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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Underwood
| C-250223, C-250224 | ANDERS — PLEA — APPELLATE COUNSEL: Where appellant’s counsel filed a no-error brief, and where the record contains a legal issue arguable on the merits as to whether the trial court’s involvement in the plea-bargaining process rendered appellant’s pleas involuntary, counsel’s motion to withdraw must be granted and new counsel appointed to brief the identified issue. | Crouse | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5726 |
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State v. Durbin
| C-250063 | EVID.R. 404(B) — OTHER-BAD-ACT EVIDENCE — PLAIN ERROR — EVID.R. 801 — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — R.C. 2903.11 — FELONIOUS ASSAULT: No plain error resulted from the trial court’s admission of evidence about defendant’s drug use where the evidence was relevant for the nonpropensity purpose of establishing defendant’s motive and where defendant suffered no prejudice from admission of the evidence. Where a statement is an admission of a party opponent and is not hearsay, a separate analysis must be conducted to determine whether the statement is admissible under Evid.R. 404(B). Where defendant checked into a hotel to avoid arrest, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a video of defendant’s subsequent arrest because the video was relevant and admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Defendant’s conviction for felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record shows that the victim was dragged and run over by a vehicle driven by defendant and suffered serious physical harm. | Crouse | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5724 |
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State v. Roberts
| C-250107 | EXPUNGEMENT — R.C. 2353.32 — R.C. 2353.33 — OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD — FULL AND FAIR HEARING: Defendant received a full and fair hearing because although the judge denied the expungement before defendant had the opportunity to be heard, defendant spoke before the hearing ended, which allowed the trial court to consider all defendant said before journalizing its judgment. | Nestor | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5725 |
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State v. Hardy
| C-250011 | MURDER — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE — COUNSEL: Defendant’s conviction for murder was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence presented at trial established that an individual wearing camouflage clothing was walking near the scene of the shooting at the time that the shooting occurred, a pair of camouflage pants and a camouflage jacket were found in defendant’s apartment, the camouflage jacket tested positive for gunshot residue, the murder weapon was found in defendant’s safe, and defendant’s DNA was recovered from the weapon and the camouflage jacket. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after a juror may have seen defendant in handcuffs where the record failed to definitively establish which juror was implicated and whether that juror, in fact, saw defendant in handcuffs, and where counsel weighed all potential options before electing not to question the jurors or move for a mistrial. Where the testimony that any expert may have offered was purely speculative, defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to engage an expert witness in crime scene reconstruction. | Crouse | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5723 |
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State v. Baxter
| C-240555 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS —IMPROPER HANDLING: The trial court erred when it granted 18-year-old defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge of unlawfully carrying concealed weapons: in State v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708 (1st Dist.), this court held that the State may prosecute unqualified adults for carrying concealed weapons. The trial court erred when it dismissed the charge for improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle: in State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.), this court held that the State has a lawful interest in regulating concealed weapons, and in State v. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 (1st Dist.), this court held that the statute prohibiting defendant from carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle until he reaches the age of 21 is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of restricting the rights of those deemed unable to responsibly carry firearms. [See CONCURRENCE: Pursuant to our Nation’s history and tradition, the state may regulate the manner in which individuals may carry firearms, but any age-based restrictions must be tied to the age of majority.] [But see DISSENT: Dismissal of the charges was appropriate because the 18-year-old defendant’s conduct would not have been criminal if he had been 21. See State v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, ¶ 48 (1st Dist.) (Bock, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), and State v. Barber, 2025-Ohio-1193, ¶ 64-79 (1st Dist.). | Moore | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5722 |
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State v. Cannon
| C-250313 | COMMUNITY-CONTROL SENTENCING — PLAIN ERROR — MERGER — DOUBLE JEOPARDY: The trial court did not err by imposing a jail term of 180 days as part of defendant’s community-control sentence, where the jail term was authorized under R.C. 2929.16(A)(2) and the jail term was not imposed as a result of actual vindictiveness. The trial court committed plain error, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, by imposing multiple sentences on two drug-trafficking convictions where the factual basis of the convictions was one sale of a single mixture of drugs, and the offenses should have been merged. | Zayas | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5729 |
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State v. Briers
| C-250267 | PUBLIC INDECENCY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s conviction for public indecency was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established defendant exposed his penis and urinated while standing on a public sidewalk on a public roadway next to a bus stop in broad daylight. | Zayas | Hamilton |
12/23/2025
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12/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5727 |
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State ex rel. Yost v. Elevate Smoke, L.L.C.
