In the Supreme Court of Ohio

STATE *EX REL.* NADINE YOUNG	:	**CASE NO. 2023-1622**
RELATOR,	:	**ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS**
V.	:	
BLENDON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT	:	
RESPONDENT.	:	

MERIT BRIEF OF RELATOR

Elizabeth A. Well*
Reg No. 0087750
Latina Bailey
Reg. No. 0087053
**Counsel of Record*
Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center
3976 North Hampton Drive
Powell, Ohio 43065
P: (614) 848-8500
F: (614) 848-8501
ewell@ocvjc.org

Sean L. Walton
Reg No. 0088401
WALTON + BROWN, LLP
395 E. Broad Street, Suite 200
Columbus, Ohio 43215
P: (614) 636-3476
F: (614) 636-3453
swalton@waltonbrownlaw.com

Counsel for Relator

Patrick Kasson
Reg. No. 0055570
Thomas N. Spyker
Reg. No. 0098075
Reminger Co., L.P.A.
200 Civic Center Dr., Suite 800
Columbus, Ohio 43215
P: (614) 228-1311
F: (614) 232-2410
pkasson@reminger.com
tspyker@reminger.com

Counsel for Respondent

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Relator, Nadine Young (hereinafter, "Ms. Young"), is an Ohio citizen, next of kin to crime victim, Ta'Kiya Young, and the client on whose behalf Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center requested records from Blendon Township Police Department (hereinafter, "BTPD"). (Joint Exhibit A at ¶ 1.) Respondent, Blendon Township Police Department, is a "public office" within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(A), which is refusing to supply records from an incident on August 24, 2023, to Ms. Young in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). *Id.* at ¶ 2.

On August 24, 2023, two unidentified BTPD officers were on the scene at a Kroger grocery store in Westerville, Ohio, for a purpose unrelated to Ta'Kiya Young (hereinafter, "Ta'Kiya"). *Id.* at ¶ 4. While assisting a citizen who had locked their keys inside their car, one of the BTPD officers was approached by a Kroger employee, who informed him that Ta'Kiya had allegedly stolen from the store. *Id.* at ¶ 5. The two unidentified BTPD officers responded to this report and approached Ta'Kiya as she was inside her vehicle, preparing to leave the store parking lot. *Id.* at ¶ 6. This interaction is on body camera video. *Id.* As the video provided to this Court shows, the two unidentified officers instructed Ta'Kiya to exit her vehicle. One officer placed his hands inside the driver's side window of Ta'Kiya's vehicle. The other officer ran in front of Ta'Kiya's vehicle and drew his firearm, pointing it at Ta'Kiya. After approximately one minute, Ta'Kiya attempted to drive away, turning the wheel away from the officers, and moving her vehicle slowly. The officer in front of the vehicle, rather than simply moving aside, fired a shot through the windshield, killing Ta'Kiya and her unborn child. *Id.* at ¶ 7-8.

On November 14, 2023, Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center (hereinafter, "OCVJC") submitted a public records request (within the meaning of R.C. 149.43) to BTPD on behalf of its client, Ms. Young. (Joint Exhibit E.) On November 15, 2023, BTPD confirmed receipt of the

request and contacted OCVJC to determine the preferred email address to which to send the fulfilled request. *Id.* That same day, BTPD provided an email with a link and documents with its response indicating that redactions in the videos had been made pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(17)(h),(k),(l), R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr), and R.C. 2930.07(D). *Id.*

BTPD redacted the names and identifying information of the two unidentified BTPD officers from the body-worn camera recordings of the killing of Ta'Kiya Young and the incident report provided to Ms. Young in response to her public records request. *Id.*

Recordings from body-worn cameras are "public records" within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(A). *See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati*, 2019-Ohio-3876, ¶ 13. The incident report is a public record under the meaning of R.C. 149.43. *State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith*, 2007-Ohio-609, ¶ 13.

Further, names of peace officers are public record. R.C. 149.434(A) ("Each public office or person responsible for public records shall maintain a database or a list that includes the name of all public officials and employees elected to or employed by that public office. The database or list is a public record and shall be made available upon a request made pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code."). In fact, BTPD's own policies require that its officers' names be publicly displayed any time an officer is in uniform.[1] (Joint Exhibit B at 570.)

For these reasons, OCVJC contacted BTPD to request removal of those redactions. (Joint Exhibit E.) After several days without a response, BTPD confirmed receipt of OCVJC's inquiry but provided no further clarification. *Id.* On December 6, 2023, OCVJC provided legal authority

[1] "1024.4 INSIGNIA AND PATCHES
(c) The regulation nameplate, or an authorized sewn-on cloth nameplate, shall be worn at all times while in uniform. The nameplate shall display the employee's first and last name."

to support its original public records request and requested BTPD's use of force policies to which OCVJC received no immediate response once again. *Id.* On December 12, 2023, OCVJC made a phone call to BTPD and was able to confirm receipt of the communication and was told that the records would soon be released. *Id*. Seven days later, OCVJC made another phone call to BTPD and was informed that BTPD's use of force polices would be produced, but that there was no estimated time for production. *Id*. However, OCVJC was able to obtain BTPD's use of force policies (as well as the remainder of its policies) through co-counsel, Sean Walton, Jr., who previously made a public records request to obtain these policies.

On December 21, 2023, Ms. Young filed the instant complaint in mandamus. Subsequently, BTPD produced its use of force policies to Ms. Young. (Joint Exhibit A at ¶ 12.) To date, BTPD has not produced any records to OCVJC that contain the names, addresses, or identifying information of the BTPD officer that shot Ta'Kiya Young nor of the other officer on scene during the encounter. *Id.* at ¶ 13.

ARGUMENT

A. Introduction

Ohio voters overwhelmingly passed Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a (commonly, "Marsy's Law") in November 2017. The amendment went into effect in February 2018. Since that time, this Court has had only one[2] other occasion to analyze the "victim" definition contained in the amendment. *City of Centerville v. Knab*, 2020-Ohio-5219.

[2] *State ex rel. Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. d/b/a The Columbus Dispatch v. The City of Columbus Police Department*, Case No. 2023-1327 involves the "victim" definition, but is currently pending before this Court.

As is clear from this Court's detailed analysis in *Knab*, the "victim" definition in Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) and R.C. 2930.01(H) is designed to be applied to the facts of each case, and often requires an incisive case-by-case analysis.

Case-by-case analysis is appropriate here because it is used in other contexts in which courts are attempting to determine who is a "victim." *In re Clapacs*, 58 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 3 (Ct. of Cl. 1989) ("The court finds that the interests of justice demand that a case-by-case analysis be utilized to ascertain the impact a criminal incident may have upon a person other than the individual directly involved in the crime."); *see also In re Lacour-Belyn*, 2012-Ohio-4684 (Ct. of Cl.) ("The determination of whether a person qualifies as a victim in one's own right is to be based upon a case-by-case analysis.") In addition, this Court has used case-by-case analysis in matters involving public records exceptions, such as analyzing whether a family member is always a designee of an incarcerated offender for purposes of public records requests. *State ex rel. Summers v. Fox*, 2020-Ohio-5585, ¶ 35.

Case-by-case analysis is often preferable in cases involving criminal offenses generally. *See e.g. State v. Knuff*, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 61, quoting *State v. Cassano*, 2002-Ohio-3751, ¶ 40 ("We have rejected a bright-line rule that a motion for self-representation is timely when it is made 'any time before trial.' "); *State v. Milligan*, 40 Ohio St.3d 341, 344 (1988) (holding case-by-case analysis must be applied when determining whether to dismiss or suppress intercepted communications between defendants and their counsel). Concerning analysis of allied offenses of similar import, this Court pointedly stated: "No bright-line rule can govern every situation." *State v. Ruff*, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 30.

Here, Ms. Young is not arguing that Ohio peace officers, by virtue of their profession, can never meet the "victim" definition in Ohio Const., art. I, §10a. Instead, Ms. Young is asking

this Court to hold peace officers claiming victim status after using deadly force to the same standards of any other Ohio citizen.

To assert victim status and access its attendant rights, officers who use lethal force should face the rebuttable presumption that they *are not* victims—the same presumption any Ohio citizen would face if there was some question about whether the person's actions were those of a victim or a perpetrator. In other words, a peace officer who uses force should have to demonstrate that, by law, the officer meets the "victim" definition. Requiring those claiming victim status to make this showing is not unusual. *See State v. Morales*, 2023-Ohio-2459 (1st Dist.) (Considering whether an individual whose car was totaled when the defendant crashed into it was considered a "victim" under the Ohio Const., art I, § 10a(D)); *State v. Cunningham,* 2021-Ohio-4053, ¶ 7-8 (11th Dist.) (discussing whether guardians of the children of a deceased victim would be victims themselves); *State v. Jones*, 2020-Ohio-81, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.); *State v. Lee*, 2019-Ohio-4725 (12th Dist.); *State v. McCauley*, 2023-Ohio-2133 (5th Dist.) (parents of child victim appealing trial court finding that they did not meet the victim definition).

While some litigants have urged this Court to adopt a bright-line rule regarding peace officers and victim status for the sake of predictability, creating predictability is not the highest value in our legal system—the highest value is justice. Ms. Young urges this Court to decline to adopt a bright-line rule that ultimately serves no one and, instead, evaluate *this case* and hold that the two unidentified officers are not victims under Ohio law, for all the reasons set forth herein.

B. Standard of Review

" 'Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43, Ohio's Public Records Act.' " *State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage*, 2015-Ohio-974, ¶ 10, quoting *State ex rel. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ.*, 2006-

Ohio-903, ¶ 6. To establish entitlement to a writ of mandamus under the Public Records Act, a relator must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a "clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of [the Respondent] to provide relief." *Id.*

"Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception." *State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones Kelley*, 2008-Ohio-1770, ¶ 10, citing *State ex rel. Carr v. Akron*, 2006-Ohio-6714, ¶ 30; *State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron*, 2004-Ohio-6557, ¶ 25. "A custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception." *Id.*

<u>Proposition of Law No. I:</u> There is a rebuttable presumption that a peace officer who uses lethal force while on duty is not a victim pursuant to Ohio Const., art. I, §10a(D) and R.C. 2930.01(H).

C. Applying the plain language of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) and R.C. 2930.01(H), the two unidentified BTPD officers cannot overcome the rebuttable presumption that they do not meet the definition of "victim."

Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) provides the following:

> 'Victim' means a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The term 'victim' does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or incapacitated victim.

Notably, the definition contains an explicit exclusion: "The term 'victim' does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or incapacitated victim." *Id*.

R.C. 2930.01(H) states: " 'Victim' has the same meaning as in Section 10a of art. I of the Ohio Constitution." This victim definition is a prerequisite to assertion of each right in Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a and R.C. 2930, including the right to redaction contained in R.C. 2930.07.

When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning controls. *See Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn.*, 2016-Ohio-2806, ¶ 16 (explaining that "in construing the Constitution, we apply the same rules of construction that we apply in construing statutes;" "[w]ords used in the Constitution that are not defined therein must be taken in their usual, normal, or customary meaning;" and " '[w]here the meaning of a provision is clear on its face, we will not look beyond the provision in an attempt to divine what the drafters intended it to mean' "), *reconsideration denied*, 2016-Ohio-5108. "Courts must give effect to the words … and may not modify an unambiguous [provision] by deleting words used or inserting words not used." *State v. Waddell*, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631 (1995).

Likewise, courts should apply the unambiguous language of a statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. *See Taber v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv*., 125 Ohio App.3d 742, 747 (10th Dist.1998); *Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision*, 2002-Ohio-4032, ¶ 11 ("When a statute is unambiguous in its terms, courts must apply it rather than interpret it.").

Under Ohio law, one must meet the definition of "victim" to be entitled to redaction of their name, address, and identifying information from case documents, such as incident reports and body cam footage. R.C. 2930.07(D)(1)(a); R.C. 2930.07(A)(1)(a) ("Case document" means "a document or information in a document, or audio or video recording of a victim of violating a protection order, an offense of violence, or a sexually oriented offense, regarding a case that is submitted to a court, a law enforcement agency or officer, or a prosecutor or filed with a clerk of court, including, but not limited to, pleadings, motions, exhibits, transcripts, orders, and judgments, or any documentation, including audio or video recordings of a victim of violating a

protection order, an offense of violence, or a sexually oriented offense, prepared or created by a court, clerk of court, or law enforcement agency or officer, or a prosecutor regarding a case.").

