| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Flannery
| C-240419 | GRAND JURY — DISCLOSE OF TRANSCRIPTS — PARTICULARIZED NEED: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering full disclosure of grand jury transcripts to defense counsel where lesser remedies would adequately furnish the factual bases necessary for the trial court to decide the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on allegations that the grand jury was biased due to the prosecution’s failure to present substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/28/2025
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3/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1074 |
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State v. Poveda
| C-240496 | SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08 — R.C. 2929.12 — IMMIGRATION STATUS: An appellate court cannot vacate or modify a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) based on its view that the imposed sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), the trial court properly considered whether the offender’s conduct constituted the worst form of the offense. Where the offender’s immigration status was one of many considerations that the trial court relied on when imposing a maximum sentence, the court did not err in considering the immigration status under R.C. 2929.12. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/28/2025
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3/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1075 |
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Rick & Charles Invests., L.L.C. v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc.
| C-240456 | INSURANCE — VACANCY — CUSTOMARY OPERATIONS — BAD FAITH — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Where the customary operations of the insured property were those of a church or synagogue, and where the property was not being used for those purposes, but rather was used as a warehouse, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the insurer on a claim for breach of contract because the insurer properly denied coverage under a vacancy provision in the policy that required at least 31 percent of the property be used to conduct customary operations. Where the insurer had a reasonable justification to deny coverage, the insurer did not act in bad faith and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the insurer on the insured’s claim for bad-faith denial of coverage. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/26/2025
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3/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1035 |
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Harmon v. Walters
| C-240321 | MOTION TO WITHDRAW — INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff’s counsels’ motion to withdraw where the record reflects that plaintiff’s first attorney withdrew while plaintiff was still represented by two other attorneys from the same law firm, and where the record reflects that plaintiff attended a hearing on a motion to withdraw filed by the two remaining attorneys, who alleged that plaintiff had terminated their relationship, and plaintiff did not object to their withdrawal, and therefore, plaintiff waived any issue with regard to the withdrawal of his second and third attorneys. The trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff’s case under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a pretrial filing deadline where the trial court did not give plaintiff an opportunity to explain noncompliance with the pretrial filing deadline before dismissing plaintiff’s case. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/26/2025
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3/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1037 |
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State v. Walker
| C-240357, C-240358 | CRIM.R. 44 — WAIVER OF COUNSEL — VENUE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — IMPROPERLY DISCHARGING A FIREARM AT OR INTO A HABITATION — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY: The trial court substantially complied with the requisite Crim.R. 44 colloquy during its extensive inquiry to determine whether defendant was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and appointed standby counsel who was present throughout the trial, and therefore, defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court did not err in entering convictions for two counts of felonious assault and one count of having weapons while under a disability where the State proved venue beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial and direct evidence. Defendant is discharged from his conviction for receiving stolen property where the State concedes the record is devoid of evidence that defendant knew the handgun used in the commission of the offenses was stolen. Defendant’s conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant’s identity as a complicitor in the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and witness testimony—one being a codefendant—and where defendant conceded on appeal that he made statements to encourage his codefendant to shoot the victim, who was standing in front of his home when the codefendant opened fire. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/21/2025
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3/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-975 |
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State v. Sherman
| C-240472 | JAIL-TIME CREDIT — MOOTNESS — POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant’s appeal was not moot where, although his prison sentence was completed by the time his appeal was heard, he remained under postrelease control, which satisfies his burden of demonstrating an adverse legal consequence of his conviction. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for jail-time credit where the credit he sought was served pending a different, unrelated criminal conviction. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/21/2025
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3/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-976 |
