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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Jones
| C-240449 | SPEEDY TRIAL – ACTUAL PREJUDICE – PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE – FAILURE TO REINSTATE DRIVER’S LICENSE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial rights were not violated despite an 11-month delay in executing arrest warrants where defendant failed to demonstrate how he was actually prejudiced by the disposal of a responding officer’s body-worn camera footage and where the circumstances surrounding the delay, including defendant’s driver’s license, which contained an outdated address, were not particularly egregious to warrant a presumption of prejudice. [See CONCURRENCE: Where an arrest warrant is executed beyond the statutory-limitation period, issues involving delays caused by a lack of reasonable diligence are better suited for statute-of-limitations analyses under R.C. 2901.03.] Defendant’s conviction for failure to reinstate license was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State only introduced defendant’s BMV record, which indicated that, at the time of the incident, defendant was under an active suspension, and no testimony was offered explaining if another expired suspension obligated defendant to reinstate his license. Defendant’s conviction for failure to maintain control was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness identified defendant as the driver and retrieved defendant’s wallet at the scene of the accident. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3297 |
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Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor
| C-240504 | DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — JUSTICIABILITY — DISMISSAL: Where plaintiff’s complaint for a declaratory judgment did not satisfy the justiciability requirement of presenting a live controversy, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: a collateral attack on a criminal conviction does not present a live controversy but instead asks the court to determine whether rights that were previously adjudicated were properly adjudicated and a declaratory judgment action cannot be used as a substitute for the remedies the Ohio criminal rules and statutes provide for direct review of criminal judgments. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3298 |
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State v. Jones
| C-240533 | ROBBERY — R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) — DEADLY WEAPON — EVID.R. 404(B) — BODY-WORN-CAMERA VIDEO – PLAIN ERROR – MANIFEST WEIGHT: When statements on the police officer’s body-worn-camera video indicating that the robbery defendant had committed other theft offenses were muted at trial but inadvertently sent to the jury for deliberations, no plain error occurred because the statements would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Defendant’s conviction for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the record shows that he used a knife recovered by Cincinnati police officers as he stole goods from the store. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3252 |
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In re G.T.
| C-240546, C-240547 | JUVENILE — SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in committing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services where the court did not base its decision on an incorrect statement of the dispositional alternatives under R.C. 2152.19: The court narrowed down the options in the juvenile’s case to commitment or out-of-state probation, and it properly chose commitment. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services instead of alternative dispositional options. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3253 |
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State v. McCollum
| C-250051 | AGGRAVATED MENACING — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court was aware of the witnesses’ close relationships to one another and, nonetheless, found their testimony to be credible. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3254 |
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State v. Howell
| C-250106 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — OPERATION — PROBABLE CAUSE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Because the State may prove operation of a motor vehicle through circumstantial evidence, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress her arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated for lack of probable cause that defendant had operated the vehicle where defendant admitted she was coming from Columbus, attempted to locate her driver’s license in the car, and was the only person standing near the car when the officer arrived. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3255 |
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State v. Bediako
| C-240567 | GROSS NEGLECT OF A PATIENT — R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — CAUSATION: The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the inaction of defendant, an employee at an “intermediate care facility,” upon finding her patient unresponsive was the actual cause of harm to her patient where the evidence fails to show when or how defendant’s patient died, or that Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation ("CPR") would have prevented harm to her patient. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3169 |
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Tirado v. Tirado
| C-240666 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: Father cannot prevail on his appeal challenging the trial court’s shared-parenting decision where Father failed to file a transcript of the shared-parenting hearing and failed to develop legal arguments in support of his appeal. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3170 |
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OTR Hous. Assocs., Ltd. v. Engleman
| C-240693 | EVICTION — FORCIBLE-ENTRY-AND-DETAINER — R.C. 1923.06(H)(1) — CONTEMPT — CURE: In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, the trial court erred in issuing an immediate writ of restitution without holding a trial on the merits. The trial court did not err in striking defendant tenant’s jury demand where defendant failed to pay the required bond. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant tenant an opportunity to purge her contempt for nonpayment of the required bond. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3171 |
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State v. Smith