There can be no dispute that the two unidentified officers are "persons" under the plain language of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D). *See Knab* at ¶ 24. But the officers were neither persons against whom a criminal offense was committed, nor persons directly and proximately harmed by a criminal offense.

The redacted body cam video provided by BTPD itself demonstrates that Ta'Kiya is the victim in this matter. In the video, two unidentified BTPD officers approached Ta'Kiya purportedly on the suspicion that she had taken alcohol from the Kroger store without paying for it. Even if true, this offense would be a misdemeanor of the first degree. R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). Importantly, Kroger would be the victim of any misdemeanor theft offense, not the officers.

One BTPD officer placed his hand on the window of Ta'Kiya's car. The other placed himself in the front of the vehicle, almost immediately drawing his firearm and pointing it at Ta'Kiya. Ta'Kiya then cut the wheel away from the officer with his firearm drawn. This action can be seen clearly in the officer's body cam video. Had she intended to strike the officer with the car, she would not have cut the wheel away.

The various claims that the officer, at that moment, became a victim of attempted murder or attempted vehicular assault are belied by the officer's own body cam video that clearly shows Ta'Kiya Young had the intent to steer her car away from the officer. *See Ohio police release video of fatal police shooting of pregnant 21-year-old Ta'Kiya Young*, https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/01/us/takiya-young-ohio-police-shooting/index.html (accessed July 15, 2024) (police statement accusing Ta'Kiya Young of "attempted vehicular assault" and "misdemeanor assault."); *Shoplifting shouldn't have escalated to death in Ta'Kiya Young police*

shooting, https://www.dispatch.com/story/opinion/columns/2023/09/02/video-takiya-young-shooting-black-pregnant-woman-shot-by-police-in-ohio-kroger-blendon-township/70743378007/ (accessed July 15, 2024) (FOP representative accusing Ta'Kiya Young of "aggravated robbery" and trying to "run down a fellow human being.").

For the unidentified BTPD officers to be victims, Ta'Kiya would have to have committed one of these offenses. Yet, she did not.

There is no plausible claim that Ta'Kiya possessed the requisite level of intent for attempted murder. R.C. 2903.02 (Emphasis added) ("(A) No person shall *purposely* cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy. (B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code."). "A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature." R.C. 2901.22(A). Ta'Kiya can be seen cutting the steering wheel away from the BTPD officer who is standing in front of her car with his gun drawn. Ta'Kiya's car barely crept forward before she was shot. These are not the actions of a person acting with purpose to kill. Further, Ta'Kiya was not fleeing Kroger after having committed an offense of violence that was a felony of the first or second degree. Therefore, neither officer could be credibly called a victim of attempted murder.

Neither officer suffered serious physical harm, nor did Ta'Kiya attempt to cause serious physical harm, making attempted vehicular assault inapplicable. *See* R.C. 2903.08 ("(A) No

person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall cause serious physical harm to another person or another's unborn in any of the following ways: (1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance; (b) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance; (c) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A)(3) of section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance. (2) In one of the following ways: (a) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a reckless operation offense, provided that this division applies only if the person to whom the serious physical harm is caused or to whose unborn the serious physical harm is caused is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the reckless operation offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (E) of this section; (b) Recklessly. (3) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a speeding offense, provided that this division applies only if the person to whom the serious physical harm is caused or to whose unborn the serious physical harm is caused is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the speeding offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (E) of this section.").

Further, Ta'Kiya was not operating an aircraft, she was not in a construction zone, and there is no allegation that she committed an OVI. Finally, Ta'Kiya was not driving recklessly because she did not disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that she was likely to harm

anyone—she cut the wheel away from the officer, she moved exceedingly slowly to attempt to remove herself from the risk *she* was facing. *See* R.C. 2901.22(C) ("A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.").

Put simply, Ta'Kiya Young lacked the requisite mental culpability to be credibly accused of any offense of violence. The only offense Ta'Kiya could be credibly accused of is a misdemeanor theft offense, with Kroger as its victim. Under the plain language of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D), Ta'Kiya Young is a victim. The unidentified BTPD officer who shot her is a perpetrator who is not constitutionally entitled to victims' rights. The other officer is, at best, a witness and, at worst, complicit. Either way, he is not a victim. Further, since Ta'Kiya is the true victim, neither officer *can* meet the victim definition, because neither is, or was, acting in her best interests as the deceased victim. This conclusion is further buttressed by the two officers' blatant disregard for every applicable BTPD policy during their interaction with Ta'Kiya.

Upon review of BTPD's use of force policies, it is evident that both unidentified BTPD officers acted in violation of BTPD's policies, specifically sections 300.2.1, 300.3.6, 300.4. and 300.4.1. (Joint Exhibit A.)

Section 300.4.1 is particularly pertinent in this case and states:

> 300.4.1 MOVING VEHICLES
>
> Shots fired at or from a moving vehicle involve additional considerations and risks and are rarely effective. When feasible, officers should take reasonable steps to move out of the path of an approaching vehicle instead of discharging their firearm at the vehicle or any of its occupants. An officer should only discharge a firearm at

a moving vehicle or its occupants when the officer reasonably believes there are no other reasonable means available to avert the imminent threat of the vehicle, or if deadly force other than the vehicle is directed at the officer or others. Officers should not shoot at any part of a vehicle in an attempt to disable the vehicle.

Id. at 38.

In addition, the officers' actions violated other critical BTPD policies, including:

300.2.1 DUTY TO INTERCEDE AND REPORT
Any officer present and observing another law enforcement officer or a member using force that is clearly beyond that which is objectively reasonable under the circumstances shall, when in a position to do so, intercede to prevent the use of unreasonable force.

Id. at 35.

300.3.6 ALTERNATIVE TACTICS - DE-ESCALATION
When circumstances reasonably permit, officers should use non-violent strategies and techniques to decrease the intensity of a situation, improve decision-making, improve communication, reduce the need for force, and increase voluntary compliance (e.g., summoning additional resources, formulating a plan, attempting verbal persuasion).

Id. at 38.

300.4 DEADLY FORCE APPLICATIONS
When reasonable, the officer shall, prior to the use of deadly force, make efforts to identify him/herself as a peace officer and to warn that deadly force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe the person is aware of those facts. Use of deadly force is justified in the following circumstances involving imminent threat or imminent risk:
(a) An officer may use deadly force to protect him/herself or others from what he/she reasonably believes is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
(b) *An officer may use deadly force to stop a fleeing subject when the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual has committed, or intends to commit, a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death, and the officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death to any other person if the individual is not immediately apprehended.* Under such circumstances, a verbal warning should precede the use of deadly force, where feasible.

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 38.

Thus, the two unidentified BTPD officers violated their own policies and procedures in responding to a misdemeanor report when one officer both put his hands inside Ta'Kiya's car and did nothing to stop the other officer who stood in front of Ta'Kiya's car, drew his firearm, pointed it at Ta'Kiya, and ultimately shot through Ta'Kiya's windshield, killing her and her unborn child.

In filings currently before this Court in *State ex rel. Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. d/b/a The Columbus Dispatch v. The City of Columbus Police Department*, Case No. 2023-1327, the Columbus Division of Police and its amici argue that peace officers should be treated like any other Ohio citizen—no more and no less. If any other Ohio citizen stood in front of someone's car, then drew and pointed a weapon at them, there is no dispute that the person in the car is a victim and that person would have every right to attempt to escape by driving away. If anything, peace officers should be held to a higher standard than ordinary citizens. *See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates*, 907 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir.1990).

> Police officers also present a special case for concern. We confer vast powers upon them and largely depend upon them for our safety in these difficult times. They are armed and they must make many judgments that affect the rights of numerous citizens each day. They decide whether to stop a driver, or to question a person on the street, or to respond to the scene when a citizen is in danger. They patrol neighborhoods and business areas at night to assure that burglaries and other wrongdoings are kept at as low an ebb as possible. We are properly shocked to hear that an officer has become a burglar or a thief. *We demand that officers be, and appear to be, honest and that they use their authority wisely. Therefore, while officers 'are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights,' the fact that they are policemen may affect the meaning of 'reasonableness' when their rights are being considered.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.*, quoting *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).

Finally, it is worth noting that BTPD has options to protect its officers' identities other than improper assertion of victims' rights. Uncharged suspects are also entitled to redaction of their names, addresses, and identifying information. R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h); R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a).

This argument for redaction would be in line with the application of the plain language of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) and R.C. 2930.01(H). Yet, BTPD has chosen not to utilize this provision in an attempt to obfuscate responsibility for the actions of its officers.

Nevertheless, analyzing the plain language of the "victim" definition in light of the undisputed facts of this case, there is no reasonable argument that the two unidentified BTPD officers meet the definition of "victim" within the meaning of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) and R.C. 2930.01(H).

D. Considering the average voter's understanding of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D), as well as the purpose of the amendment and history of its adoption, the two unidentified BTPD officers do not meet the definition of "victim."

"In construing constitutional text that was ratified by direct vote, we consider how the language would have been understood by the voters who adopted the amendment." *Knab* at ¶ 22, citing *Castleberry v. Evatt*, 147 Ohio St. 30, 33 (1946). "The court generally applies the same rules when construing the Constitution as it does when it construes a statutory provision, beginning with the plain language of the text." *Id*., citing *State v. Jackson*, 2004-Ohio-3206, ¶ 14. This Court will also consider "how the words and phrases would be understood by the voters in their normal and ordinary usage." *Id.*, citing *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 576-577 (2008).

"But in ascertaining the intent of the voters who approved the amendment, our inquiry must often include more than a mere analysis of the words found in the amendment." *Id*., citing *State ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney*, 69 Ohio St.2d 567, 570 (1982). "The purpose of the amendment and the history of its adoption may be pertinent in determining the meaning of the language used." *Id*. "When the language is unclear or of doubtful meaning the court may review the history of the amendment and the circumstances surrounding its adoption, the reason and

necessity of the amendment, the goal the amendment seeks to achieve, and the remedy it seeks to provide to assist the court in its analysis." *Id*., citing *Cleveland v. Bd. of Tax Appeals*, 153 Ohio St. 97, 103 (1950), *overruled in part on other grounds by Denison Univ. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals*, 2 Ohio St.2d 17 (1965), paragraph two of the syllabus; *City of Cleveland v. State*, 2019-Ohio-3820, ¶ 17 (lead opinion).

Regarding the victim definition, this Court stated: "A constitution serves, in part, as a guarantor of private rights, and Marsy's Law engrains into our Constitution protection for crime victims. It seems incongruent in this context to interpret the word 'person' in the amendment in a way that would give the government rights enforceable against its own citizens." *Knab* at ¶ 29. Chief Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, wrote: "Marsy's Law is contained in Ohio's Bill of Rights, and the purpose of a bill of rights is 'to protect people from the state." *Id.* at ¶ 47 (Kennedy, J. concurring in judgment), quoting *Walker v. Rowe,* 791 F.2d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1986). "Marsy's Law therefore creates rights that victims of crime may wield against the government; it does not grant the government rights against the people or itself." *Id*. at ¶ 48.

"As an additional tool to ascertain voters' intent, we presume that the voters who approved [the amendment] were aware of existing Ohio law." *Id.* at ¶ 28, citing *State v. Carswell*, 2007-Ohio-3723, ¶ 6.

Under Ohio law, it is axiomatic that "[t]he police department of a municipal corporation derives its authority from the state . . ." *Cleveland v. Payne*, 72 Ohio St. 347 (1905), paragraph 1 of the syllabus. Equally axiomatic, "[a] corporation is 'an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.' " *Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank*, 133 Ohio St. 81, 86 (1937), citing *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); *see also State ex rel. Crabbe, Atty. Genl., v. Thistle Down Jockey Club, Inc.*, 114 Ohio St. 582, 590 (1926). A

corporation "can function only through its officers, agents or representatives." *Id.* In this case, Blendon Township, as a municipal corporation, exercises state power through its police officers, who are state actors.