| C-250175 | MOTION TO DISMISS — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — HARMLESS ERROR — EXPRESS PREEMPTION — IMPLIED PREEMPTION: The trial court’s erroneous use of the standard for motions to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) when reviewing a motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 was harmless where the only issue before the trial court was the preemptive effect of federal law, a purely legal question. Federal law regulating labels and market authorization for e-cigarettes implicitly preempted claims under Ohio’s consumer protection law against defendant-retailer of e-cigarettes because those claims exist solely by virtue of the federal law requiring premarket review of e-cigarettes and those claims conflict with the federal law’s labeling requirements for e-cigarettes. | Bock | Hamilton |
12/19/2025
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12/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5652 |
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Scheidler v. Maciejewski
| C-250074 | CIVIL TRESPASS — NUISANCE — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — ACTUAL DAMAGES — PROXIMATE CAUSE — MOTION TO STRIKE — PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Where counterclaim plaintiff failed to establish that counterclaim defendant’s trespassory conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to her property, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding $8,000 in actual damages. Where plaintiff disclosed an expert witness well past the expert-disclosure deadline, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to strike the expert’s affidavit. Where plaintiff’s claims asserted that defendant’s actions caused erosion to his property, and where plaintiff did not present expert testimony regarding the causation of the erosion, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant. The trial court erred in awarding punitive damages in the absence of actual damages. | Crouse | Hamilton |
12/19/2025
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12/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5651 |
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In re A.J.
| C-250544 | BEST INTEREST – MANIFEST WEIGHT – PARENTAL TERMINATION – R.C. 2151.414: The juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting permanent custody of her child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where Mother failed to obtain sobriety, tested positive for various substances on toxicology screens, appeared to be under the influence during visits with her child, and failed to provide evidence of meaningful substance abuse treatment. | Nestor | Hamilton |
12/17/2025
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12/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5616 |
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State v. Desmarais
| C-250198 | OPERATING A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION — SUFFICIENCY OF THE CHARGING INSTRUMENT — UNCHARGED OFFENSE — NUNC PRO TUNC — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — PROHIBITED CONCENTRATION — PER SE VIOLATION: The complaint, which generally charged defendant under the per se section of the statute criminalizing operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, was not defective and did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the case where the complaint cited the “umbrella” paragraph in the prohibited concentration section of the statute and the State filed a bill of particulars prior to trial specifying the three statutory subsections upon which the prosecution premised its case, including sections for amphetamines and marijuana metabolite. The trial court did not convict defendant of a nonexistent or uncharged offense where the record revealed that the court merely cited the wrong statutory subsection in its judgment entry but articulated the standard reflecting the correct statutory subsection in announcing its verdict in open court, but the cause must be remanded for the trial court to enter a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the record to reflect the statutory subsection of which defendant was convicted. Defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolite in his urine was supported by sufficient evidence where the record showed that defendant was operating his vehicle and the defense stipulated to a laboratory report indicating defendant’s urine contained an amount of marijuana metabolite far in excess of the statutory threshold. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5541 |
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Littlejohn v. Am. Fedn. of State Cty. & Mun. Emps., Ohio Council 8, AFL-CIO
| C-250020 | STATE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD — EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION — COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT — UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE: The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, which essentially alleged an unfair labor practice, because the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) had exclusive jurisdiction to hear her claim, and where SERB dismissed her unfair labor practice charge for lack of probable cause, plaintiff cannot appeal that decision to the court of common pleas. | Nestor | Hamilton |
12/10/2025
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12/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5492 |
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State v. Bell
| C-250084 | OPERATING A VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — JURY DEMAND — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A VEHICLE WITHOUT A VALID LICENSE — SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE: In a prosecution for OVI and related offenses, defendant has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to file a timely jury demand where counsel told the trial court on the day of a scheduled bench trial that defendant wanted a jury trial, that counsel did not specifically inform defendant of his right to a jury trial, and that counsel assumed defendant wanted to waive his right to a jury trial based upon earlier filed charges, which had been set for a bench trial: Nothing in the record demonstrates that defendant was unaware of his right to a jury trial, and even if counsel acted unreasonably by failing to inform defendant of his right to a jury trial under these circumstances, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced where the trial court acquitted defendant of the impaired OVI charge and found him guilty of the per se OVI charge. Defendant has not shown his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained after defendant’s arrest for OVI: Although defendant lodges various challenges to the officer’s field sobriety tests on appeal, the totality of the facts and circumstances support a finding of probable cause to establish that defendant was driving under the influence without the field sobriety tests where defendant was driving his truck at a speed of 44 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone, the officer noticed an odor of a “fruity” alcoholic beverage coming from within the vehicle, the officer noticed defendant sweating and exhibiting watery eyes, defendant did not have a valid driver’s license, and defendant admitted to drinking a “half pint” of wine. Evidence is sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle without a valid license where the officer testified at trial that defendant did not have a driver’s license at the time of the offense. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