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Tyra v. Griffith
| C-240189 | DOMESTIC RELATIONS — PARENTING TIME — R.C. 3109.051(D) MODIFICATION — DUE PROCESS — CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE — NOTICE — FORFEITURE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant-mother’s motion to modify appellee-father’s parenting time because evidence in the record of Father’s progress in his relationship with his children supported the trial court’s determination that an increase in parenting time was in the children’s best interest under R.C. 3109.051. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited appellant-mother’s evidence to events that occurred after 2022 because evidence of appellee-father’s 2013 conviction was cumulative to the evidence of that conviction that was already in the record, and because the trial court’s temporal limitation was consistent with a 2022 agreed entry reinstating appellee-father’s parenting time that the parties submitted six months after appellee-father was charged with domestic violence. Appellant-mother forfeited her challenge to the admission of the Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL")’s testimony on appeal because she failed to object to the GAL’s testimony at the hearing and failed to argue that the admission of that testimony was plain error. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/19/2025
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3/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-912 |
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In re Estate of Joseph
| C-240150 | PROBATE — LOST WILL — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: In a probate case, appellant failed to file a transcript of the hearing on his application to admit a lost will, and therefore, he cannot establish any error on the part of the probate court in denying the admission of the lost will to probate. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/14/2025
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3/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-858 |
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State v. Lawson
| C-240325 | SPEEDY TRIAL – R.C. 2945.71 – PLEAS – WAIVER: Defendant’s voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his statutory speedy-trial rights under R.C. 2945.71. Defendant’s voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of his constitutional speedy-trial rights where the trial judge informed defendant that his plea would waive his constitutional right to a speedy trial. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-818 |
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Wilson v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| C-240284 | FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT – NEGLIGENCE – RAILROADS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – CAUSATION: Disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on plaintiff employee’s Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) claim where plaintiff testified in his deposition that defendant railroad had failed to repair the nonfunctioning crane on his work truck, where he testified that failure to repair required plaintiff to repeatedly lift abnormally heavy objects into his truck, and where plaintiff introduced expert affidavits attesting that “excessive physical labor at the railroad” caused plaintiff’s knee and back injuries. Plaintiff did not provide evidence of railroad negligence under FELA where plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant railroad had failed to perform certain assessments and offer certain trainings, but provided no evidence of what those assessments would have disclosed or what those trainings would have taught. Expert doctors’ affidavits attesting that “excessive physical labor at the railroad” caused plaintiff’s degenerative injuries did not provide adequate evidence to show that plaintiff’s trip-and-fall on a particular date played a part in those degenerative injuries. Plaintiff failed to show that defendant railroad breached its duty of care | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-819 |
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In re T.C.
| C-240145 | SEXUAL IMPOSITION — CORROBORATION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION: The juvenile’s adjudication for sexual imposition was supported by corroborating evidence where the victim immediately disclosed the offense to multiple individuals, and the juvenile repeatedly apologized and made admissions via text messages. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision because the State provided sufficient corroborating evidence, the juvenile’s assertion that the juvenile court would have made different credibility determinations is speculative, and counsel’s admission that the juvenile engaged in offensive sexual contact occurred after his adjudication, and therefore, did not prejudice the juvenile. The trial court did not err in classifying the juvenile as a sex offender because the offense involved offensive sexual contact, which, by definition, is not consensual. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-820 |
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In re S/F Children
| C-240651, C-240676 | PERMANENT CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: The juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where domestic violence was the basis for removing the children from the home, where that domestic violence persisted throughout the proceedings, and where the trial court reasonably determined that mother and father continued to be “intertwined in each other’s lives.” The juvenile court did not plainly err in not rejecting the magistrate’s decision because of the alleged ineffective assistance of the children’s appointed counsel. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/12/2025
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3/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-822 |
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GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Falah
