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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co.
| 113863 | Motion for reconsideration; Civ.R. 6; response time; due process; judgment on the pleadings; saving statute; statute of limitations; double-dismissal rule. Trial court did not violate plaintiff’s due-process rights even though it ruled on motion for reconsideration before plaintiff’s response deadline had passed because plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that was the subject of the reconsideration. Trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s third complaint was barred by Ohio’s saving statute and the applicable statutes of limitations where first refiled complaint was dismissed by the trial court without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2), and Civ.R. 41(A)(2) does not include a double-dismissal rule. Late production of plaintiff’s expert reports did not warrant dismissal where court did not grant defendants’ motion to strike the reports. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1058 |
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State v. Brown
| 113879 | Anders brief; lack of meritorious grounds for appeal; wholly frivolous; motion to withdraw; dismiss the appeal; plea made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); remand; nunc pro tunc; clerical error. Motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), granted where there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Case remanded for the trial court to issue nunc pro tunc judgment entries that reflect the offenses to which the defendant-appellant pleaded guilty and the sentences imposed. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1059 |
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Naiman v. Cleveland Elec. Illum., Co.
| 113926 | Summary judgment, de novo review, trespass, prescriptive easement, nuisance, affidavit, personal knowledge. Judgment affirmed. Because appellate review of a trial court decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court’s decision for a different reason. We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on a ground different than the trial court. While the trial court found that the appellee had an express easement for one of the subject poles at issue and a prescriptive easement for the other two poles at issue, our de novo reveals that all three poles were subject to a prescriptive easement. Because the poles were subject to a prescriptive easement, appellant failed to demonstrate a trespass cause of action against appellee. We further find that the poles did not constitute a nuisance. The trial court properly disregarded portions of an affidavit as not being based on personal knowledge and containing conclusory averments. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1060 |
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Cleveland v. Johnston
| 114044 | Housing court; community control; violations of community control; sanctions; interior inspection; reasonably related; overbroad. Judgment reversed. The trial court’s order requiring defendant to permit interior inspections of his two properties as a violation of his community control was not reasonably related to the goals of community control and overbroad and, therefore, impermissible. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1061 |
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M.J.S. v. C.S.S.
| 114151 | Civil contempt; clear and convincing evidence; prima facie case; valid court order; knowledge of the order; violation of the order; abuse of discretion; agreed judgment entry; shared-parenting plan; intent of parties; order is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation; ambiguous. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt for home-schooling the children because the language in the agreed judgment entry was ambiguous, and thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that he had violated the court’s order. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1062 |
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E. Cleveland v. Kline
| 114180 | Operating a Vehichle Impaired ("OVI"); under the influence; Traf.R. 10; Traf.R. 10(D); Traf.R. 10(B); Traf.R. 1(B); Traf.R. 2(D); Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 1(C)(3); traffic case; ordinance; misdemeanor; petty offense; plea; effect; no contest; accepted; never entered; conviction; nullity. Reversed appellant’s conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence, which was a petty misdemeanor traffic offense. Because the case involved the violation of a traffic ordinance, Traf.R. 10 applied, rather than Crim.R. 11. Appellant challenged whether the trial court complied with Traf.R. 10(B) and (D). Regardless of any deficiencies in informing appellant of the effect of the plea of no contest, the record showed that appellant never actually entered a plea of no contest, which was conceded by the city. Therefore, appellant’s conviction was a nullity. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1063 |
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State v. Shirley
| 114225 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; drug possession; R.C. 2925.11(A). Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s conviction for possession of drugs was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant argued that he did not possess the pill bottle that was later found to contain methamphetamines. Both police officers’ testimonies and video evidence showed that appellant had something in his hand that resembled the pill bottle, and later, as he was being apprehended by police, he crouched down near the spot where the pill bottle was found. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1064 |
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Garfield Hts. v. Poree
| 114308 | Manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s theft conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court was in the best position to judge the witnesses’ credibility, and this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against the conviction. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1065 |
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State v. Todd
