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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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E.A. v. A.A.
| 113654 | divorce, child support, spousal support, distributive award, financial misconduct, R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b), date of marriage, equitable distribution, attorneys’ fees, guardian ad litem fees, abuse of discretion, manifest weight of the evidence, | Sutton | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4583 |
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State v. Hartness
| 114241 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); fines; indigency; right to allocution. Affirmed. Appellant has not demonstrated that his consecutive sentences are clearly and convincingly contrary to the record, that the trial court erred by imposing the fine, or that the trial court deprived him of the right to allocution by interrupting his statements attempting to minimize his conduct. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4584 |
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Cleveland v. Hero Homes JV2, L.L.C.
| 114561 & 114800 | Housing court; articles of organization; statutory agent; Cleveland Cod.Ord. 367.131; strict liability; finding of guilt; fine; contrary to law; community control; unwarranted; cured. - Housing court did not err in finding the organization-appellant guilty, following a no contest plea, because Cleveland Code Ordinance ("CCO") 367.131 is a strict liability ordinance. Court’s imposition of a $20,000 fine on a first-degree misdemeanor was contrary to law. Court’s imposition of a period of community control and the terms was unwarranted because it did not relate to rehabilitation or the underlying offense, nor were they narrowly tailored to the offense. The administrative, non-dwelling infraction was cured prior to service of the complaint. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4585 |
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Parma v. Wojas
| 114586 | Dangerous dogs; attempt; abuse of discretion; contrary to law. Order vacated. The trial court was without authority to order the removal or destruction of the dog when the owner pled guilty under the attempt ordinance. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4586 |
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State v. Bigbee
| 114647 | Guilty pleas; Alford plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; Reagan Tokes Law. The appellant’s guilty pleas were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11, and there was no need for the trial court to comply with the Alford mandates. Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective. Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4587 |
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Barttile Recovery Solutions L.L.C. v. Cleavenger
| 114708 | Arbitration clause; R.C. 2711.03(A) and (B); hearing. Trial court erred when it denied appellants’ motion to compel arbitration without a hearing, despite the parties’ failure to request a hearing, where the record reflected that the making of the arbitration agreement was at issue, and the evidence established there was a genuine issue of material fact but was insufficient to rule on the motion without more evidence and/or testimony. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4589 |
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NEO Garage, L.L.C. v. Saad
| 114737 | Motion to dismiss; mootness; satisfaction of judgment; voluntary payment; stay of execution; Civ.R. 62(B); App.R. 7; R.C. 2505.09; supersedeas bond; counterclaims; jurisdiction; final appealable order; Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a); voluntary dismissal; self-executing; journalization; docket. Appeal dismissed. Appellee’s motion to dismiss is granted. Appellant’s first assignment of error was rendered moot by the satisfaction of judgment. And we lack jurisdiction to address appellant’s second assignment of error because appellant’s initial notice of voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) is self-executing and not an adjudication on the merits. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4590 |
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State v. Amodei
| 114763 | Jury instructions; self-defense; at fault; affray; initial aggressor; burden of production; sufficiency; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); R.C. 2901.09(B). Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant was convicted of murder, felonious assault, and discharge of a firearm near prohibited premises after shooting the victim seven times following a verbal argument. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a self-defense jury instruction. Self-defense requires legally sufficient evidence on all three elements, beginning with proof that a defendant was not at fault in creating the affray. The evidence, including surveillance video and appellant’s own testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, showed that the victim had made only verbal threats and displayed no weapon before appellant drew, racked, and pointed his firearm. Because appellant advanced toward the victim and escalated a verbal dispute into a deadly confrontation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant had not produced sufficient evidence to show he was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray. Because appellant failed to meet his burden of production on the first element of self-defense, the trial court properly refused the instruction. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4592 |
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In re J.H.