| C-240579 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — MIRANDA — EVID.R. 404(B) — MURDER — WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress under Miranda where the evidence showed that defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time defendant voluntarily told detectives that he was not at the scene of the shooting, but instead at a Bengals tailgate and then out of town. The trial court did not err under Evid.R. 404(B) in admitting defendant’s ex-girlfriend’s testimony that defendant threatened to set her on fire the night before defendant allegedly shot and killed the victim outside the ex-girlfriend’s apartment: The State offered defendant’s threatening statement in the context of the ex-girlfriend’s broader testimony regarding the events leading up to the shooting, and the evidence was relevant to explain defendant’s identity as the shooter and his intent when the shooting occurred. Defendant’s murder conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s ex-girlfriend testified that she had called the victim to change the locks on the front door of her apartment to keep defendant out when defendant arrived unannounced and a fight ensued between defendant and the victim, the victim was shot, defendant left the scene, and police could not locate any firearm at the scene of the shooting. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3131 |
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State v. Marshall
| C-240601 | POSTCONVICTION — DNA TESTING — OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s postconviction application for DNA testing of a shell casing found at the crime scene where an exclusionary result would not have been outcome determinative: even if another person’s DNA was present, it would only suggest that another person loaded the gun, not that defendant was not the shooter in light of other evidence presented at trial implicating defendant. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3132 |
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Tabbosha v. Abdelrehim
| C-250001 | SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — ANNULMENT — RES JUDICATA: The general division of the court of common pleas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment that amounted to a request for an annulment where the domestic relations division of the court of common pleas has exclusive jurisdiction to grant annulments, and annulments represent a special statutory proceeding that cannot be circumvented through a declaratory-judgment action. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3133 |
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State v. Jones
| C-230564 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – CROSS-EXAMINATION – PRIOR TESTIMONY – EVID.R. 806 – HEARSAY: The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of the now-deceased police-officer witness given at defendant’s prior trial under the Confrontation Clause, where defendant had not been provided an adequate opportunity to cross-examine that witness at his prior trial because the State withheld records crucial to impeach the witness. Defendant’s ability to introduce impeachment materials against an unavailable witness under Evid.R. 806 could not render the unavailable witness’s prior testimony admissible under the Confrontation Clause, where defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine that witness in the prior proceeding. [But see DISSENT: The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the order excluding the testimony where the State had perfected its appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court of this court’s order denying the State leave to appeal the trial court’s previous order granting defendant a new trial.] | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3095 |
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Clark v. Durrani
| C-240294 | CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL — COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE — ABSENT-DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION — EVID.R. 601(B)(5)(b) — EXPERT WITNESS —PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — CIV.R. 17(A) —REAL PARTY IN INTEREST — CIV.R. 19(A) — JOINDER: In a medical-malpractice case, the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) where the evidence showed that reasonable minds could not conclude in defendants’ favor, and the weight of the evidence was not contrary to the judgment and no reason for good cause to grant the motions was shown. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendants’ request for a comparative-negligence instruction where there was no evidence to support giving the instruction. The trial court did not err a matter of law in giving its instruction on defendant doctor’s absence at trial as the trial court informed the jury that any inferences it drew from defendant doctor’s absence were permissive, not required; further, the fact that the jury found for defendants on some claims, and the instructions were tested by interrogatories, demonstrated the trial court’s instruction did not affect the jury’s verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting plaintiffs’ doctor-witness to testify as an expert where Evid.R. 601(B)(5)(b), as amended in July 2023, applied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff’s motion for past medical expenses where the plaintiff’s health insurer had a subrogation agreement under which the insurer would collect the medical expenses it paid on plaintiff’s behalf from plaintiff’s damages. The trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A). | Moore | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3096 |
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State v. Beard
| C-240388 | RAPE — R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) — SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — SUFFICIENCY — KNOWLEDGE — SIXTH AMENDMENT — VINDICTIVE SENTENCE: The State’s evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knew the victim was substantially impaired as an element of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) where testimony described the victim’s instability on her feet, heaving, and vomiting near defendant after drinking alcohol with defendant earlier in the night. Defendant’s conviction for rape and the jury’s finding that the victim was substantially impaired are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury believed testimony from witnesses and the victim describing her condition, which indicated that alcohol had impaired the victim’s ability to apprise the nature of her conduct and consent to sexual intercourse. Defendant’s sentence is contrary to law where the trial court’s repeated condemnatory remarks at the sentencing hearing about defendant’s not-guilty plea and decision to have a jury trial suggest that defendant received the maximum penalty for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3097 |
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State v. Hudson
| C-240554 | SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — IMPORTUNING — R.C. 2907.07: Defendant’s conviction for importuning was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile victim testified that defendant school-security guard texted her to determine what class she was in, showed up outside of her classroom, and when the victim left class to go to the restroom, defendant waited for her and then asked her to engage in sexual activity. | Nestor | Hamilton |
8/27/2025
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8/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3057 |
