino Project that were included in the wrap-up agreement should be immune from the respondent's negligence claim.

**E. Conflicting Ohio Decisions Exist.**

*Etie* is one of only a few similar cases from other jurisdictions. The Eastern District of Michigan applied blanket immunity under Michigan law in *Stevenson v. HH & N/Turner*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2002). In rendering its decision, the *Stevenson* court explained that the self-insurance plans that are available only in large construction projects

that meet certain parameters. The self-insurance plans allow for a common risk management and safety program to apply to everyone involved with the construction site. *Id.* at \*5-\*6. The court pointed out that workers' compensation statutes reflect a compromise between the interests of the employees and employers. In return for guaranteed workers' compensation, the employees give up their rights to common law remedies for work related injuries. *Id.* at \*4. The same principles are true in this case. The subcontractors on the job made an agreement with Messer which provided their employees with insurance coverage. In exchange for being provided that coverage, the employees, including the respondent, give up their rights to common law negligence claims against their employers.

An unreported case out of the Eastern District of Wisconsin reached a decision contrary to *Stevenson* in *Pride v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40833, 2007 WL 1655111 (E.D. Wis. June 5, 2007). However, that court made clear that its decision in *Pride* was specific to a Wisconsin statute that expressly allowed third-party claims. *Id.* at \*7-8. The statute in question states it "shall not affect the right of the employee to make a claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3<sup>rd</sup> party. . . ." Wis. Stat. §102.29. Because the Wisconsin statute contains an expressly carved out exception to immunity that the Ohio statute does not contain, the statutes are not analogous, and *Pride* is not applicable.

This issue has been addressed by two courts in Ohio. Both cases involved negligence claims related to the floor collapse at the Casino Project. Other employees injured on the Casino Project filed a Complaint alleging negligence in state court in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. *Lancaster, et al. v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., et al.* Hamilton C.P. No. A1208721 (Nov. 5, 2012). In that case, D.A.G. and TriVersity filed motions for summary judgment based upon Ohio Rev. Code §4123.35 (O). The *Lancaster* court agreed that D.A.G.

and TriVersity were immune from the plaintiffs' claims and granted summary judgment. The trial court's entry granting summary judgment stated the following:

R.C. 4123.35(O)(2) states in clear terms, at ¶5, that any injuries sustained by employees of an enrolled subcontractor are to be viewed "as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer". Therefore, Plaintiffs, as employees of Jostin Construction Co., are deemed by statute to be employees of Messer. As constructive employees of Messer, the Plaintiffs received from their constructive employer the benefits of the "social bargain" to which they were entitled under the Workers' Compensation statute. Plaintiffs' desire to hold "third parties responsible for the collapse of the casino floor" liable for negligence does not comport with the scheme laid out by §4123.35(O). (Citation footnote omitted.)

*Lancaster, et al. v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., et al.* Hamilton C.P. No. A1208721 (March 25, 2013).

The trial court determined that there was no dispute that Messer complied with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.35(O). Therefore, Messer was afforded immunity under the statute. The court also determined that there was no dispute that D.A.G. and TriVersity were properly enrolled subcontractors under Messer's wrap-up plan. Therefore, the court determined that D.A.G. and TriVersity also should be granted workers' compensation immunity under the plan.

The respondent had a similar case pending in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. However, the respondent voluntarily dismissed that case and refiled his action in United States District Court Southern District of Ohio Western Division. The same arguments regarding immunity that had been made in state court in the *Lancaster* case were made in District Court in the *Stolz* case. In contrast to the trial court's decision in *Lancaster*, the District Court maintained that the respondent had a right to make claims against D.A.G. and TriVersity as third parties outside the protection of the plan. The District Court stated that D.A.G. and TriVersity did not meet their end of the social bargain and therefore were not entitled to immunity. The District Court acknowledged that the *Lancaster* court had reached a contrary decision, but expressly disagreed with it. The proposition of law set forth by the petitioner will be determinative on this issue.

## CONCLUSION

Ohio Revised Code 4123.35 establishes an arrangement for providing workers' compensation to all workers on large jobs sites and sets forth that contractors and subcontractors included in the arrangement are entitled to immunity. The intent of the statute is to ensure that all employees on large job sites are covered by workers' compensation insurance. In exchange, the contractors and subcontractors on the job site are given immunity from claims for negligence. Because Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers' Compensation self-insurance plan and D.A.G. and TriVersity were enrolled in such a plan, D.A.G. and TriVersity are immune from the tort claims made by an employee of another enrolled subcontractor. On this question of Ohio law, the petitioners respectfully request that this Court find in the affirmative for the proposition that Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers' Compensation self-insurance plan from tort claims made by employees of other enrolled subcontractors injured while working on a self-insured project.

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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served via U.S. Mail and/or e-mail this 3rd day of August, 2015 upon the following:

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**ORIGINAL**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
WESTERN DIVISION

DANIEL STOLZ,

Plaintiff,

vs.

J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-44

**15-0628**

Judge Timothy S. Black

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A  
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE  
ORIGINAL FILED IN MY OFFICE  
ON 4/13/2015  
RICHARD W. NAGEL, Clerk of Court  
By: [Signature]  
Deputy Clerk  
Date: 4/15/15

**CERTIFICATION ORDER**

Pursuant to Supreme Court of Ohio Rules of Practice 9.01 through 9.04, the Court hereby issues this Certification Order, to be served upon all parties or their counsel of record and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Ohio, under seal of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

**A. Case Name**

*Daniel Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., et al.*, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Case No. 1:14-cv-44

**B. Statement of Facts**

**1. Nature of the Case**

Plaintiff alleges he was injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction, Inc. ("Jostin") at the Horseshoe Casino construction project in Cincinnati ("Casino Project"). Plaintiff brings this civil action against Defendants J & B Steel

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CLERK OF COURT  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Consultants, Inc. ("Terracon"), Pendleton Construction Group, LLC ("Pendleton"), D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. ("D.A.G."), and Triversity Construction Co., LLC ("Triversity"), each of whom Plaintiff alleges had responsibilities related to the Casino Project, for negligence.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Circumstances Giving Rise To the Question of Law

At the time of his alleged injuries, Plaintiff was working for Jostin as a concrete finisher at the Casino Project. (Doc. 49 at ¶ 1). Defendant Messer was the general contractor for the Casino Project, and Jostin was one of its subcontractors. (Doc. 49 at ¶¶ 1, 4; Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4).

Prior to Plaintiff's accident, Defendant Messer had obtained authority from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") to self-administer the workers' compensation program for all of the enrolled subcontractors on the Casino Project. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 14-3). Jostin and Defendants and J & B Steel, D.A.G., and Triversity were enrolled subcontractors participating in Defendant Messer's workers' compensation program for the Casino Project under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC to Defendant Messer. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 14-3; Doc. 14-4).

Defendants Messer, J & B Steel, D.A.G., and Triversity moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff's negligence claim pursuant to Ohio's workers' compensation laws, including Ohio Revised Code

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. Plaintiff asserted an employer intentional tort claim against Defendant Messer (only), which was dismissed. (See Doc. 33).

§§ 4123.35 and 4123.74. (Docs. 14, 37, and 40).<sup>2</sup> The Court found that Defendant Messer was entitled to immunity as the self-insuring employer on the Casino Project. (Doc. 68 at 6). The Court found that Defendants J & B Steel, D.A.G., and Triversity (“Subcontractor Defendants”) were not entitled to immunity because an enrolled subcontractor is only entitled to immunity vis-à-vis its own employees under the above-cited statutes. (*Id.* at 13-14). Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant Messer’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Subcontractor Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (*Id.* at 19).

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<sup>2</sup> Section 4123.35(O) provides, in relevant part:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section. . . . The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor’s or subcontractor’s employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project.

Section 4123.74 provides:

Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

### 3. Question of Law To Be Answered

The question of law to be answered by the Supreme Court of Ohio is as follows:

Whether Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers' Compensation self-insurance plan from tort claims made by employees of [other] enrolled subcontractors injured while working on the self-insured project.

As set forth in its Order granting the Subcontractor Defendants' motion to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court of Ohio (Doc. 73), the Court finds that this is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding and for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Supreme Court.

#### C. Names of the Parties

##### Plaintiff

Daniel Stolz

##### Defendants

J & B Steel Erectors, Inc.  
Messer Construction Co.<sup>3</sup>  
Terracon Consultants, Inc.  
Pendleton Construction Group, LLC  
D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc.  
Triversity Construction Co., LLC

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<sup>3</sup> Defendant Messer Construction Co. was terminated from the case on December 31, 2014, when the Court granted its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's negligence claim remains pending against all other Defendants. Defendants Terracon Consultants, Inc. and Pendleton Construction Group, LLC have not asserted an immunity defense.

**D. Counsel for Each Party**

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**E. Designation of the Moving Party**

Defendants J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc., and Triversity Construction Co., LLC are the moving parties.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Date: 4/13/15

*s/ Timothy S. Black*  
Timothy S. Black  
United States District Judge

**Other Orders/Judgments**  
1:14-cv-00044-TSB Stolz v. J & B  
Steel Erectors, Inc. et al

JURY,LC3

**U.S. District Court**  
**Southern District of Ohio**

**Notice of Electronic Filing**

The following transaction was entered on 4/13/2015 at 1:58 PM EDT and filed on 4/13/2015

Case Name: Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc. et al

Case Number: 1:14-cv-00044-TSB

Filler:

Document Number: 74

**Docket Text:**

**CERTIFICATION ORDER. Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 4/13/2015. (mr1)**

1:14-cv-00044-TSB Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Stephen James Patsfall spatsfall@pyplaw.com, bwhite@pyplaw.com

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] [0c31af08d89fa23b456358ceb653ce253772d4c42689b75f6df1a30fbc2a1913985  
59f36fle7e1069cd6c71da81a43f4f0b85546fa04aaf6f283636b68c554dc]]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
WESTERN DIVISION

DANIEL STOLZ,	:	Case No. 1:14-cv-44
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	Judge Timothy S. Black
	:	
vs.	:	
	:	
J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC., <i>et al.</i> ,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC.,  
D.A.G. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,  
AND TRIVERSITY CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC'S  
MOTION TO CERTIFY A QUESTION OF STATE LAW  
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Doc. 70)**

This civil action is before the Court on Defendants J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc., and Triversity Construction Co., LLC's motion to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court of Ohio (Doc. 70),<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 71), and movants' reply. (Doc. 72).<sup>2</sup>

**I. BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff alleges he was injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction, Inc. ("Jostin") at the Horseshoe Casino construction project in Cincinnati ("Casino Project"). Plaintiff brings this civil action against Defendants J & B Steel

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<sup>1</sup> In the alternative, the movants ask the Court to certify its Order denying their motions for summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). Because the Court will certify the proposed question to the Supreme Court of Ohio, this Court need not address whether certification of an interlocutory appeal is warranted.

<sup>2</sup> Defendants Messer Construction Co., Terracon Consultants, Inc., and Pendleton Construction Group, LLC did not respond to the motion.

Erectors, Inc. (“J & B Steel”), Messer Construction Co. (“Messer”), Terracon Consultants, Inc. (“Terracon”), Pendleton Construction Group, LLC (“Pendleton”), D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. (“D.A.G.”), and Triversity Construction Co., LLC (“Triversity”), each of whom Plaintiff alleges had responsibilities related to the Casino Project, for negligence.<sup>3</sup>

Defendants Messer, J & B Steel, D.A.G., and Triversity moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s negligence claim pursuant to Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws, including Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74. (Docs. 14, 37, and 40).<sup>4</sup> The Court found that Defendant Messer was entitled to immunity as the self-insuring employer of the Casino

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<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. Plaintiff asserted an employer intentional tort claim against Defendant Messer (only), which was dismissed. (*See* Doc. 33).