| 115038 | Permanent custody; manifest weight; clear and convincing evidence; best interest; prior removals; lack of basic needs; failure to remedy; lack of commitment; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); timeliness of dispositional hearing; continuance; R.C. 2151.35(B)(1); case plan timing; R.C. 2151.412(D); leave to amend; Juv.R. 22(B); guardian ad litem recommendations. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody to the Agency under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record established that despite reasonable case-planning efforts, mother failed to remedy chronic conditions such as unsafe and unsanitary housing, failure to meet basic, educational, and medical needs. She refused access to the home and did not comply with offered services. Parents demonstrated lack of commitment. The children benefited from structured placements, and permanent custody served their best interests. The court complied with R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) because the dispositional trial was set within the statutory deadline and was continued (at the mother’s request) within the permissible 45-day extension period. Mother’s complaint that the case plan was filed one day late under R.C. 2151.412(D) was waived by not raising it below, and mother further failed to show prejudice. Finally, proceeding with and deciding the permanent-custody disposition, rather than granting the Agency’s request to amend the proposed disposition to temporary custody, was within the court’s discretion under Juv.R. 22(B). The parties tried the disposition on the merits, and the court was not bound by the guardian ad litem’s oral shift away from his written recommendation of permanent custody. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4593 |
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In re Z.B.
| 115115 | Permanent custody; parental rights; Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; best interest of the child; clear and convincing evidence; dependency; protective supervision; unsafe housing; mental health; parenting classes; guardian ad litem recommendation; child welfare; Ohio juvenile law; repeated removals; statutory factors; prior terminations; developmental delays; legal custody; agency case plan; temporary custody; unsanitary conditions; appellate review; trial court findings. Mother failed to remedy the conditions leading to removal, including unsafe housing, lack of engagement in services, and minimal participation in the child’s developmental care. The record demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). The record also reflected that Mother previously lost custody of four other children under similar circumstances. The trial court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/2/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4594 |
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State v. Tyson
| 114691 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; guilty pleas; waiver. Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise alleged issues on appeal that defendant had waived by his guilty pleas. Applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to denial of speedy-trial rights, alleged misidentification of defendant during arraignment, unlawful detention, manipulation and backdating of the trial court docket, and appellate counsel’s alleged failure to adequately communicate and consult with defendant before filing appellate brief. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/30/2025
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10/2/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4588 |
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State v. Skanes
| 114528 | Motion to suppress; statement; argument abandoned in the trial court is waived on appeal; party-presentation principle; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; motion for acquittal; sufficiency of the evidence; assignments of error must be separately argued. Appellant’s argument regarding his motion to suppress had been abandoned in the trial court and thus was waived on appeal. The State presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s convictions. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4462 |
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State v. Beasley
| 114589 | Sufficiency; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 29; felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); serious physical harm; R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a); mental condition; consecutive sentences; life without parole; moot; gruesome photographs; Evid.R. 403; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; lay witness testimony; Evid.R. 701; demonstrative evidence; indefinite sentences with life sentences. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. The State failed to present sufficient evidence of serious physical harm when there was no testimony regarding the child victims’ mental condition. The autopsy photos were not gruesome, repetitive, or cumulative. Furthermore, they were relevant to establish the elements of murder and felonious assault. The detective’s testimony regarding his experience with semiautomatic and automatic weapons was properly admitted lay witness testimony. Moreover, the video demonstrating the difference between semiautomatic and automatic weapons was relevant and helpful for the jury to determine the six-year firearm specifications. Whether the trial court made the requisite consecutive-sentencing findings is moot when the appellant was sentenced to life without parole. Finally, the trial court did not err and, in fact, is required to sentence on each count, even when sentencing an offender to life without parole. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4463 |
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Cleveland v. State Emp. Relations Bd.
| 114616 | State Employment Relations Board; SERB; abuse of discretion; collective bargaining; R.C. 4117.11(A)(5); R.C. 4117.08; effects; policy change; collective-bargaining agreement; CBA. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the State Employment Relations Board’s (“SERB”) order and opinion finding that the City of Cleveland committed an unfair labor practice in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(5) when it refused to bargain with the Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association regarding the effects of a wearable-camera system, because the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties did not expressly and specifically state that the association was giving up the right to bargain the effects of the policy change. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4464 |
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RFK Bldg., L.L.C. v. RELD & G Ent., Inc.