12/5/2025
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12/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5439 |
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State v. Harris
| C-240539 | AGGRAVATED MURDER — SELF-DEFENSE — PRIOR CALCULATION AND DESIGN — VOIR DIRE — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — JUDICIAL BIAS — CUMULATIVE ERROR — MOTION TO DISMISS — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FINDINGS — JAIL-TIME CREDIT — FORFEITURE: The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s self-defense claim where defendant was at fault because he chose to confront the victim, left the safety of his porch, and brought along a loaded firearm and where the record indicates defendant did not fear the victim but sought to protect the neighborhood from someone he perceived to be a car thief rather than fearing the unknown man. There was sufficient, credible evidence of prior calculation and design to support defendant’s aggravated murder conviction where the record shows that defendant pointed his gun at the victim three times immediately upon arriving home and seeing the man down the street and defendant then went up to his house, deliberated, and chose to leave the threshold and confront the victim with a loaded firearm in hand. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing defense counsel’s questions during voir dire about implicit racial bias after one juror mentioned having negative experiences at work with Black people where defense counsel did not attempt to inquire into that juror’s experiences and instead moved on to another topic and, moreover, where the defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike a prospective juror for cause because the juror strongly believed convicted felons should not be able to use guns for self-defense where, upon questioning by the trial court, the prospective juror indicated he could follow the law and be fair and impartial, and where the defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges. The trial court did not err in ruling that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments when she stated that defendant essentially admitted to the charges by pleading self-defense where the prosecutor correctly explained that defendant did not dispute fatally shooting the victim and where the trial court properly instructed the jurors on the law governing self-defense; nor did the prosecutor commit misconduct in initially omitting to mention the element of prior calculation and design for aggravated murder where the prosecutor mentioned that element shortly after; nor was it misconduct to argue that defendant was the initial aggressor as that argument aligned with the State’s theory of the case; nor did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by playing a segment of video footage during closing arguments that had not yet played before the jury where the footage was part of a defense exhibit that was admitted in its entirety and without any limitations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on defense of property where defendant testified that he approached the victim to see if the victim was breaking into cars parked on the street and where the instruction likely did not confuse the jury as it comprised just one sentence in the detailed self-defense instructions. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for a mistrial and a new trial where the proper vehicle to address whether the trial judge should have recused due to bias was an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03; nor did the trial judge’s conduct in overseeing the case violate defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial where, despite the contentious proceedings and repeated admonishments by the trial court, the judge’s words and actions did not surmount the high bar to demonstrate the appearance of bias or prejudice against defense counsel. Because there were no instances of harmless error, the cumulative error doctrine was inapplicable. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss without holding a hearing where trial court’s entry indicated that there was a hearing and the appellate court presumes the trial court’s entry accurately reflected the proceedings. The trial court erred in failing to include the consecutive sentences findings announced in open court in the judgment entry of sentence, which omission was correctable via a nunc pro tunc entry. The trial court erred in failing to calculate jail-time credit, which omission required a limited remand for resentencing so the court could notify defendant of the jail-time credit to which he was entitled and then incorporate the credit into the judgment entry of sentence. Defendant lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s order forfeiting the gun used in the shooting because defendant expressly disclaimed any ownership interest in the gun at trial and testified that the gun belonged to his girlfriend. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
12/5/2025
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12/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5438 |
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In re E.J.
| C-250454 | PARENTAL TERMINATION — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY —MANIFEST WEIGHT — R.C. 2151.414 — BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting permanent custody of her child to the child services agency was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the child had lived with the same foster-to-adopt family for five years, the child was bonded with the foster family, a psychological evaluation of the child revealed that the child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by Mother’s past neglect, Mother’s inconsistent visitations caused the child anxiety, and Mother abandoned the child for a significant period of time. | Bock | Hamilton |
12/3/2025
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12/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5404 |
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Newman v. Durrani
| C-250126, C-250127, C-250128 | FINAL ORDER — R.C. 2505.02(B)(8) — MEDICAL CLAIM — STATUTE OF REPOSE — R.C. 2305.113 — ABSENT-DEFENDANT TOLLING — R.C. 2305.15: Where the trial court determined that amended R.C. 2305.15 is not applicable to plaintiffs’ medical-malpractice complaints in the absence of express intent from the General Assembly that the amended statute applies retroactively, the trial court’s orders denying defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings on this basis of the medical-claim statute of repose are not final orders under R.C. 2505.02(B)(8) as the orders do not restrain or restrict enforcement of any state statute. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5329 |
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State v. Graves
| C-250194 | BURGLARY — SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for burglary was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the judge, in a bench trial, heard testimony from officers and the victim, watched body worn camera footage, and saw photos, all of which demonstrated forced entry by defendant. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5332 |
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In re L.K.