<sup>4</sup> Section 4123.35(O) provides, in relevant part:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section. . . . The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor’s or subcontractor’s employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees’ employment on that construction project.

Section 4123.74 provides:

Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

Project, having been issued a certificate of authority by the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. (See Doc. 68 at 6). The Court found that Defendants D.A.G., Triversity, and J & B Steel ("Subcontractor Defendants") were not entitled to immunity because an enrolled subcontractor is only entitled to immunity vis-à-vis its own employees under the above-cited statutes. (*Id.* at 13-14). Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant Messer's motion for summary judgment and denied the Subcontractor Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (*Id.* at 19).

The Subcontractor Defendants now move the Court to certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Ohio:

Whether Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74 provide immunity to subcontractors enrolled in a Workers' Compensation self-insurance plan from tort claims made by employees of [other] enrolled subcontractors injured while working on the self-insured project.

("Proposed Question") (Doc. 70 at 1).

## **II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Federal courts are authorized to certify questions to a state supreme court. *Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court of Ohio may answer questions of Ohio law certified to it by federal courts as set forth in the following Rule of Practice:

The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States. This rule is invoked if the certifying court, in a proceeding before it, issues a certification order finding there is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding and for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Supreme Court.

S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.01(A).

Whether to certify a question to a state supreme court is within the sound discretion of a district court. *Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co.*, 50 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing *Lehman Bros. v. Schein*, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)). Mere “difficulty in ascertaining local law provides an insufficient basis for certification.” *Duryée v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury*, 6 F.Supp.2d 700, 704 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (citing *Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co.*, 958 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1992)). If the Court “believes it can resolve an issue of state law with available research materials already at hand, and makes the effort to do so,” certification is unwarranted. *Drown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA*, No. 2:10-CV-00272, 2010 WL 4939963, at \*1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2010) (citing *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 395 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). “[F]ederal courts generally ‘will not trouble our sister state courts . . . . When we see a reasonably clear and principled course, we will seek to follow it ourselves.’” *Pennington*, 553 F.3d at 450 (quoting *Pino v. United States*, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007)).

“[U]se of the certification procedure is most appropriate when the question of state law is new or state law is unsettled.” *Transamerica Ins. Co.*, 50 F.3d at 372. “Novel or unsettled questions of state law may be appropriate for certification where certification will save time, energy and resources, or where there are conflicting federal interpretations of an important state law question which would otherwise evade state court review.” *Metz*

v. *Unizan Bank*, 416 F.Supp.2d 568, 574 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (citing *Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 77, (1997)); see also *Geib v. Amoco Oil Co.*, 29 F.3d 1050, 1060 (6th Cir. 1994)).

### III. ANALYSIS

The parties agree that Ohio law governs the issue of subcontractor immunity in this case. (See generally Docs. 37, 40, 63). The facts, for the purposes of the subcontractor immunity inquiry, are largely undisputed. (See Doc. 68). Thus, the Proposed Question is a question of Ohio law. Further, the Proposed Question may be determinative of the proceeding as to the Subcontractor Defendants, because the determination of whether Plaintiff can assert his negligence claim against the Subcontractor Defendants is at issue.

The parties have not presented the Court with any case law from the Supreme Court of Ohio that addresses subcontractor immunity in the context of a self-insurance plan, and this Court has not found any in the course of its independent research. In fact, it does not appear that the Question Presented has been addressed by an Ohio Court of Appeals either. This question of Ohio law appears only to have been previously addressed in *Lancaster, et al. v. Pendleton Construction Group, LLC, et al.*, Hamilton C.P. No. A1208721 (Mar. 25, 2013). As this Court has acknowledged, it reached a conclusion contrary to that of the *Lancaster* court, which found that enrolled subcontractors were entitled to immunity under similar circumstances.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Plaintiff's suggestion that Section 4123.35(O) is not susceptible to a contrary construction is belied by the result in *Lancaster*.

Because the Proposed Question has been answered differently by an Ohio court and a federal court, and because those two courts are the only courts to have addressed the question, it is both new and unsettled. When federal courts apply state law that is not well settled, it has the potential to diminish the state's sovereignty. *Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A.*, 62 Ohio St.3d 39, 43 (1991). A determination by the Supreme Court of Ohio would provide clarification for both courts *and* contractors and subcontractors who seek to draft, negotiate, and bid future large-scale construction project contracts.<sup>6</sup>

Given the current posture of this case, the parties would be required to complete extensive discovery on liability and a jury trial before the Subcontractor Defendants could appeal the Court's decision. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 54; *White by Swafford v. Gerbitz*, 860 F.2d 661, 662 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1988) ("absent certification for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), an order disposing of fewer than all of the parties or claims in an action is not appealable"). For this reason, a determinative ruling from the Supreme Court of Ohio would also promote judicial economy.<sup>7</sup>

Plaintiff claims that the instant request for certification of the Proposed Question is simply Subcontractor Defendants' attempt to garner "a second bite at the apple."

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<sup>6</sup> In order for a contractor to be eligible to act as a self-insurer with regard to workers' compensation, the project must be scheduled for completion within six years after the date it begins and have an estimated total cost to exceed \$100 million. O.R.C. § 4123.35(O).

<sup>7</sup> Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, the Court may revise its Order on Subcontractor Defendants' motion for summary judgment at any time before the entry of final judgment. Therefore, in the event that the Supreme Court of Ohio concludes that Ohio Rev. Code §§4123.35 and 4123.74 *do* provide enrolled subcontractors with immunity from tort claims brought by other enrolled subcontractors' employees, the Court could reconsider its Order before the matter proceeded to trial.

However, Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that a party seeking certification must do so prior before the relevant issue is decided by the certifying court.<sup>8</sup>

This Court does not believe that it erred in its finding that the Subcontractor Defendants were not entitled to the immunity they sought. Nevertheless, having weighed the relevant factors the Court finds that certification of the Proposed Question to the Supreme Court of Ohio is appropriate.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:

1. Defendants J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc., and Triversity Construction Co., LLC's joint motion to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court of Ohio (Doc. 70) is **GRANTED**; and
2. The Court will docket a Certification Order by separate entry.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Date: 4/13/15

s/ Timothy S. Black  
Timothy S. Black  
United States District Judge

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<sup>8</sup> Plaintiff first filed his action in Hamilton County, Ohio and voluntarily dismissed his case after the Subcontractor Defendants and others filed motions for summary judgment in *Lancaster*. See *Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., et al.*, Hamilton C.P. No. A1208595 (Feb. 4, 2013). After those motions for summary judgment were granted, Plaintiff refiled his action in this Court. A determinative ruling from the Supreme Court would facilitate consistent outcomes in federal and state courts. "Like cases should end in like judgments. Once a court decides questions of law presented in a dispute, a nearly identical dispute ought to yield a similar outcome." *Rutherford v. Columbia Gas*, 575 F.3d 616, n.1 (6th Cir. 2009).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
WESTERN DIVISION

DANIEL STOLZ,	:	Case No. 1:14-cv-44
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	Judge Timothy S. Black
	:	
vs.	:	
	:	
J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC., <i>et al.</i> ,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MESSER CONSTRUCTION CO.'S  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 14) AND  
DENYING THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS  
D.A.G. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., TRIVERSITY CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC,  
AND J & B STEEL ERECTORS, INC. (Docs. 37 and 40)**

This civil action is before the Court on Defendant Messer Construction Co.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14), Defendants D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc.'s and Triversity Construction Co., LLC's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37), Defendant J & B Steel Erectors, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40), and the parties' responsive memoranda (Docs. 56, 61, 63, 65, and 66).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff seeks oral argument on these motions. (*See* Doc. 56 at 1; Doc. 63 at 1). S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.1(b)(2) provides for oral argument where it "is deemed to be essential to the fair resolution of the case because of its public importance or the complexity of the factual or legal issues presented[.]" Here, the Court finds that the factual and legal issues are clear on their face, so oral argument is not necessary. *See Whitescarver v. Sabin Robbins Paper Co.*, Case No. C-1-03-911, 2006 WL 2128929, at \*2, (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2006) (C.J. Dlott) ("Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) leaves the Court with discretion whether to grant a request for oral argument.").

## I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was allegedly injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction, Inc. (“Jostin”) at the Horseshoe Casino construction project in Cincinnati. Plaintiff brings this civil action against Defendants Messer Construction Co. (“Messer”), D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. (“D.A.G.”), Triversity Construction Co., LLC (“Triversity”), J & B Steel Erectors, Inc. (“J & B Steel”), Terracon Consultants, Inc., and Pendleton Construction Group, LLC, each of whom allegedly had responsibilities related to the construction project. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were negligent.<sup>2</sup> He also seeks punitive damages.

Defendant Messer moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) it is entitled to immunity under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws as a self-insuring employer and (2) the election of remedies doctrine bars Plaintiff from pursuing his claim against Defendant Messer.

Defendants D.A.G., Triversity, and J & B Steel argue that they are entitled to immunity under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws as enrolled subcontractors under Defendant Messer’s workers’ compensation program.

## II. UNDISPUTED FACTS<sup>3</sup>

1. At the time of his alleged injuries, Plaintiff Daniel Stolz was working for Jostin as a concrete finisher at the construction project for the Horseshoe Casino in Cincinnati, Ohio (“Casino Project”). (Doc. 49 at ¶ 1).

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff also asserted an employer intentional tort claim against Defendant Messer only. The Court previously dismissed this claim. (See Doc. 33).

<sup>3</sup> See Doc. 14-1, Doc. 40-2, Doc. 56 at 12-13, and Doc. 63-1.

2. Defendant Messer was the general contractor for the Casino Project and Jostin was one of its subcontractors. (Doc. 49 at ¶¶ 1, 4; Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4).
3. Prior to Plaintiff's accident, Messer had obtained authority from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") to self-administer the workers' compensation program for all of the enrolled subcontractors on the Casino Project. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 14-3).
4. Plaintiff's employer, Jostin, was an enrolled subcontractor participating in Messer's workers' compensation program under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC to Messer. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 14-3; Doc. 14-4).
5. J & B Steel was an enrolled subcontractor participating in Messer's workers' compensation program for the Casino Project under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC to Messer. (See Doc. 14-2 at ¶3; Doc. 14-4).

### III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).

## IV. ANALYSIS

### A. Defendant Messer

#### 1. Workers' Compensation Immunity

Workers' compensation "represents a social bargain in which employers and employees exchange their respective common-law rights and duties for a more certain and uniform set of statutory benefits and obligations." *Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co.*, 92 Ohio St. 3d 115, 119, 2001-Ohio-109, 748 N.E.2d 1111. In the event an employee is injured in a work-related incident, he is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, even if the employer is not to blame for the employee's injury. In exchange, the employer receives tort immunity for work-related injuries. See Ohio Rev. Code ("O.R.C.") §§ 4123.35, 4123.74.<sup>4</sup> This exchange of rights is referred to as the *quid pro quo*. See *Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson*, 467 U.S. 925, 931 (1984).

The "exclusivity rule" dictates that an employee who is injured in the course of his employment must accept workers' compensation benefits as his exclusive remedy vis-à-vis his employer. See *Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp.*, 4 Ohio St.3d 5, 7, 445 N.E.2d 1110 (1983) (citing O.R.C. § 4123.74); *Saunders v. Holzer Hosp. Found.*, 2009-Ohio-2112, at ¶ 21 (4th Dist. April 30, 2009) (quoting *Kaiser v. Strall* (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 91, 94, 449 N.E.2d 1) ("[c]laimants enjoy no prerogative, constitutional or otherwise, to

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<sup>4</sup> "[Ohio's] Workers' Compensation Act 'operates as a balance of mutual compromise between the interests of the employer and the employee whereby employees relinquish their common law remedy and accept lower benefit levels coupled with the greater assurance of recovery and employers give up their common law defenses and are protected from unlimited liability.'" *Holeton*, 92 Ohio St.3d at 119 (quoting *Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc.*, 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 614, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982)).

choose between workers' compensation and common-law remedies where the former has been legislatively deemed to provide the exclusive means of recovery.'").