| 114640 | Promissory note; breach of contract; nonparty subpoena duces tecum; Civ.R. 26(B); Civ.R. 45(C); relevancy; not relevant; not admissible; not discoverable. The trial court erred by denying the Nonparties’ motions to quash the subpoenas duces tecum issued by plaintiff-appellee because they requested irrelevant and thereby undiscoverable documents and information. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4465 |
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Euclid v. Hunter
| 114662 | Misdemeanor guilty plea; inducing panic; R.C. 2917.31; possessing a replica firearm; Euclid Cod.Ord. 571.15; first-degree misdemeanors; ineffective assistance of counsel; no prejudice; plea bargain; sentence contrary to law; waived all but plain error; no plain error. Appellant appeals raising two assignments error: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective which affected his guilty plea; and (2) that his sentence was contrary to law. Upon review we find his trial counsel was not ineffective since appellant failed to establish a reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s alleged “errors” he would not have pled guilty. We also find that his sentence is not contrary to law and there was no plain error in the trial court’s sentence, which was within statutory range, so it must be presumed that the trial court considered the required statutory factors. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4466 |
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State v. Roberts
| 114736 | Sentence contrary to law; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law because the sentence does not fall outside the statutory range for the offense and the sentencing court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4467 |
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State v. Asaba
| 114739 | Violation of a protection order; menacing by stalking; intimidation of witnesses; hearsay; harmless error. - Judgment affirmed. Asaba’s convictions are affirmed because while the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, such exclusion was harmless and likely inured to Asaba’s benefit, since the jury acquitted him of two of his five charges. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4468 |
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State v. Tolbert
| 114748 | Motion to suppress; search warrant; warrant affidavit; probable cause; Franks v. Delaware; Franks hearing; false statements; omissions; undisclosed inferences. Reversed and remanded. The trial court did not determine, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, whether the warrant affidavit contained intentionally false statements or false statements with reckless disregard for the truth, nor did the trial court determine whether the search warrant affidavit’s remaining content is sufficient to establish probable cause. The trial court also did not determine whether any significant undisclosed inferences were made in the search warrant affidavit. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4469 |
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Am. Express Natl. Bank v. Reynolds
| 114794 | Default judgment; motion to void default judgment; pro se litigant; fail to file a transcript; presume regularity; App.R. 9; App.R. 4. Judgment affirmed. In the instant case, the appellant failed to include a transcript of the proceedings she challenges. Without the filing of a transcript (or a statement of the evidence or proceedings under App.R. 9(C) or an agreed statement under App.R. 9(D)), this court must presume regularity in the lower court’s proceedings and affirm the lower court’s judgment. Additionally, pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel. Furthermore, we note that to the extent that appellant directly attacks the merits of the default judgment, this attempt is untimely and we decline to address it. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4470 |
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Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Oasis Surf & Turf, Ltd.
| 114801 | Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); insurance policy; contract law; insured; real estate manager. Judgment affirmed. Summary judgment in favor of the insurance company was proper when appellant set forth no evidence to establish that she was a covered insured under the policy. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4471 |
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Graves v. Solorzano
| 114974 | Replevin; cat; motion for possession; civil bench trial; manifest weight; R.C. 959.01; abandon. Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion for possession of property, the property being an orange tabby cat named Marvin, because appellant did not show she had a superior claim to the cat. The trial court did not err when it found appellee did not abandon Marvin when she moved from the apartment she shared with appellant because appellee continued to provide care for Marvin and visit him. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4472 |
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In re M.A.
| 114981 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(E); best interest of the child. Trial court’s decision granting permanent custody to the agency was supported by sufficient evidence and the greater weight of the evidence, where the record established that six of Mother’s ten children had been committed to the permanent custody of the agency, one child was in the legal custody of an interested party, and two children were in the emergency temporary custody of the agency, and Mother failed to complete case plan goals, or establish that she was able to provide a legally secure permanent placement and provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the child. Furthermore, permanent custody was in the best interest of the child where he had been in the agency’s custody since he was two days old, he was thriving in the foster care environment, the guardian ad litem ("GAL") recommended permanent custody, and the record established that Mother had not addressed her chronic mental-health and drug-abuse issues. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4473 |
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State v. Mynatt
| 115107 | Conceded error; community-based correctional facility; prison term; consecutive. Judgment in CR-24-695091-A vacated. The State concedes, and we agree that, under the authority of State v. Hitchcock, 2019-Ohio-3246, the trial court could not order the defendant to a community-based correctional facility after serving his prison term on two other cases. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/25/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4474 |
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State ex rel. Robertson v. O’Donnell
| 115117 | Prohibition, personal jurisdiction, minimum contacts, waiver, Civ.R. 12(H)(1) and adequate remedy at law through appeal. This court concluded that the conflicting allegations about whether there were sufficient minimum contacts among the relator, Ohio, and the underlying case vested the respondent judge with sufficient jurisdiction to determine his own jurisdiction and, if appropriate, the relator has an adequate remedy at law through appeal. Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(1), the defense of personal jurisdiction is preserved if a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is made. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/24/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4475 |
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Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood
| 112456 | Application and motion to compel arbitration; Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"); grievance; Last Chance Agreement ("LCA"); arbitration; presumption of arbitrability; express exclusion; strong and forceful evidence. Judgment affirmed. Where a CBA contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Here, there was a dispute as to whether the employee’s grievance was arbitrable based on language in the LCA between the parties. Arbitration of the grievance was not expressly excluded by the LCA because it failed to specify who is to determine whether a violation has occurred. Additionally, the City has failed to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption of arbitrability because it presented no “strong and forceful” evidence of an intention to exclude the grievance from arbitration. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly granted the Union’s application and motion to compel arbitration. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4369 |
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In re A.G.