| 114349 | Sentencing hearing; victim-impact statement; Marsy’s Law; rights of crime victims; Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a; R.C. 2929.19(A); trial court discretion; nonvictim statements at sentencing hearing; victim’s representative; R.C. 2930.02(A)(1); R.C. 2930.02(D). Trial court did not err by allowing the victim’s mother to speak at the defendant’s sentencing hearing, even though she was not a designated victim representative under Marsy’s Law. Ohio law grants trial courts discretion to allow others besides victims to speak at sentencing hearings with the court’s approval. Marsy’s Law expanded the rights of crime victims but did not limit the trial court’s preexisting discretion under R.C. 2929.19(A) to hear from other individuals. In addition, nothing in the record indicated the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court permitting the victim’s mother to speak. When the trial court proceeded to sentencing, it focused on the statutory factors relevant to sentencing and did not mention the statements of the victim’s mother. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1066 |
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State v. McClain
| 113597 | Substantial impairment rape; sufficiency of the evidence; hearsay; failure to object; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment vacated. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence that the defendant knew of the alleged victim’s substantial impairment. Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the victim’s hearsay testimony that a bartender told her that other woman at the bar had been drugged, as well as other witnesses’ hearsay testimony. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-962 |
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State v. Hinton
| 113836 | Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; hearsay testimony; sentence contrary to law. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not allow inadmissible hearsay testimony. The appellant’s sentence was not contrary to law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-963 |
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Legacy Village Investors, L.L.C. v. Bravo Brio Restaurants, L.L.C.
| 113853 | Magistrate’s decision; breach of lease; late fees; local rules. The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision and further concluding that the appellant’s request for monetary damages was improper under the local rules. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-964 |
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Sammon v. Leneghan
| 113886 | Equitable contribution, summary judgment, declaratory judgment, life estate, de novo review. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and declaring that she was not required to reimburse appellant for the monies he paid towards the tax liens because the surrender of appellee’s life estate without compensation was sufficient contribution. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-965 |
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State v. McCann
| 113982 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; objections; trial strategy; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel’s purported failure to object to a witness’s testimony amounts to a trial strategy that, even if debatable, does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Moreover, the defendant fails to establish that trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that the defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Further, we find that the trial court engaged in the proper analysis, considered the required statutory criteria, and made the necessary findings before imposing consecutive sentences. The record clearly supports the trial court’s findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-966 |
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State v. Goldsby
| 114118 | Felonious assault; strangulation; abduction; inducing panic; domestic violence; Crim.R. 29 motion; manifest weight of the evidence; merger; effective assistance of counsel; court’s witness; restitution. Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions, and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to merge the counts. The harm caused by each count was separate and/or committed with a separate animus. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek merger of the counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to call the victim as a court witness, even if the State was not surprised by the victim’s recantation. The city and its police department were not victims, and thus the order of restitution in their favor was error. Convictions affirmed; restitution order reversed. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-967 |
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Salone v. Stovall
| 114257 | Declaratory judgment; quiet title; deed; fraudulent transfer; motion for summary judgment; voluntary satisfaction; judgment; stay; moot. Appeal dismissed as moot. Plaintiff claimed that defendants defrauded her out of her home and recorded a fraudulent deed. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, voided the fraudulent deed, and entered declaratory judgment ordering that the subject property is quieted and all right, title and interest is vested in plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a copy of the trial court’s judgment entry with the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office. The next day, defendants filed the instant appeal and sought a stay of the judgment with the trial court five days later. The trial court denied the stay as moot, finding that plaintiff has already executed the judgment. It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot. Here, defendants failed to obtain a stay of the trial court’s judgment nullifying a quitclaim deed to the subject property prior to plaintiff quieting title against the defendants. Therefore, the appeal is moot. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-968 |
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In re Z.D.
| 114377 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); best interest of the child, reasonable efforts; manifest weight; legal custody; termination of parental rights. Judgment affirmed. The termination of Mother’s parental rights and granting of permanent custody to the Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother did not complete the case-plan services, which included services for substance abuse and mental health, or did not demonstrate she benefitted from services. The juvenile court did not err when it denied the motion for legal custody of three of the Children to a maternal aunt because it was not in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court did not err when it found that reasonable efforts had been made to reunify Mother with the Children. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-969 |
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In re A.V.