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State ex rel. Daniels v. Hinkson
| C-240688 | WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO — SUMMARY JUDGMENT— LACHES — MUNICIPAL CHARTER — REMOVAL OF OFFICERS: Relator was entitled to a writ of quo warranto ousting respondent from relator’s seat on the municipality’s city council where the city council failed to pass a resolution declaring relator’s seat vacant as required by the removal provision of the municipal charter, and therefore, realtor was never legally removed from his seat on the council and respondent was never legally appointed to fill relator’s seat. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/27/2025
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8/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3058 |
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State v. Protich
| C-240507 | CRIMINAL — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — CRIMINAL TRESPASS —RESISTING ARREST: Defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence as the totality of the defendant’s interaction with the police in which defendant argued with officers, refused to provide identification, attempted to walk away from officers after being asked to provide identification, “slung” his arm back when an officer grabbed his arm, and then physically resisted the officers’ attempts to restrain him constituted a substantial stoppage of the officers’ official duties. Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant refused to leave a brewery after being told by an employee to leave three times and defendant did not leave until learning that the police had been called. Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported by sufficient evidence where there was a lawful basis for his arrest as the police possessed probable cause to believe that defendant had criminally trespassed and obstructed official business. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2981 |
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State v. Walker
| C-240551 | R.C. 2921.13 – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – PURPOSE – SUBSTANTIAL STOPPAGE : The trial court’s finding that defendant acted with a purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was supported by sufficient evidence where the State’s evidence showed that uniformed police officers had been waiting to warn and cite defendant at the home of his ex-girlfriend, but that defendant, upon meeting the officers’ eyes in a well-lit hallway, fled, despite the officers’ commands to halt. The trial court’s finding that defendant acted with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, because circumstantial evidence of specific intent was not manifestly outweighed by the evidence that the officers never stated they were police and that defendant sat down and complied upon seeing additional officers in his path after a 40-second flight. The trial court’s finding that defendant hampered or impeded the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where officers had been waiting outside the apartment of defendant’s former partner in order to cite defendant on an outstanding warrant and warn him to stay away, and where they were delayed in doing so by defendant’s 40-second flight through a hallway, down multiple flights of stairs, around the apartment building, and over a fence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2982 |
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State v. Jeffries
| C-240695 | R.C. 2921.331 — FAILURE TO COMPLY — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(A) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence presented at trial established that defendant ignored repeated commands from officers to exit from a vehicle in which he was a passenger after the officers conducted a traffic stop of that vehicle. | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2983 |
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Ravenscraft v. Durrani
| C-240297, C-240298 | MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE — ADVERSE INFERENCE — PREJUDICE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 702 — COMPETENCE — EVID.R. 601 — HABIT EVIDENCE — EVID.R. 406 — JURY INTERROGATORIES — CIV.R. 49: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where (1) the plaintiffs received the same diagnosis and spine surgery from surgeon defendant; (2) expert testimony focused on whether those surgeries were medically indicated; and (3) the plaintiffs sought damages from the same defendants for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and informed-consent claims and the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court’s instruction to consider each case on its own merits. The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of surgeon defendant’s habitual assurances to patients under Evid.R. 406 without a proper foundation, but that error was harmless where the record (1) includes evidence of identical assurances to patient plaintiffs and (2) does not suggest that the jury relied on the habit evidence to reach its verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the physician witness satisfied Evid.R. 601’s active-clinical-practice requirement demonstrating the physician witness’s competency because the rule was amended during the pendency of the plaintiffs’ actions, and therefore applied to their cases, to permit a trial court to find that a physician who devoted half of his professional time to the active clinical practice in his field when the negligent act occurred is competent to testify as an expert. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on patient plaintiff’s comparative negligence where the evidence failed to show that patient plaintiff’s failure to complete physical therapy that surgeon defendant recommended was the contemporaneous, active, and efficient contributing cause of patient plaintiff’s injury. The trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury that surgeon defendant’s absence gave rise to a negative inference was harmless where the trial court explained that the decision to draw an inference rested with the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the neuroradiologist witness to testify about operative reports, explain surgeries and recovery times, and assess surgical technique because that testimony related his interpretation of medical imaging, which falls within the scope of a neuroradiologist’s area of expertise. Defendants forfeited their challenge to the trial court’s omission of a jury interrogatory where defendants failed to object to the trial court’s omission during a conference or at trial and defendants failed to argue that the trial court committed plain error. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2900 |
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Shteiwi v. Abdelmassih
