

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO**

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MAURICE GALES

Defendant-Appellee

CASE NO.

ON APPEAL FROM CUYAHOGA  
COUNTY COURT OF APPEALS,  
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 102809

**STATE OF OHIO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION**

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**EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT THE STATE'S  
APPEAL**

The State should accept this case for review and hold this case for *State v. Thomas*, Case No. 2015-0473. Senate Bill 2 (“S.B. 2”), the ‘truth in sentencing’ statute, which was made effective July 1, 1996, is only applicable to offenses committed after July 1, 1996. *See generally State v. Rush*, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 1998-Ohio 423, 697 N.E.2d 634. Specifically, Section 5 of S.B. 2 provides:

Section 5. The provisions of the Revised Code in existence prior to July 1, 1996, shall apply to a person upon whom a court imposed a term of imprisonment prior to that date and to a person upon whom a court, on or after that date in accordance with the law in existence prior to that date, imposed a term of imprisonment for an offense that was committed prior to that date.

The provisions of the Revised Code in existence on and after July 1, 1996, apply to a person who commits an offense on or after that date.

Section 5 of S.B. 2, (146 Laws, part VI, 7810).

Therefore, a defendant who commits an offense prior to July 1, 1996 is subject to the sentencing law in effect at the time of the offense. In turn, a defendant who commits an offense after July 1, 1996, is subject to sentencing under the statutory scheme enacted under S.B. 2 and H.B. 86, which was effective September 30, 2011.

This decision by the Eighth District in *State v. Kevin Bell*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102141, 2015-Ohio-4178, much like many other decisions before is a dramatic change in sentencing law. See also *State v. Wheeler*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102375, 2015-Ohio-3768, *State v. Stearns*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102463, 2015-Ohio-3239, *State v. Bryan*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101209, 2015-Ohio-1635, *State v. Thomas*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101202, 2015-Ohio-415, and *State v. Girts*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101075, 2014-Ohio-5545, *State v. Kent*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101853, 2015-Ohio-1546, *State v. Jackson*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100877, 2014-Ohio-5137 and

*State v. Owens*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102276, 2015-Ohio-3881. Together, these decisions hold that the S.B. 2 wall which separated crimes committed before July 1, 1996 no longer exists. The body of case law has tremendous impact on outstanding cold cases, any pre July 1, 1996 case that may be unresolved, or any number of delayed reporting case. The impact changes the landscape of what laws a defendant may be sentenced under when the offense was committed before July 1, 1996. The State of Ohio respectfully requests that this Court accept this case for review and to hold this case for the decision in *State v. Jermain Thomas*, Case No. 2015-0473, and to ultimately reverse the decision of the Eighth District, which fails to account for this Court's precedent and the intent of the General Assembly in reforming the structure of Ohio's sentencing law.

### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS**

In this case, the victim who was 17 years old at the time of the offense was raped by a male she only knew by his nickname and his page number. Although she invited him to her home, she wanted him to leave at the end of the night. That man raped the 17 year old victim. The crime occurred on August 13, 1994. The case was indicted in 2014 as part of the rape kit testing initiative. In 2012, the DNA profile from the rape kit resulted in a profile that was consistent with the Appellee, Maurice Gales. The case was indicted in 2014 as part of the rape kit testing initiative. Gales was found guilty of both rape and kidnapping and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for ten years. On appeal he raised 8 assignments of error, the State raised a cross-appeal, and appealed the sentence. The Eighth District affirmed the conviction and sentence. *State v. Gales*, 8<sup>th</sup> Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102809, 2016-Ohio-588.

## LAW AND ARGUMENT

**PROPOSITION OF LAW:** A DEFENDANT WHO COMMITS AN OFFENSE PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1996 IS SUBJECT TO LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE AND NOT SUBJECT TO SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF H.B. 86 EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 30, 2011.