| 114379 | Motion for continuance; due process; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for continuance or violate his right to due process. The record before us does not suggest that Father exhibited cooperation or communicated with counsel and the juvenile court and fails to demonstrate good cause for a continuance. Moreover, after weighing the potential prejudice to Father against the juvenile court’s right to control its docket and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, we cannot say that the juvenile court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying Father’s motion. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-970 |
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In re B.V.
| 114421 | Permanent custody; continuance; R.C. 2151.414(A)(2); Juv.R. 4(A); discretion; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgments granting permanent custody of two children to the agency and terminating mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance of the permanent-custody trial. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D) and (E), and its judgments were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-971 |
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State v. Tucker
| 113843 | Motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; murder; new witness; recanting witness; affidavit testimony; Crim.R. 33; newly discovered evidence; unavoidably prevented. - Judgment affirmed. Tucker’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial fails to make the required showing that Tucker was unavoidably prevented from discovering an allegedly previously unknown witness, and Tucker’s arguments regarding a recanting witness are barred by res judicata. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/18/2025
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3/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-923 |
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Caldwell v. Custom Craft Builders, Inc.
| 113209 | Admissibility of evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; pierce the corporate veil; breach of contract; apparent agency; consumer sales practices act; conspiracy to commit fraud. The trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on breach-of-contract, consumer sales practices act violations, and conspiracy-to-commit-fraud-claims after a bench trial is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment for plaintiff on her breach-of-contract claim is affirmed. There was evidence presented at trial that the defendant LLC is liable for the actions of the “bad actor” in this case under the doctrine of apparent agency. Judgment on the remaining two claims is reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence in the record. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-828 |
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Parsai v. Parsai
| 113550; 113747 | Divorce; division of marital property; equitable division of property; spousal support; temporary support; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 75(N); R.C. 3105.171; de facto marriage termination; financial entanglements; bilateral; unilateral; motion for new trial; motion for relief from judgment; invited error; failure to prosecute; modification of temporary support; credit for payments during divorce proceedings; valuation of property; valuation evidence; time limits on presentation of evidence; prejudice; mootness; marriage inception date; pension; R.C. 3105.18. On Husband’s assignments of error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in rejecting a de facto marriage termination date of May 1, 2017, in favor of the final hearing date, October 11, 2023. The record supported the trial court’s determination that the separation was the result of unilateral action by Wife rather than bilateral action by both parties, that there were continuing financial entanglements, and that there was insufficient evidence of the value of marital property on May 1, 2017, hampering the trial court’s ability to equitably divide marital property as of that date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not retroactively modifying the temporary spousal-support order premised upon Husband’s retirement. Husband did not prosecute his Civ.R. 75(N)(2) motion and never filed a motion to modify temporary support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not granting Husband credit for direct payments made to Wife during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Trial court took payments into account in its ultimate property division determinations, and arguments regarding marital property valuation were waived where Husband failed to submit valuation evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by placing time limitations on direct examination and cross-examination. Husband did not demonstrate what evidence he was prohibited from presenting due to the limitations and how he was prejudiced by the limitations. Furthermore, the transcript does not reflect that the trial court favored one side over the other in its timekeeping. Husband’s arguments with respect to his motion for a new trial are disposed of by our resolution of his other assignments of error. Having overruled Husband’s other assignments of error, we find that his assignment of error regarding the denial of his motion for a new trial is moot. On Wife’s assignments of error, the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in finding that the parties were married on September 8, 1989, the date of their civil marriage, rather than sometime in 1981, when Wife claimed they privately exchanged vows in an Islamic ceremony. There was no evidence that it would be inequitable or prejudicial for the trial court to use the legal marriage date as the marriage inception date, especially where all significant marital property was obtained after the civil marriage date. The trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in ordering Husband to pay Wife monthly support in the amount of $1,500 per month for life, absent Wife’s cohabitation or remarriage. The record reflects that the trial court considered Husband’s pension in its analysis of the R.C. 3105.18 factors with respect to an equitable division of property and did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of Husband’s pension. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-829 |
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Beachwood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
| 113803 | Interlocutory appeal; political immunity; governmental function; provision of a system of public education; motion for summary judgment; settlement agreement; sharing of tax revenue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court’s denial of Warrensville Heights’ motion for partial summary judgment was proper. Warrensville Heights is not entitled to political subdivision immunity for Beachwood’s unjust-enrichment, promissory estoppel, fraud, and conversion claims because Warrensville Heights’ breach of the parties’ settlement agreement is not conduct related to the provision of a system of public education and, as a result, is not a governmental function. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-830 |
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State v. Hubbard
| 113833 | Jail-time credit; offense specific; concurrent sentences; fully served; pretrial detention; separate cases; equal protection. An appeal from a trial court’s decision on a motion for additional jail-time credit was dismissed as moot because the defendant-appellant had fully served his sentences on the offenses for which jail-time credit may have applied and jail-time credit on those offenses cannot transfer to a separate sentence incurred in a separate case. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-831 |
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Trout v. Shani DEV8, L.L.C.