| C-250179 | CHILDREN — NEGLECT — R.C. 2151.03 — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Where the stipulated facts failed to establish that the child lacked adequate parental care or that, because of Mother’s conduct, the child suffered a physical or mental injury that harmed or threatened to harm his health or welfare, the juvenile court’s adjudication of the child as neglected under R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and (6) was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5331 |
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State v. Thurmond
| C-250035 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CONSTITUTIONAL — WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY — PENDING INDICTMENT: The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his charge for having weapons under disability where the State failed to carry its burden under the Second Amendment to show that prohibiting defendant from possessing a weapon while under indictment for a drug offense, see R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), was consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. | Bock | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5328 |
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State v. Henry
| C-250200 | ASSAULT — SELF-DEFENSE — BURDEN OF PROOF — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for assault was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the State met its burden to show that defendant was not provoked when he punched the victim in the face; testimonial evidence reflected the victim had not attempted to strike or otherwise interact with defendant, and the victim had his back to defendant when defendant turned him around and punched him in the face. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5333 |
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State v. Horton
| C-250167 | MOOT: Defendant’s appeal was moot where, after obtaining a stay of his sentence, he voluntarily completed the sentence while his appeal was pending. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5330 |
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Haggard v. Durrani
| C-240300, C-240301 | CIV.R. 42 — EVID.R. 601(B)(5)(b) — HABIT EVIDENCE — JURY INSTRUCTIONS— PUNITIVE DAMAGES — SETOFF — CIV.R. 19(A) — ABSENT-DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION — R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(b): The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 in joining plaintiffs’ medical claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, received similar surgeries from defendant, and presented identical expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a physician witness as to defendant’s habit in advising his patients where the physician witness did not testify to a proper foundation for defendant’s habit, but the error was harmless because there was no indication the jury relied on this testimony in reaching its verdicts. The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the standard of active clinical practice in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which applied to plaintiffs’ cases because they were pending at the time. The trial court did not err in issuing an absent-defendant instruction that advised that the defendant doctor’s absence from the trial gave rise to a negative inference but also advised that the jury retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in curing the absence of plaintiffs’ insurers as the real parties in interest under Civ.R. 19(A) by excusing defendant’s payment for past medical expenses, absent appropriate releases. The trial court did not err in limiting the demonstration of spinal anatomy by defense experts because such demonstrations would have been cumulative. The trial court did not err in allowing an award for the plaintiffs’ future medical damages where predictive evidence was submitted at trial. The trial court erred in failing to cap punitive damages against an individual doctor-defendant at $350,000 pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(b), as the statute imposes an absolute cap of $350,000 for individuals, but it did not err in failing to cap damages against a business at this rate, given that no evidence existed that the business was a small employer. The trial court erred in denying defendants’ request for setoff where this court recently overturned the precedent relied on by the trial court and held that intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). | Kinsley | Hamilton |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5327 |
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Provolish v. DeCioccio Showroom, Inc.
| C-250047 | CONTRACTS — Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") — USAGE OF TRADE — MAGISTRATES — APP.R. 34 — CIV.R. 53 Plaintiff-appellant’s request to strike defendant-appellee’s brief, made in appellant’s reply brief, was improper, because the appellate court’s magistrate had already issued an order accepting appellee’s brief, and that order had to be challenged in a separate motion. In a dispute over whether custom chairs conformed to the parties’ agreement, the trial court’s finding that measurements provided by the chairs’ manufacturer accurately represented the chairs’ dimensions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where buyer introduced no evidence of alternative measurements or to suggest the manufacturer’s measurements were invalid. The trial court’s finding that the contract’s reference to “seat depth” referred to the distance from the front edge of the seat to the face of the seatback pillow (rather than the seatback itself) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where seller introduced evidence that this definition was a standard usage of trade under R.C. 1302.05(A) and 1301.303(C), and where buyer introduced no evidence to rebut this. Where a contract to purchase custom chairs expressly listed several dimensions and provided that the chairs would be similar to a provided concept photo and based on the manufacturer’s interpretation of the concept photo’s design, the seller and manufacturer were not required to deliver chairs that conformed to the dimensions of the chair in the concept photo that were not listed in the agreement. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5253 |
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Kelley v. Horton
