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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Dornette v. Green Bldg. Consulting, L.L.C.
| C-240689 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — REPLEVIN — BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT — ATTORNEY’S FEES — COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: In plaintiff’s replevin action arising out of a construction contract with defendant, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor where the parties had entered into a previous settlement agreement releasing each other from future claims related to the construction contract. The trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s request for attorney’s fees on its counterclaim for breach of the settlement agreement was not contrary to law where Ohio courts, the Northern District of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit have all held that a party’s expenditure on attorney’s fees due to a breach of a settlement agreement is recoverable as compensatory damages. | Moore | Hamilton |
10/29/2025
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10/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4944 |
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Ditech Fin., L.L.C. v. Balimunkwe
| C-240060 | FORECLOSURE — FORGERY — EXPERT WITNESS — EVID.R. 702 — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MAGISTRATES — STANDING — MORTGAGES — PROMISSORY NOTES — ABUSE OF DISCRETION The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s decision to exclude defendant’s handwriting expert under Evid.R. 702 where that expert failed to notice or indicate that two of the known signatures used as comparators and included in her report were, in fact, duplicates, and where the expert employed methods of magnification that yielded distorted results. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s finding that defendant’s signature on the disputed promissory note and mortgage were not forged, because the magistrate’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, given evidence that defendant had received a court order to refinance his home several months before the mortgage was signed and that highly personal documents regarding defendant’s finances had been transmitted to the lender around that time were included in the mortgage file. Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint, because, at the time of filing, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had been assigned the mortgage on the property. Plaintiff was not prohibited from introducing evidence of an agreement to modify the interest rate of defendant’s loan where plaintiff alleged the modified interest rate in its complaint and defendant impliedly consented to try issues regarding the applicability and validity of the modification agreement by failing to object to its admission at trial. A signed and notarized agreement to modify the terms of defendant’s loan was properly admitted as self-authenticating under both Evid.R. 902(B)(8) and (9). The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision applying the interest rate in a loan-modification agreement, because a finding that the party listed as note-holder held the note at the time it entered into the agreement with defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4884 |
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Ostigny v. France
| C-240210 | DAMAGES — CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT — R.C. 1345.09 — HOME SOLICITATION SALES ACT — R.C. 1345.23 — CIV.R. 37 — NOTICE — DISMISSAL — SANCTION — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Under R.C. 1345.09(B) of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the trial court erred in awarding damages beyond the statutory $200 where the consumer only established supplier’s liability for failing to comply with R.C. 1345.23(B)(1) and (2) and did not show any actual pecuniary loss from the proven violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs-suppliers’ remaining claims with prejudice under Civ.R. 37 where they did not comply with the court’s order to produce responses by a date certain and failed to offer any reason for the failure to comply, and the discovery requests had been outstanding for over one year at the time of the dismissal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4885 |
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State v. Riffee
| C-240535 | CRIMINAL LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL — SECOND AMENDMENT — R.C. 2923.15 – HANDLING FIREARM WHILE INTOXICATED — DANGEROUSNESS — ARTICLE 1, § 4 OHIO CONSTITUTION — REASONABLE REGULATION — MOTION TO DISMISS: The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Second Amendment: R.C. 2923.15 is sufficiently similar to our Nation’s history and traditions of firearm regulation. The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Ohio Constitution: limiting an intoxicated person’s use of a firearm is a reasonable regulation substantially related to the safety of the public. [See CONCURRENCE: In certain cases, a general “dangerousness” analysis could be used to more efficiently assess the constitutionality of a challenged firearm regulation.] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4886 |
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Gilbert v. Welter
| C-250090 | TESTIMONY — OATH — SWEAR IN — EVID.R. 603 — R.C. 2317.30 — — SECTION 7, ARTICLE 1 of the OHIO CONSTITUTION — WAIVER — PLAIN ERROR — MOTION TO STRIKE — CIV.R. 59: Where an objection to the trial court’s failure to swear in a witness is not timely made, any resulting error is waived. Where the trial court failed to swear in a witness before the witness testified, the court did not err in allowing the jury to hear the witness’ testimony or in denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike where the court administered a belated oath to the witness after testimony was concluded, the witness swore that the testimony previously given was truthful, plaintiffs had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and the record contained no indication that the witness would have testified differently had the oath been timely administered.Under these same circumstances, the record did not establish that the trial court’s failure to swear in a witness before that witness testified deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial or resulted in the rendering of a judgment that was contrary to law, and the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ Civ.R. 59 motion to set aside the jury verdict and order a new trial. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4887 |
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State v. Kinman