There is no question that police officers, and many times even private security officers, are considered state actors in the eyes of Ohio courts. *See State v. Hughes*, 2008-Ohio-3966, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.) (holding a private security officer was a state actor because he had the authority and discretion to make arrests); *State v. Clark*, 2014-Ohio-4873, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.) ("Rather, the focus is on the action of the police – a state actor, searching and seizing Clark's medical records without a warrant."); *State v. Ward*, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 588, *11 (10th Dist. Feb. 20, 2001) (" There was no evidence that the police (or any arm of the state)…").

Since peace officers, like municipal corporations, are state actors, their acts, especially uses of force, are state action. *See United States v. Classic,* 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."); *see also Screws v. United States*, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) ("Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties" constitute state action, "whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it."). A peace officer who is on duty and uses lethal violence is exercising the ultimate power of the state.

It is within the context of this framework that this Court must evaluate BTPD's argument that its officers are victims. The voters who approved Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a would not have understood or intended for the BTPD officers to fit within the meaning of "victim" under Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a, especially when one officer intentionally put himself in harm's way and pointed and discharged a firearm at an unarmed woman suspected of a misdemeanor offense. An

ordinary voter would most assuredly interpret the BTPD officers' actions as the epitome of state power being wielded against a citizen.

To gauge voter intent, this Court could consider the voices of Ohio citizens. Jeff Wenninger, an Ohio citizen and former longtime Los Angeles Police Department officer wrote in an Op. Ed. to the Columbus Dispatch: "What I observed was nothing short of a violent, potentially criminal act, perpetrated on nothing more than an uncooperative individual." *Ta'Kiya Young shooting video shows incompetent, 'potentially criminal' acts| Retired officer*, https://www.dispatch.com/story/opinion/columns/guest/2023/09/05/video-of-takiya-young-police-shooting-pregnant-ohio-woman-columbus-protest-baby-blendon-township/70763241007/ (accessed July 22, 2024). Bowling Green State University criminal justice professor Philip Stinson told WOSU that the BTPD officer who killed Ta'Kiya Young had no justification to use deadly force and had put himself in harm's way. *Professor calls Ta'Kiya Young fatal shooting unjustified, says officer created danger for himself*, https://www.wosu.org/news/2023-09-05/professor-calls-takiya-young-fatal-shooting-unjustified-says-officer-created-danger-for-himself (accessed July 22, 2024).

Undoubtedly, peace officers can be victims of crime. In fact, there are several statutes in which *only* peace officers can be victims. R.C. 2903.01(E) ("No person shall purposely cause the death of a law enforcement officer whom the offender knows or has reasonable cause to know is a law enforcement officer . . . "). However, the factual differences between this case and other cases in which peace officers have made a credible claim to victim status are stark. *See, e.g., Columbus officer released from hospital, police say motive still unknown in Amazon facility shooting,* https://spectrumnews1.com/oh/columbus/news/2024/05/14/columbus-police-officer-

amazon-facility-shooting (accessed July 15, 2024). Therefore, case-by-case analysis is the best and only option when applying victims' rights laws and protections to peace officers.

Ultimately, when an on-duty officer wields the deadly power of the state against a citizen in a confrontation that the officer initiated, in violation of every pertinent policy of that officer's department, the officer simply cannot claim victim status to shield their identity from the public. This is, in essence, the position taken by Marsy's Law for All, which illuminates the purpose of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a and the history of its adoption. *Questions arise about intent of Marsy's Law, meant to protect crime victims in Ohio*. https://nbc24.com/news/local/questions-about intent-of-marsys-law-meant-to-protect-crime-victims-in-ohio# (Marsy' Law for All stating: "When reviewing the conduct of an on-duty law enforcement officer who has used physical force, the right to privacy of their name must quickly yield to the public's right to know.") This Court took into consideration the history, intent, and positions of the Marsy's Law for All national campaign in *Knab* and should continue to do so in this matter. *See Knab* at ¶ 30.

The history of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a and intent of its drafters simply do not support BTPD's interpretation. For these reasons, this Court should hold that there is a rebuttable presumption that a peace officer, acting in an official capacity, using lethal force, is not a victim for purposes of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D) and R.C. 2930.

E. BTPD's interpretation of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a, R.C. 2930.07(D), and R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr) burdens the right of Ms. Young, and other similarly situated Ohio citizens, to redress of injury pursuant to Ohio Const., art. I, § 16 and freedom of speech pursuant to Ohio Const., art. I, § 11.

The right to access the name and identifying information of one who harms you is integral to the right of Ohio citizens to seek a "remedy in due course of law" protected by Ohio Const., art. I, § 16. It is also critical to the right of Ohio citizens to engage in political speech protected by Ohio Const., art. I, § 11.

Without knowing the identities of the BTPD officers, Ms. Young is deprived of the information necessary to pursue her constitutional right to seek a remedy against the officers involved in the death of her granddaughter. Specifically, without knowing the identity of the officer who killed her granddaughter, Ms. Young is left with the considerably more daunting and potentially fruitless task of suing Blendon Township as a municipality. Because BTPD cannot be sued on a theory of respondeat superior, to prevail, Ms. Young will face the heightened challenge of proving that BTPD had a policy that led to the death of her granddaughter. *See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), paragraphs 2-3 of the syllabus. It is not enough that BTPD merely employed the officer who killed Ta'Kiya. *See id.*

This Court has held "one of the most fundamental and protected rights of our judicial system is the ability of citizens to access the courts. This right is preserved in both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 to the Ohio Constitution." *See Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc.*, 2012-Ohio-4193, ¶ 22. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that "regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct . . . aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid." *See Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997), quoting *Procunier v. Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).

Further, without knowing the identities of the BTPD officers, Ms. Young is deprived of the information needed to engage in constitutionally protected political speech pursuant to Ohio Const., art I, § 11, concerning police violence and its impact on her family and the community. If Ms. Young speaks out against a particular officer, without confirming his identity, Ms. Young faces the very real possibility of a defamation lawsuit. *See Defamation Lawsuit Against Afroman Filed by Ohio Cops Will Partially Proceed*, https://reason.com/2023/10/18/defamation-lawsuit-against-afroman-filed-by-ohio-cops-will-partially-proceed/ (accessed July 15, 2024).

Because BTPD's interpretation burdens Ms. Young's rights to access the courts and to free speech under the Ohio Constitution, this Court should find that the two unidentified BTPD officers cannot claim "victim" status under the meaning of Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(D).

F. Redaction of the names and identifying information of the two unidentified BTPD officers is a violation of the PRA because there is no applicable PRA exception in this matter.

Recordings from body-worn cameras are "public records" within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(A). *See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati*, 2019-Ohio-3876, ¶13. Names of peace officers are public record. *See* R.C. 149.434(A) ("Each public-office or person responsible for public records shall maintain a database or a list that includes the name of all public officials and employees elected to or employed by that public office. The database or list is a public record and shall be made available upon a request made pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code."). Incident reports are public records under the meaning of R.C. 149.43. *State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith,* 2007-Ohio-609, ¶ 13.

BTPD redacted the names and identifying information of two unidentified BTPD officers from the body-worn camera recordings and incident report provided to Ms. Young in response to her public records request. BTPD claimed these redactions are required under R.C. 2930.07 and R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr) because the two unidentified officers are "victims." However, for all the reasons set forth herein, BTPD cannot establish that the redactions fall squarely within the exception created by these statutes, and, therefore, cannot meet its burden. *State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron*, 2004-Ohio-6557, ¶ 25 ("A custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception.").

Thus, BTPD's redaction of the names and identifying information of the two BTPD officers involved in Ta'Kiya Young's death is legally impermissible because the BTPD officers

are not "victims" and, thus, do not "fall squarely" within the exception in R.C. 2930.07 and R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(rr).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Relator respectfully requests that this Court issue an order directing BTPD to make the requested records available without further delay.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Elizabeth A. Well
Elizabeth A. Well (0087750)
Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center
3967 North Hampton Drive
Powell, Ohio 43065
P: 614-848-8500
F: 614-848-8501
E: ewell@ocvjc.org
Attorney for Relator

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Merit Brief was sent by electronic mail and/or ordinary U.S. mail on this 25th day of July, 2024, to:

Patrick Kasson
Thomas N. Spyker
Reg. No. 0098075
Reminger Co., L.P.A.
200 Civic Center Dr., Suite 800 Columbus, Ohio 43215
P: (614) 228-1311
F: (614) 232-2410
pkasson@reminger.com
tspyker@reminger.com

Counsel for Respondent

/s Elizabeth A. Well
Elizabeth A. Well (0087750)

APPENDIX

Article I, Section 10a | Rights of victims of crime

Ohio Constitution / Article I Bill of Rights

Effective: *2017*

(A) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, which shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused:

(1) to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity and privacy;
(2) upon request, to reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim, and to be present at all such proceedings;
(3) to be heard in any public proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing, disposition, or parole, or in any public proceeding in which a right of the victim is implicated;
(4) to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused;
(5) upon request, to reasonable notice of any release or escape of the accused;
(6) except as authorized by section 10 of Article I of this constitution, to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused;
(7) to full and timely restitution from the person who committed the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim;
(8) to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt conclusion of the case;
(9) upon request, to confer with the attorney for the government; and

(10) to be informed, in writing, of all rights enumerated in this section.

(B) The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim's other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or in which the victim's rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim's lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the petition.

(C) This section does not create any cause of action for damages or compensation against the state, any political subdivision of the state, any officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any political subdivision, or any officer of the court.

(D) As used in this section, "victim" means a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The term "victim" does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or incapacitated victim.

(E) All provisions of this section shall be self-executing and severable, and shall supersede all conflicting state laws.

(F) This section shall take effect ninety days after the election at which it was approved.

Article I, Section 11 | Freedom of speech; of the press; of libels

Ohio Constitution / Article I Bill of Rights

Effective: *1851*

Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.

Article I, Section 16 | Redress for injury; Due process

Ohio Constitution / Article I Bill of Rights

Effective: *1912*

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.

Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.

Section 149.011 | Documents, reports, and records definitions.

Effective: *February 18, 2011* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 1 - 129th General Assembly*

As used in this chapter, except as otherwise provided:

(A) "Public office" includes any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, or other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government. "Public office" does not include the nonprofit corporation formed under section 187.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) "State agency" includes every department, bureau, board, commission, office, or other organized body established by the constitution and laws of this state for the exercise of any function of state government, including any state-supported institution of higher education, the general assembly, any legislative agency, any court or judicial agency, or any political subdivision or agency of a political subdivision. "State agency" does not include the nonprofit corporation formed under section 187.01 of the Revised Code.

(C) "Public money" includes all money received or collected by or due a public official, whether in accordance with or under authority of any law, ordinance, resolution, or order, under color of office, or otherwise. It also includes any money collected by any individual on behalf of a public office or as a purported representative or agent of the public office.

(D) "Public official" includes all officers, employees, or duly authorized representatives or agents of a public office.

(E) "Color of office" includes any act purported or alleged to be done under any law, ordinance, resolution, order, or other pretension to official right, power, or authority.

(F) "Archive" includes any public record that is transferred to the state archives or other designated archival institutions because of the historical information contained on it.

(G) "Records" includes any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or characteristic, including an electronic record as defined in section 1306.01 of the Revised Code, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.

Available Versions of this Section

February 18, 2011 – House Bill 1 - 129th General Assembly

Section 149.43 | Availability of public records for inspection and copying.