| C-240429 | DIVORCE – DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS – SEPARATE PROPERTY – TRACING – CHILD SUPPORT – DEVIATION – R.C. 3119.23 – LIFE INSURANCE – EQUITABLE DIVISION: The trial court did not err when it found Husband failed to demonstrate that a rental property constituted separate property. The trial court did not err when it found Husband failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that subsequent rental properties were purchased with separate funds, nor did the court err when it found Husband’s expert’s tracing report to be unreliable. The trial court did not err when it adopted an upward child support deviation, and the court properly relied upon the relevant factors under R.C. 3119.23. The trial court did not err when it required Husband to maintain a life insurance policy that exceeded the total support obligation Husband would have provided his minor child until the child reached the age of majority if Husband remained alive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it equitably divided the parties’ marital property, nor did the court abuse its discretion when it required the parties to divide their cryptocurrency wallets by number of coins as opposed to value. | Moore | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2901 |
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State v. Williams
| C-240534 | GUILTY PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(a) — MANDATORY SENTENCE — COMMUNITY-CONTROL ELIGIBILITY — PLEA COLLOQUY: The trial court completely failed to determine, as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), that defendant understood he was facing a mandatory sentence and was ineligible for community control where its colloquy and the plea form misrepresented defendant’s eligibility for community control and the trial court failed to correct defendant when he requested community control at the plea hearing. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2902 |
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State v. Wilson-Jones
| C-240548 | SEALING — REHABILITATION — CRIMINAL HISTORY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s application to seal a 2012 drug-trafficking conviction based on defendant’s lack of rehabilitation where defendant’s criminal history revealed a pattern of drug-trafficking convictions following his 2012 conviction, defendant had only been released from prison for two years since his last conviction, defendant’s evidence of rehabilitation included facts that were true prior to his subsequent drug-trafficking convictions, and defendant’s remaining evidence was not so overwhelming that the appellate court could reverse the trial court’s judgment. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2903 |
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Harsh v. NHC - Five Points, L.L.C.
| C-240699 | CIV.R. 56 — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF PROMISSORY NOTE — BREACH OF GUARANTY — NOTICE — MITIGATION OF DAMAGES — WAIVER — AFFIDAVIT: Where the language of the promissory notes and guaranties precluded defendants from relying on a lack of notice of default as a failure to mitigate damages, and defendants presented no evidence or argument regarding plaintiffs’ lack of reasonable efforts to mitigate damages as the nonbreaching party, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding notice and mitigation of damages that precluded a grant of summary judgment. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment did not rely on a finding of credibility where the record lacked evidence contradicting plaintiffs’ affidavit’s averments regarding defendants’ outstanding principal balance on promissory notes and guaranties. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2904 |
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State v. Quattara
| C-240549 | VENUE: The State failed to prove venue where the State presented no evidence of the location of the soccer stadium where the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk to the health or safety of a mentally-retarded person or a developmentally-disabled person. | Zayas | Hamilton |
8/13/2025
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8/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2850 |
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Middlebrooks v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth.
| C-250049 | POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY — PHYSICAL DEFECT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: In a personal injury action brought by a tenant against a public housing authority stemming from a leaking ceiling in the tenant’s apartment, the trial court did not err in denying the housing authority’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of political subdivision immunity: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the tenant, a factfinder could reasonably determine under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) that the housing authority had notice of the physical defect in the tenant’s apartment prior to the tenant’s injury. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
8/13/2025
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8/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2851 |
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State v. Byers
| C-240147 | GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION — INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — CREDIBILITY: The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of gross sexual imposition because a rational trier of fact could find that the victim’s testimony proved that defendant had touched the victim to achieve sexual arousal or gratification where the victim described waking up in the middle of the night to defendant licking her toes before he rubbed her breasts. Defendant’s conviction for gross sexual imposition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim’s testimony established that defendant touched the victim’s erogenous zone to achieve sexual arousal or gratification, and the trial court found the victim credible and defendant’s account of the touching incredible. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2795 |
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State v. Harris
| C-240342 | FAILURE TO COMPLY — DISORDERLY CONDUCT — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Defendant’s conviction for failure to comply was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established that defendant stopped her vehicle in a lane of travel, was ordered to move her vehicle by a police officer, and remained in the lane of traffic, and the factfinder found the police officer’s testimony to be credible. Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct was not supported by sufficient evidence where no evidence was presented to prove that defendant’s shouting of profanities at a police officer inconvenienced the neighboring bystanders. Defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was not supported by sufficient evidence where no evidence was presented to prove that defendant’s conduct hampered or impeded the investigation. Although the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of failure to comply, the defendant did not establish that she was prejudiced by the error. | Zayas | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2796 |
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Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., Inc.