| 114401 | Neglected child, temporary agency custody, magistrate’s decisions, transcript, Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii), Loc.Juv.R. 36, hearsay, adjudication, disposition, manifest weight of the evidence. Mother appeals adjudication of child as neglected and disposition of temporary agency custody. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s decisions where Mother did not file hearing transcripts with the juvenile court, as Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) requires. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to file a witness list and exhibit list instanter where she waited until 5 days before trial to do so, violating Loc.Juv.R. 36. Without a transcript, we cannot review Mother’s claim that A.G.’s school records were hearsay. Manifest weight of the evidence supported adjudication and disposition where the guardian ad litem ("GAL") report stated that A.G. has significant unexplained school absences and that Mother was not cooperating with Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"). | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4371 |
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Tatarunas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.
| 114440 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); R.C. 4112.02; reverse race discrimination; reverse sex discrimination; similarly situated employees; legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; intentional infliction of emotional distress; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Ohio Const., art. I, § 16; breach of contract. The plaintiff-appellant, a white male, was employed by the defendant-appellee for approximately eight years. While employed, appellant was disciplined multiple times during his tenure. Appellant sued appellee, raising a number of claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee with respect to appellant’s claims concerning reverse race discrimination, reverse sex discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and breach of contract. Appellant failed to meet his burden in showing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Appellant did, however, present a prima facie case of sex discrimination. But even though appellant presented a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination, appellee present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for appellant’s termination. Appellant failed to present evidence demonstrating that appellee’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Appellee had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and legally justifiable reason to terminate appellant, and therefore appellant failed to demonstrate that appellee’s termination of his employment was “extreme and outrageous.” Appellant also failed to present any evidence that he suffered “severe and debilitating injury” as a result of his termination. He failed to present any expert opinion or lay person testimony concerning any significant changes in his emotional or habitual make-up. The only evidence he presented with respect to his “injury” is only his own claims. As such, appellant failed to support his prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to appellant’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, appellant failed to demonstrate a clear public policy that appellee violated when it terminated appellant. As such, appellant failed to demonstrate he was terminated in violation of established public policy. Appellant was a participant in a performance plan while employed with appellee. A term of the plan required a participant in the plan to be employed on a specific date in order to be entitled to payment under the plan. Appellant was lawfully terminated and was no longer employed on the date set forth in the plan. Since appellant was no longer employed on the date set forth in the plan, appellee was not in breach of contract. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4372 |
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State v. New Bey
| 114610 | Postconviction petition; untimely; exceptions; pandemic; COVID-19; access; legal materials. Trial court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s petition for postconviction relief where the petition was filed after the statutory deadline had passed and neither of the two exceptions for late filings were applicable. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4373 |
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State v. Harris
| 114710 | R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c); rape; substantial impairment; knowledge; knowingly; intoxication; consent; sufficiency; manifest weight; Crim.R. 29; jury instructions; mens rea; R.C. 2929.19(B)(5); fine; ability to pay. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s conviction of rape involving a substantially impaired victim in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim testified that she was intoxicated, passed out, and awoke to find appellant already engaged in intercourse. The victim’s testimony alone was sufficient under governing law to support the conviction, and there was nothing to suggest the jury lost its way and created a miscarriage of justice by finding appellant guilty. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide a separate instruction defining “knowingly.” The standard OJI rape instruction adequately conveyed the mens rea element. With respect to the $5,000 fine, the trial court sufficiently considered appellant’s present and future ability to pay under R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4374 |
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SPP Properties, L.L.C. v. Jones
| 114740 | Forcible entry and detainer action; R.C. 1923.06; second cause of action; money-damages claim; misapplication of law; service; Civ.R 1; Civ.R. 3(A); Civ.R. 4-4.6; waiver of service; appearance; motion to quash. Judgment reversed. The trial court failed to comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure’s service requirements and erred when it denied the defendant’s motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint. Based on the facts and circumstances presented by this case, dismissal was appropriate under Civ.R. 3(A), requiring that service be perfected within one year of the complaint’s filing for the action to commence, and Civ.R. 4(E), mandating dismissal when service is not made upon a defendant within six months after the complaint’s filing and good cause for noncompliance cannot be shown. The matter is remanded with instructions for the municipal court to vacate the judgments granted against the defendant and dismiss the plaintiff’s money-damages claim. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4375 |
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In re K.K.