| C-240332 | CIV.R. 60(B) — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT — AFFIDAVIT — EXCUSABLE NEGLECT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where defendant submitted an affidavit in support of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court’s entry granting the motion. Where the record contained evidence in support of a motion for relief from judgment in the form of an affidavit, and where the party opposing the motion failed to respond, failed to raise a challenge to the credibility of the statements in the affidavit, and failed to request the opportunity to present its own evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to take additional evidence before ruling on the motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to issue findings of fact in support of its ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, particularly where no such request was made by a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Where defendant admitted receiving service of the complaint, contacted counsel for plaintiff to tell counsel that defendant had not been involved in the automobile accident that was the subject of the complaint, failed to receive a response from plaintiff’s counsel, and failed to respond to the complaint based on a belief that it was a scam, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the presence of excusable neglect and in granting defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/7/2025
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3/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-755 |
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Brock v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| C-240133 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — ADMINISTRATIVE — ZONING — R.C. 2506.04 — APP.R. 16: In an administrative zoning appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to set forth arguments in compliance with App.R. 16(A)(7) that demonstrate error by the court of common pleas that is reviewable by the appellate court under R.C. 2506.04. The record does not show that the trial court failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence where the trial court expressly stated that it reviewed the administrative transcript and the additional evidence filed by the appellants, and there is nothing contradictory in the record. The appellants failed to demonstrate error in the trial court’s decision where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument. The appellants failed to establish an improper administrative search where they failed to cite to the record in support of their argument, and did not identify the precise incident from which they claimed an improper search. The appellants failed to establish a “misapplication of the zoning laws” where they failed to identify any zoning provision that was misapplied. The appellants failed to establish error in the trial court’s decision where they argue noncompliance with a zoning provision that is inapplicable to the cause before the court. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/5/2025
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3/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-717 |
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State v. Sexton
| C-240274 | FELONIOUS ASSAULT — SELF-DEFENSE — DEADLY FORCE — ALLIED OFFENSES: Defendant’s convictions for felonious assault were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence on defendant’s claim of self-defense where the record credibly supports that defendant acted as the first aggressor by striking the victim with a landscaping machete when the victim attempted to remove his wayward dog from defendant’s open truck and credible evidence negated that defendant truly believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and his only means of escape was in the use of deadly force against the victim, who was older, smaller, and noticeably more frail than defendant. The trial court’s imposition of concurrent prison terms in lieu of merging two counts of felonious assault was contrary to law as the offenses constituted allied offenses of similar import, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for resentencing. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/5/2025
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3/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-718 |
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State v. Brand
| C-240376 | CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLE PREVENTION: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion based on irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence where defendant could not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the grounds upon which he now relies to support his new-trial motion. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-669 |
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State v. Currie
| C-240273 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — REASONABLE GROUNDS — PROBATION — ANONYMOUS TIP — SENTENCING — MINIMUM SENTENCE: Defendant-probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when probation officers searched defendant-probationer and his apartment because defendant-probationer consented to being searched if there were reasonable grounds to believe defendant-probationer violated the terms of probation and an anonymous tip received by the probation officer, which included a photograph of defendant-probationer with a firearm that was verified by the probation officer as credible, established reasonable ground to believe that defendant-probationer was violating the terms of probation. The trial court did not err when it selected a three-year minimum sentence as part of defendant’s indefinite sentence for committing a second-degree felony because the sentencing statute requires a trial court to select a minimum sentence for a conviction of a second-degree felony, the three-year minimum falls within the range prescribed by the sentencing statute, and defendant’s attorney told the trial court that defendant was subject to a three-year minimum sentence. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-670 |
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In re Y.S.