| C-240622 | CONTEMPT — RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS — RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES: Where defendant did not appeal the entry finding him in contempt and imposing a sentence, this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the assignment of error challenging the contempt finding. The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to compulsory process when it denied his request to recall the victim where defendant failed to subpoena the victim to testify in court. The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him when it denied his request to recall the victim where defendant thoroughly cross-examined the victim during the State’s case-in-chief. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4822 |
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State v. Oliver
| C-240702 | AGGRAVATED MENACING — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant admitted the victim could see her gun, and defendant told victim that she wished she had the gun loaded. | Moore | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4824 |
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State v. Thompson
| C-240720 & C-240721 | RECOMMENDED SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Where the defendant and the State agreed to a joint recommendation to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court was not required to make the consecutive-sentence findings, despite imposing a prison term that deviated from the joint recommendation for one of defendant’s underlying convictions. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4825 |
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State v. McKinney
| C-250007 | RESTITUTION — SENTENCING: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for damage to the prosecuting witness’s car hood where there was competent, credible evidence in the record to show that the economic loss sustained by the owner of the car was a direct and proximate result of defendant’s conduct in throwing a brick at the car’s windshield. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4826 |
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Burge v. Bethesda Hosp., Inc.
| C-250023 | MEDICAL MALPRACTICE — R.C. 2305.113(C) — STATUTE OF REPOSE — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — DISMISSAL — TOLLING — R.C. 2305.15 — R.C. 2305.16: The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s medical-malpractice complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where the claims were filed almost seven years after the alleged malpractice and the allegations in the complaint do not set forth any facts sufficient to indicate an applicable tolling provision that would extend the statute of repose under R.C. 2305.113(C) and cause the claims to be timely filed. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4827 |
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Ndiathe v. Ndiath
| C-250038 | DIVORCE — CONTEMPT — TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS — APP.R. 9 — APP.R. 16(A)(7) — R.C. 2705.02: Where defendant husband failed to file the necessary transcripts, this court will presume the regularity of the proceedings. Where this court must presume the regularity of the contempt proceedings and there are no apparent errors of law on the face of the trial court’s contempt decision, this court must affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4828 |
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State v. Beckley
| C-250087 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — ANONYMOUS TIP — MANIFEST WEIGHT — DISARMAMENT — POSSESSION OF A FIREARM — CONSTITUTIONAL/CRIMINAL — PLAIN ERROR: The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip because the information provided in the anonymous tip was both verifiable and reliable. Defendant’s firearm convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because although there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of the officers and the firearm was never identified or introduced into evidence, this was not an exceptional case where the evidence weighed heavily against defendant’s convictions. The trial court did not plainly err in failing to dismiss defendant’s firearms charges as being unconstitutional where defendant failed to show an obvious error, especially where the law surrounding whether defendant’s disarmament is constitutional is unsettled. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4829 |
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State v. Chambers
| C-240578 | MOOTNESS — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — R.C. 2921.31 — RESISTING ARREST — R.C. 2921.33 — MENS REA — SPECIFIC INTENT — FIRST AMENDMENT — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — SUBSTANTIAL STOPPAGE: Because defendant was sentenced only to the time he had involuntarily served prior to trial, defendant did not serve his sentence voluntarily, and his misdemeanor appeal was not moot. Evidence that defendant shouted and cursed at officers and his alleged victim in a manner that derailed the officers’ investigation, together with evidence suggesting an obstructive intent, including defendant’s refusal to sit on the curb and attempts to step away from the approaching officer, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business. Evidence that officers witnessed defendant obstruct official business, that defendant protested he did not wish to be arrested, and that the officers sought to physically seize and restrain him before he resisted, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4737 |
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State v. Saunders
| C-240664 | DOUBLE JEOPARDY — SUA SPONTE MISTRIAL — CONSENT —NECESSITY: The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based on double jeopardy where the trial court presiding over defendant’s first trial had abused its discretion in sua sponte declaring a mistrial: defendant did not consent to the mistrial and the original judge’s act of affirming the prosecutor’s recollection of an in-chambers discussion between the parties did not prevent a fair trial. | Nestor | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4741 |
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Quehl v. Roberts
| C-250031 | CUSTODY – MAGISTRATE – CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES – BEST INTEREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overturned the magistrate’s decision and denied a nonresidential parent’s motion to modify the custody decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities because the trial court had a duty to conduct an independent review of the facts and law, and competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that modification was not necessary to serve the best interests of the two children. | Bock | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4742 |
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State v. Bishop