Effective: *October 3, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 33 - 135th General Assembly*

(A) As used in this section:

(1) "Public record" means records kept by any public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and school district units, and records pertaining to the delivery of educational services by an alternative school in this state kept by the nonprofit or for-profit entity operating the alternative school pursuant to section 3313.533 of the Revised Code. "Public record" does not mean any of the following:

(a) Medical records;

(b) Records pertaining to probation and parole proceedings, to proceedings related to the imposition of community control sanctions and post-release control sanctions, or to proceedings related to determinations under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code regarding the release or maintained incarceration of an offender to whom that section applies;

(c) Records pertaining to actions under section 2151.85 and division (C) of section 2919.121 of the Revised Code and to appeals of actions arising under those sections;

(d) Records pertaining to adoption proceedings, including the contents of an adoption file maintained by the department of health under sections 3705.12 to 3705.124 of the

Revised Code;

(e) Information in a record contained in the putative father registry established by section 3107.062 of the Revised Code, regardless of whether the information is held by the department of job and family services or, pursuant to section 3111.69 of the Revised Code, the office of child support in the department or a child support enforcement agency;

(f) Records specified in division (A) of section 3107.52 of the Revised Code;

(g) Trial preparation records;

(h) Confidential law enforcement investigatory records;

(i) Records containing information that is confidential under section 2710.03 or 4112.05 of the Revised Code;

(j) DNA records stored in the DNA database pursuant to section 109.573 of the Revised Code;

(k) Inmate records released by the department of rehabilitation and correction to the department of youth services or a court of record pursuant to division (E) of section 5120.21 of the Revised Code;

(l) Records maintained by the department of youth services pertaining to children in its custody released by the department of youth services to the department of rehabilitation and correction pursuant to section 5139.05 of the Revised Code;

(m) Intellectual property records;

(n) Donor profile records;

(o) Records maintained by the department of job and family services pursuant to section 3121.894 of the Revised Code;

(p) Designated public service worker residential and familial information;

(q) In the case of a county hospital operated pursuant to Chapter 339. of the Revised Code or a municipal hospital operated pursuant to Chapter 749. of the Revised Code, information that constitutes a trade secret, as defined in section 1333.61 of the Revised Code;

(r) Information pertaining to the recreational activities of a person under the age of eighteen;

(s) In the case of a child fatality review board acting under sections 307.621 to 307.629 of the Revised Code or a review conducted pursuant to guidelines established by the director of health under section 3701.70 of the Revised Code, records provided to the board or director, statements made by board members during meetings of the board or by persons participating in the director's review, and all work products of the board or director, and in the case of a child fatality review board, child fatality review data submitted by the board to the department of health or a national child death review database, other than the report prepared pursuant to division (A) of section 307.626 of the Revised Code;

(t) Records provided to and statements made by the executive director of a public

children services agency or a prosecuting attorney acting pursuant to section 5153.171 of the Revised Code other than the information released under that section;

(u) Test materials, examinations, or evaluation tools used in an examination for licensure as a nursing home administrator that the board of executives of long-term services and supports administers under section 4751.15 of the Revised Code or contracts under that section with a private or government entity to administer;

(v) Records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law;

(w) Proprietary information of or relating to any person that is submitted to or compiled by the Ohio venture capital authority created under section 150.01 of the Revised Code;

(x) Financial statements and data any person submits for any purpose to the Ohio housing finance agency or the controlling board in connection with applying for, receiving, or accounting for financial assistance from the agency, and information that identifies any individual who benefits directly or indirectly from financial assistance from the agency;

(y) Records listed in section 5101.29 of the Revised Code;

(z) Discharges recorded with a county recorder under section 317.24 of the Revised Code, as specified in division (B)(2) of that section;

(aa) Usage information including names and addresses of specific residential and commercial customers of a municipally owned or operated public utility;

(bb) Records described in division (C) of section 187.04 of the Revised Code that are not

designated to be made available to the public as provided in that division;

(cc) Information and records that are made confidential, privileged, and not subject to disclosure under divisions (B) and (C) of section 2949.221 of the Revised Code;

(dd) Personal information, as defined in section 149.45 of the Revised Code;

(ee) The confidential name, address, and other personally identifiable information of a program participant in the address confidentiality program established under sections 111.41 to 111.47 of the Revised Code, including the contents of any application for absent voter's ballots, absent voter's ballot identification envelope statement of voter, or provisional ballot affirmation completed by a program participant who has a confidential voter registration record; records or portions of records pertaining to that program that identify the number of program participants that reside within a precinct, ward, township, municipal corporation, county, or any other geographic area smaller than the state; and any real property confidentiality notice filed under section 111.431 of the Revised Code and the information described in division (C) of that section. As used in this division, "confidential address" and "program participant" have the meaning defined in section 111.41 of the Revised Code.

(ff) Orders for active military service of an individual serving or with previous service in the armed forces of the United States, including a reserve component, or the Ohio organized militia, except that, such order becomes a public record on the day that is fifteen years after the published date or effective date of the call to order;

(gg) The name, address, contact information, or other personal information of an individual who is less than eighteen years of age that is included in any record related to

a traffic accident involving a school vehicle in which the individual was an occupant at the time of the accident;

(hh) Protected health information, as defined in 45 C.F.R. 160.103, that is in a claim for payment for a health care product, service, or procedure, as well as any other health claims data in another document that reveals the identity of an individual who is the subject of the data or could be used to reveal that individual's identity;

(ii) Any depiction by photograph, film, videotape, or printed or digital image under either of the following circumstances:

(i) The depiction is that of a victim of an offense the release of which would be, to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, an offensive and objectionable intrusion into the victim's expectation of bodily privacy and integrity.

(ii) The depiction captures or depicts the victim of a sexually oriented offense, as defined in section 2950.01 of the Revised Code, at the actual occurrence of that offense.

(jj) Restricted portions of a body-worn camera or dashboard camera recording;

(kk) In the case of a fetal-infant mortality review board acting under sections 3707.70 to 3707.77 of the Revised Code, records, documents, reports, or other information presented to the board or a person abstracting such materials on the board's behalf, statements made by review board members during board meetings, all work products of the board, and data submitted by the board to the department of health or a national infant death review database, other than the report prepared pursuant to section 3707.77 of the Revised Code.

(ll) Records, documents, reports, or other information presented to the pregnancy-associated mortality review board established under section 3738.01 of the Revised Code, statements made by board members during board meetings, all work products of the board, and data submitted by the board to the department of health, other than the biennial reports prepared under section 3738.08 of the Revised Code;

(mm) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(1)(oo) of this section, telephone numbers for a victim, as defined in section 2930.01 of the Revised Code or a witness to a crime that are listed on any law enforcement record or report.

(nn) A preneed funeral contract, as defined in section 4717.01 of the Revised Code, and contract terms and personally identifying information of a preneed funeral contract, that is contained in a report submitted by or for a funeral home to the board of embalmers and funeral directors under division (C) of section 4717.13, division (J) of section 4717.31, or section 4717.41 of the Revised Code.

(oo) Telephone numbers for a party to a motor vehicle accident subject to the requirements of section 5502.11 of the Revised Code that are listed on any law enforcement record or report, except that the telephone numbers described in this division are not excluded from the definition of "public record" under this division on and after the thirtieth day after the occurrence of the motor vehicle accident.

(pp) Records pertaining to individuals who complete training under section 5502.703 of the Revised Code to be permitted by a school district board of education or governing body of a community school established under Chapter 3314. of the Revised Code, a STEM school established under Chapter 3326. of the Revised Code, or a chartered

nonpublic school to convey deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance into a school safety zone;

(qq) Records, documents, reports, or other information presented to a domestic violence fatality review board established under section 307.651 of the Revised Code, statements made by board members during board meetings, all work products of the board, and data submitted by the board to the department of health, other than a report prepared pursuant to section 307.656 of the Revised Code;

(rr) Records, documents, and information the release of which is prohibited under sections 2930.04 and 2930.07 of the Revised Code;

(ss) Records of an existing qualified nonprofit corporation that creates a special improvement district under Chapter 1710. of the Revised Code that do not pertain to a purpose for which the district is created.

A record that is not a public record under division (A)(1) of this section and that, under law, is permanently retained becomes a public record on the day that is seventy-five years after the day on which the record was created, except for any record protected by the attorney-client privilege, a trial preparation record as defined in this section, a statement prohibiting the release of identifying information signed under section 3107.083 of the Revised Code, a denial of release form filed pursuant to section 3107.46 of the Revised Code, or any record that is exempt from release or disclosure under section 149.433 of the Revised Code. If the record is a birth certificate and a biological parent's name redaction request form has been accepted under section 3107.391 of the Revised Code, the name of that parent shall be redacted from the birth certificate before it is released under this

paragraph. If any other section of the Revised Code establishes a time period for disclosure of a record that conflicts with the time period specified in this section, the time period in the other section prevails.

(2) "Confidential law enforcement investigatory record" means any record that pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high probability of disclosure of any of the following:

(a) The identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to which the record pertains, or of an information source or witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably promised;

(b) Information provided by an information source or witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably promised, which information would reasonably tend to disclose the source's or witness's identity;

(c) Specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific investigatory work product;

(d) Information that would endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or a confidential information source.

(3) "Medical record" means any document or combination of documents, except births, deaths, and the fact of admission to or discharge from a hospital, that pertains to the medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition of a patient and that is generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment.

(4) "Trial preparation record" means any record that contains information that is specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a civil or criminal action or proceeding, including the independent thought processes and personal trial preparation of an attorney.

(5) "Intellectual property record" means a record, other than a financial or administrative record, that is produced or collected by or for faculty or staff of a state institution of higher learning in the conduct of or as a result of study or research on an educational, commercial, scientific, artistic, technical, or scholarly issue, regardless of whether the study or research was sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or private concern, and that has not been publicly released, published, or patented.

(6) "Donor profile record" means all records about donors or potential donors to a public institution of higher education except the names and reported addresses of the actual donors and the date, amount, and conditions of the actual donation.

(7) "Designated public service worker" means a peace officer, parole officer, probation officer, bailiff, prosecuting attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney, correctional employee, county or multicounty corrections officer, community-based correctional facility employee, designated Ohio national guard member, protective services worker, youth services employee, firefighter, EMT, medical director or member of a cooperating physician advisory board of an emergency medical service organization, state board of pharmacy employee, investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation, emergency service telecommunicator, forensic mental health provider, mental health evaluation provider, regional psychiatric hospital employee, judge,

magistrate, or federal law enforcement officer.

(8) "Designated public service worker residential and familial information" means any information that discloses any of the following about a designated public service worker:

(a) The address of the actual personal residence of a designated public service worker, except for the following information:

(i) The address of the actual personal residence of a prosecuting attorney or judge; and

(ii) The state or political subdivision in which a designated public service worker resides.

(b) Information compiled from referral to or participation in an employee assistance program;

(c) The social security number, the residential telephone number, any bank account, debit card, charge card, or credit card number, or the emergency telephone number of, or any medical information pertaining to, a designated public service worker;

(d) The name of any beneficiary of employment benefits, including, but not limited to, life insurance benefits, provided to a designated public service worker by the designated public service worker's employer;

(e) The identity and amount of any charitable or employment benefit deduction made by the designated public service worker's employer from the designated public service worker's compensation, unless the amount of the deduction is required by state or federal law;

(f) The name, the residential address, the name of the employer, the address of the employer, the social security number, the residential telephone number, any bank account, debit card, charge card, or credit card number, or the emergency telephone number of the spouse, a former spouse, or any child of a designated public service worker;

(g) A photograph of a peace officer who holds a position or has an assignment that may include undercover or plain clothes positions or assignments as determined by the peace officer's appointing authority.

(9) As used in divisions (A)(7) and (15) to (17) of this section:

"Peace officer" has the meaning defined in section 109.71 of the Revised Code and also includes the superintendent and troopers of the state highway patrol; it does not include the sheriff of a county or a supervisory employee who, in the absence of the sheriff, is authorized to stand in for, exercise the authority of, and perform the duties of the sheriff.

"Correctional employee" means any employee of the department of rehabilitation and correction who in the course of performing the employee's job duties has or has had contact with inmates and persons under supervision.

"County or multicounty corrections officer" means any corrections officer employed by any county or multicounty correctional facility.

"Designated Ohio national guard member" means a member of the Ohio national guard who is participating in duties related to remotely piloted aircraft, including, but not limited to, pilots, sensor operators, and mission intelligence personnel, duties related to special forces operations, or duties related to cybersecurity, and is designated by the

adjutant general as a designated public service worker for those purposes.

"Protective services worker" means any employee of a county agency who is responsible for child protective services, child support services, or adult protective services.

"Youth services employee" means any employee of the department of youth services who in the course of performing the employee's job duties has or has had contact with children committed to the custody of the department of youth services.