A defendant who commits an offense prior to July 1, 1996 is subject to the law in effect at the time of the offense. This rule is contained in Section 5 of S.B. 2, which is uncodified law. Statements included in legislation but not placed in the code are “uncodified law,” and are part of the law in Ohio. See *Maynard v. Eaton Corporation*, 119 Ohio St.3d 443, 2008-Ohio-4542, 895 N.E.2d 145, ¶7. The original, unamended form of Section 5 of S.B. 2 reads as follows:

Section 5. The provisions of the Revised Code in existence prior to July 1, 1996, shall apply to a person upon whom a court imposed a term of imprisonment prior to that date and to a person upon whom a court, on or after that date and in accordance with the law in existence prior to that date, imposed a term of imprisonment for an offense that was committed prior to that date.

The provisions of the Revised Code in existence on and after July 1, 1996, apply to a person who commits an offense on or after that date.

Section 5 of S.B. 2 (146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 7810)

This was later redundantly amended through Section 3 of S.B. 269 (146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 11099) to emphasize that S.B. 2’s provisions apply only to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996 “notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code.” *State v. Rush*, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 57. *Rush* and Section 5 of S.B. 2 make clear that R.C. 1.58(B) do not apply to a person who committed their offense prior to July 1, 1996 and is sentenced after that date.

“Acts of the General Assembly (and the codified and uncodified statutes they contain) are compiled and published in Ohio’s ‘session laws,’ the *Laws of Ohio*.” A Guidebook for Ohio Legislators, *Appendix C*, pg. 169-170, <http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/guidebook/guidebook13.pdf> (accessed December 21, 2015). 2011 Am. Sub. H.B. 86 was then enacted by the 129<sup>th</sup> General Assembly and is published with the Secretary of State. *Laws of Ohio, 129<sup>th</sup> General Assembly*,

<http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/historicaldocuments/LawsofOhio/historical/129th.aspx> (accessed December 21, 2015). Also published are uncodified laws affected by the acts of the 129<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. This publication does not include Section 5 of S.B. 2 of the 121<sup>st</sup> General Assembly as being affected by any legislative act of the 129<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. <http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/laws/129/11-uncodified-affected.pdf> (accessed December 21, 2015). No express language in H.B. 86 repeals Section 5 of 1995 S.B. 2, and as a result that uncodified provision is still the law in Ohio.

In its analysis, the Eighth District interpreted Section 4 of H.B. 86 to make H.B. 86 retroactively applicable to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996. Section 4 of H.B. 86 provides that the amendments “apply to a person who commits an offense specified or penalized under those sections on or after the effective date of this section and to a person to whom division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code makes the amendments applicable.” Thus, H.B. 86 applies in only two circumstances: (1) where an offense is committed on or after September 30, 2011 or (2) where a person is sentenced after September 30, 2011 **and** R.C. 1.58 applies (emphasis added). Neither condition is met with regard to pre S.B. 2 offenders. The Eighth District reasoned that the lack of limiting language in Section 4 of H.B. 86, like the limiting in Section 5 of S.B. 2, should be read to mean that H.B. 86 applies retroactively to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1996.

Even though an offender such as Appellant/Cross-Appellee is sentenced after September 30, 2011, R.C. 1.58(B) has not been made applicable to him due to S.B. 2’s uncodified provisions, which have not been expressly repealed. *Rush*, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 57. The absence of limiting language in H.B. 86 does not expressly repeal Section 5 of S.B. 2. Nor should Section 4 of H.B. 86 be interpreted as a repeal by implication. As a general rule “repeals by implication are not favored, and the presumption obtains that the legislature in passing a statute did not intended to

interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter unless the [differences] between the two is irreconcilable.” *State ex rel. Fleisher Engineering & Construction Co. v. State Office Building Commission et al.*, 123 Ohio St. 70, 74 174 N.E. 8. The more recent amendments to H.B. 86 are not irreconcilable with S.B. 2. Therefore, Section 5 of S.B. 2 must be given full effect.

### **CONCLUSION**

The State of Ohio respectfully requests that this Court accept the State’s appeal for the decision in *State v. Jermain Thomas*, Case No. 2015-0473.

Respectfully Submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum was sent by regular U.S. mail or electronic service

this 4th day of April, 2016 to:

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