| C-250050 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WAIVER — ALLIED OFFENSES — FAILING TO DISCLOSE A CONCEALED HANDGUN: Defendant waived his Fifth-Amendment challenge regarding the officer’s questioning where he failed to raise the issue in his motion to suppress. The trial court committed plain error by failing to merge the carrying-a-concealed-weapon and improper-handling convictions where the offenses were similar in import, committed at the same time, and committed with a single animus, where both offenses were based on defendant’s failure to disclose a concealed handgun to the officer. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4743 |
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In re M. Children
| C-250379 | PERMANENT CUSTODY – REASONABLE EFFORTS – BEST INTERESTS – MANIFEST WEIGHT: The juvenile court did not have to determine whether the child-services agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family when deciding a motion for permanent custody filed under R.C. 2151.413 where a reasonable-efforts finding was made at earlier stages of the proceedings. The juvenile court’s decision to grant the child-services agency permanent custody of the children based on mother’s inability to provide a legally secure permanent placement to the children was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine months before the custody hearing and had not distanced herself from her abusive relationship with father. [See CONCURRENCE: Given that permanent custody is the family law equivalent of the death penalty, and given that “behavioral change” is a vague term with no legal meaning, greater precision is required in distinguishing cannot-or-should-not-place cases, in which the juvenile court can consider whether a parent remedied the conditions that led a child to be removed from the home, from 12-in-22 cases, in which the juvenile court considers the broader question of whether a parent can provide a legally secure placement for the child.] | Bock | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4744 |
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Edelstein v. Edelstein
| C-240626 | DIVORCE — PROTECTION ORDER — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE —JURISDICTION — SERVICE OF PROCESS — EVIDENCE — EX PARTE — SUBPOENA: The trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over Respondent where Respondent failed to raise the issue of insufficiency of process by motion or in a responsive pleading and where Respondent fully participated in the litigation, effectively waiving the affirmative defense of insufficiency of process. The trial court’s issuance of a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where Respondent caused Petitioner to fear for his and the minor child’s safety and the child’s age and previous enmeshment with Respondent justified discounting the child’s testimony. The trial court did not err in quashing a subpoena for the minor child’s school records where Respondent failed to file the subpoena with the clerk of courts. The trial court did not err in finding no improper ex parte communications between Petitioner and the court where Respondent failed to substantiate the claim of improper ex parte communication. The trial court did not err in reviewing exhibits from the ex parte hearing where those exhibits were relevant to the proceedings, and where the issuance of the Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was based on testimony and exhibits issued at the full evidentiary hearing. | Nestor | Hamilton |
10/10/2025
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10/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4686 |
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State v. Reed
| C-240530 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS: Nineteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did not violate Ohio Const., art. I, § 4. Nineteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did not violate the Second Amendment. [See CONCURRENCE: Although defendant’s age alone could not justify restricting defendant’s right to bear arms, our Nation has a history and tradition of restricting all concealed carry, as explained in State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.).] [But see DISSENT IN PART: The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his charge for carrying a concealed weapon where the State failed to carry its burden under the Second Amendment to show that the charge was consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations, including demonstrating that the State’s reasons for the restriction on defendant’s ability to possess a concealed weapon was for comparable reasons as historical analogues.] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
10/10/2025
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10/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4708 |
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State v. Swanigan
| C-240598 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL — DUE PROCESS — R.C. 2945.38: During the course of a single proceeding, a defendant may not be ordered to receive competency-restoration treatment for a cumulative period greater than that specified in R.C. 2945.38(C). The trial court erred in ordering defendant to undergo six months of competency-restoration treatment, where defendant had previously undergone five months of competency-restoration treatment, a forensic examiner concluded defendant could only be restored to competency again if the six-month period was “reset,” and the parties did not dispute the application of R.C. 2945.38 to the proceedings below. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4648 |
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Souders v. Lazor
| C-240613 | R.C. 2323.52 — VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR — SCOPE OF APPEAL — FIRST AMENDMENT: The classification of plaintiff as a vexatious litigator was not violative of the First Amendment and the right to seek redress of grievances where the classification does not prevent him from seeking redress for legitimate grievances. An appellant challenging a vexatious-litigator determination must set forth more than a mere conclusory assertion that the litigation pursued by him was neither frivolous nor intended to cause harm to meet the burden to demonstrate error on appeal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4649 |
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Stansberry v. Theetge
| C-240687 | MOTION TO DISMISS — SERVICE — CIV.R. 5: The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff was not properly served with the motion to dismiss where the record shows that the motion to dismiss was served on plaintiff at the address provided in the complaint and subsequent filings by plaintiff, and plaintiff did not challenge service below or offer any evidence in the record that service was not accomplished. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4650 |
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435 Elm Invest., L.L.C. v. CBD Invest. Ltd.