"Firefighter" means any regular, paid or volunteer, member of a lawfully constituted fire department of a municipal corporation, township, fire district, or village.

"EMT" means EMTs-basic, EMTs-I, and paramedics that provide emergency medical services for a public emergency medical service organization. "Emergency medical service organization," "EMT-basic," "EMT-I," and "paramedic" have the meanings defined in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

"Investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation" has the meaning defined in section 2903.11 of the Revised Code.

"Emergency service telecommunicator" means an individual employed by an emergency service provider as defined under section 128.01 of the Revised Code, whose primary responsibility is to be an operator for the receipt or processing of calls for emergency services made by telephone, radio, or other electronic means.

"Forensic mental health provider" means any employee of a community mental health service provider or local alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services board who, in the course of the employee's duties, has contact with persons committed to a local

alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services board by a court order pursuant to section 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, or 2945.402 of the Revised Code.

"Mental health evaluation provider" means an individual who, under Chapter 5122. of the Revised Code, examines a respondent who is alleged to be a mentally ill person subject to court order, as defined in section 5122.01 of the Revised Code, and reports to the probate court the respondent's mental condition.

"Regional psychiatric hospital employee" means any employee of the department of mental health and addiction services who, in the course of performing the employee's duties, has contact with patients committed to the department of mental health and addiction services by a court order pursuant to section 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, or 2945.402 of the Revised Code.

"Federal law enforcement officer" has the meaning defined in section 9.88 of the Revised Code.

(10) "Information pertaining to the recreational activities of a person under the age of eighteen" means information that is kept in the ordinary course of business by a public office, that pertains to the recreational activities of a person under the age of eighteen years, and that discloses any of the following:

(a) The address or telephone number of a person under the age of eighteen or the address or telephone number of that person's parent, guardian, custodian, or emergency contact person;

(b) The social security number, birth date, or photographic image of a person under the

age of eighteen;

(c) Any medical record, history, or information pertaining to a person under the age of eighteen;

(d) Any additional information sought or required about a person under the age of eighteen for the purpose of allowing that person to participate in any recreational activity conducted or sponsored by a public office or to use or obtain admission privileges to any recreational facility owned or operated by a public office.

(11) "Community control sanction" has the meaning defined in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(12) "Post-release control sanction" has the meaning defined in section 2967.01 of the Revised Code.

(13) "Redaction" means obscuring or deleting any information that is exempt from the duty to permit public inspection or copying from an item that otherwise meets the definition of a "record" in section 149.011 of the Revised Code.

(14) "Designee," "elected official," and "future official" have the meanings defined in section 109.43 of the Revised Code.

(15) "Body-worn camera" means a visual and audio recording device worn on the person of a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer while the correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.

(16) "Dashboard camera" means a visual and audio recording device mounted on a peace officer's vehicle or vessel that is used while the peace officer is engaged in the performance of the peace officer's duties.

(17) "Restricted portions of a body-worn camera or dashboard camera recording" means any visual or audio portion of a body-worn camera or dashboard camera recording that shows, communicates, or discloses any of the following:

(a) The image or identity of a child or information that could lead to the identification of a child who is a primary subject of the recording when the department of rehabilitation and correction, department of youth services, or the law enforcement agency knows or has reason to know the person is a child based on the department's or law enforcement agency's records or the content of the recording;

(b) The death of a person or a deceased person's body, unless the death was caused by a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer or, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the decedent's executor or administrator has been obtained;

(c) The death of a correctional employee, youth services employee, peace officer, firefighter, paramedic, or other first responder, occurring while the decedent was engaged in the performance of official duties, unless, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the decedent's executor or administrator has been obtained;

(d) Grievous bodily harm, unless the injury was effected by a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer or, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the injured person or the injured person's guardian has been obtained;

(e) An act of severe violence against a person that results in serious physical harm to the person, unless the act and injury was effected by a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer or, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the injured person or the injured person's guardian has been obtained;

(f) Grievous bodily harm to a correctional employee, youth services employee, peace officer, firefighter, paramedic, or other first responder, occurring while the injured person was engaged in the performance of official duties, unless, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the injured person or the injured person's guardian has been obtained;

(g) An act of severe violence resulting in serious physical harm against a correctional employee, youth services employee, peace officer, firefighter, paramedic, or other first responder, occurring while the injured person was engaged in the performance of official duties, unless, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the consent of the injured person or the injured person's guardian has been obtained;

(h) A person's nude body, unless, subject to division (H)(1) of this section, the person's consent has been obtained;

(i) Protected health information, the identity of a person in a health care facility who is not the subject of a correctional, youth services, or law enforcement encounter, or any other information in a health care facility that could identify a person who is not the subject of a correctional, youth services, or law enforcement encounter;

(j) Information that could identify the alleged victim of a sex offense, menacing by stalking, or domestic violence;

(k) Information, that does not constitute a confidential law enforcement investigatory record, that could identify a person who provides sensitive or confidential information to the department of rehabilitation and correction, the department of youth services, or a law enforcement agency when the disclosure of the person's identity or the information provided could reasonably be expected to threaten or endanger the safety or property of the person or another person;

(l) Personal information of a person who is not arrested, cited, charged, or issued a written warning by a peace officer;

(m) Proprietary correctional, youth services, or police contingency plans or tactics that are intended to prevent crime and maintain public order and safety;

(n) A personal conversation unrelated to work between correctional employees, youth services employees, or peace officers or between a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer and an employee of a law enforcement agency;

(o) A conversation between a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer and a member of the public that does not concern correctional, youth services, or law enforcement activities;

(p) The interior of a residence, unless the interior of a residence is the location of an adversarial encounter with, or a use of force by, a correctional employee, youth services employee, or peace officer;

(q) Any portion of the interior of a private business that is not open to the public, unless an adversarial encounter with, or a use of force by, a correctional employee, youth

services employee, or peace officer occurs in that location.

As used in division (A)(17) of this section:

"Grievous bodily harm" has the same meaning as in section 5924.120 of the Revised Code.

"Health care facility" has the same meaning as in section 1337.11 of the Revised Code.

"Protected health information" has the same meaning as in 45 C.F.R. 160.103.

"Law enforcement agency" means a government entity that employs peace officers to perform law enforcement duties.

"Personal information" means any government-issued identification number, date of birth, address, financial information, or criminal justice information from the law enforcement automated data system or similar databases.

"Sex offense" has the same meaning as in section 2907.10 of the Revised Code.

"Firefighter," "paramedic," and "first responder" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(B)(1) Upon request by any person and subject to division (B)(8) of this section, all public records responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection to the requester at all reasonable times during regular business hours. Subject to division (B)(8) of this section, upon request by any person, a public office or person responsible for public records shall make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at cost and within a reasonable period of time. If a public record contains

information that is exempt from the duty to permit public inspection or to copy the public record, the public office or the person responsible for the public record shall make available all of the information within the public record that is not exempt. When making that public record available for public inspection or copying that public record, the public office or the person responsible for the public record shall notify the requester of any redaction or make the redaction plainly visible. A redaction shall be deemed a denial of a request to inspect or copy the redacted information, except if federal or state law authorizes or requires a public office to make the redaction. When the auditor of state receives a request to inspect or to make a copy of a record that was provided to the auditor of state for purposes of an audit, but the original public office has asserted to the auditor of state that the record is not a public record, the auditor of state may handle the requests by directing the requestor to the original public office that provided the record to the auditor of state.

(2) To facilitate broader access to public records, a public office or the person responsible for public records shall organize and maintain public records in a manner that they can be made available for inspection or copying in accordance with division (B) of this section. A public office also shall have available a copy of its current records retention schedule at a location readily available to the public. If a requester makes an ambiguous or overly broad request or has difficulty in making a request for copies or inspection of public records under this section such that the public office or the person responsible for the requested public record cannot reasonably identify what public records are being requested, the public office or the person responsible for the requested public record may deny the request but shall provide the requester with an opportunity to revise the request by informing the requester of the manner in which records are maintained by the public

office and accessed in the ordinary course of the public office's or person's duties.

(3) If a request is ultimately denied, in part or in whole, the public office or the person responsible for the requested public record shall provide the requester with an explanation, including legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied. If the initial request was provided in writing, the explanation also shall be provided to the requester in writing. The explanation shall not preclude the public office or the person responsible for the requested public record from relying upon additional reasons or legal authority in defending an action commenced under division (C) of this section.

(4) Unless specifically required or authorized by state or federal law or in accordance with division (B) of this section, no public office or person responsible for public records may limit or condition the availability of public records by requiring disclosure of the requester's identity or the intended use of the requested public record. Any requirement that the requester disclose the requester's identity or the intended use of the requested public record constitutes a denial of the request.

(5) A public office or person responsible for public records may ask a requester to make the request in writing, may ask for the requester's identity, and may inquire about the intended use of the information requested, but may do so only after disclosing to the requester that a written request is not mandatory, that the requester may decline to reveal the requester's identity or the intended use, and when a written request or disclosure of the identity or intended use would benefit the requester by enhancing the ability of the public office or person responsible for public records to identify, locate, or deliver the public records sought by the requester.

(6) If any person requests a copy of a public record in accordance with division (B) of this section, the public office or person responsible for the public record may require the requester to pay in advance the cost involved in providing the copy of the public record in accordance with the choice made by the requester under this division. The public office or the person responsible for the public record shall permit the requester to choose to have the public record duplicated upon paper, upon the same medium upon which the public office or person responsible for the public record keeps it, or upon any other medium upon which the public office or person responsible for the public record determines that it reasonably can be duplicated as an integral part of the normal operations of the public office or person responsible for the public record. When the requester makes a choice under this division, the public office or person responsible for the public record shall provide a copy of it in accordance with the choice made by the requester. Nothing in this section requires a public office or person responsible for the public record to allow the requester of a copy of the public record to make the copies of the public record.

(7)(a) Upon a request made in accordance with division (B) of this section and subject to division (B)(6) of this section, a public office or person responsible for public records shall transmit a copy of a public record to any person by United States mail or by any other means of delivery or transmission within a reasonable period of time after receiving the request for the copy. The public office or person responsible for the public record may require the person making the request to pay in advance the cost of postage if the copy is transmitted by United States mail or the cost of delivery if the copy is transmitted other than by United States mail, and to pay in advance the costs incurred for other supplies used in the mailing, delivery, or transmission.

(b) Any public office may adopt a policy and procedures that it will follow in transmitting,

within a reasonable period of time after receiving a request, copies of public records by United States mail or by any other means of delivery or transmission pursuant to division (B)(7) of this section. A public office that adopts a policy and procedures under division (B)(7) of this section shall comply with them in performing its duties under that division.

(c) In any policy and procedures adopted under division (B)(7) of this section:

(i) A public office may limit the number of records requested by a person that the office will physically deliver by United States mail or by another delivery service to ten per month, unless the person certifies to the office in writing that the person does not intend to use or forward the requested records, or the information contained in them, for commercial purposes;

(ii) A public office that chooses to provide some or all of its public records on a web site that is fully accessible to and searchable by members of the public at all times, other than during acts of God outside the public office's control or maintenance, and that charges no fee to search, access, download, or otherwise receive records provided on the web site, may limit to ten per month the number of records requested by a person that the office will deliver in a digital format, unless the requested records are not provided on the web site and unless the person certifies to the office in writing that the person does not intend to use or forward the requested records, or the information contained in them, for commercial purposes.

(iii) For purposes of division (B)(7) of this section, "commercial" shall be narrowly construed and does not include reporting or gathering news, reporting or gathering information to assist citizen oversight or understanding of the operation or activities of

government, or nonprofit educational research.

(8) A public office or person responsible for public records is not required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction or a juvenile adjudication to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution or concerning what would be a criminal investigation or prosecution if the subject of the investigation or prosecution were an adult, unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information that is subject to release as a public record under this section and the judge who imposed the sentence or made the adjudication with respect to the person, or the judge's successor in office, finds that the information sought in the public record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person.