| C-240256, C-240257, C-240258 | JUVENILE — PLEA AGREEMENT — JUDICIAL RELEASE: The juvenile court erred when it granted the juvenile judicial release where the juvenile was ineligible for judicial release under the terms of the plea agreement and where the juvenile court bound itself to the agreement when it signed the agreement, accepted the agreement in its dispositional entries, and made assurances at the plea hearing to the juvenile that he would not receive judicial release. [See CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: The juvenile court erred in refusing to enforce the plea agreement because the plea agreement was a valid and enforceable contract between the juvenile and the State.] | Bock | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-671 |
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State v. Wright
| C-240158 | OVI — R.C. 4511.01(HHH) —SUFFICIENCY— MANIFEST WEIGHT: In an OVI prosecution, the State presented sufficient evidence of operation under R.C. 4511.01(HHH), and defendant’s OVI conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where police found defendant unconscious in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked at a gas station with drug paraphernalia in his hand, defendant admitted to driving the car from his parents’ home to the gas station 20 minutes prior to police contact, defendant stipulated that he was intoxicated when police found him, and the State introduced a toxicology report showing the presence of a number of chemical substances in defendant’s system. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
2/28/2025
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2/28/2025
| 2025-Ohio-672 |
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Burd v. Artis
| C-240216 | DIVORCE — PROPERTY — OBJECTION — JUDICIAL NOTICE: In a divorce proceeding, the record does not demonstrate any error in the trial court’s failure to take judicial notice of records from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles where defendant husband failed to file any objections to the magistrate’s decision and failed to file any transcript of proceedings, and the magistrate’s entry indicates that husband did not dispute at the hearing that the vehicle at issue was acquired during the marriage. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/26/2025
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2/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-625 |
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Liles v. Sporing
| C-240439 | STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — SAVINGS STATUTE — R.C. 2305.19 — VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL — OTHERWISE THAN UPON THE MERITS: The trial court erred in determining that Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, did not apply to plaintiff’s refiled complaint where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first complaint under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), which was a failure “otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute, despite the fact that the dismissal occurred after the expiration of the statute of limitations and after Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement period, as the plain language of the savings statute only asks whether a previous case failed otherwise than upon the merits and Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) expressly states that a plaintiff’s first voluntary dismissal is without prejudice and not on the merits. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/26/2025
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2/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-626 |
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In re G.R.B.
| C-240282 | VENUE — JUV.R. 11(B) — MANDATORY TRANSFER: The juvenile court erred in finding that transfer of the cause to another county was mandatory under Juv.R. 11(B) where no other action was pending at the time that the custody complaint was filed in Hamilton County. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/21/2025
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2/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-556 |
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In re C.R.
| C-240347 | LEGAL CUSTODY — JUV.R. 40(D)(4)(d) — OBJECTION — INDEPENDENT REVIEW: The juvenile court’s decision must be reversed where it is unclear whether the juvenile court inappropriately applied appellate standards of review to the magistrate’s decision upon father’s objection rather than conducting the requisite independent review under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) as to the objected matter. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/21/2025
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2/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-557 |
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In re B.W.
| C-240163 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – DUE PROCESS – JUVENILE – SEX OFFENSES – R.C. 2152.83(A): R.C. 2152.83(A), which mandates that a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile who commits a sex offense be classified into a tier under Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act as a juvenile-offender registrant at the initial classification hearing, does not violate the juvenile’s right to procedural due process. | Zayas | Hamilton |
2/14/2025
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2/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-469 |
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State v. Harris
| C-240266 | OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — RESISTING ARREST — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — R.C. 2945.10 — JURY — RIGHT TO BE PRESENT: Where officers had a reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances that defendant may have been armed and were justified in attempting to conduct a limited pat-down search of defendant, and where defendant’s resistance to that search was not privileged, defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where officers had a reasonable belief that defendant committed the offense of obstructing official business, and where defendant struggled with the officers when they attempted to arrest him for that offense, defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Where defendant failed to establish that he suffered material prejudice or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, the trial court’s delay in instructing the jury after closing arguments in violation of R.C. 2945.10 was not reversible error. Where the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court communicated with the jury outside of defendant’s presence, defendant’s right to be present at all stages of the proceedings was not violated. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/12/2025
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2/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-444 |
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State v. Turner
| C-240250 | NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MURDER — HAVING A WEAPON WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — COMPLICITY — COUNSEL — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — R.C. 2929.14: The trial court’s nunc pro tunc entry was invalid where it was used to make a substantive change to the judgment rather than reflect what actually occurred. Defendant’s convictions for murder and having a weapon while under disability were supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence where defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the offenses was established by video evidence from surveillance cameras and an officer’s body-worn-camera footage and where defendant’s own statements placed him at the crime scene. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to engage an expert to conduct an independent examination of the firearms and to enhance the video of the incident. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/7/2025
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2/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-386 |
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Cowherd v. McGuffey
| C-240642 | HABEAS CORPUS — BAIL — OHIO CONSTITUTION, SECTION 9, ARTICLE 1 — R.C. 2937.011 — PUBLIC SAFETY: Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 and R.C. 2937.011, a trial court is permitted to consider public safety when determining the appropriate amount of bail to impose. Where the record contains no evidence that petitioner posed any additional risk to public safety, where petitioner has been employed at the same company since 2021 and has ties to the community, and where the trial court ignored petitioner’s financial resources and ability to pay, the $1,000,000 bail imposed by the trial court was excessive and the trial court erred in imposing it, and therefore, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be granted. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/7/2025
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2/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-387 |
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State v. Stanley
| C-240356 | CRIM.R. 11 — GUILTY PLEA: The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting defendant’s guilty pleas where the record shows that the court informed defendant of each of the constitutional rights listed under the rule that defendant waived by pleading guilty. | Bock | Hamilton |
2/5/2025
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2/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-358 |
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Fuller v. Quality Casing Co., Inc.