| C-230599 & C-240596 | APPELLATE JURISDICTION — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — BANKRUPTCY — MOOTNESS — UNPAID JUDGMENT: In an action to recover on an unpaid judgment, the appeals are moot, and the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction, where intervening bankruptcy orders discharged the underlying debt and avoided “any and all judgment liens” in favor of the judgment creditor. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/3/2025
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10/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4606 |
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State v. Gray
| C-250119 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WARRANTLESS SEARCH — SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST — WAIVER — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — MARIJUANA — PROBABLE CAUSE — R.C. CH. 3780: Where the record contained no evidence that officers had a reasonable belief that evidence related to the crime of arrest would be found in the vehicle driven by defendant, and where defendant was secured in a police cruiser and not within reaching distance of the vehicle, a warrantless search of the vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest. Where a party fails to raise an argument below, the argument is waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. A vehicle search for officer safety pursuant to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), is not permissible where the officers have not yet determined if the detained individual will be returning to the vehicle. Following Ohio’s legalization of marijuana under certain circumstances in R.C. Ch. 3780, the odor of marijuana alone is no longer sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The odor of marijuana remains a relevant factor under the totality of the circumstances in a probable-cause analysis. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/3/2025
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10/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4607 |
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Bunn v. Hlubek
| C-240680 | MALPRACTICE — CIV.R. 10(D)(2) — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — COMMON-KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION: The trial court did not err in requiring an affidavit of merit under Civ.R. 10(D)(2) and not allowing plaintiff’s malpractice claim to proceed under the common-knowledge exception where all the malpractice allegations in the complaint are highly technical and concern matters of professional skill and judgment beyond the common knowledge of a jury. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4563 |
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State v. Williamson
| C-240692 | JUDGMENTS — COMMUNITY CONTROL — RES JUDICATA — APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL — SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Defendant’s new sentence for violating community control was not invalid because his original sentence, which had imposed community control consecutive to a prison term, had not been void, but merely voidable, and defendant had not challenged it on direct appeal. The court lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) to review defendant’s sentence imposed following the revocation of community control, where the defendant and prosecutor had jointly recommended a fixed, ten-year prison term for any violation of community control as part of defendant’s original plea, and the sentence imposed for violating community control was entirely consistent with that recommendation and within the range of sentences permitted by law. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4564 |
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State v. Hill
| C-240703 | SIXTH AMENDMENT — SPEEDY TRIAL — MOTION TO DISMISS: Defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights were violated by the State’s two-and-a-half-year delay between charging defendant with misdemeanor theft and arresting defendant for the theft where the State knew defendant’s address the entire time, made no effort to serve her with the warrant, and failed to rebut the presumption that the lengthy delay prejudiced defendant. [See CONCURRENCE: Where the State negligently allowed enough time to pass between the filing of charges and arresting defendant that the statute of limitations had lapsed, the State cannot rebut the presumption that defendant was prejudiced by the delay.] | Bock | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4565 |
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Fenner v. Durrani
| C-240498 & C-240499 | MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — ADVERSE INFERENCE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — DAMAGES — CIV.R. 19 — PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — PUNITIVE DAMAGES — R.C. 2315.21 — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST — R.C. 1343.03 — GOOD-FAITH EFFORT — R.C. 2323.43 — SETOFF — R.C. 2307.28 — R.C. 2307.25: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where the plaintiffs asserted the same causes of action against the same defendants and the expert testimony presented at trial focused on whether the surgeries performed on the plaintiffs were medically indicated, and because the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court’s instruction to consider each case on its own merits. [But see CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority’s opinion on this issue subject to a caveat regarding the proper postjudgment considerations when assessing prejudice from the joinder of trials under Civ.R. 42.] The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the active-clinical-practice requirement in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which assessed the competency of a witness to testify at the time of the alleged medical