| C-240402 & C-240407 | CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION – IMPRACTICABILITY REQUIREMENT – NUMEROSITY REQUIREMENT – CIV. R. 23: In an action involving a dispute among the owners of condominium units in a 175-unit high-rise building, plaintiffs appeal a common pleas court order certifying a class action on behalf of 153 unit owners who filed counterclaims against the plaintiffs. Counterclaimants failed to meet their burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the numerosity requirement of Civ.R. 23 by failing to argue any specific facts to establish that the "class" was so numerous that joinder for purposes of class action certification is impractical where the potential class members were already joined in the litigation when named as "interested defendants" in the plaintiffs' complaint, were represented by the same attorney and law firm, and had already filed the counterclaims they sought to have certified as a class action. | Hendrickson | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2797 |
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State v. Henderson
| C-240434 | POSTCONVICTION RELIEF — SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS — EVALUATION: The common pleas court erroneously dismissed defendant’s petition for postconviction relief based on Ohio’s serious-mental-illness law, see R.C. 2909.025, where the record lacked competent, credible evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant had knowingly refused to submit to a court-ordered serious-mental-illness evaluation, which effectively led to defendant waiving his right to seek the commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment: the mental-health professional who was conducting the evaluation was not allowed to speak with defendant and therefore there was no evidence that defendant was informed that the evaluator was at the prison to conduct the court-ordered evaluation or of the consequences for not submitting to the evaluation. | Nestor | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2798 |
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State v. Grubbs
| C-240165 | EVID.R. 404 — MURDER — SELF-DEFENSE — COUNSEL — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT: While the admission of the still shot of a Facebook video portraying defendant and codefendant holding guns was admissible for impeachment purposes, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the still shot to be published to the jury bearing a caption containing both violent and racially pejorative language, however, the admission of the still shot was harmless error as the State showed defendant was not prejudiced by its admission as, if it were excised, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt remained to support defendant’s conviction. The trial court did not plainly err by admitting evidence of other guns and drugs where defendant cannot show, if the evidence were excised, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Defendant received the effective assistance of counsel as he cannot show that, had counsel objected to the evidence of other guns and drugs, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. While counsel’s statements regarding defendant’s initial burden of production were unnecessary since it is the trial court’s duty to instruct the jury on self-defense, it did not amount to a deficient performance nor was it so prejudicial to defendant as to constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel; further, counsel did not misstate the law as to a defendant’s initial burden of proof. The State’s calling defendant a “liar” on the record did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct where the statement was made based on defendant’s inconsistent testimony, and there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the State did not mischaracterize the forensic expert’s testimony that the decedent was not holding his gun when defendant used deadly force against him. Defendant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State’s evidence to refute defendant’s self-defense claim showed that defendant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of which the only means of escape was the use of deadly force, and expert testimony refuted defendant’s claim that he shot the decedent after seeing the decedent draw his gun. | Moore | Hamilton |
8/6/2025
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8/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2756 |
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Brown v. Reading Community School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
| C-240646 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — EXPERT WITNESS — SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT — NEGLIGENCE — STANDARD OF CARE: The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to a contractor in a negligence dispute on the basis that a settlement agreement entered into between plaintiffs and the contractor was a full and final agreement barring plaintiffs from raising claims for future damages. The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to defendants in a negligence action involving downhill flooding allegedly caused by construction because plaintiffs failed to provide an expert witness that could testify to the standard of care. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
8/6/2025
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8/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2757 |
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In re A.H.