| 113965 | Constructive notice; negligence; slip and fall; directed verdict; judgment notwithstanding the verdict; Civ.R. 50; business invitee. Defendant-appellant did not have constructive notice of a liquid substance on the floor prior to plaintiff-appellee’s slip and fall. Plaintiff-appellee cannot rely on speculation to prove how long a liquid substance was on the floor prior to her fall. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-832 |
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State v. Early
| 113985 & 113986 | Temporary protection order; expired; effective assistance of counsel; due process; fair trial; sufficiency; abduction; new trial. Appellant’s conviction for abduction was supported by sufficient evidence where the appellant, without permission, drove off in the victim’s car with the victim’s child present in the backseat. Appellant was denied a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object or recognize that the temporary protection order that the State used in support of its case had expired prior to the alleged commission the offenses. Appellant is entitled to a new trial. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-833 |
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State v. Clouser
| 114094 | Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); nonconstitutional rights; prejudice; consecutive sentence; findings; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); supported by the record; Reagan Tokes; unconstitutional. Defendant entered his guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily even though court did not advise him that it could, theoretically, proceed directly to judgment and sentence because the substitute judge who accepted the guilty pleas informed the defendant that the assigned judge would sentence him at a later date. Trial court’s findings in support of consecutive sentence were supported by the record. Indefinite sentence imposed pursuant to Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-834 |
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State v. Ward
| 114107 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); not disproportionate to seriousness and danger posed; adequately reflects seriousness of defendant’s crimes; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s findings; cruel and unusual punishment; Eighth Amendment; proportionality; Crim.R. 32(A); unreasonable delay. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences and did not show that the sentences imposed consecutively to the sentence in an unrelated case constituted cruel and unusual punishment or amounted to an unreasonable delay. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-835 |
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State v. Foster
| 114148 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. The trial court engaged in the proper analysis, considered the required statutory criteria, and made the necessary findings before imposing consecutive sentences. Moreover, the record clearly supports the trial court’s findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-836 |
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State v. McCuller
| 114153 | Appellate jurisdiction; State appeal as of right; R.C. 2953.08; sentence contrary to law; modification of sentence; leave to appeal; App.R. 5; motion to dismiss indictment; R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a); Megan’s Law; completion of prison sentence. The trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Appellant was required to register under R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) because, contrary to his assertion, he had not completed his prison term before July 1, 1997. His prison sentence had been resumed when he returned to prison for parole violations. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-837 |
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lundeen
| 114184 | Confirmation of sale; R.C. 2329.021 et seq.; res judicata; law of the case; foreclosure. Appellant’s attempts to challenge the decree of foreclosure were barred by the law- of-the-case doctrine, waiver, and res judicata; accordingly, the only issue before the court of appeals was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it confirmed the sale of the property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the sale where the appellant failed to challenge the valuation of the property or challenge appellee’s compliance with R.C. 2329.021 et seq., before the trial court. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-838 |
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State v. Wells
| 114195 | Nunc pro tunc; denial; resentencing; postrelease control; Tier III; sex offender; jurisdiction; presumption of regularity; sentencing entry. Trial court did not err in denying defendant-appellant’s request for a nunc pro tunc order of a sentencing entry when nothing in the record indicated that there was an error or omission in the sentencing entry that required correction through a nunc pro tunc order. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-839 |
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State v. Davis
| 114243 | Conceded error; effective assistance of counsel; conflict of interest. Our review of the record reveals a clear conflict of interest exists in this case; assigned defense counsel for the defendant’s community-control violation hearing was previously the State’s prosecuting attorney in the same matter. Judgment reversed and remanded to the trial court for the assignment of new defense counsel and a community-control violation hearing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-840 |
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Megalight, Inc. v. Reliable Final Mile Transport, L.L.C.