On most projects, contractors and subcontractors provide their own liability and workers' compensation coverage. However, under certain circumstances, contractors on large-scale construction projects may self-insure the project, whereby the employees of subcontractors enrolled in the self-insurer's plan for that project are treated as employees of the self-insuring contractor for purposes of workers' compensation. O.R.C.

§ 4123.35(O).<sup>5</sup> Section 4123.35(O) expressly confers on a construction project self-insurer the protections of Chapters 4123 and 4121:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section.

Section 4123.74 provides:

Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

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<sup>5</sup> In order for a contractor to be eligible to act as a self-insurer with regard to workers' compensation, the project must be scheduled for completion within six years after the date it begins and have an estimated total cost to exceed one hundred million dollars. O.R.C. § 4123.35(O).

The Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") issued a "Certificate of Employer's Right to Pay Compensation Directly" for "Subs 2000 4170-2 Horseshoe Casino - Cincinnati Wrap Up" ("certificate of authority") to Defendant Messer, effective March 1, 2011 to March 1, 2012. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-2; Doc. 14-3). The list of "subs" identified under this "Wrap Up" included Plaintiff's employer, Jostin. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 14-4). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was Jostin's employee and that Jostin was an enrolled subcontractor under Defendant Messer's workers' compensation plan. (Doc. 49 at ¶ 1; Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 14-3; Doc. 14-4). Accordingly, sections 4123.35(O) and 4123.74 impart workers' compensation immunity upon Defendant Messer for any injuries sustained by Plaintiff while working on the Casino Project, since he was an employee of enrolled subcontractor Jostin.

Plaintiff argues that because Defendant Messer failed to comply with the requirements set forth in section § 4123.35, Messer is not entitled to the immunity set forth in Section 4123.74. *See* O.R.C. § 4123.35(O) (granting self-insuring employers the protections of Chapters 4123 and 4121 "provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section"); O.R.C. § 4123.74 (providing that "[e]mployers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute"). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Messer did not adequately comply with the requirements set forth in O.R.C. § 4123.35 (O), (P) and (E) and Ohio Adm. Code § 4123-19-16(E).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the BWC found that Defendant Messer *had* complied with the requirements of section 4123.35. The BWC certified on the face of the Certificate of Authority that “on the date hereof the named employer [Defendant Messer] *having met the requirements provided in Section 4123.35 of the Ohio Revised Code* has been granted authority to pay compensation directly to its injured[.]” (Doc. 14-3) (emphasis supplied).<sup>6</sup> Plaintiff has not pointed to any case law to support its contention that an entity’s deviation from technical statutory requirements allows a party who has participated in the entity’s workers’ compensation program, and accepted benefits thereunder,<sup>7</sup> to sue the entity for negligence. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that

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<sup>6</sup> It was within the BWC’s discretion to determine whether Messer had met the requirements to self-insure the Casino Project. *See* Ohio Adm. Code § 4123-19-16(B) (“The purpose of this rule is to establish standards by which the administrator may permit a responsible self-insuring employer to self-insure a construction project entered into by the responsible self-insuring employer pursuant to division (O) of section 4123.35 of the Revised Code.”); *see also* Ohio Adm. Code § 4123-19-16(C) (acknowledging that “[t]he administrator’s authority to grant self-insured status for a construction project is permissive”); *State ex rel. Vaughn v. Indus. Commission of Ohio*, 69 Ohio St.2d 115, 119, 430 N.E.2d 1332 (1982) (recognizing that the BWC has “substantial discretion” in determining whether to revoke a company’s self-insured status); *State ex rel. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ryan*, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1223, 2008-Ohio-2835, ¶¶ 51-60 (finding that the decision of whether to grant an application for self-insured status lies within the BWC’s discretion).

<sup>7</sup> Defendant Messer proposed the following as an undisputed fact: “Plaintiff has participated in Messer’s Workers’ Compensation plan and received medical care, treatment, and attention at no cost to himself under that plan as an injured employee of the enrolled subcontractor Jostin.” (Doc. 14-1). Plaintiff denied this proposed undisputed fact “for lack of sufficient evidence” without presenting or pointing to any evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff had not received and retained coverage for his injuries under Messer’s Workers’ Compensation program. (*See* Doc. 56 at 12). This denial is insufficient to avoid summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, which requires the party opposing summary judgment to set forth specific facts indicating the existence of a genuine issue to be litigated, *Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend*, 542 F.3d 513, 522 (6th Cir. 2008), and this Court’s standing order for summary judgment motions, which requires each denial of a proposed undisputed fact to be supported by “a specific citation or citations” to the evidence supporting the denial. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that there is a material issue of fact as to whether he has received and retained coverage for his injuries under Defendant Messer’s workers’ compensation program. Indeed, the evidence before the Court clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff has in fact received and retained coverage for his injuries from Defendant Messer. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 2-4; Doc. 57-1 at 60-61).

he was harmed in any manner by the alleged deviations from the statutory and administrative requirements.

Further, Defendant Messer became liable for providing workers' compensation for injured employees of enrolled subcontractors at the Casino Project upon approval of the application, regardless of whether the rules and statutes had been strictly followed. *See* Ohio Adm. Code § 4123-19-16(F). Thus, according to Plaintiff's logic, Defendant Messer would be required to provide workers' compensation coverage upon approval of its application but would not be entitled to the benefits of immunity because Defendant Messer did not strictly comply with relevant statutes or administrative rules,

Finally, Plaintiff's attempt to bring a negligence claim against Defendant Messer runs contrary to the underlying purpose of Ohio's workers' compensation system. Plaintiff participated in Defendant Messer's workers compensation plan and received medical care, treatment, and attention at no cost to himself under that plan as an injured employee of enrolled subcontractor Jostin. Defendant Messer's risk manager testified that Defendant Messer would not have paid Plaintiff's claims if the certificate of self-insurance being challenged by Plaintiff had not been issued. (Doc. 57-1 at 61). Plaintiff seeks to retain the benefits he received under the workers' compensation system, the assurance of recovery, while simultaneously seeking to avoid his own obligations by denying Defendant Messer immunity.

For these reasons, Defendant Messer is entitled to immunity from Plaintiff's negligence claim pursuant to O.R.C. §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74.

## 2. Dual Capacity Doctrine

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Messer is liable pursuant to the dual capacity doctrine.<sup>8</sup> The dual capacity doctrine “is a narrow exception to the general rule of employer statutory immunity in negligence suits brought by employees.” *Shane v. Dlubak Glass Co.*, No. 3:03CV7721, 2005 WL 1126729, at \*7 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2005).

[I]n order for the dual-capacity doctrine to apply, there must be an allegation and showing that the employer occupied two independent and unrelated relationships with the employee, that at the time of these roles of the employer there were occasioned two different obligations to this employee, and that the employer had during such time assumed a role other than that of employer.

*Freese*, 4 Ohio St.3d at 12. Such a showing is not made where the injuries suffered were incurred during the course of employment as a result of the employer’s alleged failure to maintain a safe work place. *See id.* “In other words, the ‘dual-capacity doctrine’ does not apply where the employee seeks ‘to sue his employer for injuries which are predominately work-related.’” *Rivers v. Otis Elevator*, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99365, 2013-Ohio-3917, ¶14 (quoting *Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*, 44 Ohio St.3d 148, 150 (1989)).

Here, Defendant Messer is not Plaintiff’s actual employer. Although O.R.C. § 4123.35(O) provides that Defendant Messer is treated *as if* it were Plaintiff’s employer

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<sup>8</sup> Defendant Messer contends that this argument must be disregarded because this basis for liability was not set forth within the amended complaint (Doc. 49) and is raised for the first time in Plaintiff’s memorandum opposing summary judgment (Doc. 56). Because the Court finds the dual capacity argument to be without merit, the Court need not reach the question of whether the argument was forfeited.

for the purposes of determining immunity, it does not create an actual employment relationship. In fact, the statute specifically states that employees of covered subcontractors are not considered employees of the self-insuring employer for any purpose other than immunity and self-insuring employers have no authority under the statute to control the means, manner, or method of the subcontractor employee's work.

Further, Plaintiff's injuries were undisputedly work related and were allegedly related to Messer's failure to provide a safe working environment. (See Doc. 56 at 8-9.) Such injuries are insufficient, as a matter of law, to invoke the dual capacity doctrine. *Freese*, 4 Ohio St.3d at 12; *Rivers*, 2013-Ohio-3917, at ¶14. Here, there is no that Plaintiff's injuries were a direct result of his work at the Casino Project and were not merely incidental. (See Doc. 49 at ¶ 14-15). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact related to the applicability of the dual capacity doctrine, and the Court finds that the dual capacity doctrine does not apply.

### **3. Election of Remedies Doctrine**

Because this Court has determined that Defendant Messer is entitled to immunity pursuant to statute, the Court need not address Defendant Messer's alternative argument, that it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine. However, assuming *arguendo* that Defendant Messer is *not* entitled to such immunity, the Court finds that Defendant Messer would still be entitled to summary judgment pursuant

to the election of remedies doctrine.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages from Defendant Messer. A punitive damages claim is a derivative action that must be dismissed where the primary claim is subject to summary judgment. *Vickers v. Wren Industries, Inc.*, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20914, 2005-Ohio-3656, at ¶¶ 63-65. Because this Court has already dismissed Plaintiff's intentional tort claim (*see* Doc. 33), and because this Court determines that Defendant Messer is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining negligence claim, the derivative punitive damages claim against Defendant Messer must also be dismissed.

#### B. Defendants D.A.G., Triversity, and J & B Steel

Defendants D.A.G., Triversity, and J & B Steel ("Subcontractor Defendants") were enrolled subcontractors within Defendant Messer's workers' compensation

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<sup>9</sup> The election of remedies doctrine provides that an employee who accepts workers' compensation benefits is foreclosed from later bringing a negligence action against the provider of those benefits. *See Smith v. Turbo Parts LLC*, No. 2:10-CV-00202, 2011 WL 796793, at \*4-\*5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2011); *Saunders v. Holzer Hosp. Found.*, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 08CA11, 2009-Ohio-2112, ¶¶19-22; *Switka v. Youngstown*, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05MA74, 2006-Ohio-4617, ¶31; *Catalano v. Lorain*, 161 Ohio App.3d 841, 2005-Ohio-3298, 832 N.E.2d 134, ¶¶12-13. In the typical case, this provider is the employee's employer. Plaintiff argues that the doctrine does not apply because Defendant Messer was not Plaintiff's employer. However, section 4123.35(O) specifically provides that a self-insuring employer of a construction project, such as Defendant Messer, is entitled to the protections of immunity under section § 4123.74 "with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors . . . as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer[.]" (emphasis supplied). It is undisputed that Plaintiff received and retained workers' compensation benefits from Defendant Messer. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶¶ 2-4, Doc. 57-1 at 60-61). The provision of these benefits by Defendant Messer, and the acceptance of these benefits by Plaintiff, render the election of remedies doctrine applicable.

coverage. (Doc. 14-2 at ¶3; Doc. 14-4).<sup>10</sup> These Defendants argue that the receipt of workers' compensation benefits was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy and that, as enrolled subcontractors, they are also entitled to workers' compensation immunity from Plaintiff's negligence claim pursuant to O.R.C. §§ 4123.35 and 4123.74.<sup>11</sup> In addition to providing immunity for self-insuring employers as set forth above, section 4123.35(O) provides as follows:

The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project.