(9)(a) Upon written request made and signed by a journalist, a public office, or person responsible for public records, having custody of the records of the agency employing a specified designated public service worker shall disclose to the journalist the address of the actual personal residence of the designated public service worker and, if the designated public service worker's spouse, former spouse, or child is employed by a public office, the name and address of the employer of the designated public service worker's spouse, former spouse, or child. The request shall include the journalist's name and title and the name and address of the journalist's employer and shall state that disclosure of the information sought would be in the public interest.

(b) Division (B)(9)(a) of this section also applies to journalist requests for:

(i) Customer information maintained by a municipally owned or operated public utility,

other than social security numbers and any private financial information such as credit reports, payment methods, credit card numbers, and bank account information;

(ii) Information about minors involved in a school vehicle accident as provided in division (A)(1)(gg) of this section, other than personal information as defined in section 149.45 of the Revised Code.

(c) As used in division (B)(9) of this section, "journalist" means a person engaged in, connected with, or employed by any news medium, including a newspaper, magazine, press association, news agency, or wire service, a radio or television station, or a similar medium, for the purpose of gathering, processing, transmitting, compiling, editing, or disseminating information for the general public.

(10) Upon a request made by a victim, victim's attorney, or victim's representative, as that term is used in section 2930.02 of the Revised Code, a public office or person responsible for public records shall transmit a copy of a depiction of the victim as described in division (A)(1)(ii) of this section to the victim, victim's attorney, or victim's representative.

(C)(1) If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a public office or the person responsible for public records to promptly prepare a public record and to make it available to the person for inspection in accordance with division (B) of this section or by any other failure of a public office or the person responsible for public records to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section, the person allegedly aggrieved may do only one of the following, and not both:

(a) File a complaint with the clerk of the court of claims or the clerk of the court of

common pleas under section 2743.75 of the Revised Code;

(b) Commence a mandamus action to obtain a judgment that orders the public office or the person responsible for the public record to comply with division (B) of this section, that awards court costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the person that instituted the mandamus action, and, if applicable, that includes an order fixing statutory damages under division (C)(2) of this section. The mandamus action may be commenced in the court of common pleas of the county in which division (B) of this section allegedly was not complied with, in the supreme court pursuant to its original jurisdiction under Section 2 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution, or in the court of appeals for the appellate district in which division (B) of this section allegedly was not complied with pursuant to its original jurisdiction under Section 3 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution.

(2) If a requester transmits a written request by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail to inspect or receive copies of any public record in a manner that fairly describes the public record or class of public records to the public office or person responsible for the requested public records, except as otherwise provided in this section, the requester shall be entitled to recover the amount of statutory damages set forth in this division if a court determines that the public office or the person responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section.

The amount of statutory damages shall be fixed at one hundred dollars for each business day during which the public office or person responsible for the requested public records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section, beginning with the day on which the requester files a mandamus action to recover

statutory damages, up to a maximum of one thousand dollars. The award of statutory damages shall not be construed as a penalty, but as compensation for injury arising from lost use of the requested information. The existence of this injury shall be conclusively presumed. The award of statutory damages shall be in addition to all other remedies authorized by this section.

The court may reduce an award of statutory damages or not award statutory damages if the court determines both of the following:

(a) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as it existed at the time of the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section and that was the basis of the mandamus action, a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section;

(b) That a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct or threatened conduct.

(3) In a mandamus action filed under division (C)(1) of this section, the following apply:

(a)(i) If the court orders the public office or the person responsible for the public record

to comply with division (B) of this section, the court shall determine and award to the relator all court costs, which shall be construed as remedial and not punitive.

(ii) If the court makes a determination described in division (C)(3)(b)(iii) of this section, the court shall determine and award to the relator all court costs, which shall be construed as remedial and not punitive.

(b) If the court renders a judgment that orders the public office or the person responsible for the public record to comply with division (B) of this section or if the court determines any of the following, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the relator, subject to division (C)(4) of this section:

(i) The public office or the person responsible for the public records failed to respond affirmatively or negatively to the public records request in accordance with the time allowed under division (B) of this section.

(ii) The public office or the person responsible for the public records promised to permit the relator to inspect or receive copies of the public records requested within a specified period of time but failed to fulfill that promise within that specified period of time.

(iii) The public office or the person responsible for the public records acted in bad faith when the office or person voluntarily made the public records available to the relator for the first time after the relator commenced the mandamus action, but before the court issued any order concluding whether or not the public office or person was required to comply with division (B) of this section. No discovery may be conducted on the issue of the alleged bad faith of the public office or person responsible for the public records. This division shall not be construed as creating a presumption that the public office or the

person responsible for the public records acted in bad faith when the office or person voluntarily made the public records available to the relator for the first time after the relator commenced the mandamus action, but before the court issued any order described in this division.

(c) The court shall not award attorney's fees to the relator if the court determines both of the following:

(i) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as it existed at the time of the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section and that was the basis of the mandamus action, a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section;

(ii) That a well-informed public office or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested public records would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct or threatened conduct.

(4) All of the following apply to any award of reasonable attorney's fees awarded under division (C)(3)(b) of this section:

(a) The fees shall be construed as remedial and not punitive.

(b) The fees awarded shall not exceed the total of the reasonable attorney's fees incurred before the public record was made available to the relator and the fees described in division (C)(4)(c) of this section.

(c) Reasonable attorney's fees shall include reasonable fees incurred to produce proof of the reasonableness and amount of the fees and to otherwise litigate entitlement to the fees.

(d) The court may reduce the amount of fees awarded if the court determines that, given the factual circumstances involved with the specific public records request, an alternative means should have been pursued to more effectively and efficiently resolve the dispute that was subject to the mandamus action filed under division (C)(1) of this section.

(5) If the court does not issue a writ of mandamus under division (C) of this section and the court determines at that time that the bringing of the mandamus action was frivolous conduct as defined in division (A) of section 2323.51 of the Revised Code, the court may award to the public office all court costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees, as determined by the court.

(D) Chapter 1347. of the Revised Code does not limit the provisions of this section.

(E)(1) To ensure that all employees of public offices are appropriately educated about a public office's obligations under division (B) of this section, all elected officials or their appropriate designees shall attend training approved by the attorney general as provided in section 109.43 of the Revised Code. A future official may satisfy the requirements of this division by attending the training before taking office, provided that the future official may not send a designee in the future official's place.

(2) All public offices shall adopt a public records policy in compliance with this section for responding to public records requests. In adopting a public records policy under this division, a public office may obtain guidance from the model public records policy developed and provided to the public office by the attorney general under section 109.43 of the Revised Code. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the policy may not limit the number of public records that the public office will make available to a single person, may not limit the number of public records that it will make available during a fixed period of time, and may not establish a fixed period of time before it will respond to a request for inspection or copying of public records, unless that period is less than eight hours.

The public office shall distribute the public records policy adopted by the public office under this division to the employee of the public office who is the records custodian or records manager or otherwise has custody of the records of that office. The public office shall require that employee to acknowledge receipt of the copy of the public records policy. The public office shall create a poster that describes its public records policy and shall post the poster in a conspicuous place in the public office and in all locations where the public office has branch offices. The public office may post its public records policy on the internet web site of the public office if the public office maintains an internet web site. A public office that has established a manual or handbook of its general policies and procedures for all employees of the public office shall include the public records policy of the public office in the manual or handbook.

(F)(1) The bureau of motor vehicles may adopt rules pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code to reasonably limit the number of bulk commercial special extraction requests made by a person for the same records or for updated records during a calendar

year. The rules may include provisions for charges to be made for bulk commercial special extraction requests for the actual cost of the bureau, plus special extraction costs, plus ten per cent. The bureau may charge for expenses for redacting information, the release of which is prohibited by law.

(2) As used in division (F)(1) of this section:

(a) "Actual cost" means the cost of depleted supplies, records storage media costs, actual mailing and alternative delivery costs, or other transmitting costs, and any direct equipment operating and maintenance costs, including actual costs paid to private contractors for copying services.

(b) "Bulk commercial special extraction request" means a request for copies of a record for information in a format other than the format already available, or information that cannot be extracted without examination of all items in a records series, class of records, or database by a person who intends to use or forward the copies for surveys, marketing, solicitation, or resale for commercial purposes. "Bulk commercial special extraction request" does not include a request by a person who gives assurance to the bureau that the person making the request does not intend to use or forward the requested copies for surveys, marketing, solicitation, or resale for commercial purposes.

(c) "Commercial" means profit-seeking production, buying, or selling of any good, service, or other product.

(d) "Special extraction costs" means the cost of the time spent by the lowest paid employee competent to perform the task, the actual amount paid to outside private contractors employed by the bureau, or the actual cost incurred to create computer

programs to make the special extraction. "Special extraction costs" include any charges paid to a public agency for computer or records services.

(3) For purposes of divisions (F)(1) and (2) of this section, "surveys, marketing, solicitation, or resale for commercial purposes" shall be narrowly construed and does not include reporting or gathering news, reporting or gathering information to assist citizen oversight or understanding of the operation or activities of government, or nonprofit educational research.

(G) A request by a defendant, counsel of a defendant, or any agent of a defendant in a criminal action that public records related to that action be made available under this section shall be considered a demand for discovery pursuant to the Criminal Rules, except to the extent that the Criminal Rules plainly indicate a contrary intent. The defendant, counsel of the defendant, or agent of the defendant making a request under this division shall serve a copy of the request on the prosecuting attorney, director of law, or other chief legal officer responsible for prosecuting the action.

(H)(1) Any portion of a body-worn camera or dashboard camera recording described in divisions (A)(17)(b) to (h) of this section may be released by consent of the subject of the recording or a representative of that person, as specified in those divisions, only if either of the following applies:

(a) The recording will not be used in connection with any probable or pending criminal proceedings;

(b) The recording has been used in connection with a criminal proceeding that was dismissed or for which a judgment has been entered pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and will not be used again in connection with any probable or pending criminal proceedings.

(2) If a public office denies a request to release a restricted portion of a body-worn camera or dashboard camera recording, as defined in division (A)(17) of this section, any person may file a mandamus action pursuant to this section or a complaint with the clerk of the court of claims pursuant to section 2743.75 of the Revised Code, requesting the court to order the release of all or portions of the recording. If the court considering the request determines that the filing articulates by clear and convincing evidence that the public interest in the recording substantially outweighs privacy interests and other interests asserted to deny release, the court shall order the public office to release the recording.

Last updated January 10, 2024 at 2:22 PM

Available Versions of this Section

September 29, 2013 – House Bill 59 - 130th General Assembly

March 20, 2015 – Senate Bill 23 - 130th General Assembly

March 23, 2015 – House Bill 663 - 130th General Assembly

September 29, 2015 – House Bill 64 - 131st General Assembly

September 8, 2016 – Senate Bill 321, House Bill 359, House Bill 317 - 131st General Assembly

December 19, 2016 – House Bill 471 - 131st General Assembly

November 2, 2018 – Amended by House Bill 34, House Bill 312, House Bill 8 - 132nd General Assembly

April 8, 2019 – Amended by House Bill 341, Senate Bill 201, Senate Bill 214, House Bill

425, House Bill 139, House Bill 34, Senate Bill 229, House Bill 312, House Bill 8 - 132nd General Assembly

October 17, 2019 – Amended by House Bill 166 - 133rd General Assembly

March 24, 2021 – Amended by Senate Bill 284 - 133rd General Assembly

September 7, 2021 – Amended by Senate Bill 284 (GA 133), Senate Bill 4 (GA 134)

September 30, 2021 – Amended by House Bill 110 - 134th General Assembly

April 29, 2022 – Amended by House Bill 110 (GA 134), Senate Bill 4 (GA 134), House Bill 93 (GA 134), Senate Bill 284 (GA 133)

September 12, 2022 – Amended by House Bill 99 (GA 134)

April 7, 2023 – Amended by House Bill 254 (GA 134), Senate Bill 288 (GA 134), House Bill 45 (GA 134), House Bill 558 (GA 134), House Bill 99 (GA 134), House Bill 343 (GA 134)

October 3, 2023 – Amended by House Bill 33 - 135th General Assembly

Section 149.434 | Public offices to maintain employee database.