| 114809 | Sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, disposition, termination of parental rights, permanent legal custody, R.C. 2151.414, best-interest factors. Mother appeals juvenile court’s decision terminating parental rights, awarding permanent legal custody of K.K. to children and family services agency, and denying Mother’s motion for legal custody to K.K.s aunt (“Aunt”). Sufficient evidence and manifest weight of the evidence supported juvenile court’s decision where K.K. had significant developmental needs with which foster mother had more experience than Aunt. Further, Aunt had a history of substance abuse and tested positive throughout proceedings for alcohol and an additional substance with opiate-like effects, despite court’s order that she stop using it. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4376 |
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State v. Smith
| 114787 | Guilty plea; knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; effect of plea; prejudice; Crim.R. 11; presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; abuse of discretion; freely and liberally granted. The trial court’s failure to explicitly advise the appellant as to the effect of his plea pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) did not excuse appellant from having to demonstrate prejudice as a result. Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, and therefore, this claim was overruled. Appellant also argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. Appellant was represented by competent counsel, the trial court held a full hearing on appellant’s motion, both sides were given an adequate opportunity to address appellant’s motion, and the trial court fully considered his request. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4377 |
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In re A.R.
| 114855 | Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414; factors; best interest of the child; R.C. 3109.04; in-camera interview; guardian ad litem; wishes of the child; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; compliance with case plan. The trial court did not err in failing to conduct an in-camera hearing with the child where the court was able to consider the child’s wishes as conveyed by the guardian ad litem. The award of permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4378 |
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In re J.C.
| 115099 | Termination of parental rights; continuance; effective assistance of counsel. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying parent’s day-of-trial request for a continuance to allow a relative to seek legal custody of the children. Counsel was not deficient for failing to file a written request to continue, nor has parent demonstrated prejudice. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4380 |
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133 Garvin Ave. v. Realtywise, Inc.