| C-240644 | EVIDENCE – RELEVANCE – HEARSAY – TIMELY – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – OBJECTION – CIV.R. 51(A) – WAIVER: Plaintiff’s failure to timely raise a hearsay objection waived the objection to the evidence on that basis: plaintiff’s hearsay objection was untimely where plaintiff initially objected based solely on relevance, only to renew the objection and assert a hearsay basis a day later after the witness was excused. Plaintiff’s acquiescence to the agreed-upon remote- or intervening-cause jury instruction, paired with plaintiff’s failure to object to defendants’ remarks that allegedly improperly shifted blame for her injury onto the plaintiff, constituted a waiver of the jury-instruction issue: pursuant to Civ.R. 51(a), a waived defect in a jury instruction shall not be considered on appeal. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5252 |
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State v. Smothers
| C-230663 | MURDER — GROSS ABUSE OF A CORPSE — TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — SEARCH WARRANT — PROBABLE CAUSE — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — POST-ARREST SILENCE — IMPEACHMENT — EVID.R. 403 ¬— SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — DUE PROCESS — BRADY V. MARYLAND — EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE — POTENTIALLY-USEFUL EVIDENCE — ADVERSE-INFERENCE INSTRUCTION — JUROR MISCONDUCT: The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence where the seizure of defendant’s car in Grant County, Kentucky, and the subsequent search of the car at the Sharonville Police Department was pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and not the alleged defective warrant that police obtained to search the car. The prosecutor’s alleged improper comments at trial did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct where the comments were either made to refute defendant’s testimony or based on evidence submitted at trial and where defendant failed to show, in light of other evidence of guilt presented at trial, that defendant would not have been found guilty of the charged offenses but for the prosecutor’s comments. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting photographs of the decedent’s autopsy where each photograph was relevant to illustrate the coroner’s testimony about the condition of the decedent’s body and the cause of death and the photographs were not repetitive as multiple photographs of the same area of the body showed different injuries to those areas. Defendant’s convictions for murder, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence were supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where (1) decedent’s cell phone and towels soiled with decedent’s blood were found in defendant’s car, (2) defendant’s DNA was under decedent’s fingernails and defendant had fresh scratches on his face, (3) shoe prints in the snow near decedent’s body matched defendant’s boots, and (4) “drag marks” and a blood trail in the snow led from defendant’s trailer home to where decedent’s body was found. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based on the State’s failure to preserve the sexual-assault kit or disclose its destruction where the kit did not contain materially exculpatory evidence and was not destroyed in bad faith: there was no allegation that the decedent had been sexually assaulted, any possibility that test results might have revealed another person’s DNA on the decedent’s body was purely speculative given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial, and the coroner testified that the kit had been destroyed due to storage constraints at the coroner’s new facility and because there had been no allegation of sexual assault. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant’s proposed adverse-inference jury instruction regarding the State’s destruction and non-testing of the sexual-assault kit where the record reflects that the coroner’s destruction of the kit was not due to malfeasance or gross neglect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant’s motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct where the court based its decision on each juror’s testimony that his or her findings were based on the evidence presented at trial, not the juror’s alleged experiment. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5250 |
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State v. Harden
| C-250130, C-250131 | POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.23 — JURISDICTION: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s untimely petitions for postconviction relief where defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and therefore could not show that he would not have been found guilty by a reasonable fact finder without the constitutional error at trial, as required by R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). [See CONCURRENCE: Defendant makes a compelling case for expanding eligibility for expungement and the legislature should consider doing so.] | Bock | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5255 |
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State v. Barker
| C-240408 | POSTCONVICTION PETITION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — PLEA — CIV.R. 60(B) — EXCUSABLE NEGLECT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate the dismissal of his postconviction petition where defendant met all three requirements for relief: defendant filed his motion within the one-year time period, defendant had a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his suppression hearing to present, and defendant’s failure to attach the expert’s report to the petition or seek a stay following the State’s response to the petition constituted excusable neglect where defendant’s postconviction counsel had previously filed a notice with the court explaining defendant’s intent to amend the petition to add the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim after receiving the expert’s report in support and explained that the delay was caused by postconviction counsel being unaware that a suppression hearing had occurred prior to defendant’s plea hearing when notice of the suppression hearing and the entry denying the suppression motion was never docketed. The common pleas court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s petition for postconviction relief where the court failed to engage in the proper prejudice inquiry with respect to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate whether he could effectively waive his right to self-incrimination based on his intellectual disability: where defendant had entered pleas of no contest, the proper prejudice inquiry was not limited to whether defendant’s suppression motion would have been granted but whether, if the motion to suppress defendant’s statements had been granted, would defendant have declined to enter the his no-contest pleas and insisted on going to trial. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5251 |
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In re D.B.