| 114441 | Summary judgment; warehouse lien; breach of contract; Civ.R. 56(F). Trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and awarding damages when there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff breached the parties’ contract and as to the amount of damages if any. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-841 |
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In re S.S.
| 114445 | Parental rights, permanent custody, legal custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), R.C. 2151.011(B)(21), best interest, abuse of discretion, manifest weight, R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F), R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414(E). Judgments affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Father legal custody of the youngest child, because it was in the best interest of the child to be in a stable and loving environment. Further, granting permanent custody of the oldest child to the Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, when Mother did not sufficiently remedy her mental-health issues, which caused the removal of her children, and it was in the child’s best interest to live in a safe and stable environment. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-842 |
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In re T.M.
| 114453 | Permanent custody; reasonable efforts; child in the temporary custody of agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period; children “cannot or should not” be returned to parent; parent demonstrated a “lack of commitment”; permanent custody to agency in children’s best interest. Judgment affirmed. The record demonstrates that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with her children and the juvenile court documented those efforts throughout the case. Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children cannot or should not be returned to mother and that mother had a lack of commitment toward the children. The record demonstrates that it was in the best interest of the children to grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-843 |
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White v. Cleveland
| 112408, 112413, 112415 | Malicious prosecution; false arrest; false imprisonment; political subdivision immunity; R.C. 2744.02; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); summary judgment; genuine issue of material fact; collateral estoppel; probable cause; police officers; City of Cleveland; civil liability; intimidation; Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; juvenile court bindover. The City of Cleveland is entitled to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02 for the state-law claims, as no applicable exceptions applied. The federal court’s finding of probable cause precluded White’s claims against the officers, and collateral estoppel barred relitigating those issues in state court. The trial court erred in denying the individual defendants summary judgment, because White did not present evidence that any officer acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-739 |
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State v. Bey
| 113839 | R.C. 2907.02, rape; R.C. 2905.01, kidnapping; R.C. 2941.148, sexually violent predator; allied offenses; Evid.R. 701; lay witness testimony; plain error; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-740 |
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Michael v. Stanard
| 113916 | Judgment on the pleadings; statute of limitations; cognizable event; legal-malpractice. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-741 |
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State v. Heard
| 113929 | Involuntary manslaughter; having weapons while under disability; firearm specifications; guilty plea. Affirmed. The defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because the trial court advised him of his right to a jury trial and was not required to specifically include additional information about the jury unanimity requirement or how many jurors would be on the panel. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-742 |
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State v. Ayala
| 113944 | Felony sentencing; consecutive sentences; ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s 23-year prison sentence is affirmed because the court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing because: 1) it is not a factor for consideration under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); 2) failure to present mitigating evidence is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel; 3) the mitigating evidence at issue is not part of the record; and 4) the defendant failed to show prejudice. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-743 |
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State v. Martin
| 113955 | R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive sentences; clearly and convincingly; attempted rape; burglary; maximum sentence. The trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence was not contrary to law. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-744 |
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Justus v. Lakewood
| 113972 | Political-subdivision immunity; summary judgment; R.C. 2744.02(B)(3); exception; negligent failure; public roads; in repair; repair; depression; de minimis; hazardous condition; duty; knowledge; actual notice; constructive notice; reasonable apprehension; lack of evidence. Reversed the decision of the trial court that denied summary judgment to the city on the basis of political-subdivision immunity. The exception to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), for the negligent failure to keep public roads in repair, could not be found to apply in the matter. The plaintiff could not establish from the evidence that the city had a duty to repair the subject depression in the road where her scooter-accident occurred. Even if she could, there was nothing to show that the city actively created the condition or that it had actual or constructive notice of the condition or that it should have anticipated that the depression posed a hazard or potential danger. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-745 |
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In re J.D.