| 114746 | Final appealable order; contempt; sanctions; R.C. 2505.02(B); substantial rights. This case was dismissed for lack of final appealable order. The interlocutory order appealed from did not sanction the contemnors or fall within a category of orders that is immediately appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B). | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4382 |
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State v. Cuyler
| 113967 | Plea colloquy; delayed appeal; complete admission of guilt; Crim.R. 11(B)(1); Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a); Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Judgment reversed and case remanded. Appellant Cuyler’s guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to the trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C). The trial court did not inform Cuyler that his guilty plea would constitute a complete admission of guilt and made references to Cuyler taking only some responsibility for the charges against him, and not necessarily what the State was accusing him of doing. This introduced confusion into the proceedings, potentially inviting Cuyler to view his plea as less than a complete admission of guilt. It was therefore not obvious from the context of the plea colloquy that Cuyler understood the effect of his plea of guilty. There was a complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C), which relieved Cuyler of any burden to demonstrate prejudice and required vacating his guilty plea. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
9/18/2025
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9/25/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4461 |
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State v. Ruediger
| 112830 | App.R. 26(B), ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, failure to establish prejudice, mere recitation of assignments of error, improper arrest, exculpatory evidence, discovery, R.C. 2907.31(A), conflict of interest, photographs, witnesses lied under oath, prosecutorial misconduct, closing arguments, manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, res judicata. App.R. 26(B) provides a means of asserting claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. App.R. 26(B) provides for a two-stage process where an appellant must first make a threshold showing that appellate counsel was ineffective on appeal. State v. Leyh, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 18-19. The ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is judged using the same standard that applies to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Even if the applicant establishes that an error by his appellate counsel was professionally unreasonable, he must establish that he was prejudiced; but for the unreasonable error there exists a reasonable probability that the results of his appeal would have been different. Reasonable probability, regarding an application for reopening, is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the appeal. State v. May, 2012-Ohio-5504, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). In addition, the mere recitation of assignments of error, without the presentation of legal analysis, an explanation of how appellate counsel’s performance on appeal was deficient, and how applicant was prejudiced, does not support the reopening of applicant’s original appeal under App.R. 26(B). Herein, the applicant has failed to demonstrate how his appellate counsel performance on appeal was deficient and how he was prejudiced. In addition, many of the applicant’s proposed assignments of error were already raised and found to be without merit. Res judicata prevents the applicant from raising in his application for reopening issues already raised on appeal. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4370 |
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State ex rel. Ames v. Regional Income Tax Agency Bd. of Trustees
| 115078 | Public records; mandamus; R.C. 149.43; moot; statutory damages judicial notice. A writ of mandamus is the remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act. In order to obtain a writ of mandamus pursuant to R.C. 149.43, the party requesting public records must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the request was made by certified mail, hand delivery, or electronic submission, to the entity responsible for maintaining the public records. A review of the complaint for mandamus demonstrates that the initial four public-records requests were sent, via email, to the respondent’s chief legal officer who had retired. The affidavit of the respondent’s current chief legal counsel, as attached to the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, clearly established that the relator did not email his four requests for public records to the person responsible for public records. In addition, the affidavit of the respondent’s chief legal officer, attached to the motion for summary judgment, provides that all requested public-records have been provided or do not exist. The request for a writ of mandamus is moot. Finally, the request for statutory damages is denied because the requested public records were provided in a reasonable period of time. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/17/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4379 |
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State ex rel. Bates v. Clancy
| 115147 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; writ of prohibition; corrective writ; patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction; sex offender classification hearing; aggravated sexually oriented offender; Megan’s Law. Allegations of complaint for a writ of prohibition were insufficient to establish that respondent patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to hold sex offender classification hearing and issue related journal entries regarding designation as an aggravated sexually oriented offender and registration requirements under Megan’s Law. Complaint dismissed where assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in relator’s favor, it appeared beyond doubt that relator could prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of prohibition. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/15/2025
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9/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4381 |
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State v. Morris
| 113777 | Crim.R. 8; joinder; Crim.R. 14; prejudicial joinder; denial of motion for relief from prejudicial joinder; no prejudice; abuse of discretion; ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay; no prejudice. In appellant’s first assignment of error, he appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to Crim.R. 14. On review, we find that appellant was unable to establish prejudice from the joinder so the assignment of error is overruled. In appellant’s second assignment of error, he alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to motion the court regarding the six-year preindictment delay. On review, we find appellant failed to establish prejudice as the evidence he alleged was missing was speculative and unlikely to minimize the State’s evidence or bolster his defense. His second assignment of error was also overruled. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3273 |
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1900 Capital Trust II, by US Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v. House-Redd
| 114293 | Foreclosures; motion to dismiss; subject-matter jurisdiction; standing; summary judgment; note; mortgage; loan modification; lost-note affidavit; assignor; assignee; holder; a person or entity entitled to enforce the mortgage note; genuine issue of material fact; nonholder; possession; chain of assignments; gap assignment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in a foreclosure action where genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether plaintiff was the entity entitled to enforce the mortgage note in light of internal inconsistencies in a lost-note affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to sue. Whether the plaintiff has standing to sue is dependent on whether it can show it is entitled to enforce the mortgage note, an issue to be determined on remand. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3274 |
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D.C. v. J.C.