### **1. Workers' Compensation Immunity**

The Court's paramount concern in construing a statute is legislative intent. *See State ex rel. Steele v Morrissey*, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. To discern legislative intent, the Court first considers the statutory language, reading words and phrases in context and in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage. *Id.* (citing *State ex rel. Rose v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections* 90 Ohio

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<sup>10</sup> The fact that Defendant J & B Steel was an enrolled subcontractor participating in Messer's workers' compensation program for the Casino Project under the certificate of authority issued by the BWC is undisputed. *See* Docs. 40-2, 63-1. Defendants D.A.G. and Triversity did not propose undisputed facts for Plaintiff's review. However, because Defendants D.A.G. and Triversity's contention that they were enrolled subcontractors is supported by undisputed evidence submitted to the Court (*see* Doc. 14-4) (listing "D.A.G. Construction" and "TriVersity Group LLC"), the Court considers Defendants D.A.G. and Triversity's enrollment to be an undisputed fact as well.

<sup>11</sup> Defendants D.A.G., Triversity, and J & B Steel admit that they were not statutory self-insuring employers. (*See* Docs. 62-1, 62-2, and 62-3; *see also* Doc 65 at 2). Accordingly, they are not entitled to immunity on that ground.

St.3d 229, 231, 736 N.E.2d 886 (2000); O.R.C. 1.42). “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.” *State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). A court must “read and understand statutes ‘according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions.’” *Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott*, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 22 (quoting *Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm.*, 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 699 N.E.2d 473 (1998)). Unambiguous statutes are to be applied according to the plain meaning of the words used. *Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v. Tracy*, 75 Ohio St. 3d 125, 127, 661 N.E.2d 1011(1996). Courts are not free to delete or insert other words. *See State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Ed.*, 69 Ohio St. 3d 217, 220, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).

To read section 4123.35(O) in a manner which grants tort immunity to Subcontractor Defendants for injuries sustained by another subcontractor’s employee is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Section 4123.35(O) states, “the contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate . . . are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121 of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor’s or subcontractor’s employees . . . .” (emphasis added). The words “contractor’s” and “subcontractor’s” are written in the singular possessive form, *not* in the plural possessive form.<sup>12</sup> If the statute read “contractors’ and subcontractors’” Subcontractor Defendants

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<sup>12</sup> See also Ohio Adm. Code §4123-19-16(H) (“The contracting and subcontracting employees included under the certificate are entitled to the protections provided under Chapters 4121. and 4123. of the

would have a stronger argument that they are immune from liability in regard to multiple contractors' and subcontractors' employees.<sup>13</sup>

As the statute is written, each subcontractor is only protected from liability for injuries to one of the subcontractor's employees—its own. Even though the subcontractor is not providing the workers' compensation coverage on the job to their own employees, the Ohio General Assembly pronounced that the subcontractors are still entitled to tort immunity from their own employees.<sup>14</sup> If the General Assembly intended for immunity to extend to all subcontractors for injuries sustained by the employees of *all* the subcontractors, it would have written the statute in a manner that indicated such.<sup>15</sup>

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Revised Code with respect to the contracting and subcontracting employer's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate.”)

<sup>13</sup> Subcontractor Defendants argue that the singular possessive form is used because the phrase simply defines the qualifying employees of an enrolled contractor or subcontractor and that it is the first phrase (“the contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate”) that defines the contractors and subcontractors that are entitled to immunity. However, and notwithstanding O.R.C. § 1.43 (providing, as a rule of construction, “[t]he singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular”), the fact that the General Assembly referenced “the contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate” in the first phrase simply *highlights* the fact that the General Assembly did *not* use this same language in the second phrase. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ohio General Assembly intended to limit the protections afforded to these contractors and subcontractors as set forth above.

<sup>14</sup> Subcontractor Defendants argue that although the self-insured employer, Defendant Messer, covered the cost of the workers' compensation claims on the Project, enrolled subcontractors indirectly “paid” the cost of workers' compensation premiums and other insurance by eliminating those costs from their contract bids. (Doc. 7-1 at 13-14; Doc. 66-1at ¶ 3-4). While section 4123.35(O) may be an exception to the typical *quid pro quo* bargain underlying workers' compensation, the bargain is still intact insofar as the subcontractors are entitled to tort immunity from their own employees. Subcontractor Defendants also argue that the statute necessarily provides blanket coverage, given the scale of construction projects which are eligible for self-insured status. However, even without blanket immunity, the scheme provides immunity for the self-insured employer and the employer subcontractor.

<sup>15</sup> Subcontractor Defendants argue that the Ohio General Assembly could have inserted the word “own” into the statute if it intended to so limit the immunity available to enrolled subcontractors. Similarly, the Ohio General Assembly could have used “contractors' and subcontractors” to describe the employees with respect to whom immunity applies it intended blanket immunity. The Court is tasked with interpreting the statute as written.

To grant blanket immunity to Subcontractor Defendants, the Court would have to read protections into the statute that are not there. *See Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc.*, 134 Ohio St. 3d 303, 2012-Ohio-5380, 982 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 10 (citing *State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm.*, 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 519 (1997)) (The court “must apply the section in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language; [it] cannot add words.”). The clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute, as written, is that immunity does not extend to the Subcontractor Defendants with respect to employees of other subcontractors.

In relation to Plaintiff, the Subcontractor Defendants have not met their end of the social bargain. They have not made contributions to the workers’ compensation fund on Plaintiff’s behalf, nor have they self-administered workers’ compensation benefits to him on the instant project. It contravenes the workers’ compensation scheme to provide Subcontractor Defendants immunity when they have not earned it. To do so would not uphold the social bargain, rather, it would constitute a “free pass” on their alleged liability for their role in the injuries sustained by Plaintiff.

Subcontractor Defendants cite *Lancaster, et al. v. Pendleton Construction Group, LLC, et al.*, Hamilton C.P. No. A1208721 (Mar. 25, 2013) (order granting summary judgment), as support for their argument that they should receive blanket immunity. *Lancaster* arose from the same incident that led to Plaintiff’s injuries; the *Lancaster* plaintiffs were other Jostin employees who alleged that the negligence of Defendants Messer, D.A.G., Triversity, J & B Steel, and others caused their injuries. In *Lancaster*, Subcontractor Defendants moved for summary judgment on the same theory asserted in

the instant litigation. The *Lancaster* court acknowledged that whether these subcontractors would be immune from claims made against them by the employees of another subcontractor had not been decided by the Ohio courts in the context of a self-insured construction project. *Id.* at \*7.

The *Lancaster* court concluded that Messer was the “constructive employer” of the three moving subcontractors and that, as “constructive employees” of Messer, “the Plaintiffs received from their constructive employer the benefits of the ‘social bargain’ to which they were entitled under the Worker’s Compensation statute.” *Lancaster*, at \*6. The court acknowledged that many other jurisdictions would allow the plaintiffs to bring their claim against these subcontractors, but held that Ohio law does not. *Id.* at \*7.<sup>16</sup>

The *Lancaster* court discussed *Pride v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.*, No. 04-C-703, 2007 WL 1655111 (E.D. Wis. June 5, 2007), a factually similar Wisconsin case that declined to extend this sort of immunity. The federal court in *Pride* pointed out a number of reasons why subcontractors under a wrap-up plan should not be entitled to immunity from claims made by employees of fellow subcontractors. *Id.* at \*2-4. First, a wrap-up plan saves the subcontractors money because they do not have to pay for insurance coverage. *Id.* at \*3. The court questioned the logic behind allowing a subcontractor to

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<sup>16</sup> Subcontractor Defendants cite *Stevenson v. HH & N/Turner*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26831 (E.D. Mich. 2002) and *Etie v. Walsh & Albert Co., Ltd.*, 135 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App. 2004) to support their argument that immunity should be extended to enrolled subcontractors. As in *Stevenson*, the application of immunity to the participants in Defendant Messer’s plan is dictated by statute and unique to large-scale construction projects. As the Texas statute discussed in *Etie*, the Ohio statute authorizes a contractor to provide workers’ compensation insurance for subcontractors and their employees and deems employees of the subcontractors to be employees of the general contractor for purposes of the workers’ compensation. However, this Court is bound by the statutory language of O.R.C. § 4123.35(O) which, as explained above, does *not* provide for blanket immunity for enrolled subcontractors.

not pay for its insurance coverage, and in return, granting a subcontractor immunity it would not otherwise have. *Id.* The court also noted that extending immunity did not comport with the *quid pro quo* of workers' compensation because there was no indication that the plaintiff "bargained away any of his rights" to the fellow subcontractor. *Id.* at \*4. The court concluded by finding that allowing the contractor and subcontractors "to contract each other out of tort liability would afford the other employers a *quid* without any additional *quo* going to the injured employee." *Id.*<sup>17</sup> However, the *Lancaster* court found what it claimed to be a "glaring distinction" between the Wisconsin statute and the Ohio statute: Wisconsin's statute states that an employee's claim against an employer does not affect the right of the employee to bring suit against a third party, while "Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act provides no such allowance for third party claims." *Lancaster*, at \*6-7.

The fact that Ohio's workers' compensation statutes do not expressly state that one who receives workers' compensation is entitled to bring a claim against a third party tortfeasor, does not mean that they do not have the right to do so. The relevant fact is not that the Ohio workers' compensation act does not grant this right to plaintiffs; the relevant fact is that section 4123.35(O) *does not take this right away* from plaintiffs. See O.R.C. § 4123.35(O) ("Nothing in this division shall be construed as altering the rights of

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<sup>17</sup> Subcontractor Defendants argue that the *Pride* decision is distinguishable from the instant case because what the *Pride* decision suggests as the language the Wisconsin legislature could have included to provide subcontractor immunity ("the owner of an OCIP-insured project is deemed the sole employer of any employee of any contractor injured on that project) is the very language the Ohio General Assembly did include in §4123.35(O). However, the Ohio General Assembly went on to specifically address the immunity of enrolled subcontractors, so that provision controls.

employees under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code as those rights existed prior to September 17, 1996.”). “[T]he law is well settled in Ohio that, if a person is injured at such a time and in such a manner by the negligence of a third person, while engaged in an occupation for which he would be entitled to compensation against his employer, he may still sue and recover against the third party who causes the injury.” *Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shackovsky*, 27 Ohio App. 522, 161 N.E. 238, 239 (8th Dist. 1923) *aff’d sub nom*, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924); *George v. City of Youngstown*, 41 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1942) (“[W]orkmen's compensation statutes relate solely to the relationship of employer and employee.”). Since it has been established that, under the workers’ compensation act, a plaintiff who has received workers’ compensation payments maintains the right to make a claim against a third-party tortfeasor, and nothing in this section expressly revokes that right, Plaintiff in the present case has the right to bring a claim against any third parties that contributed to his injury, including Subcontractor Defendants.<sup>18</sup> In light of the fact that the plain language of the statute does not grant the broad immunity the Subcontractor Defendants seek, Plaintiff maintains the right to bring suit against them.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides as a matter of law that Subcontractor Defendants are not entitled to immunity under section 4123.35(O) from Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Therefore, the Court denies Subcontractor Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

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<sup>18</sup> The *Lancaster* court described the plaintiffs’ position as an attempt to seek twice the benefit of their counterparties and as at odds with the spirit of the “social bargain” struck by the workers’ compensation system. *Lancaster*, at \*7, 9. In light of the fact that Ohio law does not prohibit third party claims, this Court cannot agree.

## 2. Punitive Damages

Subcontractor Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against them on the grounds that it is a derivative claim. *See Vickers*, 2005-Ohio-3656 at ¶¶ 63-65. Because this Court finds that Subcontractor Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

## V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:

1. Defendant Messer Construction Co.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is **GRANTED**;
2. Defendants D.A.G. Construction Co., Inc. and Triversity Construction Co., LLC's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is **DENIED**;
3. Defendant J & B Steel Erectors, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40) is **DENIED**.
4. The remaining parties shall jointly submit a proposed litigation calendar by January 23, 2015.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Date: 12/31/14

*/s/ Timothy S. Black*  
Timothy S. Black  
United States District Judge



COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

**ENTERED**

MAR 25 2013

JAMES LANCASTER, et al.