Effective: *September 30, 2021* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 110 - 134th General Assembly*

(A) Each public office or person responsible for public records shall maintain a database or a list that includes the name of all public officials and employees elected to or employed by that public office. The database or list is a public record and shall be made available upon a request made pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code.

(B) As used in this section:

(1) "Employee" has the same meaning as in section 9.40 of the Revised Code.

(2) "Public official" has the same meaning as in section 117.01 of the Revised Code.

(3) "Public record" has the same meaning as in section 149.43 of the Revised Code.

Last updated July 14, 2021 at 12:50 PM

Available Versions of this Section

September 1, 2008 – House Bill 46 - 127th General Assembly

September 30, 2021 – Amended by House Bill 110 - 134th General Assembly

Section 1547.11 | Operation, control, or manipulation under influence of alcohol or drug.

Effective: *April 4, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly*

(A) No person shall operate or be in physical control of any vessel underway or shall manipulate any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters in this state if, at the time of the operation, control, or manipulation, any of the following applies:

(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.

(2) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight of alcohol per unit volume in the person's whole blood.

(3) The person has a concentration of ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(4) The person has a concentration of eleven-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(5) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(6) Except as provided in division (H) of this section, the person has a concentration of any of the following controlled substances or metabolites of a controlled substance in the

person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds any of the following:

(a) The person has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(b) The person has a concentration of cocaine in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(c) The person has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(d) The person has a concentration of heroin in the person's urine of at least two thousand nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(e) The person has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the

person's urine of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(f) The person has a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(g) The person has a concentration of marihuana in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least two nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(h) The state board of pharmacy has adopted a rule pursuant to section 4729.041 of the Revised Code that specifies the amount of salvia divinorum and the amount of salvinorin A that constitute concentrations of salvia divinorum and salvinorin A in a person's urine, in a person's whole blood, or in a person's blood serum or plasma at or above which the person is impaired for purposes of operating or being in physical control of any vessel underway or manipulating any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters of this state, the rule is in effect, and the person has a concentration of salvia divinorum or salvinorin A of at least that amount so specified by rule in the person's urine, in the person's whole blood, or in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(i) Either of the following applies:

(i) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, and, as measured by gas chromatography mass spectrometry, the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least fifteen nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ii) As measured by gas chromatography mass spectrometry, the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least thirty-five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(j) The person has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(k) The person has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of

at least ten nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(B) No person under twenty-one years of age shall operate or be in physical control of any vessel underway or shall manipulate any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters in this state if, at the time of the operation, control, or manipulation, any of the following applies:

(1) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one per cent, but less than eight-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(2) The person has a concentration of at least three-hundredths of one per cent but less than ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(3) The person has a concentration of at least twenty-eight one-thousandths of one gram, but less than eleven-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(4) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one gram, but less than eight-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(C) In any proceeding arising out of one incident, a person may be charged with a violation of division (A)(1) and a violation of division (B)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section, but the person shall not be convicted of more than one violation of those divisions.

(D)(1)(a) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is watercraft-related, the result of any test of any blood or urine withdrawn and analyzed at any health care provider, as defined in section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, may be admitted with expert testimony to be considered with any other relevant and competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is watercraft-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the defendant's or child's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, urine, or breath at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn, or specimen taken within three hours of the time of the alleged violation. The three-hour time limit specified in this division regarding the admission of evidence does not extend or affect the two-hour time limit specified in division (C) of section 1547.111 of the Revised Code as the maximum period of time during which a person may consent to a chemical test or tests as described in that section. The court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or a combination of them as described in this division when a person submits to a blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance test at the request of a law enforcement officer under section 1547.111 of the Revised Code or a blood or urine sample is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Only a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical technician-intermediate, an emergency medical technician-paramedic, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist shall withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol, drug, controlled substance, metabolite of a

controlled substance, or combination content of the whole blood, blood serum, or blood plasma. This limitation does not apply to the taking of breath or urine specimens. A person authorized to withdraw blood under this division may refuse to withdraw blood under this division if, in that person's opinion, the physical welfare of the defendant or child would be endangered by withdrawing blood.

The whole blood, blood serum or plasma, urine, or breath withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.

(2) In a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is watercraft-related, if there was at the time the bodily substance was taken a concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified for a violation of division (A)(2), (3), (4), or (5) of this section or less than the applicable concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance specified for a violation of division (A)(6) of this section, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant or in making an adjudication for the child. This division does not limit or affect a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (B) of this section or for a violation of a prohibition that is substantially equivalent to that division.

(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the chemical test shall be made available to the person or the person's attorney immediately upon completion of the test analysis.

If the chemical test was administered pursuant to division (D)(1)(b) of this section, the person tested may have a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist of the person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer, and shall be so advised. The failure or inability to obtain an additional test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer.

(E)(1) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating or being in physical control of any vessel underway or to manipulating any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters of this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating or being in physical control of any vessel underway or to manipulating any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters of this state with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator or person found to be in physical control of the vessel underway involved in the violation or the person manipulating the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests for vehicles that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that have been set by the national highway traffic safety administration, that by their nature are not clearly inapplicable regarding

the operation or physical control of vessels underway or the manipulation of water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices, all of the following apply:

(a) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

(b) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

(c) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (E)(1)(a) or (b) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence, and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

(2) Division (E)(1) of this section does not limit or preclude a court, in its determination of whether the arrest of a person was supported by probable cause or its determination of any other matter in a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding of a type described in that division, from considering evidence or testimony that is not otherwise disallowed by division (E)(1) of this section.

(F)(1) Subject to division (F)(3) of this section, in any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to either of those divisions, the court shall admit as prima-facie evidence a laboratory report from any laboratory personnel issued a permit by the department of health authorizing an analysis as described in this division that contains an analysis of the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance tested and that contains all of the information specified in this

division. The laboratory report shall contain all of the following:

(a) The signature, under oath, of any person who performed the analysis;

(b) Any findings as to the identity and quantity of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a controlled substance, a metabolite of a controlled substance, or a combination of them that was found;

(c) A copy of a notarized statement by the laboratory director or a designee of the director that contains the name of each certified analyst or test performer involved with the report, the analyst's or test performer's employment relationship with the laboratory that issued the report, and a notation that performing an analysis of the type involved is part of the analyst's or test performer's regular duties;

(d) An outline of the analyst's or test performer's education, training, and experience in performing the type of analysis involved and a certification that the laboratory satisfies appropriate quality control standards in general and, in this particular analysis, under rules of the department of health.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding the admission of evidence, a report of the type described in division (F)(1) of this section is not admissible against the defendant or child to whom it pertains in any proceeding, other than a preliminary hearing or a grand jury proceeding, unless the prosecutor has served a copy of the report on the defendant's or child's attorney or, if the defendant or child has no attorney, on the defendant or child.

(3) A report of the type described in division (F)(1) of this section shall not be prima-facie

evidence of the contents, identity, or amount of any substance if, within seven days after the defendant or child to whom the report pertains or the defendant's or child's attorney receives a copy of the report, the defendant or child or the defendant's or child's attorney demands the testimony of the person who signed the report. The judge in the case may extend the seven-day time limit in the interest of justice.

(G) Except as otherwise provided in this division, any physician, registered nurse, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical technician-paramedic, or qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist who withdraws blood from a person pursuant to this section or section 1547.111 of the Revised Code, and a hospital, first-aid station, or clinic at which blood is withdrawn from a person pursuant to this section or section 1547.111 of the Revised Code, is immune from criminal and civil liability based upon a claim of assault and battery or any other claim that is not a claim of malpractice, for any act performed in withdrawing blood from the person. The immunity provided in this division also extends to an emergency medical service organization that employs an emergency medical technician-intermediate or an emergency medical technician-paramedic who withdraws blood under this section. The immunity provided in this division is not available to a person who withdraws blood if the person engages in willful or wanton misconduct.

(H) Division (A)(6) of this section does not apply to a person who operates or is in physical control of a vessel underway or manipulates any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device while the person has a concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds the amount specified in that division, if both of the following apply:

(1) The person obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs.

(2) The person injected, ingested, or inhaled the controlled substance in accordance with the health professional's directions.

(I) As used in this section and section 1547.111 of the Revised Code:

(1) "Equivalent offense" has the same meaning as in section 4511.181 of the Revised Code.

(2) "National highway traffic safety administration" has the same meaning as in section 4511.19 of the Revised Code.

(3) "Operate" means that a vessel is being used on the waters in this state when the vessel is not securely affixed to a dock or to shore or to any permanent structure to which the vessel has the right to affix or that a vessel is not anchored in a designated anchorage area or boat camping area that is established by the United States coast guard, this state, or a political subdivision and in which the vessel has the right to anchor.

(4) "Controlled substance" and "marihuana" have the same meanings as in section 3719.01 of the Revised Code.

(5) "Cocaine" and "L.S.D." have the same meanings as in section 2925.01 of the Revised Code.

(6) "Equivalent offense that is watercraft-related" means an equivalent offense that is one of the following:

(a) A violation of division (A) of this section;

(b) A violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting a person from operating or being in physical control of any vessel underway or from manipulating any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters of this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them or prohibiting a person from operating or being in physical control of any vessel underway or from manipulating any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device on the waters of this state with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine;

(c) A violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance, law of another state, or law of the United States that is substantially equivalent to division (A) of this section;

(d) A violation of a former law of this state that was substantially equivalent to division (A) of this section.

(7) "Emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

Last updated March 8, 2023 at 10:56 AM

Available Versions of this Section

September 17, 2010 – Senate Bill 58 - 128th General Assembly

April 4, 2023 – Amended by Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly

Section 2901.22 | Degrees of culpability attached to mental states.

Effective: *March 23, 2015* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 361 - 130th General Assembly*

(A) A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.

(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

(C) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.

(D) A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the

person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person's conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.

(E) When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge, or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.

Available Versions of this Section

January 1, 1974 – House Bill 511 - 109th General Assembly

March 23, 2015 – Senate Bill 361 - 130th General Assembly

Section 2903.01 | Aggravated murder.

Effective: *March 20, 2019* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 38 - 132nd General Assembly*

(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present, terrorism, or escape.

(C) No person shall purposely cause the death of another who is under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

(D) No person who is under detention as a result of having been found guilty of or having pleaded guilty to a felony or who breaks that detention shall purposely cause the death of another.

(E) No person shall purposely cause the death of a law enforcement officer whom the offender knows or has reasonable cause to know is a law enforcement officer when either of the following applies:

(1) The victim, at the time of the commission of the offense, is engaged in the victim's duties.

(2) It is the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.

(F) No person shall purposely cause the death of a first responder or military member whom the offender knows or has reasonable cause to know is a first responder or military member when it is the offender's specific purpose to kill a first responder or military member.

(G) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.

(H) As used in this section:

(1) "Detention" has the same meaning as in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) "Law enforcement officer" has the same meaning as in section 2911.01 of the Revised Code and also includes any federal law enforcement officer as defined in section 2921.51 of the Revised Code and anyone who has previously served as a law enforcement officer or federal law enforcement officer.

(3) "First responder" means an emergency medical service provider, a firefighter, or any other emergency response personnel, or anyone who has previously served as a first responder.

(4) "Military member" means a member of the armed forces of the United States, reserves, or Ohio national guard, a participant in ROTC, JROTC, or any similar military training program, or anyone who has previously served in the military.

Available Versions of this Section

September 30, 2011 – House Bill 86 - 129th General Assembly

March 20, 2019 – Amended by House Bill 38 - 132nd General Assembly

Section 2903.02 | Murder.

Ohio Revised Code / Title 29 Crimes-Procedure / Chapter 2903 Homicide and Assault

Effective: *June 30, 1998* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 5 - 122nd General Assembly*

(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.

(C) Division (B) of this section does not apply to an offense that becomes a felony of the first or second degree only if the offender previously has been convicted of that offense or another specified offense.

(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.

Available Versions of this Section

June 30, 1998 – House Bill 5 - 122nd General Assembly

Section 2903.03 | Voluntary manslaughter.

Effective: *March 22, 2013* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 160 - 129th General Assembly*

(A) No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) No person, with a sexual motivation, shall violate division (A) of this section.

(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.