| C-240278 | FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS – MOOTNESS – CIV.R. 54(B): Where trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim without explanation, and where the trial court failed to resolve or dismiss plaintiff’s outstanding declaratory-judgment request concerning the same contract, and where resolution of the former would require resolving issues subsumed by the latter, the claims were inextricably intertwined, rendering the trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification improper, the trial court’s order nonfinal, and the court of appeals without jurisdiction. | Crouse | Hamilton |
2/5/2025
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2/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-361 |
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Clayborne v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C.
| C-240098 | AUTOMOBILES – LEMON LAW – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – MAGNUSSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT – CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT – SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT – WARRANTIES The belated repair of plaintiff’s vehicle by defendant automobile manufacturer’s authorized dealer is no defense to an otherwise-valid Lemon Law claim. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/31/2025
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1/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-283 |
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Mt. Pleasant Blacktopping Co., Inc. v. Inverness Group, Inc.
| C-240134 | COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – MOTION TO DISMISS – CIV.R. 12(B)(7) – JOINDER – CIV.R. 19 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – R.C. 2721.12 – NECESSARY PARTIES – CONTRACTS – BREACH OF CONTRACT – SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE – EXCUSE – SECURITY SEWAGE – IMPOSSIBILITY – REGULATORY IMPOSSIBILITY – GOOD FAITH – REMEDIES – DAMAGES: A prior determination by a federal court that a county regulation was not so “arbitrary and capricious” as to defy the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution did not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating the entirely distinct issue of whether the county’s application of the same regulation was “arbitrary” and therefore unforeseeable, so as to excuse plaintiff’s contractual performance, regardless of similarities in terminology. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/31/2025
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1/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-284 |
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State v. Mascus
| C-240089 | INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DISCRETIONARY BINDOVER — AMENABILITY: Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a second opinion on defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation within the juvenile system where defendant could not demonstrate that the result of the amenability proceeding was unreliable. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system where the court properly weighed the relevant factors under R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). | Winkler | Hamilton |
1/29/2025
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1/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-240 |
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State v. Johnson
| C-240142, C-240143 | CRIM.R. 11 – GUILTY PLEAS – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES – PREJUDICE – DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION Defendant’s guilty pleas were not involuntary under Crim.R. 11 where the trial court erred by failing to inform defendant that he faced a mandatory consecutive sentence on one charge, but where the trial court did explain the maximum number of months defendant could serve on each charge, where defendant offered no evidence of prejudice, and where the record contained evidence that defendant had actual knowledge of the mandatory consecutive sentence prior to the colloquy. Defendant’s guilty pleas were not involuntary under Crim.R. 11 where the trial court erred by misinforming defendant regarding the duration of the driver’s license suspension he faced and by failing to inform defendant that suspension was mandatory, but where the trial court did inform him that a license suspension was part of the maximum sentence and then did not impose the mandatory license suspension. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/22/2025
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1/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-149 |
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State v. Parks