CASE NO. A1208721

Hon. Leslie Ghiz

Plaintiffs,

JUDGE LESLIE GHIZ

-v-

PENDLETON CONSTRUCTION  
GROUP, LLC, et al.

ENTRY GRANTING SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF  
DEFENDANTS D.A.G.  
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,  
INC., J&B STEEL ERECTORS,  
INC., AND TRIVERSITY  
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LLC

Defendants.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
ENTERED  
*Leslie Ghiz*  
HON. LESLIE GHIZ  
THE CLERK SHALL SERVE NOTICE  
TO PARTIES PURSUANT TO CIVIL  
RULE 58 WHICH SHALL BE TAXED  
AS COSTS HEREIN.

Presently before this Court are Motions for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendants D.A.G. Construction Company, Inc. ("DAG"), J&B Steel Erectors, Inc. ("J&B"), and Triversity Construction Company, LLC ("Triversity") (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Defendants"). This summary judgment issue involves a disagreement by the parties over Section 4123.35(O) of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides self-insurers of construction projects with workers' compensation immunity, and whether and to what extent that immunity applies.

**ENTERED**  
MAR 25 2013

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves negligence claims against Defendants as well as derivative claims for loss of consortium, relating to injuries Plaintiffs allege they suffered while performing work for Defendant Jostin Construction Co. on the Horseshoe Casino project

(the "Project").<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that on January 27, 2012, as a result of Defendants' negligence, they were injured while pouring concrete for the second story of the Horseshoe Casino.<sup>2</sup> In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state they are bringing "claims against third parties responsible for the collapse of the casino floor".<sup>3</sup> The Defendants contend that workers' compensation immunity extends to them as "third parties" pursuant to §4123.35(O). The question at issue is whether immunity afforded to an employer-subcontractor also applies to other non-employer subcontractors covered under a "wrap up" policy approved by the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC").

Defendant Messer Construction Co. ("Messer"), the general contractor for the Project, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 10, 2012. Messer argued that through Section 4123.35(O) it was entitled to immunity provided by Chapters 4123 and 4121 of the Revised Code as a self-insuring employer. In support of its position, Messer offered the Affidavit of Angela Jansing.<sup>4</sup> It is undisputed that Messer met the requirements of BWC to receive the "privilege to self-insure a construction project".<sup>5</sup> As part of the application process, Messer submitted to the Bureau a list of the subcontractors who were to be included in its self-insurance plan.<sup>6</sup> Upon approving Messer's application, the Bureau issued to Messer a "Certificate of Employer's Right to Pay Compensation Directly" for "Subs2000 4170-2 Horseshoe Casino – Cincinnati Wrapup", effective March 1, 2011 to March 1, 2012 (the "Plan").<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Complaint, at ¶15.

<sup>2</sup> Complaint, ¶6.

<sup>3</sup> Complaint, ¶1.

<sup>4</sup> Attached as Exhibit A to Messer's Motion for Summary Judgment.

<sup>5</sup> R.C. 4123.35(O), ¶1; See Messer's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3

<sup>6</sup> A copy of the list of enrolled subcontractors is attached to the Affidavit of Angela Jansing as Exhibit 2.

<sup>7</sup> A copy of the certificate is attached to the Affidavit of Angela Jansing as Exhibit 1.

Defendants DAG, J&B, and Triversity each filed follow-on motions for summary judgment, claiming that the immunity afforded Messer under §4123.35(O) should extend to them as “enrolled subcontractors”.<sup>8</sup>

Plaintiffs oppose summary judgment in favor of these Defendants, arguing that subcontractors should not be afforded immunity for their negligence against third parties under Ohio law.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that §4123.35(O)(2) provides immunity to subcontractors with respect to the employees of each, but not with respect to employees of other subcontractors working on the site.<sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs also point out that numerous other states support subcontractor liability among and between subcontractors under their workers’ compensation statutes.<sup>11</sup>

### **SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD**

Summary judgment is a procedural device that is employed to dispose expeditiously and economically legal claims that have no factual foundation.<sup>12</sup> Summary judgment was born of the belief that litigation should be promptly terminated whenever there is nothing to try.<sup>13</sup>

The granting of summary judgment in Ohio is governed by Rule 56(C) of the Ohio rules of Civil Procedure, which states in pertinent part as follows:

“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of facts, if any, timely filed in the action, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

<sup>8</sup> Id., Exhibit 2 to Exhibit A.

<sup>9</sup> See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant J&B Steel Erectors, Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Id., p. 4, ¶3.

<sup>11</sup> See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant J&B Steel Erectors, Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> See *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett* (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548.

<sup>13</sup> See *Norris v. Ohio Standard Oil Co.* (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 1, 433 N.E.2d 615.

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence of stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence of stipulation construed most strongly in his favor.”

Today, the standard for rendering summary judgment is equated with that used for directed verdicts: *whether there is but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict when the evidence is construed most strongly in the non-moving party’s favor.*<sup>14</sup> Unique to the issue of summary judgment is the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be decided by the fact finder.<sup>15</sup>

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not simply rely on his pleadings if he bears the burden of proof at trial.<sup>16</sup> The law requires that the non-moving party must produce evidence, in some form permitted by Civil Rule 56(C), sufficient to justify the court’s conclusion that a trier of fact could properly render a verdict in his or her favor.<sup>17</sup>

Following the principles of law in the cases cited above, and construing the evidence most strongly against the moving party as the rule requires, if there is not a genuine issue of material fact, a court is required to grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> See Celotex.

<sup>15</sup> See Rayburn v. J.C. Penney Outlet Store (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 463, 455 N.E.2d 1167.

<sup>16</sup> See Celotex.

<sup>17</sup> Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505.

<sup>18</sup> Harless v. Willis Day Warehouse Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 375 N.E.2d 46.

## LEGAL ANALYSIS

This Court, having reviewed the Motions and arguments made by both sides, believes that Section 4123.35(O) of the Ohio Revised Code does provide immunity to the Defendants, as enrolled subcontractors under the Plan.

The Workers' Compensation immunity at issue springs from Section 4123.74 of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides:

Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

Section 4123.35(O) of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth the scheme under which the administrator may grant a self-insuring employer the privilege to self-insure a construction project and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121 of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section.

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The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121 of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project.

## MESSER AS CONSTRUCTIVE EMPLOYER

R.C. 4123.35(O)(2) states in clear terms, at ¶5, that any injuries sustained by employees of an enrolled subcontractor are to be viewed “as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer”. Therefore, Plaintiffs, as employees of Justin Construction Co., are deemed by statute to be employees of Messer. As constructive employees of Messer, the Plaintiffs received from their constructive employer the benefits of the “social bargain” to which they were entitled under the Workers’ Compensation statute.<sup>19</sup> Plaintiffs’ desire to hold “third parties responsible for the collapse of the casino floor” liable for negligence does not comport with the scheme laid out by §4123.35(O).

Plaintiffs presented to this court case law from Wisconsin that treated a factually similar situation, where construction workers were injured while working on a large construction project and the subcontractor-employers were named in a “wrap up” policy for workers’ compensation insurance purposes.<sup>20</sup> Plaintiffs urged this Court to consider that the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to extend “blanket immunity” to the subcontractors on that project, and argued before this Court that Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act should be similarly construed.

However, this Court notes a glaring distinction between Ohio law and the Wisconsin law on which the Pride decision turned. Wis. Stat. §102.29 states that an employee’s claim against an employer:

<sup>19</sup> See Affidavit of Angela Jansing, ¶4.

<sup>20</sup> See Pride v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., E.D. Wis., No. 04-C-703, 2007 WL 1655111, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40833.

“shall not affect the right of the employee ... to make a claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3<sup>rd</sup> party ...”<sup>21</sup>

Wisconsin’s Workers’ Compensation Act expressly allows for tort claims against non-employer contractors, even when those non-employer contractors are covered under a “wrap up” policy. Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides no such allowance for third party claims. While it may be true that numerous other jurisdictions would allow for Plaintiffs’ common law claims, Ohio law does not. This Court does not wish to expand the Ohio law as currently written.

#### WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AS “SOCIAL BARGAIN”

There is no Ohio case law on point concerning the question of whether a subcontractor can be held liable for injuries his employees caused to the employees of another subcontractor. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has described the spirit of this state’s workers’ compensation system as a “social bargain”, one from which the Plaintiffs are seeking to obtain twice the benefit of their counterparties.<sup>22</sup>

Historically, the system in which employers are entitled to broad immunity, and employees are entitled to the immediate and unquestioned medical treatment, was enacted due to the inability of the common law to adequately deal with the consequences of workplace accidents.<sup>23</sup> The Ohio Supreme Court explains, “it became undeniable that the tort system had failed as a regulatory device for distributing economic losses borne by injured Ohio workers and their families and that it should be replaced by a workers’

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<sup>21</sup> *Id.*, at \*3.

<sup>22</sup> See *Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co.*, (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 119, 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1116.

<sup>23</sup> See *Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc.*, (2011), 129 Ohio St.3d 153, 950 N.E.2d 938, at ¶33.

compensation system in which those losses would be charged, without regard to fault or wrongdoing, to the industry rather than to the individual or society as a whole.”<sup>24</sup>

Workers’ Compensation “represents a social bargain in which employers and employees exchange their respective common-law rights and duties for a more certain and uniform set of statutory benefits and obligations.”<sup>25</sup> Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act “operates as a balance of mutual compromise between the interests of the employer and the employee whereby employees relinquish their common law remedy and accept lower benefit levels coupled with the greater assurance of recovery and employers give up their common law defenses and are protected from unlimited liability.”<sup>26</sup> “This compromise is the basic premise underlying the workers’ compensation system.”<sup>27</sup>

There is no dispute that Messer complied with the requirements of R.C. 4123.35(O) and was thereby afforded immunity under R.C. 4123.74.<sup>28</sup> Likewise, there is no dispute that the Defendants were properly enrolled subcontractors under Messer’s Wrap-up Plan.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, the Defendants are granted workers’ compensation immunity under R.C. 4123.74 pursuant to R.C. 4123.35(O).

The Plaintiffs acknowledge that their injuries occurred while they were working in the course and scope of their employment on the Project.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, Plaintiffs were entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits from their employer.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, they

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<sup>24</sup> Sutton, at ¶34.

<sup>25</sup> See Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 119, 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1116.

<sup>26</sup> Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 119, quoting Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 614, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577.

<sup>27</sup> Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 119.

<sup>28</sup> Complaint, ¶ 27; Affidavit of Angela Jansing, ¶2, and Exhibit 1 thereto.

<sup>29</sup> Affidavit of Angela Jansing, ¶3, and Exhibit 2 thereto.

<sup>30</sup> Complaint, ¶¶6, 15.

<sup>31</sup> Chapter 4123 of the Ohio Revised Code


received medical treatment for their injuries as provided by the Plan: from Messer.<sup>32</sup> Plaintiffs are not also entitled to recover from the Defendants, who were properly enrolled subcontractors in the Plan. This legal conclusion is grounded in this Court's judgment that such a second bite of the apple would run counter to the "social bargain" that is the workers' compensation system. The receipt of workers' compensation benefits they received for their injuries under the Plan was the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy.

### CONCLUSION

Based on the above facts and analysis, it is the Court's determination that a fact finder could not rationally return a verdict in Plaintiffs' favor on any of the claims against the Defendants.<sup>33</sup> Construing the evidence most strongly against the Defendants, there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the applicability of Revised Code section 4123.35(O) to the Defendants. The Defendants have immunity against Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants D.A.G. Construction Company, Inc., J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., and Triversity Construction Company, LLC.