negligence, because plaintiffs’ cases were pending at the time that the trial court applied the amended rule. The trial court did not commit reversible error in issuing an absent-defendant jury instruction advising that defendant doctor’s absence from trial gave rise to a negative inference where it also instructed the jury that it retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider and award damages for past medical expenses to plaintiffs where it conditioned the receipt of those damages on the requirement that plaintiffs obtain releases from their insurers. The trial court did not err in including the jury’s award of past medical expenses when calculating the statutory cap on punitive damages. [But see CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: Where Appellants failed to raise an assignment of error or issue presented for review challenging the trial court’s award of punitive damages, this court should not determine whether the trial court’s award of punitive damages was proper when the issue of punitive damages was raised only within a sub-argument related to joinder, an issue which the majority opinion declined to address due to the lack of an assignment of error regarding joinder.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs made a good-faith offer to settle and in awarding prejudgment interest to plaintiffs where plaintiffs’ settlement offers were based on an amount that could have been awarded under available law. R.C. 2307.28, and not R.C. 2307.25, is implicated when one defendant seeks a setoff from the amount of damages owed to a plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s settlement with other defendants. Where R.C. 2307.28 prohibited plaintiffs from receiving a double recovery and entitled defendants to a setoff from the damages owed to plaintiffs based on plaintiffs’ settlements with other defendants, the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a setoff. Pursuant to the test set forth in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, the wrongfully-decided precedent in Eysoldt v. Proscan Imaging, 2011-Ohio-6740 (1st Dist.), and Adams v. Durrani, 2022-Ohio-60 (1st Dist.), which held that R.C. 2307.25 provided a narrow legislative exception to the general rule that among joint tortfeasors a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery and that intentional tortfeasors could not be entitled to a setoff, is overruled. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4477 |
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State v. Hodge
| C-240633 | CRIMINAL TRESPASS — EVIDENCE —SUFFICIENCY: Defendant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State failed to prove that defendant was without privilege to enter and remain on the property. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4478 |
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State v. Waters
| C-240659 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — TRAFFIC STOP — PROBABLE CAUSE — REASONABLE SUSPICION —AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in defendant’s car following a traffic stop where officers had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop based on their observing defendant commit a traffic violation and the officer’s smelling marijuana coming from defendant’s car along with defendant’s admission to having smoked marijuana recently provided the officers with probable cause to believe that they would find contraband in defendant’s car justifying the search of defendant’s car under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4479 |
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State v. Ponce-Suares
| C-240669 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A VEHICLE IMPAIRED ("OVI") — PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST — FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS — SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE — TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: Where defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because, even if the field-sobriety-test results had been suppressed, the totality of the circumstances support a finding that probable cause existed to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol where the arresting officer testified that defendant nearly collided his car with the police cruiser, committed marked-lane infractions, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and had the smell of alcohol coming from his mouth. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4480 |
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State v. Snyder
| C-230666 & C-230680 | HEARSAY — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DUE PROCESS — PREINDICTMENT DELAY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — FELONY MURDER — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — CHILD ENDANGERMENT-R.C. 2919.22(A) — IMPROPER VOUCHING — WITNESS COMPETENCY — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: Where parents were charged with murder of a child, felonious assault, and endangering children, a foster parent’s testimony recalling two of defendants’ children’s statements describing the defendants’ assaulting the victim more than two months after the victim’s death was not admissible under the excited-utterance hearsay exception because the children did not make the statements shortly after reaching “safety” and made the statements long after they witnessed the event, but the error was harmless because the hearsay statements were cumulative of the children’s trial testimony. Although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unredacted emails between defendant’s mother and defendant’s sister under the state-of-mind hearsay exception where only portions of the email related to the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, that admission was harmless as the email itself did not establish any element of any of the charges and other trial testimony was cumulative of the email. The trial court did not err by allowing a pediatrician specializing in child abuse to offer an opinion as to whether a bruise on the victim’s forehead was related to the victim’s fatal subdural hematoma because the expert was a pediatrician with 25 years’ experience who regularly consulted on suspected child-abuse cases, had reviewed the child’s complete medical records, and had consulted with other specialists. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendants’ convictions for felony murder and felonious assault where testimony established that defendants jointly struck their son’s head against a wall the day their son died, and medical experts established that defendants’ son died from a subdural hematoma that occurred on the day he died. The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain R.C. 2919.22(A) child-endangerment convictions involving two of defendants’ children where the State’s evidence involved affirmative acts of abuse that should have been charged under R.C. 2919.22(B), failed to establish the normal rate of weight gain for one child, and failed to establish that the children experienced pains associated with starvation; but the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a third R.C. 2929.22(A) conviction because expert testimony established that the child had experienced pain associated with starvation and malnutrition. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4444 |
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Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Krehnbrink
| C-240511 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — WAIVER — AUTHENTICATED EVIDENCE — CIV.R. 54(B) CERTIFICATION: The trial court properly granted mortgage-loan servicer’s motion for summary judgment on homeowner’s counterclaims where homeowners failed to submit authenticated evidence in opposition to summary judgment and accordingly failed to carry their reciprocal burden in opposing summary judgment, and homeowners raised several arguments on appeal that they did not advance before the trial court, and therefore were forfeited on appeal. The trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification of no just reason for delay was proper because the trial court’s order resolved all of the homeowners’ claims against mortgage-loan servicer and homeowners failed to perfect service on the remaining counterclaim defendants. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4445 |
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State v. Thacker
| C-240523 | SELF DEFENSE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT: Defendant’s convictions for two counts of felonious assault were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s claim of self-defense failed and because evidence showed that defendant’s fear of imminent death or severe bodily harm was not objectively reasonable where the defendant chased after fleeing would-be burglars and fired shots at them while they were driving away. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4446 |
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State v. Jenkins
| C-240565 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — CRIM.R. 12(F) — FINDINGS OF FACT —WARRANTLESS SEARCH — POSTRELEASE CONTROL — REASONABLE GROUNDS: The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and a gun found in a bag carried by defendant on the basis of the staleness of a tip where, even after five months, there remained a reasonable likelihood that the parole officer would find a gun in the bag defendant brought to a meeting because the tip was made by a reliable informant, defendant had not carried a bag during the parole officer’s previous encounters with defendant, and the bag defendant was carrying during a meeting with the parole officer met the description given in the tip five months prior. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4447 |
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State v. Mosley
| C-240574 & C-240575 | RAPE — MURDER — INTIMIDATION — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DISCOVERY — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The convictions for rape, conspiracy to commit murder, and intimidation were not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the jury believed the testimony of the State’s witnesses and did not believe defendant’s testimony, and the credibility of the witnesses is a determination for the trier of fact. Defendant did not establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance where counsel, after consultation with defendant, made a strategic decision to not oppose the consolidation of the indictments for trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call that was not disclosed until trial and allowing defendant a continuance to review the evidence where the discovery violation was not willful, the 911 call corroborated events, and the 911 caller testified at trial. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered defendant’s criminal history and his risk of future offenses, the need to protect the community, and the nature and circumstances of the offenses, including that defendant committed one or more of the offenses while awaiting trial. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4448 |
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State v. White
| C-250150 | RESTITUTION — EVIDENCE: Following defendant’s guilty plea to criminal damaging, the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution for drywall repair where defendant objected to the amount of restitution requested, and the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary restitution hearing prior to entering its restitution order. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4449 |
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Branson v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.