| 114330 | Divorce; pro se; counsel; parenting agreement; divorce decree; parenting time; residential parent; void; motion; R.C. 3109.051(A); Civ.R. 7(B)(1); reunification counselor; GAL. In a divorce action, the trial court’s adoption of the parenting agreement and issuance of the divorce decree were upheld. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance to obtain new counsel, because he had three months to do so but made no effort until one week before trial. Father offered no evidence of a lack of mutual agreement regarding the parenting agreement, which he had signed and affirmed on the record. Thus, there was no basis to invalidate the agreement. The court properly incorporated the agreement’s terms into the decree, including reunification counseling as a condition of Father’s parenting time and allowing the counselor to determine parenting time. The court also acted within its discretion in limiting Father’s testimony to the unresolved issues at trial. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3275 |
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State v. Riley
| 114449 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c); juvenile record. Judgment affirmed. The defendant challenges the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), claiming that his juvenile criminal history does not provide support for the imposition of a discretionary consecutive sentence. However, a defendant’s juvenile record may be considered as part of an offender’s criminal conduct under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) for the purposes of determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. Based on the record before us, we cannot clearly and convincingly conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) finding. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3276 |
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Westlake v. Knowles
| 114517, 114518 | R.C. 2919.22(A); child endangerment; motion to continue; motion for new counsel; abuse of discretion; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; substantial risk of harm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant’s untimely request for new counsel and corresponding request for a continuance of trial. Defendant-appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Flagg Lanzinger | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3277 |
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Cambridge Health Leasing, L.L.C. v. Embassy Cambridge, L.L.C.
| 114523 | Breach of contract; operating agreement; unjust enrichment; conversion; civil conspiracy; motion for summary judgment. The trial court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant’s breach of contract claims and unjust enrichment. The trial court erred in awarding conversion for the same monies subject to the contract and therefore the conversion claim was denied as a matter of law. Subsequently, the trial court’s award of punitive damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the conversion award was also an error and said awards were vacated. Similarly, the appellant’s civil conspiracy claim failed as a matter of law because the conversion finding was the basis of the unlawful independent act. As such, the trial court erred when it denied appellee’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the civil conspiracy claim. The jury verdict’s award and the trial court’s judgment concerning the civil conspiracy claim are vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3278 |
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Parma VTA, L.L.C. v. Parma GE 7400, L.L.C.
| 114601 | Arbitration Award; tenancy-in-common agreement (“TIC Agreement”); cash call; mortgage payoff; vacate arbitration award; de novo; R.C. 2711.10(D); arbitrators exceeded their powers; draws from essence of the contract; rational nexus; narrow scope of judicial review; statute of frauds; double recovery. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3279 |
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State v. Sopko
| 114604 | Sufficiency of evidence; identity; prior calculation and design; manifest weight of the evidence; firearm toolmark evidence; cell phone location evidence; abuse of discretion; cumulative-error doctrine. Judgment affirmed. The State presented sufficient evidence of appellant’s identity as the shooter, as identity can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The State also presented sufficient evidence of prior calculation and design in this execution-style murder. The weight of the evidence supported the conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing firearm toolmark and cell phone location testimony. Because the trial court did not commit multiple errors, the cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3280 |
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State v. Howard
| 114623 | Evidence; Crim.R. 16; discovery violation; felony murder; “proximate cause theory”; manifest weight; sufficiency; circumstantial evidence; stacking inferences; silence; lack of remorse; Fifth Amendment; sentencing; recidivism factors; consecutive sentences. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting newly discovered evidence not produced in discovery in violation of Crim.R. 16 because there was no indication that the evidence prejudiced the defense. Direct and circumstantial evidence were sufficient to establish the defendant’s criminal liability without impermissibly stacking inferences. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the trial court impermissibly considered the defendant’s silence as a lack of remorse for sentencing purposes, the defendant’s consecutive sentence was affirmed because other factors supported the consecutive sentence and the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the trial court’s consideration of his silence, the sentence would have been different. Trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3281 |
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Grimm v. Caesar's Holdings, Inc.
| 114631 | Sanctions; attorney fees; expenses; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; discretion; abuse of discretion; discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant’s motion for attorney fees and other expenses under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 where plaintiff-appellee continued litigation long enough to obtain certain discovery items needed to determine the continuing viability of his claims against defendant-appellant. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/11/2025
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9/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3282 |
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