So ordered.

  
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LESLIE GHIZ, Judge

March 25, 2013

<sup>32</sup> Affidavit of Angela Jansing, ¶4.

<sup>33</sup> See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The Court hereby certifies that a copy of the above Entry Granting Summary Judgment was served upon the following by ordinary U.S. Mail on March 25, 2013:

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## ORC Ann. 4123.35

Current through Legislation passed by the 131st General Assembly and filed with the Secretary of State through file 14 (HB 52), with some gaps from files 6 (SB 38), 9 (HB 3), 10 (HB 29), and 11 (HB 64).

Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated > Title 41: Labor and Industry > Chapter 4123: Workers' Compensation > Premiums; Funds

### Notice

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► This section has more than one version with varying effective dates.

*Second of three versions of this section.*

### **§ 4123.35 Payment of premiums; certificate of payment; granting of self-insuring employer status; self-insured construction projects. [Effective until September 29, 2015]**

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- (A) Except as provided in this section, and until the policy year commencing July 1, 2015, every private employer and every publicly owned utility shall pay semiannually in the months of January and July into the state insurance fund the amount of annual premium the administrator of workers' compensation fixes for the employment or occupation of the employer, the amount of which premium to be paid by each employer to be determined by the classifications, rules, and rates made and published by the administrator. The employer shall pay semiannually a further sum of money into the state insurance fund as may be ascertained to be due from the employer by applying the rules of the administrator.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, for a policy year commencing on or after July 1, 2015, every private employer and every publicly owned utility shall pay annually in the month of June immediately preceding the policy year into the state insurance fund the amount of estimated annual premium the administrator fixes for the employment or occupation of the employer, the amount of which estimated premium to be paid by each employer to be determined by the classifications, rules, and rates made and published by the administrator. The employer shall pay a further sum of money into the state insurance fund as may be ascertained to be due from the employer by applying the rules of the administrator. Upon receipt of the payroll report required by division (B) of section 4123.26 of the Revised Code, the administrator shall adjust the premium and assessments charged to each employer for the difference between estimated gross payrolls and actual gross payrolls, and any balance due to the administrator shall be immediately paid by the employer. Any balance due the employer shall be credited to the employer's account.

For a policy year commencing on or after July 1, 2015, each employer that is recognized by the administrator as a professional employer organization shall pay monthly into the state insurance fund the amount of premium the administrator fixes for the employer for the prior month based on the actual payroll of the employer reported pursuant to division (C) of section 4123.26 of the Revised Code.

A receipt certifying that payment has been made shall be issued to the employer by the bureau of workers' compensation. The receipt is prima-facie evidence of the payment of the premium. The administrator shall provide each employer written proof of workers' compensation coverage as is required in section 4123.83 of the Revised Code. Proper posting of the notice constitutes the employer's compliance with the notice requirement mandated in section 4123.83 of the Revised Code.

The bureau shall verify with the secretary of state the existence of all corporations and organizations making application for workers' compensation coverage and shall require every such application to include the employer's federal identification number.

A private employer who has contracted with a subcontractor is liable for the unpaid premium due from any subcontractor with respect to that part of the payroll of the subcontractor that is for work performed pursuant to the contract with the employer.

Division (A) of this section providing for the payment of premiums semiannually does not apply to any employer who was a subscriber to the state insurance fund prior to January 1, 1914, or, until July 1, 2015, who may first become a subscriber to the fund in any month other than January or July. Instead, the semiannual premiums shall be paid by those employers from time to time upon the expiration of the respective periods for which payments into the fund have been made by them. After July 1, 2015, an employer who first becomes a subscriber to the fund on any day other than the first day of July shall pay premiums according to rules adopted by the administrator, with the advice and consent of the bureau of workers' compensation board of directors, for the remainder of the policy year for which the coverage is effective.

The administrator, with the advice and consent of the board, shall adopt rules to permit employers to make periodic payments of the premium and assessment due under this division. The rules shall include provisions for the assessment of interest charges, where appropriate, and for the assessment of penalties when an employer fails to make timely premium payments. The administrator, in the rules the administrator adopts, may set an administrative fee for these periodic payments. An employer who timely pays the amounts due under this division is entitled to all of the benefits and protections of this chapter. Upon receipt of payment, the bureau shall issue a receipt to the employer certifying that payment has been made, which receipt is prima-facie evidence of payment. Workers' compensation coverage under this chapter continues uninterrupted upon timely receipt of payment under this division.

Every public employer, except public employers that are self-insuring employers under this section, shall comply with sections 4123.38 to 4123.41, and 4123.48 of the Revised Code in regard to the contribution of moneys to the public insurance fund.

- (B) Employers who will abide by the rules of the administrator and who may be of sufficient financial ability to render certain the payment of compensation to injured employees or the dependents of killed employees, and the furnishing of medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital attention and services and medicines, and funeral expenses, equal to or greater than is provided for in sections 4123.52, 4123.55 to 4123.62, and 4123.64 to 4123.67 of the Revised Code, and who do not desire to insure the payment thereof or indemnify themselves against loss sustained by the direct payment thereof, upon a finding of such facts by the administrator, may be granted the privilege to pay individually compensation, and furnish medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital services and attention and funeral expenses directly to injured employees or the dependents of killed employees, thereby being granted status as a self-insuring employer. The administrator may charge employers who apply for the status as a self-insuring employer a reasonable application fee to cover the bureau's costs in connection with processing and making a determination with respect to an application.

All employers granted status as self-insuring employers shall demonstrate sufficient financial and administrative ability to assure that all obligations under this section are promptly met. The administrator shall deny the privilege where the employer is unable to demonstrate the employer's ability to promptly meet all the obligations imposed on the employer by this section.

- (1) The administrator shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors, where applicable, in determining the employer's ability to meet all of the obligations imposed on the employer by this section:
- (a) The employer employs a minimum of five hundred employees in this state;
  - (b) The employer has operated in this state for a minimum of two years, provided that an employer who has purchased, acquired, or otherwise succeeded to the operation of a business, or any part thereof, situated in this state that has operated for at least two years in this state, also shall qualify;
  - (c) Where the employer previously contributed to the state insurance fund or is a successor employer as defined by bureau rules, the amount of the buyout, as defined by bureau rules;
  - (d) The sufficiency of the employer's assets located in this state to insure the employer's solvency in paying compensation directly;
  - (e) The financial records, documents, and data, certified by a certified public accountant, necessary to provide the employer's full financial disclosure. The records, documents, and data include, but are not limited to, balance sheets and profit and loss history for the current year and previous four years.

- (f) The employer's organizational plan for the administration of the workers' compensation law;
- (g) The employer's proposed plan to inform employees of the change from a state fund insurer to a self-insuring employer, the procedures the employer will follow as a self-insuring employer, and the employees' rights to compensation and benefits; and
- (h) The employer has either an account in a financial institution in this state, or if the employer maintains an account with a financial institution outside this state, ensures that workers' compensation checks are drawn from the same account as payroll checks or the employer clearly indicates that payment will be honored by a financial institution in this state.

The administrator may waive the requirements of divisions (B)(1)(a) and (b) of this section and the requirement of division (B)(1)(e) of this section that the financial records, documents, and data be certified by a certified public accountant. The administrator shall adopt rules establishing the criteria that an employer shall meet in order for the administrator to waive the requirements of divisions (B)(1)(a), (b), and (e) of this section. Such rules may require additional security of that employer pursuant to division (E) of section 4123.351 of the Revised Code.

The administrator shall not grant the status of self-insuring employer to the state, except that the administrator may grant the status of self-insuring employer to a state institution of higher education, including its hospitals, that meets the requirements of division (B)(2) of this section.

- (2) When considering the application of a public employer, except for a board of county commissioners described in division (G) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code, a board of a county hospital, or a publicly owned utility, the administrator shall verify that the public employer satisfies all of the following requirements as the requirements apply to that public employer:
  - (a) For the two-year period preceding application under this section, the public employer has maintained an unvoted debt capacity equal to at least two times the amount of the current annual premium established by the administrator under this chapter for that public employer for the year immediately preceding the year in which the public employer makes application under this section.
  - (b) For each of the two fiscal years preceding application under this section, the unreserved and undesignated year-end fund balance in the public employer's general fund is equal to at least five per cent of the public employer's general fund revenues for the fiscal year computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
  - (c) For the five-year period preceding application under this section, the public employer, to the extent applicable, has complied fully with the continuing disclosure requirements established in rules adopted by the United States securities and exchange commission under 17 C.F.R. 240.15c 2-12.
  - (d) For the five-year period preceding application under this section, the public employer has not had its local government fund distribution withheld on account of the public employer being indebted or otherwise obligated to the state.
  - (e) For the five-year period preceding application under this section, the public employer has not been under a fiscal watch or fiscal emergency pursuant to section 118.023, 118.04, or 3316.03 of the Revised Code.
  - (f) For the public employer's fiscal year preceding application under this section, the public employer has obtained an annual financial audit as required under section 117.10 of the Revised Code, which has been released by the auditor of state within seven months after the end of the public employer's fiscal year.
  - (g) On the date of application, the public employer holds a debt rating of Aa3 or higher according to Moody's investors service, inc., or a comparable rating by an independent rating agency similar to Moody's investors service, inc.
  - (h) The public employer agrees to generate an annual accumulating book reserve in its financial statements reflecting an actuarially generated reserve adequate to pay projected claims under this chapter for the applicable period of time, as determined by the administrator.

- (i) For a public employer that is a hospital, the public employer shall submit audited financial statements showing the hospital's overall liquidity characteristics, and the administrator shall determine, on an individual basis, whether the public employer satisfies liquidity standards equivalent to the liquidity standards of other public employers.
- (j) Any additional criteria that the administrator adopts by rule pursuant to division (E) of this section.

The administrator may adopt rules establishing the criteria that a public employer shall satisfy in order for the administrator to waive any of the requirements listed in divisions (B)(2)(a) to (j) of this section. The rules may require additional security from that employer pursuant to division (E) of section 4123.351 of the Revised Code. The administrator shall not waive any of the requirements listed in divisions (B)(2)(a) to (j) of this section for a public employer who does not satisfy the criteria established in the rules the administrator adopts.

- (C) A board of county commissioners described in division (G) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code, as an employer, that will abide by the rules of the administrator and that may be of sufficient financial ability to render certain the payment of compensation to injured employees or the dependents of killed employees, and the furnishing of medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital attention and services and medicines, and funeral expenses, equal to or greater than is provided for in sections 4123.52, 4123.55 to 4123.62, and 4123.64 to 4123.67 of the Revised Code, and that does not desire to insure the payment thereof or indemnify itself against loss sustained by the direct payment thereof, upon a finding of such facts by the administrator, may be granted the privilege to pay individually compensation, and furnish medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital services and attention and funeral expenses directly to injured employees or the dependents of killed employees, thereby being granted status as a self-insuring employer. The administrator may charge a board of county commissioners described in division (G) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code that applies for the status as a self-insuring employer a reasonable application fee to cover the bureau's costs in connection with processing and making a determination with respect to an application. All employers granted such status shall demonstrate sufficient financial and administrative ability to assure that all obligations under this section are promptly met. The administrator shall deny the privilege where the employer is unable to demonstrate the employer's ability to promptly meet all the obligations imposed on the employer by this section. The administrator shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors, where applicable, in determining the employer's ability to meet all of the obligations imposed on the board as an employer by this section:

- (1) The board as an employer employs a minimum of five hundred employees in this state;
- (2) The board has operated in this state for a minimum of two years;
- (3) Where the board previously contributed to the state insurance fund or is a successor employer as defined by bureau rules, the amount of the buyout, as defined by bureau rules;
- (4) The sufficiency of the board's assets located in this state to insure the board's solvency in paying compensation directly;
- (5) The financial records, documents, and data, certified by a certified public accountant, necessary to provide the board's full financial disclosure. The records, documents, and data include, but are not limited to, balance sheets and profit and loss history for the current year and previous four years.
- (6) The board's organizational plan for the administration of the workers' compensation law;
- (7) The board's proposed plan to inform employees of the proposed self-insurance, the procedures the board will follow as a self-insuring employer, and the employees' rights to compensation and benefits;
- (8) The board has either an account in a financial institution in this state, or if the board maintains an account with a financial institution outside this state, ensures that workers' compensation checks are drawn from the same account as payroll checks or the board clearly indicates that payment will be honored by a financial institution in this state;
- (9) The board shall provide the administrator a surety bond in an amount equal to one hundred twenty-five per cent of the projected losses as determined by the administrator.