| C-240558 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — CONFLICTING TERMS — PAROL EVIDENCE RULE — BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING — BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: The trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant-bank on plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract following defendant’s liquidation of assets held as collateral to secure an asset-backed line of credit when the value of the assets fell below the contractually set minimum value because (1) defendant was not required to provide notice prior to the liquidation of the assets as while the contract contained conflicting terms regarding the need for notice, the contract specifically provided defendant with the power to choose the more favorable terms in the event of a conflict; (2) while the contract permitted plaintiff to pledge additional collateral to bringing his loan into compliance, the terms of the contract required that collateral to be either cash or marketable securities and plaintiff offered defendant neither; and (3) plaintiff’s evidence that defendant orally agreed to refrain from liquidating the assets during the terms of the 120-day loan was barred by the parole evidence rule as it directly conflicted with the terms of the parties’ written contract. The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing where defendant’s actions were authorized by the express terms of the parties’ contract. The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim where plaintiff’s complaint was limited to allegations of defendant’s self-dealing and plaintiff’s sole evidence in support of his claim related to defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff ten-days’ notice prior to the liquidation of the assets—which the contract did not require—and defendant’s failure to deleverage plaintiff in accordance with plaintiff and defendant’s plan as by the time defendant obtained control of plaintiff’s assets, the assets’ value had fallen below the contractually-determined minimum value resulting in a breach under the contract. [But see DISSENT: The trial court erred in finding that defendant-bank met its burden on summary judgment to show that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim where defendant-bank moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was permitted to sell the assets under the terms of the loan contracts without addressing its dual roles as lender and investment advisor and where none of the written agreements (the loan contracts or the written investment-management agreement) incorporate the dual roles played by defendant-bank or expressly acknowledge the conflict and risk involved or set forth how the dual roles may ultimately affect the investment account.] | Bock | Hamilton |
9/19/2025
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9/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4396 |
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State v. Dickey
| C-250022 | PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C) — VOLUNTARINESS — COERCION — CLERICAL ERROR — NUNC PRO TUNC: Where an allegation was made that the trial court gave “some indication” that it would impose a sentence that would “very likely be less” than the sentence offered by the State during plea negotiations, and where the trial court denied making any promises regarding sentencing, the record did not establish that the trial court’s involvement in the plea-bargaining process rendered defendant’s plea involuntary. Where the sentencing entry contains a clerical error incorrectly reflecting the count to which a weapon specification is attached, the error must be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry on remand. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/19/2025
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9/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4397 |
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State v. Thompson
| C-240446 | DRUG OFFENSES — WEAPONS — JURISDICTION — CONTEMPT — RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL — DUE PROCESS — CONFRONTATION — COUNSEL WAIVER — OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE — AUTHENTICATION — FIREARM OPERABILITY — COMPETENCY — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — CUMULATIVE ERROR: Where the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment in the trial court, he waived that issue on appeal; the trial court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant, and the judgment of conviction was not void. Where the defendant did not appeal the entry finding him in contempt and imposing a sentence, this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the assignment of error challenging the contempt finding. Defendant waived his right to be present at trial by refusing to attend and participate in his trial. Defendant’s being tried despite his refusal to sign the waiver-of-counsel form was harmless error where the trial court engaged in a thorough colloquy that established defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior drug sales where the evidence was necessary and relevant to the background of the offenses and explained the issuance of the search warrant. The trial court did not err in admitting still photos from a recording device where the officer authenticated the photos by testifying to the reliability of the recording device and the accuracy of the photos. The operability of the firearms was proven where the officer testified that a loaded firearm was found on defendant’s bed, a firearm with ammunition was found in the headboard of defendant’s bed with mail addressed to him, and the firearms, test-fire packs, and ammunition were presented to the jury. Defendant waived the competency hearing by stipulating to the contents of the report finding him competent. The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the firearms found on his bed and in his headboard with mail addressed to him; the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant possessed the drugs where the evidence established the drugs were found in his home, defendant prepared the drugs for sale, and defendant admitted drugs were confiscated from his home. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered the presentence investigation, defendant’s criminal history, which included offenses involving a firearm, the harm to the community from the offenses, and the necessity of protecting the public. Defendant failed to demonstrate that cumulative errors denied him of due process and a fair trial where he failed to establish any instance of error. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4359 |
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Navy Fed. Credit Union v. McAfee
| C-240451 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIV.R. 56 — AFFIDAVITS — BUSINESS RECORDS — EVID.R. 803(6) — PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: Plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on its action on account where the affidavit and evidence attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were inadmissible. The trial court abused its discretion when it considered the affidavit and evidence attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the affidavit did not cite the affiant’s personal knowledge as a basis for the statements in the affidavit and the affiant’s job title does not create an inference that the affiant had personal knowledge of either plaintiff’s record-keeping system or documents allegedly showing defendant’s outstanding balance. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4360 |