| C-250178 & C-250209 | PARENTAL TERMINATION — PERMANENT CUSTODY — BEST INTEREST — LEGALLY SECURE PLACEMENT — LEGAL CUSTODY: The juvenile court’s judgment (1) granting permanent custody of the child to the child services agency was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) denying appellant-aunt’s motion for legal custody was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, where the evidence established that appellant-aunt could provide a secure placement without a grant of permanent custody based on an approved home study for placement, her prior experience as a foster parent, and her testimony establishing that she had strong protective instincts, and the juvenile court’s findings that aunt minimized the child’s mother’s substance abuse was based on speculative testimony. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/1/2025
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8/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2708 |
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In re R.K.
| C-250222 | PARENTAL TERMINATION — R.C. 2151.414(D) — CUSTODY PETITION — R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) — BEST INTEREST — R.C. 3109.04(F): The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying maternal grandmother’s petition for legal custody of the children where the court properly considered the appropriate statutory factors, see R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), to determine that a legally secure placement could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and considered the appropriate statutory factors, see R.C. 2151.414(D), to determine that an award of legal custody to maternal grandmother would not be in the children’s best interest where: (1) the children were strongly bonded to their respective foster families and the guardian ad litem ("GAL") supported the grant of permanent custody to the agency; (2) the children lacked a strong bond to maternal grandmother and did not wish to be placed with her; (3) the children were in the custody of the agency for more than 12 months out of a consecutive 22-month period; and (4) the children were in need of a legally secure placement due to mother’s inconsistent engagement in case-plan services, each father’s failure to engage in services, maternal grandmother’s refusal to engage in therapy, and the denial of grandmother’s home study. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/30/2025
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7/30/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2670 |
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State v. Rainey
| C-240497 | CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLY PREVENTED — NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion based on newly-discovered evidence where the new evidence, the codefendant’s confession, was not newly discovered but merely newly available for defendant’s use, and where defendant failed to show that, by using reasonable diligence, he could not have discovered the substance of codefendant’s now-available testimony within the 120-day period following the return of the jury verdicts. | Bock | Hamilton |
7/25/2025
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7/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2608 |
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Glick Mgt., L.L.C. v. Cincinnati
| C-240652 | R.C. 4513.601 – R.C. 4513.611 – R.C. 4513.61 – R.C. 2744.02 – POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS – PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS: Where plaintiff-lienholder’s complaint alleged that defendant-city had “seized” a vehicle in which it had a security interest, placed it in the police impoundment lot, and “sold” the vehicle, the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff-lienholder’s claims for violation of R.C. 4513.611, conversion, and unjust enrichment, because defendant-city’s alleged failure to provide notice under R.C. 4513.601 may have concerned a negligent omission in connection with a proprietary function under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), such that plaintiff-lienholder’s complaint did not clearly demonstrate that defendant-city would be immune from these claims. The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff-lienholder’s claim based upon defendant-city’s alleged failure to provide notice under R.C. 4513.61 where such a failure-to-notify claim under R.C. 4513.61 concerned an omission in connection with a governmental function, no provision of the Revised Code expressly imposed liability, and the complaint therefore clearly demonstrated that defendant-city was entitled to immunity. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/23/2025
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7/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2572 |
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State v. Jewell
| C-240406 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS – CUSTODY – WAIVER – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – COMPLICITY INSTRUCTION – JURY ADMONISHMENTS – R.C. 2945.34 – MURDER – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds that defendant should have been Mirandized; although in prison, defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation, given that the interview was conducted in an office at defendant’s initiation, defendant was not handcuffed, the interview was short in duration, and defendant could leave at any time. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because defendant’s voluntary participation in police questioning after expressly indicating that he understood his Miranda rights implied that he waived his right against self-incrimination. Defendant did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel where he could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s failure to cite the Ohio Constitution as a basis for his motion to suppress. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a complicity instruction where the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant was either the principal offender or an accomplice. The trial court failed to strictly deliver the jury admonishments required by R.C. 2945.34, but no plain error occurred since the outcome of the trial would not have been different had the trial court more rigidly followed the statute. Defendant’s conviction for murder was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record shows that defendant used his codefendant’s gun to pick up the victim with his codefendants and to shoot him on the side of the road. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
7/16/2025
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7/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2496 |
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State v. Kirkendall
| C-240438 | MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING — COMMUNITY CONTROL — R.C. 2929.25(A)(1) — HOUSE ARREST — R.C. 2929.01(P): The trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it imposed house arrest with a limited exception for treatment as a community-control sanction as punishment for a misdemeanor conviction because the statutory definition of house arrest requires an exception for employment. | Bock | Hamilton |
7/16/2025
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7/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2497 |
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Love v. Hamilton Cty. Job. & Family Servs.