| C-240114, C-240115 | JUSTICIABILITY – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – OVI – SHOTGUN MOTION – NHTSA – SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE – SUFFICIENCY: The trial court’s clerical error in notating that defendant was convicted by both guilty plea and jury verdict, after defendant was convicted following a jury trial, did not affect the appellate court’s jurisdiction to hear defendant’s appeal. Defendant’s specific and targeted inquiries into the arresting officer’s compliance with National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) standards elevated the State’s burden of proof, from a general and slight burden, to establishing by clear and convincing evidence that field sobriety testing was performed in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards. The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress as the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the field sobriety testing substantially complied with NHTSA testing procedures. Defendant’s OVI convictions were supported by sufficient evidence because defendant admitted to drinking prior to driving, the arresting officer observed defendant’s eyes were glassy and watery, defendant appeared lethargic, defendant’s speech was slurred, defendant’s vehicle had an odor of alcohol, and defendant performed poorly on field sobriety tests. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
1/17/2025
|
1/23/2025
| 2025-Ohio-191 |
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State v. Poole
| C-240270 | OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE – PROBABLE CAUSE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS: The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence collected prior to her warrantless arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence for lack of probable cause where the trial court made extensive factual findings indicating that the arresting officer’s in-court testimony was contradicted by cruiser camera footage of field sobriety testing, where one field sobriety test was not conducted in substantial compliance with the relevant standards, and where the State did not challenge the trial court’s factual findings on appeal. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
1/15/2025
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1/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-91 |
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State v. Hahaj
| C-240033 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – PREINDICTMENT DELAY – DUE PROCESS – DUE COURSE OF LAW – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – DE NOVO – STANDARD OF REVIEW – ACTUAL PREJUDICE – MOTION TO DISMISS: The appellate court does not review the trial court’s dismissal of an indictment based on preindictment delay for an abuse of discretion, but should instead defer to the trial court’s factual determinations and inferences where supported by competent, credible evidence, while reviewing de novo its legal conclusions and application of the relevant legal standard to the facts. Defendant did not meet her burden of showing actual prejudice from the State’s preindictment delay, where defendant failed to demonstrate how particular lost evidence and unavailable witnesses could have minimized the impact of the State’s evidence or otherwise bolstered her defense. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/10/2025
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1/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-52 |
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State v. Rodriguez
| C-240075 | JURY INSTRUCTIONS — VERDICT FORMS — PLAIN ERROR — ENDANGERING CHILDREN — DOUBLE JEOPARDY: Where defendant was charged with multiple counts of the same offense against the same victim, the jury demonstrated confusion as to which conduct on the part of defendant applied to each count, and defendant was convicted of some counts and acquitted of others, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to provide the jury with final instructions and/or verdict forms that specified which conduct was the basis of each count. Where it is unclear which acts were included in the jury’s verdicts of acquittal, and it is not possible to eliminate the possibility that defendant would be retried for an offense upon which she has already been acquitted, the trial court’s judgment convicting defendant of various counts of child endangering must be reversed and defendant discharged. [But see DISSENT: Because Ohio law does not require a trial court to include a defendant’s alleged conduct in the jury instructions or in the verdict forms in order to differentiate counts of the indictment, and because the State’s closing argument included a count-by-count reiteration of defendant’s conduct for the jury, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to include defendant’s alleged conduct in the jury instructions or the verdict forms.] | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/10/2025
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1/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-53 |
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State v. Brown
| C-240230 | CONSTITUTIONAL/CRIMINAL — WEAPONS UNDER A DISABILITY — ROBBERY INDICTMENT — R.C. 2923.13 – SECOND AMENDMENT – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – DANGEROUSNESS: Defendant’s weapons-under-a-disability charge was properly dismissed for being unconstitutional as applied to him because (1) the State failed to provide evidence that disarming an indictee under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) is consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation and (2) there was no finding of his dangerousness by the trial court. [But see DISSENT: The cause should be remanded to the trial court for further consideration in light of, and consistent with, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).] | Bergeron | Hamilton |
1/3/2025
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1/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-8 |