| 114007 | Juvenile court; competency hearing; R.C. 2152.51 through 2152.59; ineffective assistance of counsel; statutory timing requirements for conducting competency evaluations of juveniles; failure to order residential competency treatment. Juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating the juvenile delinquent and committing him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services is reversed. Evidence in the record showed that the juvenile was likely incompetent when he entered his admission to aggravated robbery. Additionally, the court erred when it failed to comply with various timing requirements in the juvenile competency statutes. The juvenile’s counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency, failing to file a motion to withdraw the admission, and failing to object to the court not complying with the statutory timing requirements concerning competency. Furthermore, the court erred when it found that it had no “authority” to refer the juvenile for residential competency treatment. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-746 |
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State v. M.F.
| 114032 & 114033 | Notice of conceded error; partial sealing; multiple offenses. The defendant was convicted of three counts of drug possession and one count of physical control of vehicle while under the influence. He was also charged in a separate indictment arising from the same set of facts. The latter indictment was dismissed. He was ineligible to have either of his cases sealed since physical control of vehicle while under the influence is not eligible for sealing or expungement. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-747 |
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In re D.H.
| 114164 | Permanent custody, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Appeal dismissed; appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), is granted. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determinations, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s decision as a matter of law. Further, the juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Moreover, Mother failed to present clear and convincing evidence that, despite having had her parental rights terminated for a sibling of the subject child, she would be able to provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child as required under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). On this record, an extension of temporary custody was not warranted and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not granting an extension. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-748 |
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Wells Fargo Bank Natl. Assn. v. Doberdruk
| 114218 | Foreclosure; confirmation of the sale; bond; motion for stay; moot; R.C. 2329.45. Appeal dismissed as moot. Appellant failed to obtain a stay of the confirmation of the sale because she did not post the required bond set by the trial court. Therefore, the sale of the property was confirmed and the proceeds were distributed. Appellant’s argument that the appeal was not moot because R.C. 2329.45 provides a remedy when the property has been sold is unpersuasive because this court has held that R.C. 2329.45 applies only to appeals that were taken from the order confirming the sale and when an appellant successfully obtains a stay. Here, the appellant failed to obtain a stay. Thus, the appeal is moot. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-749 |
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State v. Lenard
| 114263 | Return of property; forfeiture; res judicata; timely; waiver. - Trial court did not commit prejudicial error in denying appellant’s motion for return of property because he did not timely raise the issue with the trial court during the pendency of the case and res judicata now bars the issue from consideration in his criminal case. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-750 |
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In re Ar.M.
| 114335 | Complaint for abuse and neglect, R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), request for permanent custody, cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time, should not be placed with either parent, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), best interests of the child, clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414(E). Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") filed a complaint alleging abuse and neglect, requesting temporary custody of twin four-year-old children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the agency permanent custody where it found the children cannot be placed with one parent in a reasonable time, should not be placed with either parent, and temporary custody was in the best interests of the children. There was clear and convincing record evidence sufficient to support the court’s findings, which were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This evidence included that the children had been previously found abused while under parents’ care, resulting in injuries to Ar.M. that required significant, ongoing medical care; CCDCFS later became unable to locate the children because of mother’s failure to communicate with her case worker; the children were eventually found with an inadequate caregiver who suffered from dementia; the children were dirty, dehydrated or severely underweight, requiring hospitalization; mother was incarcerated at time of trial facing charges of child endangering regarding these children; the children had been in temporary agency custody for more than half of their lives; and CCDCFS could not identify alternative adequate caregivers. Judgment affirmed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-751 |
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In re A.M.
| 114380; 114381 | Permanent custody; abused; neglected; dependent; special needs; paternity; R.C. 2151.353(A); R.C. 2151.414(E); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); R.C. 2151.414(E)(14); R.C. 2151.414(E)(15); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); legal custody; reunification; reasonable efforts; sufficiency; manifest weight; clear and convincing. Affirmed juvenile court’s decision granting permanent custody of twin children to the children services agency and terminating father’s parental rights. The court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) and in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E) and 2151.414(D)(1). Its findings were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicated that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The juvenile court made multiple reasonable-efforts determinations prior to the dispositional hearing. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/6/2025
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3/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-752 |
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