- (D) The administrator shall require a surety bond from all self-insuring employers, issued pursuant to section 4123.351 of the Revised Code, that is sufficient to compel, or secure to injured employees, or to the dependents of employees killed, the payment of compensation and expenses, which shall in no event be less than that paid or furnished out of the state insurance fund in similar cases to injured employees or to dependents of killed employees whose employers contribute to the fund, except when an employee of the employer, who has suffered the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye prior to the injury for which compensation is to be paid, and thereafter suffers the loss of any other of the members as the result of any injury sustained in the course of and arising out of the employee's employment, the compensation to be paid by the self-insuring employer is limited to the disability suffered in the subsequent injury, additional compensation, if any, to be paid by the bureau out of the surplus created by section 4123.34 of the Revised Code.
- (E) In addition to the requirements of this section, the administrator shall make and publish rules governing the manner of making application and the nature and extent of the proof required to justify a finding of fact by the administrator as to granting the status of a self-insuring employer, which rules shall be general in their application, one of which rules shall provide that all self-insuring employers shall pay into the state insurance fund such amounts as are required to be credited to the surplus fund in division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code. The administrator may adopt rules establishing requirements in addition to the requirements described in division (B)(2) of this section that a public employer shall meet in order to qualify for self-insuring status.

Employers shall secure directly from the bureau central offices application forms upon which the bureau shall stamp a designating number. Prior to submission of an application, an employer shall make available to the bureau, and the bureau shall review, the information described in division (B)(1) of this section, and public employers shall make available, and the bureau shall review, the information necessary to verify whether the public employer meets the requirements listed in division (B)(2) of this section. An employer shall file the completed application forms with an application fee, which shall cover the costs of processing the application, as established by the administrator, by rule, with the bureau at least ninety days prior to the effective date of the employer's new status as a self-insuring employer. The application form is not deemed complete until all the required information is attached thereto. The bureau shall only accept applications that contain the required information.

- (F) The bureau shall review completed applications within a reasonable time. If the bureau determines to grant an employer the status as a self-insuring employer, the bureau shall issue a statement, containing its findings of fact, that is prepared by the bureau and signed by the administrator. If the bureau determines not to grant the status as a self-insuring employer, the bureau shall notify the employer of the determination and require the employer to continue to pay its full premium into the state insurance fund. The administrator also shall adopt rules establishing a minimum level of performance as a criterion for granting and maintaining the status as a self-insuring employer and fixing time limits beyond which failure of the self-insuring employer to provide for the necessary medical examinations and evaluations may not delay a decision on a claim.
- (G) The administrator shall adopt rules setting forth procedures for auditing the program of self-insuring employers. The bureau shall conduct the audit upon a random basis or whenever the bureau has grounds for believing that a self-insuring employer is not in full compliance with bureau rules or this chapter.

The administrator shall monitor the programs conducted by self-insuring employers, to ensure compliance with bureau requirements and for that purpose, shall develop and issue to self-insuring employers standardized forms for use by the self-insuring employer in all aspects of the self-insuring employers' direct compensation program and for reporting of information to the bureau.

The bureau shall receive and transmit to the self-insuring employer all complaints concerning any self-insuring employer. In the case of a complaint against a self-insuring employer, the administrator shall handle the complaint through the self-insurance division of the bureau. The bureau shall maintain a file by employer of all complaints received that relate to the employer. The bureau shall evaluate each complaint and take appropriate action.

The administrator shall adopt as a rule a prohibition against any self-insuring employer from harassing, dismissing, or otherwise disciplining any employee making a complaint, which rule shall provide for a financial penalty to be levied by the administrator payable by the offending self-insuring employer.

- (H) For the purpose of making determinations as to whether to grant status as a self-insuring employer, the administrator may subscribe to and pay for a credit reporting service that offers financial and other business information about individual employers. The costs in connection with the bureau's subscription or individual reports from the service about an applicant may be included in the application fee charged employers under this section.
- (I) The administrator, notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, may permit a self-insuring employer to resume payment of premiums to the state insurance fund with appropriate credit modifications to the employer's basic premium rate as such rate is determined pursuant to section 4123.29 of the Revised Code.
- (J) On the first day of July of each year, the administrator shall calculate separately each self-insuring employer's assessments for the safety and hygiene fund, administrative costs pursuant to section 4123.342 of the Revised Code, and for the portion of the surplus fund under division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code that is not used for handicapped reimbursement, on the basis of the paid compensation attributable to the individual self-insuring employer according to the following calculation:
  - (1) The total assessment against all self-insuring employers as a class for each fund and for the administrative costs for the year that the assessment is being made, as determined by the administrator, divided by the total amount of paid compensation for the previous calendar year attributable to all amenable self-insuring employers;
  - (2) Multiply the quotient in division (J)(1) of this section by the total amount of paid compensation for the previous calendar year that is attributable to the individual self-insuring employer for whom the assessment is being determined. Each self-insuring employer shall pay the assessment that results from this calculation, unless the assessment resulting from this calculation falls below a minimum assessment, which minimum assessment the administrator shall determine on the first day of July of each year with the advice and consent of the bureau of workers' compensation board of directors, in which event, the self-insuring employer shall pay the minimum assessment.

In determining the total amount due for the total assessment against all self-insuring employers as a class for each fund and the administrative assessment, the administrator shall reduce proportionately the total for each fund and assessment by the amount of money in the self-insurance assessment fund as of the date of the computation of the assessment.

The administrator shall calculate the assessment for the portion of the surplus fund under division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code that is used for handicapped reimbursement in the same manner as set forth in divisions (J)(1) and (2) of this section except that the administrator shall calculate the total assessment for this portion of the surplus fund only on the basis of those self-insuring employers that retain participation in the handicapped reimbursement program and the individual self-insuring employer's proportion of paid compensation shall be calculated only for those self-insuring employers who retain participation in the handicapped reimbursement program. The administrator, as the administrator determines appropriate, may determine the total assessment for the handicapped portion of the surplus fund in accordance with sound actuarial principles.

The administrator shall calculate the assessment for the portion of the surplus fund under division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code that under division (D) of section 4121.66 of the Revised Code is used for rehabilitation costs in the same manner as set forth in divisions (J)(1) and (2) of this section, except that the administrator shall calculate the total assessment for this portion of the surplus fund only on the basis of those self-insuring employers who have not made the election to make payments directly under division (D) of section 4121.66 of the Revised Code and an individual self-insuring employer's proportion of paid compensation only for those self-insuring employers who have not made that election.

The administrator shall calculate the assessment for the portion of the surplus fund under division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code that is used for reimbursement to a self-insuring employer under division (H) of section 4123.512 of the Revised Code in the same manner as set forth in divisions (J)(1) and (2) of this section except that the administrator shall calculate the total assessment for this portion of the surplus fund only on the basis of those self-insuring employers that retain participation in reimbursement to the self-insuring employer under

division (H) of section 4123.512 of the Revised Code and the individual self-insuring employer's proportion of paid compensation shall be calculated only for those self-insuring employers who retain participation in reimbursement to the self-insuring employer under division (H) of section 4123.512 of the Revised Code.

An employer who no longer is a self-insuring employer in this state or who no longer is operating in this state, shall continue to pay assessments for administrative costs and for the portion of the surplus fund under division (B) of section 4123.34 of the Revised Code that is not used for handicapped reimbursement, based upon paid compensation attributable to claims that occurred while the employer was a self-insuring employer within this state.

- (K) There is hereby created in the state treasury the self-insurance assessment fund. All investment earnings of the fund shall be deposited in the fund. The administrator shall use the money in the self-insurance assessment fund only for administrative costs as specified in section 4123.341 of the Revised Code.
- (L) Every self-insuring employer shall certify, in affidavit form subject to the penalty for perjury, to the bureau the amount of the self-insuring employer's paid compensation for the previous calendar year. In reporting paid compensation paid for the previous year, a self-insuring employer shall exclude from the total amount of paid compensation any reimbursement the self-insuring employer receives in the previous calendar year from the surplus fund pursuant to section 4123.512 of the Revised Code for any paid compensation. The self-insuring employer also shall exclude from the paid compensation reported any amount recovered under section 4123.931 of the Revised Code and any amount that is determined not to have been payable to or on behalf of a claimant in any final administrative or judicial proceeding. The self-insuring employer shall exclude such amounts from the paid compensation reported in the reporting period subsequent to the date the determination is made. The administrator shall adopt rules, in accordance with Chapter 119. of the Revised Code, that provide for all of the following:
- (1) Establishing the date by which self-insuring employers must submit such information and the amount of the assessments provided for in division (J) of this section for employers who have been granted self-insuring status within the last calendar year;
  - (2) If an employer fails to pay the assessment when due, the administrator may add a late fee penalty of not more than five hundred dollars to the assessment plus an additional penalty amount as follows:
    - (a) For an assessment from sixty-one to ninety days past due, the prime interest rate, multiplied by the assessment due;
    - (b) For an assessment from ninety-one to one hundred twenty days past due, the prime interest rate plus two per cent, multiplied by the assessment due;
    - (c) For an assessment from one hundred twenty-one to one hundred fifty days past due, the prime interest rate plus four per cent, multiplied by the assessment due;
    - (d) For an assessment from one hundred fifty-one to one hundred eighty days past due, the prime interest rate plus six per cent, multiplied by the assessment due;
    - (e) For an assessment from one hundred eighty-one to two hundred ten days past due, the prime interest rate plus eight per cent, multiplied by the assessment due;
    - (f) For each additional thirty-day period or portion thereof that an assessment remains past due after it has remained past due for more than two hundred ten days, the prime interest rate plus eight per cent, multiplied by the assessment due.
  - (3) An employer may appeal a late fee penalty and penalty assessment to the administrator.

For purposes of division (L)(2) of this section, "prime interest rate" means the average bank prime rate, and the administrator shall determine the prime interest rate in the same manner as a county auditor determines the average bank prime rate under section 929.02 of the Revised Code.

The administrator shall include any assessment and penalties that remain unpaid for previous assessment periods in the calculation and collection of any assessments due under this division or division (J) of this section.