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State v. Miller
| C-240649 | ASSAULT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — WITNESS CREDIBILITY — SENTENCING — RESTITUTION: Where the trial court, which was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, specifically found the victim’s testimony to be credible despite its inconsistencies, defendant’s conviction for assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Where defendant had a lengthy criminal record including multiple convictions for offenses of violence, and where defendant had struck the victim in her side, hit her with a kettlebell, and slammed her head on the ground, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a maximum sentence for a misdemeanor offense and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of damages that the victim testified she had incurred as a result of the offense. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4361 |
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State v. Jones
| C-240449 | SPEEDY TRIAL – ACTUAL PREJUDICE – PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE – FAILURE TO REINSTATE DRIVER’S LICENSE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial rights were not violated despite an 11-month delay in executing arrest warrants where defendant failed to demonstrate how he was actually prejudiced by the disposal of a responding officer’s body-worn camera footage and where the circumstances surrounding the delay, including defendant’s driver’s license, which contained an outdated address, were not particularly egregious to warrant a presumption of prejudice. [See CONCURRENCE: Where an arrest warrant is executed beyond the statutory-limitation period, issues involving delays caused by a lack of reasonable diligence are better suited for statute-of-limitations analyses under R.C. 2901.03.] Defendant’s conviction for failure to reinstate license was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State only introduced defendant’s BMV record, which indicated that, at the time of the incident, defendant was under an active suspension, and no testimony was offered explaining if another expired suspension obligated defendant to reinstate his license. Defendant’s conviction for failure to maintain control was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness identified defendant as the driver and retrieved defendant’s wallet at the scene of the accident. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3297 |
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Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor
| C-240504 | DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — JUSTICIABILITY — DISMISSAL: Where plaintiff’s complaint for a declaratory judgment did not satisfy the justiciability requirement of presenting a live controversy, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: a collateral attack on a criminal conviction does not present a live controversy but instead asks the court to determine whether rights that were previously adjudicated were properly adjudicated and a declaratory judgment action cannot be used as a substitute for the remedies the Ohio criminal rules and statutes provide for direct review of criminal judgments. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3298 |
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State v. Jones
| C-240533 | ROBBERY — R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) — DEADLY WEAPON — EVID.R. 404(B) — BODY-WORN-CAMERA VIDEO – PLAIN ERROR – MANIFEST WEIGHT: When statements on the police officer’s body-worn-camera video indicating that the robbery defendant had committed other theft offenses were muted at trial but inadvertently sent to the jury for deliberations, no plain error occurred because the statements would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Defendant’s conviction for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the record shows that he used a knife recovered by Cincinnati police officers as he stole goods from the store. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3252 |
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In re G.T.
| C-240546, C-240547 | JUVENILE — SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in committing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services where the court did not base its decision on an incorrect statement of the dispositional alternatives under R.C. 2152.19: The court narrowed down the options in the juvenile’s case to commitment or out-of-state probation, and it properly chose commitment. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services instead of alternative dispositional options. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3253 |
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State v. McCollum
| C-250051 | AGGRAVATED MENACING — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court was aware of the witnesses’ close relationships to one another and, nonetheless, found their testimony to be credible. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3254 |
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State v. Howell
| C-250106 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — OPERATION — PROBABLE CAUSE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Because the State may prove operation of a motor vehicle through circumstantial evidence, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress her arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated for lack of probable cause that defendant had operated the vehicle where defendant admitted she was coming from Columbus, attempted to locate her driver’s license in the car, and was the only person standing near the car when the officer arrived. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3255 |
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State v. Bediako
| C-240567 | GROSS NEGLECT OF A PATIENT — R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — CAUSATION: The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the inaction of defendant, an employee at an “intermediate care facility,” upon finding her patient unresponsive was the actual cause of harm to her patient where the evidence fails to show when or how defendant’s patient died, or that Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation ("CPR") would have prevented harm to her patient. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3169 |
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Tirado v. Tirado
| C-240666 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: Father cannot prevail on his appeal challenging the trial court’s shared-parenting decision where Father failed to file a transcript of the shared-parenting hearing and failed to develop legal arguments in support of his appeal. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3170 |
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