| C-240468 | CAPACITY – CIV.R. 3(A) – PERSONAL JURISDICTION – CIV.R. 12(B)(2) – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – POLITICAL SUBDIVISION EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY – R.C. 2744.02 – PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: The trial court did not err in concluding that the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services lacked the capacity to be sued because no statute had given the department that capacity. Because the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services based on the department’s lack of capacity, and because a defendant’s lack of capacity deprives a trial court of personal jurisdiction over that defendant, the trial court erred by dismissing those claims with prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), rather than without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2). The trial court did not err in dismissing claims against individual defendants where plaintiff did not assert any cause of action recognized under Ohio law. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claim for gross negligence against an individual defendant based on political-subdivision-employee immunity, R.C. 2744.03, where plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant was, at most, negligent. Plaintiff failed to state a claim to recover damages for deprivation of procedural due process because no allegation in his complaint suggested that the named defendant either deprived him of a constitutionally-protected interest or prevented him from availing himself of the relevant protective procedures. Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which injunctive relief could be granted where nothing in the complaint suggested that the named defendant had the power to remedy plaintiff’s allegedly ongoing injury. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/16/2025
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7/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2498 |
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State v. Neal
| C-240674 | MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea where: (1) defendant was represented by competent counsel when he entered the plea; (2) defendant was afforded a complete Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy; (3) defendant failed to include specific reasons for withdrawing his plea; and (4) the record does not demonstrate that defendant did not understand the charges and possible penalties he was facing or had a complete defense to the charge. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/16/2025
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7/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2499 |
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State v. Deloney
| C-240009 | COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – CIV.R. 43(A) – JUROR BIAS – FARETTA – RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: The trial court did not err in failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte where defendant was previously found competent to stand trial and subsequent facts and events did not create a sufficient doubt about his competency. The trial court did not err in determining that defendant’s absence from trial was voluntary where defendant was offered the opportunity to appear in court each day and failed to present evidence to corroborate that his injuries or medications prevented him from participating at trial. The trial court did not plainly err in failing to strike two jurors sua sponte for bias where one was rehabilitated and the other’s responses were merely ambiguous. Defendant did not receive constitutionally ineffective assistance where counsel failed to strike two jurors either peremptorily or for-cause, but where one juror was rehabilitated and the other juror’s answers were merely ambiguous. The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s request to represent himself made on the third day of voir dire, as the request was untimely. Even assuming counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the suppression of defendant’s confession and exclusion of testimony of the State’s facial-recognition expert, defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because defendant failed to show that the admission of either the confession or the expert testimony prejudiced him. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/11/2025
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7/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2458 |
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State v. Policano
| C-240503 | RESTITUTION — ECONOMIC LOSS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on a contractor’s estimate for replacing the victim’s front door damaged by defendant because (1) the replacement cost is an appropriate measure of value where the value of the victim’s property before the offense is not readily discernable and (2) a lower estimate failed to account for the full scope of replacing the damaged property. | Bock | Hamilton |
7/11/2025
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7/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2459 |
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In re D.K.