- (M) As used in this section, "paid compensation" means all amounts paid by a self-insuring employer for living maintenance benefits, all amounts for compensation paid pursuant to sections 4121.63, 4121.67, 4123.56, 4123.57, 4123.58, 4123.59, 4123.60, and 4123.64 of the Revised Code, all amounts paid as wages in lieu of such compensation, all amounts paid in lieu of such compensation under a nonoccupational accident and sickness program fully funded by the self-insuring employer, and all amounts paid by a self-insuring employer for a violation of a specific safety standard pursuant to Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution and section 4121.47 of the Revised Code.
- (N) Should any section of this chapter or Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code providing for self-insuring employers' assessments based upon compensation paid be declared unconstitutional by a final decision of any court, then that section of the Revised Code declared unconstitutional shall revert back to the section in existence prior to November 3, 1989, providing for assessments based upon payroll.
- (O) The administrator may grant a self-insuring employer the privilege to self-insure a construction project entered into by the self-insuring employer that is scheduled for completion within six years after the date the project begins, and the total cost of which is estimated to exceed one hundred million dollars or, for employers described in division (R) of this section, if the construction project is estimated to exceed twenty-five million dollars. The administrator may waive such cost and time criteria and grant a self-insuring employer the privilege to self-insure a construction project regardless of the time needed to complete the construction project and provided that the cost of the construction project is estimated to exceed fifty million dollars. A self-insuring employer who desires to self-insure a construction project shall submit to the administrator an application listing the dates the construction project is scheduled to begin and end, the estimated cost of the construction project, the contractors and subcontractors whose employees are to be self-insured by the self-insuring employer, the provisions of a safety program that is specifically designed for the construction project, and a statement as to whether a collective bargaining agreement governing the rights, duties, and obligations of each of the parties to the agreement with respect to the construction project exists between the self-insuring employer and a labor organization.

A self-insuring employer may apply to self-insure the employees of either of the following:

- (1) All contractors and subcontractors who perform labor or work or provide materials for the construction project;
- (2) All contractors and, at the administrator's discretion, a substantial number of all the subcontractors who perform labor or work or provide materials for the construction project.

Upon approval of the application, the administrator shall mail a certificate granting the privilege to self-insure the construction project to the self-insuring employer. The certificate shall contain the name of the self-insuring employer and the name, address, and telephone number of the self-insuring employer's representatives who are responsible for administering workers' compensation claims for the construction project. The self-insuring employer shall post the certificate in a conspicuous place at the site of the construction project.

The administrator shall maintain a record of the contractors and subcontractors whose employees are covered under the certificate issued to the self-insured employer. A self-insuring employer immediately shall notify the administrator when any contractor or subcontractor is added or eliminated from inclusion under the certificate.

Upon approval of the application, the self-insuring employer is responsible for the administration and payment of all claims under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code for the employees of the contractor and subcontractors covered under the certificate who receive injuries or are killed in the course of and arising out of employment on the construction project, or who contract an occupational disease in the course of employment on the construction project. For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code, a claim that is administered and paid in accordance with this division is considered a claim against the self-insuring employer listed in the certificate. A contractor or subcontractor included under the certificate shall report to the self-insuring employer listed in the certificate, all claims that arise under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code in connection with the construction project for which the certificate is issued.

A self-insuring employer who complies with this division is entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered

under a certificate issued under this division for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project, as if the employees were employees of the self-insuring employer, provided that the self-insuring employer also complies with this section. No employee of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division shall be considered the employee of the self-insuring employer listed in that certificate for any purposes other than this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code. Nothing in this division gives a self-insuring employer authority to control the means, manner, or method of employment of the employees of the contractors and subcontractors covered under a certificate issued under this division.

The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division are entitled to the protections provided under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code with respect to the contractor's or subcontractor's employees who are employed on the construction project which is the subject of the certificate, for death or injuries that arise out of, or death, injuries, or occupational diseases that arise in the course of, those employees' employment on that construction project.

The contractors and subcontractors included under a certificate issued under this division shall identify in their payroll records the employees who are considered the employees of the self-insuring employer listed in that certificate for purposes of this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code, and the amount that those employees earned for employment on the construction project that is the subject of that certificate. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code, the administrator shall exclude the payroll that is reported for employees who are considered the employees of the self-insuring employer listed in that certificate, and that the employees earned for employment on the construction project that is the subject of that certificate, when determining those contractors' or subcontractors' premiums or assessments required under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code. A self-insuring employer issued a certificate under this division shall include in the amount of paid compensation it reports pursuant to division (L) of this section, the amount of paid compensation the self-insuring employer paid pursuant to this division for the previous calendar year.

Nothing in this division shall be construed as altering the rights of employees under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code as those rights existed prior to September 17, 1996. Nothing in this division shall be construed as altering the rights devolved under sections 2305.31 and 4123.82 of the Revised Code as those rights existed prior to September 17, 1996.

As used in this division, "privilege to self-insure a construction project" means privilege to pay individually compensation, and to furnish medical, surgical, nursing, and hospital services and attention and funeral expenses directly to injured employees or the dependents of killed employees.

- (P) A self-insuring employer whose application is granted under division (O) of this section shall designate a safety professional to be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the safety program that is specifically designed for the construction project that is the subject of the application.

A self-insuring employer whose application is granted under division (O) of this section shall employ an ombudsperson for the construction project that is the subject of the application. The ombudsperson shall have experience in workers' compensation or the construction industry, or both. The ombudsperson shall perform all of the following duties:

- (1) Communicate with and provide information to employees who are injured in the course of, or whose injury arises out of employment on the construction project, or who contract an occupational disease in the course of employment on the construction project;
- (2) Investigate the status of a claim upon the request of an employee to do so;
- (3) Provide information to claimants, third party administrators, employers, and other persons to assist those persons in protecting their rights under this chapter and Chapter 4121. of the Revised Code.

A self-insuring employer whose application is granted under division (O) of this section shall post the name of the safety professional and the ombudsperson and instructions for contacting the safety professional and the ombudsperson in a conspicuous place at the site of the construction project.

- (Q) The administrator may consider all of the following when deciding whether to grant a self-insuring employer the privilege to self-insure a construction project as provided under division (O) of this section:

- (1) Whether the self-insuring employer has an organizational plan for the administration of the workers' compensation law;
  - (2) Whether the safety program that is specifically designed for the construction project provides for the safety of employees employed on the construction project, is applicable to all contractors and subcontractors who perform labor or work or provide materials for the construction project, and has as a component, a safety training program that complies with standards adopted pursuant to the "Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970," 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C.A. 651, and provides for continuing management and employee involvement;
  - (3) Whether granting the privilege to self-insure the construction project will reduce the costs of the construction project;
  - (4) Whether the self-insuring employer has employed an ombudsperson as required under division (P) of this section;
  - (5) Whether the self-insuring employer has sufficient surety to secure the payment of claims for which the self-insuring employer would be responsible pursuant to the granting of the privilege to self-insure a construction project under division (O) of this section.
- (R) As used in divisions (O), (P), and (Q), "self-insuring employer" includes the following employers, whether or not they have been granted the status of being a self-insuring employer under division (B) of this section:
- (1) A state institution of higher education;
  - (2) A school district;
  - (3) A county school financing district;
  - (4) An educational service center;
  - (5) A community school established under Chapter 3314. of the Revised Code;
  - (6) A municipal power agency as defined in section 3734.058 of the Revised Code.
- (S) As used in this section:
- (1) "Unvoted debt capacity" means the amount of money that a public employer may borrow without voter approval of a tax levy;
  - (2) "State institution of higher education" means the state universities listed in section 3345.011 of the Revised Code, community colleges created pursuant to Chapter 3354. of the Revised Code, university branches created pursuant to Chapter 3355. of the Revised Code, technical colleges created pursuant to Chapter 3357. of the Revised Code, and state community colleges created pursuant to Chapter 3358. of the Revised Code.

## History

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GC § 1465-69; 103 v 72, § 22; 107 v 159; 108 v PtI, 313; 109 v 291; 118 v 410; 120 v 194; Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53; 128 v 743 (Eff 11-2-59); 136 v S 545 (Eff 1-17-77); 138 v H 184 (Eff 6-27-79); 139 v H 244 (Eff 2-2-82); 141 v S 307 (Eff 8-22-86); 143 v H 222 (Eff 11-3-89); 144 v H 185 (Eff 7-1-91); 144 v S 192 (Eff 12-1-92); 145 v S 50 (Eff 8-31-93); 145 v H 107 (Eff 7-1-94); 146 v H 7 (Eff 9-1-95); 146 v H 278 (Eff 9-29-95); 146 v H 245 (Eff 9-17-96); 147 v S 45†; 147 v H 361 (Eff 12-16-97); 148 v S 266 (Eff 3-12-2001); 149 v H 675 (Eff 3-14-2003); 149 v S 227, Eff 4-9-2003; 150 v H 223, § 1, eff. 10-13-04; 151 v S 7, § 1, eff. 6-30-06; 152 v H 100, § 101.01, eff. 9-10-07; 152 v H 79, § 1, eff. 1-6-09; 153 v H 15, § 101, eff. 9-29-09; 2011 HB 123, § 101, eff. July 29, 2011; 2011 SB 171, § 1, eff. June 30, 2011; 2011 HB 153, § 101.01, eff. June 30, 2011; 2012 HB 487, § 101.01, eff. Sept. 10, 2012; 2013 HB 59, § 101.01, eff. Sept. 29, 2013; 2014 HB 493, § 1, eff. Sept. 17, 2014.

**Annotations****Notes**

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**Editor's Notes**

The amendments made by SB 45 (147 v —) were rejected by the 11-4-97 referendum vote on Issue 2.

The effective date is set by § 313 of 153 v H 15.

The effective date is set by § 609.03 of 152 v H 100.

See provisions of § 3 of 151 v S 7 following RC § 4121.10.

The provisions of § 3, H.B. 223 (150 v —), read as follows:

SECTION 3. Section 4123.35 of the Revised Code is presented in this act as a composite of the section as amended by both H.B. 675 and Sub. S.B. 227 of the 124th General Assembly. The General Assembly, applying the principle stated in division (B) of section 1.52 of the Revised Code that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of simultaneous operation, finds that the composite is the resulting version of the section in effect prior to the effective date of the section as presented in this act.

**Effect of amendments**

The 2013 amendment inserted the second paragraph of (A); and substituted “requirements of divisions (B)(1)(a), (b), and (e)” for “requirement of division (B)(1)” in the second sentence of the second paragraph of (B)(1).

The 2012 amendment substituted “including” for “excluding” in the last paragraph of (B)(1).

The 2011 amendment, by identical sections of SB 171 and HB 153, deleted the first sentence of (K), which read: “The administrator shall deposit any moneys received from a self-insuring employer for the self-insuring employer’s assessment to pay the costs solely attributable to the workers’ compensation council into the administrative assessment account described in division (B) of section 4123.342 of the Revised Code for the administrative cost assessment collected by the administrator for the council.”

The 2011 amendment, by HB 123, rewrote the second paragraph of (B)(2)(j) which formerly read: “The administrator shall not approve the application of a public employer, except for a board of county commissioners described in division (G) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code, a board of a county hospital, or publicly owned utility, who does not satisfy all of the requirements listed in division (B)(2) of this section.”

153 v H 15, effective September 29, 2009, added (R)(6).

152 v H 79, effective January 6, 2009, in (K), added the first sentence.

152 v H 100, effective September 10, 2007, in the first paragraph of (J)(2), substituted “bureau of workers’ compensation board of directors” for “workers’ compensation oversight commission”; and corrected internal references.

151 v S 7, effective June 30, 2006, inserted the fourth paragraph following (J)(2); and rewrote (L).

The 2014 amendment by HB 493 rewrote (A).

## **ORC Ann. 4123.74**

Current through Legislation passed by the 131st General Assembly and filed with the Secretary of State through file 14 (HB 52), with some gaps from files 6 (SB 38), 9 (HB 3), 10 (HB 29), and 11 (HB 64).

**Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated** > **Title 41: Labor and Industry** > **Chapter 4123: Workers' Compensation** > **Employer's Liability**

### **§ 4123.74 Immunity of complying employers.**

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Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the employer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter.

### **History**

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GC § 1465-70; 103 v 72, § 23; 118 v 422, Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53; 128 v 743(770) (Eff 11-2-59); 128 v 1334 (Eff 11-2-59); 141 v S 307 (Eff 8-22-86); 144 v S 192 (Eff 12-1-92); 145 v H 107 Eff 10-20-93.

### **Annotations**

### **Notes**

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### **Editor's Notes**

The effective date is set by section 21 of HB 107.