| C-250248 | APPELLATE REVIEW — CIVIL — JUVENILE — PRESUMED REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS: As appellant mother failed to cause the proper transcripts to be included in the record under App.R. 9, this court must presume the regularity of the proceedings and affirm the trial court’s judgment. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5256 |
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State v. Bailey
| C-250116 | FELONY SENTENCING — R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) — PRESUMPTION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL — R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) — IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS: The presumption in favor of community control under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) did not apply to defendant’s sentences where defendant was convicted of two fifth-degree felonies and, by its terms, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) applies only if the defendant is convicted of a single fourth- or fifth-degree felony. Defendant’s argument that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11(B) and 2929.12(A) fails because an appellate court cannot vacate or modify a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The trial court properly considered defendant’s possession of a machete during defendant’s attempted burglary because that fact was relevant to the seriousness of the offense and defendant’s conduct’s impact on the victim. | Bock | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5254 |
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Evans v. McGuffey
| C-250475 | WRITS — HABEAS CORPUS — BAIL DENIAL — R.C. 2937.222 — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — DUE PROCESS — NAPUE — SELF-DEFENSE Habeas corpus was the proper remedy for petitioner who alleged that he was denied bail without due process of law, because the trial court refused to reopen petitioner’s bail-denial hearing, such that he lacked an adequate remedy at law. Petitioner was deprived of his liberty without due process of law when he was denied bail because of the State’s knowing use of false and uncorrected testimony, and that false testimony could have, in any reasonable likelihood, contributed to the trial court’s decision to hold petitioner without bail. Where a police officer who investigated petitioner on behalf of the State then knowingly made false statements against petitioner in a judicial proceeding, knowledge of those statements’ falsity could be imputed to the State for due-process purposes. Although evidence of self-defense is not relevant to determining whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the charged offense under R.C. 2937.222(B), it can and should be considered when assessing whether the accused poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and whether any release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of that person and the community under the same provision. Petitioner demonstrated that he was unlawfully held without bail and entitled to a writ of habeas corpus where (1) petitioner claimed he shot the victim in self-defense, (2) a law-enforcement officer testified at petitioner’s bail-denial hearing that no witnesses had said the victim had a gun or had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (3) petitioner showed that the law-enforcement officer had interviewed witnesses prior to the hearing who told her that the victim had possessed a gun and had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (4) the State had introduced no substantive evidence regarding the shooting at the bail-denial hearing apart from the law-enforcement officer’s testimony, and (5) the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to reopen the bail-denial hearing after he had discovering the evidence of the officer’s false testimony. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5205 |
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Bruns v. Adlard
| C-240636 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — EVIDENCE — CONVERSION — CONSPIRACY — BURDEN ON APPEAL — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of money left in ward’s bedroom where the money was capable of identification and the evidence—when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian—shows that the ward held title or the right to possess the specific money at issue and the money was taken at the direction of defendant and given to her, with only a partial amount being returned. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s ownership interest in a limited liability company where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s ownership interest in the limited liability company. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s personal property where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s personal property that may have been removed from the Kentucky property by other prayer group members. The trial court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for civil conspiracy deriving from the alleged taking of cash from ward’s bedroom where genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the conversion claim on which the civil-conspiracy claim was based. Guardian failed to meet his burden on appeal to show error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a not-for-profit corporation on his claim for unjust enrichment where guardian failed to identify any specific money received and/or retained by the not-for-profit corporation. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence shows that the ward experienced palpable anxiety and was declared incompetent based on defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over ward. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on ward’s daughter’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to daughter, fails to show that any severe emotional distress experienced by daughter was as a result of defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over her mother, the ward, rather than as a result of the litigation thereafter. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5202 |
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Reisman v. Sanskar, L.L.C.
| C-250154 | AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE – ATTORNEY FEES – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – INDEPENDENT REVIEW – LANDLORD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION – SERVICE OF PROCESS – SMALL CLAIMS COURT – TENANT – WAIVER: The trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over plaintiff on defendant’s amended counterclaim where plaintiff failed to raise the issue of insufficient service of process of defendant’s amended counterclaim by motion or by responsive pleading and where he fully participated in the litigation, effectively waiving the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. The trial court properly considered the merits of defendant’s amended counterclaim, even though defendant filed it after 28 days, because the procedural rules in small claims court are somewhat relaxed to accommodate pro se litigants. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explain its reasoning for adopting the magistrate’s decisions because it was not required to do so in order to perform a proper independent review of objected-to matters. The trial court’s judgments comported with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and this court has proper jurisdiction because the time to appeal the final order did not begin to run until the trial court properly ruled on plaintiff’s second set of objections. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5203 |
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State v. Freeman
| C-250291 | R.C. 2941.25 — ALLIED OFFENSES — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — STRANGULATION — PLAIN ERROR: The trial court did not plainly err in failing to merge defendant’s convictions for domestic violence and strangulation where the convictions were premised upon separate conduct and import. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5204 |
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State v. N.S.
| C-250059 | RECORD SEALING — EXPUNGEMENT — R.C. 2953.32: Where the trial court concluded that all the factors under R.C. 2953.32(C) were met in support of granting defendant’s applications for record sealing and where the same factors apply when determining whether to grant defendant’s applications for expungement, the trial abused its discretion by denying defendant’s applications for expungement. [See CONCURRENCE: Where an applicant contemporaneously requests to seal and expunge a record of conviction, a trial court is not required to grant both, however, where the record supports both sealing and expungement, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying an expungement over sealing.] | Moore | Hamilton |
11/14/2025
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11/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5166 |
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State v. Sharkey
| C-240675 | BENCH TRIAL – BODY-WORN-CAMERA VIDEO – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – PREJUDICE – TRIAL STRATEGY: Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel’s decision to introduce body-worn-camera video constitutes trial strategy, and defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the introduction of the body-worn-camera video. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5117 |
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State v. Campbell
| C-250076 | EXPUNGEMENT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s application for expungement where the trial court considered the victim’s objection and sought additional information to address the victim’s objection. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5119 |
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State v. Higgins
| C-240723 | FELONIOUS ASSAULT — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s felonious-assault convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the factfinder determined that the State’s witnesses were credible and believed the State’s witnesses over the defendant. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5118 |
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State v. Norman
| C-240663 | COMPETENCY — RESTORATION — INVOLUNTARY-MEDICATION ORDER — MOOTNESS: Defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s involuntary-medication order is moot where defendant has been restored to competency, and the involuntary-medication order has expired. The exception to the mootness doctrine is inapplicable as defendant cannot show that the expired involuntary-medication order is capable of repetition yet evading review where defendant has maintained her competency over the course of six months pending her trial, and any subsequent concerns of incompetency require a new competency assessment and hearing. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5070 |
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Longnecker v. Velontra Inc.