| C-250160 | PERMANENT CUSTODY — SUFFICIENCY — WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD — R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) — LEGALLY SECURE PLACEMENT — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) — R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) — R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) — R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) — ABANDONMENT — R.C. 2151.414(E)(10): The juvenile court’s judgment granting the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services’ (“JFS”) motion for permanent custody was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) as the child had been in the temporary custody of JFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, and mother failed to remedy the issues which brought the child into JFS’s temporary custody where she (1) struggled with sobriety and consistency in engaging in counseling services throughout the three-year pendency of the case, (2) inconsistently visited with the child over the course of the proceedings, and (3) became homeless months before trial after she sold her home and obtained housing only days before trial commenced, and while mother did not abandon the child, father was found to have abandoned her. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/11/2025
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7/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2460 |
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State v. Miller
| C-240378 | RES JUDICATA — POSTCONVICTION — SENTENCE: Defendant’s postconviction challenge to his sentence is barred by res judicata where the trial court had jurisdiction over defendant’s case and person. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/9/2025
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7/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2423 |
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2900 Invests., L.L.C. v. Jebril
| C-240514 | RECORD ON APPEAL — APP.R. 9 — EASEMENT — PRESCRIPTION — EVIDENCE: The exhibits admitted at trial and held by the trial court exhibit clerk are a part of the appellate record under App.R. 9. The trial court did not err when it found that the plaintiff proved all the required elements of a prescriptive easement over defendant’s property where the evidence presented at trial definitively established the area over which the easement was claimed and how the area was used by plaintiff openly, consistently and without permission since 1990. The trial court’s description of the easement in its judgment entry was insufficient where the entry merely described the easement as the “property at issue” rather than providing a sufficient description of the location of the easement, such as by incorporating the survey map exhibit utilized at trial. | Zayas | Hamilton |
7/9/2025
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7/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2424 |
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State v. Dowell
| C-240712 | MOTION TO DISMISS – RESISTING ARREST – OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS: Where defendant resisted police officers’ attempts to take her into custody pursuant to R.C. 5122.10, Ohio’s civil commitment statute, the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s charges for resisting arrest and obstructing official business even though R.C. 5122.10 does not contain a criminal penalty for refusing to submit to custody, because obstructing official business does not require an illegal act to have occurred and the complaints, on their faces, fulfilled each legal element of the crimes charged. | Nestor | Hamilton |
7/9/2025
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7/9/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2425 |
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State v. Brown
| C-240328 | MANIFEST WEIGHT – MURDER – SELF-DEFENSE – SENTENCING – SPECIFICATIONS – R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g): Defendant’s conviction for murder was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because the State, in disproving defendant’s self-defense defense, demonstrated both that defendant was responsible for creating the conflict and that defendant lacked a bona fide belief that he faced imminent death or great bodily harm. The trial court did not err in failing to merge the firearm specifications for purposes of sentencing and ordering them to be served consecutively because R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) requires that certain offenders receive prison terms for multiple specifications, and imposing separate prison terms for multiple firearm specifications is required even when the criminal offenses to which those firearm specifications are attached have been merged as allied offenses. See State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370, ¶ 1. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2351 |
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Courtney v. Durrani
| C-240295, C-240296 | CIV.R. 42 — EVID.R. 601(B)(5)(b) — HABIT EVIDENCE — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE — ABSENT-DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION – CIV.R. 19(A): The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 in joining plaintiffs’ medical claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, received similar surgeries from defendant, and presented identical expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. [See CONCURRENCE: The trial court did not om holding a joint professional-negligence jury trial where this court’s precedent permits such claims to be joined and defendant-doctor failed to raise a general prejudice argument below; however, jointing professional-negligence claims for trial against the same defendant-professional carries an unacceptable risk of prejudice from jury confusion and verdicts based on improper propensity considerations.] The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a physician witness as to defendant’s habit in advising his patients where the physician witness did not testify to a proper foundation for defendant’s habit, but the error was harmless because there was no indication the jury relied on this testimony in reaching its verdicts. The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the standard of active clinical practice in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which applied to plaintiffs’ cases because they were pending at the time. The trial court did not err in rejecting defendants’ request for a comparative negligence jury instruction, because defendants failed to present evidence that plaintiffs’ failure to complete physical therapy and their return to demanding jobs caused their ongoing injuries. The trial court did not commit reversible error in issuing an absent-defendant jury instruction that advised that defendant doctor’s absence from trial gave rise to a negative inference but also advised that the jury retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in determining that joining plaintiffs’ insurers as the real parties in interest under Civ.R. 19(A) was infeasible on the eve of trial and in curing their absence from trial by excusing defendant’s payment for past medical expenses absent appropriate releases. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
7/2/2025
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7/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2335 |
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State v. Benson
| C-240369 | POSTCONVICTION PETITION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — EXPERT TESTIMONY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s R.C. 2953.21 petition for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing where defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of her trial would have been different but for her trial counsel’s failure to qualify the defense witness as an expert so as to challenge the State’s expert witness in accident reconstruction where: the defense witness was an expert in videography and computer imaging and not accident reconstruction; the jury was able to review the extensive video evidence for themselves and observe any details that the defense witness would have testified about; the jury heard the defense witness’s trial testimony that the video showed that defendant driver’s front tires had already been turned towards the victim as a result of defendant driver reversing her car; and defendant driver’s credibility was damaged where the video evidence contradicted defendant driver’s statement to police. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/2/2025
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7/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2336 |
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