| C-250082 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — JURISDICTION – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – R.C. 2505.02 — CIV.R. 54(B) — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his breach-of-contract claim against defendant corporation was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02 where the trial court failed to award any damages for the breach. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his declaratory-judgment claim was improper because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether plaintiff’s stock is subject to repurchase under the agreement: the terms of the stock restriction agreement are ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5072 |
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Sidloski v. Fischer
| C-240570 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT – PRODUCTS LIABILITY – DESIGN DEFECT – FAILURE TO WARN – PROXIMATE CAUSE – TORT – WRONGFUL DEATH: The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor regarding proximate cause because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a design defect in the jet boat and/or the lack of an adequate warning about carbon monoxide exposure contributed to the drowning death of a passenger. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor on the failure-to-warn claim because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the warning labels on the boat adequately apprised consumers of carbon monoxide risks. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor on the design-defect claim because the court impermissibly treated one factor of R.C. 2307.75, which sets forth the appropriate analysis for such a claim, as dispositive of the entire analysis, even though genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the boat was defective in its design, including whether there were economically feasible design alternatives. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5069 |
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Estate of Hodory v. Duke Realty Corp.
| C-240545 | CONTRACTS – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - ENFORCEABILITY – ESSENTIAL TERMS – AMBIGUOUS – EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DURESS – FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION – MUTUAL MISTAKE – CIV.R. 38(B) – PAROL EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err when it concluded the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement was an enforceable contract where plaintiff failed to demonstrate the agreement was a result of duress or that defendants had fraudulently induced plaintiff into agreeing to the terms: the third-party offer to purchase property in which both parties had an interest was made available to each party prior to the settlement conference. The plaintiff was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the enforceability of the 2019 settlement agreement where it failed to identify a legitimate dispute to the existence of the agreement: the settlement agreement was made in court and the terms were read into the record. The trial court did not err when it resolved an ambiguity in the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement concerning defendant’s expected obligations to minimize plaintiff’s tax exposure or in its conclusion that the term was not a result of mutual mistake: the settlement conference transcript and an evidentiary hearing on the issue reflected that the parties were aware that defendants were not going to amend past tax returns. Plaintiff was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before a jury on its motion to set aside the settlement agreement where it only sought equitable relief in the form of contract recission. The trial court did not err when it concluded the parties’ 2009 settlement agreement was unenforceable, because the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on all essential terms. The trial court erred when it interpreted a payment term in the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement as obligating defendants to pay plaintiff an additional sum above the intended settlement award when the term was unambiguous: the contract language clearly stated that the $150,000 payment was a part of the total settlement award. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5068 |
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Maccarone v. Mark Mandell-Brown, M.D., Inc.
| C-250052 | STANDING — PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION — RESTRICTIVE COVENANT — EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT — NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting employee’s request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the noncompetition restrictive covenant in the employment agreement between employee and employer where the record supports the trial court’s determination that the noncompetition restrictive covenant was greater than required for the protection of the employer. Appellant, a third-party plaintiff, lacks standing to appeal from the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction where the record does not support that the appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court at issue in the appeal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5071 |
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Toelke v. Williams
| C-250005 | BREACH OF CONTRACT — LAND SALE — DEFAULT: The trial court’s decision in favor of plaintiff on her breach of contract claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the terms of the contract required defendants to pay a certain sum at the time of signing, and they failed to do so: defendants could not produce receipts of later, smaller payments to or on behalf of plaintiff. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/5/2025
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11/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5032 |
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In re J.W.
| C-240566 | JUVENILE — CUSTODY — PARENTING TIME — MODIFICATION — SHARED PARENTING — EVIDENCE — TESTIMONY — RELEVANCY — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — EVID.R. 401 — EVIDENCE PRESENTATION — MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding father parenting time where the juvenile court adopted mother’s proposed shared parenting plan with certain modifications that supported the best interest of the child: the juvenile court’s findings that child was adjusted to father’s home, father’s schedule accommodated increased parenting time, father had increased his participation in child’s life, and father was willing to communicate with mother were all supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about mother’s alleged prior violence that occurred prior to the last custody order and prior to the child’s birth where the information was relevant to the current proceedings in that father offered the testimony to explain his behavior since the initial decree, including his trepidation in communicating with mother. The trial court did not provide father with any unfair advantage at trial due to the permitted mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence at trial where mother was ultimately permitted to cross-examine father on all his direct evidence, and she was permitted to testify in rebuttal to all of father’s testimony and was given the last word. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/5/2025
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11/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5031 |
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State v. Stonewall
| C-240607 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CONCEALED CARRY — IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE: The statute prohibiting defendant from carrying a concealed handgun until he reaches 21 years of age did not violate the Second Amendment because defendant is permitted to openly carry a firearm. The statute prohibiting defendant from carrying a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle until he reaches 21 years of age did not violate the Second Amendment where regulating individuals aged 18 to 20 is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of restricting the rights of those who were deemed unable to responsibly bear arms. [But see DISSENT: The statutes prohibiting defendant, a 19-year-old, from carrying a concealed handgun and transporting a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle until he reaches 21 years of age violate the Second Amendment as applied to defendant where the State failed to carry its burden to show that regulating a young adult’s access to firearms while travelling and ability to carry a concealed weapon fall within our Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation when the State presented no evidence to support the “why” underlying the challenged firearm regulations, which effectively prevented the identification of a similarly relevant historical analogue.] | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/31/2025
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10/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4974 |
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State v. Henry
| C-250188 | COMMUNITY-CONTROL SANCTION: The trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited the defendant from working in an establishment with firearms where the restriction had no relationship to the vandalism conviction and was not reasonably related to rehabilitation. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/31/2025
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10/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4975 |
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Dornette v. Green Bldg. Consulting, L.L.C.
| C-240689 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — REPLEVIN — BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT — ATTORNEY’S FEES — COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: In plaintiff’s replevin action arising out of a construction contract with defendant, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor where the parties had entered into a previous settlement agreement releasing each other from future claims related to the construction contract. The trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s request for attorney’s fees on its counterclaim for breach of the settlement agreement was not contrary to law where Ohio courts, the Northern District of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit have all held that a party’s expenditure on attorney’s fees due to a breach of a settlement agreement is recoverable as compensatory damages. | Moore | Hamilton |
10/29/2025
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10/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4944 |
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State v. Riffee
| C-240535 | CRIMINAL LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL — SECOND AMENDMENT — R.C. 2923.15 – HANDLING FIREARM WHILE INTOXICATED — DANGEROUSNESS — ARTICLE 1, § 4 OHIO CONSTITUTION — REASONABLE REGULATION — MOTION TO DISMISS: The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Second Amendment: R.C. 2923.15 is sufficiently similar to our Nation’s history and traditions of firearm regulation. The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Ohio Constitution: limiting an intoxicated person’s use of a firearm is a reasonable regulation substantially related to the safety of the public. [See CONCURRENCE: In certain cases, a general “dangerousness” analysis could be used to more efficiently assess the constitutionality of a challenged firearm regulation.] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4886 |
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Ostigny v. France
| C-240210 | DAMAGES — CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT — R.C. 1345.09 — HOME SOLICITATION SALES ACT — R.C. 1345.23 — CIV.R. 37 — NOTICE — DISMISSAL — SANCTION — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Under R.C. 1345.09(B) of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the trial court erred in awarding damages beyond the statutory $200 where the consumer only established supplier’s liability for failing to comply with R.C. 1345.23(B)(1) and (2) and did not show any actual pecuniary loss from the proven violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs-suppliers’ remaining claims with prejudice under Civ.R. 37 where they did not comply with the court’s order to produce responses by a date certain and failed to offer any reason for the failure to comply, and the discovery requests had been outstanding for over one year at the time of the dismissal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4885 |
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Ditech Fin., L.L.C. v. Balimunkwe
| C-240060 | FORECLOSURE — FORGERY — EXPERT WITNESS — EVID.R. 702 — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MAGISTRATES — STANDING — MORTGAGES — PROMISSORY NOTES — ABUSE OF DISCRETION The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s decision to exclude defendant’s handwriting expert under Evid.R. 702 where that expert failed to notice or indicate that two of the known signatures used as comparators and included in her report were, in fact, duplicates, and where the expert employed methods of magnification that yielded distorted results. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s finding that defendant’s signature on the disputed promissory note and mortgage were not forged, because the magistrate’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, given evidence that defendant had received a court order to refinance his home several months before the mortgage was signed and that highly personal documents regarding defendant’s finances had been transmitted to the lender around that time were included in the mortgage file. Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint, because, at the time of filing, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had been assigned the mortgage on the property. Plaintiff was not prohibited from introducing evidence of an agreement to modify the interest rate of defendant’s loan where plaintiff alleged the modified interest rate in its complaint and defendant impliedly consented to try issues regarding the applicability and validity of the modification agreement by failing to object to its admission at trial. A signed and notarized agreement to modify the terms of defendant’s loan was properly admitted as self-authenticating under both Evid.R. 902(B)(8) and (9). The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision applying the interest rate in a loan-modification agreement, because a finding that the party listed as note-holder held the note at the time it entered into the agreement with defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4884 |
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