(D) As used in this section, "sexual motivation" has the same meaning as in section 2971.01 of the Revised Code.

Available Versions of this Section

March 22, 2013 – Senate Bill 160 - 129th General Assembly

Section 2903.04 | Involuntary manslaughter.

Effective: *January 1, 2004* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 123 - 124th General Assembly*

(A) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a felony.

(B) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of any degree, a regulatory offense, or a minor misdemeanor other than a violation of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor and other than a violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation that, regardless of the penalty set by ordinance for the violation, is substantially equivalent to any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor.

(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the first degree. Violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.

(D) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section and if the felony, misdemeanor, or regulatory offense that the offender committed or attempted to commit, that proximately resulted in the death of the other person or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy, and that is the basis of the offender's violation of division (A) or (B) of this section was a violation of division (A) or

(B) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance or included, as an element of that felony, misdemeanor, or regulatory offense, the offender's operation or participation in the operation of a snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft while the offender was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, both of the following apply:

(1) The court shall impose a class one suspension of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(1) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(2) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term for the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section from the range of prison terms authorized for the level of the offense under section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.

Available Versions of this Section

January 1, 2004 – Senate Bill 123 - 124th General Assembly

Section 2903.08 | Aggravated vehicular assault; vehicular assault.

Effective: *April 4, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly*

(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall cause serious physical harm to another person or another's unborn in any of the following ways:

(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance;

(b) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance;

(c) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A)(3) of section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.

(2) In one of the following ways:

(a) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a reckless operation offense, provided that this division applies only if the person to whom the serious physical harm is caused or to whose unborn the serious physical harm is caused is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the reckless operation offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (E) of this section;

(b) Recklessly.

(3) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a speeding offense, provided that this division applies only if the person to whom the serious physical harm is caused or to whose unborn the serious physical harm is caused is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the speeding offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (E) of this section.

(B)(1) Whoever violates division (A)(1) of this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular assault. Except as otherwise provided in this division, aggravated vehicular assault is a felony of the third degree. Aggravated vehicular assault is a felony of the second degree if any of the following apply:

(a) At the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code.

(b) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section.

(c) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense.

(d) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance within the previous ten years.

(e) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior

violations of division (A) of section 1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance within the previous ten years.

(f) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A)(3) of section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance within the previous ten years.

(g) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of any combination of the offenses listed in division (B)(1)(d), (e), or (f) of this section.

(h) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a second or subsequent felony violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code.

(2) In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, the court shall impose upon the offender a class three suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(3) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. If the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, or any traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, the court shall impose either a class two suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of that section or a class one suspension as specified in division (A)(1) of that section.

(C)(1) Whoever violates division (A)(2) or (3) of this section is guilty of vehicular assault and shall be punished as provided in divisions (C)(2) and (3) of this section.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this division, vehicular assault committed in violation of division (A)(2) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree. Vehicular assault committed in violation of division (A)(2) of this section is a felony of the third degree if, at the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, or if, in the same course of conduct that resulted in the violation of division (A)(2) of this section, the offender also violated section 4549.02, 4549.021, or 4549.03 of the Revised Code.

In addition to any other sanctions imposed, the court shall impose upon the offender a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, or any traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, a class three suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(3) of that section.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in this division, vehicular assault committed in violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Vehicular assault

committed in violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree if, at the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense.

In addition to any other sanctions imposed, the court shall impose upon the offender a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, or any traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, a class three suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(3) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(D)(1) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term, as described in division (D)(4) of this section, on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) of this section.

(2) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term, as described in division (D)(4) of this section, on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(2) of this section or a felony violation of division (A)(3) of this section if either of the following applies:

(a) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or section 2903.06 of the Revised Code.

(b) At the time of the offense, the offender was driving under suspension under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code.

(3) The court shall impose a mandatory jail term of at least seven days on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a misdemeanor violation of division (A)(3) of this section and may impose upon the offender a longer jail term as authorized pursuant to section 2929.24 of the Revised Code.

(4) A mandatory prison term required under division (D)(1) or (2) of this section shall be a definite term from the range of prison terms provided in division (A)(2)(b) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the second degree, from division (A)(3)(a) of that section for a felony of the third degree, or from division (A)(4) of that section for a felony of the fourth degree, whichever is applicable, except that if the violation is a felony of the second degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, the court shall impose as the minimum prison term for the offense a mandatory prison term that is one of the minimum terms prescribed for a felony of the second degree in division (A)(2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.

(E) Divisions (A)(2)(a) and (3) of this section do not apply in a particular construction zone unless signs of the type described in section 2903.081 of the Revised Code are erected in that construction zone in accordance with the guidelines and design specifications established by the director of transportation under section 5501.27 of the Revised Code. The failure to erect signs of the type described in section 2903.081 of the

Revised Code in a particular construction zone in accordance with those guidelines and design specifications does not limit or affect the application of division (A)(1) or (2)(b) of this section in that construction zone or the prosecution of any person who violates either of those divisions in that construction zone.

(F) As used in this section:

(1) "Mandatory prison term" and "mandatory jail term" have the same meanings as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) "Traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense" and "traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense" have the same meanings as in section 2903.06 of the Revised Code.

(3) "Construction zone" has the same meaning as in section 5501.27 of the Revised Code.

(4) "Reckless operation offense" and "speeding offense" have the same meanings as in section 2903.06 of the Revised Code.

(G) For the purposes of this section, when a penalty or suspension is enhanced because of a prior or current violation of a specified law or a prior or current specified offense, the reference to the violation of the specified law or the specified offense includes any violation of any substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, former law of this state, or current or former law of another state or the United States.

Last updated March 27, 2023 at 2:45 PM

Available Versions of this Section

April 4, 2007 – House Bill 461 - 126th General Assembly

April 6, 2017 – House Bill 388 - 131st General Assembly

March 22, 2019 – Amended by Senate Bill 201 - 132nd General Assembly

April 4, 2023 – Amended by Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly

Section 2913.02 | Theft.

Effective: *April 4, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly*

(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways:

(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;

(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;

(3) By deception;

(4) By threat;

(5) By intimidation.

(B)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of theft.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this division or division (B)(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or (9) of this section, a violation of this section is misdemeanor theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is one thousand dollars or more and is less than seven thousand five hundred dollars or if the property stolen is any of the property listed in section 2913.71 of the Revised Code, a violation of this section is theft, a felony of the fifth degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is seven thousand five hundred dollars or more and is less than one hundred fifty thousand

dollars, a violation of this section is grand theft, a felony of the fourth degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is one hundred fifty thousand dollars or more and is less than seven hundred fifty thousand dollars, a violation of this section is aggravated theft, a felony of the third degree. If the value of the property or services is seven hundred fifty thousand dollars or more and is less than one million five hundred thousand dollars, a violation of this section is aggravated theft, a felony of the second degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is one million five hundred thousand dollars or more, a violation of this section is aggravated theft of one million five hundred thousand dollars or more, a felony of the first degree.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or (9) of this section, if the victim of the offense is an elderly person, disabled adult, active duty service member, or spouse of an active duty service member, a violation of this section is theft from a person in a protected class, and division (B)(3) of this section applies. Except as otherwise provided in this division, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony of the fifth degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is one thousand dollars or more and is less than seven thousand five hundred dollars, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony of the fourth degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is seven thousand five hundred dollars or more and is less than thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony of the third degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars or more and is less than one hundred fifty thousand dollars, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony of the second degree. If the value of the property or services stolen is one hundred fifty thousand dollars or more, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony of the first degree. If the victim of the offense is an elderly person, in

addition to any other penalty imposed for the offense, the offender shall be required to pay full restitution to the victim and to pay a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars. The clerk of court shall forward all fines collected under division (B)(3) of this section to the county department of job and family services to be used for the reporting and investigation of elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation or for the provision or arrangement of protective services under sections 5101.61 to 5101.71 of the Revised Code.

(4) If the property stolen is a firearm or dangerous ordnance, a violation of this section is grand theft. Except as otherwise provided in this division, grand theft when the property stolen is a firearm or dangerous ordnance is a felony of the third degree, and there is a presumption in favor of the court imposing a prison term for the offense. If the firearm or dangerous ordnance was stolen from a federally licensed firearms dealer, grand theft when the property stolen is a firearm or dangerous ordnance is a felony of the first degree. The offender shall serve a prison term imposed for grand theft when the property stolen is a firearm or dangerous ordnance consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(5) If the property stolen is a motor vehicle, a violation of this section is grand theft of a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree.

(6) If the property stolen is any dangerous drug, a violation of this section is theft of drugs, a felony of the fourth degree, or, if the offender previously has been convicted of a felony drug abuse offense, a felony of the third degree.

(7) If the property stolen is a police dog or horse or an assistance dog and the offender knows or should know that the property stolen is a police dog or horse or an assistance

dog, a violation of this section is theft of a police dog or horse or an assistance dog, a felony of the third degree.

(8) If the property stolen is anhydrous ammonia, a violation of this section is theft of anhydrous ammonia, a felony of the third degree.

(9) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section with respect to property with a value of seven thousand five hundred dollars or more and division (B)(3) of this section with respect to property with a value of one thousand dollars or more, if the property stolen is a special purpose article as defined in section 4737.04 of the Revised Code or is a bulk merchandise container as defined in section 4737.012 of the Revised Code, a violation of this section is theft of a special purpose article or articles or theft of a bulk merchandise container or containers, a felony of the fifth degree.

(10) In addition to the penalties described in division (B)(2) of this section, if the offender committed the violation by causing a motor vehicle to leave the premises of an establishment at which gasoline is offered for retail sale without the offender making full payment for gasoline that was dispensed into the fuel tank of the motor vehicle or into another container, the court may do one of the following:

(a) Unless division (B)(10)(b) of this section applies, suspend for not more than six months the offender's driver's license, probationary driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, or nonresident operating privilege;

(b) If the offender's driver's license, probationary driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, or nonresident operating privilege has previously been suspended pursuant to division (B)(10)(a) of this section, impose a class seven

suspension of the offender's license, permit, or privilege from the range specified in division (A)(7) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code, provided that the suspension shall be for at least six months.

(c) The court, in lieu of suspending the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license, probationary driver's license, temporary instruction permit, or nonresident operating privilege pursuant to division (B)(10)(a) or (b) of this section, instead may require the offender to perform community service for a number of hours determined by the court.

(11) In addition to the penalties described in division (B)(2) of this section, if the offender committed the violation by stealing rented property or rental services, the court may order that the offender make restitution pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code. Restitution may include, but is not limited to, the cost of repairing or replacing the stolen property, or the cost of repairing the stolen property and any loss of revenue resulting from deprivation of the property due to theft of rental services that is less than or equal to the actual value of the property at the time it was rented. Evidence of intent to commit theft of rented property or rental services shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of section 2913.72 of the Revised Code.

(C) The sentencing court that suspends an offender's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege under division (B)(10) of this section may grant the offender limited driving privileges during the period of the suspension in accordance with Chapter 4510. of the Revised Code.

Last updated January 25, 2023 at 10:09 AM

Available Versions of this Section

September 16, 2014 – House Bill 488 - 130th General Assembly

March 20, 2019 – Amended by Senate Bill 158 - 132nd General Assembly

April 4, 2023 – Amended by Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly

Section 2930.01 | Definitions.

Effective: *April 6, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 343 - 134th General Assembly*

As used in this chapter, unless otherwise defined in any section in this chapter:

(A) "Criminal offense" means an alleged act or omission committed by a person that is punishable by incarceration and is not eligible to be disposed of by the traffic violations bureau.

(B) "Custodial agency" means one of the following:

(1) The entity that has custody of a defendant or an alleged juvenile offender who is incarcerated for a criminal offense, is under detention for the commission of a delinquent act, or who is detained after a finding of incompetence to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity relative to a criminal offense, including any of the following:

(a) The department of rehabilitation and correction or the adult parole authority;

(b) A county sheriff;

(c) The entity that administers a jail, as defined in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code;

(d) The entity that administers a community-based correctional facility and program or a district community-based correctional facility and program;

(e) The department of mental health and addiction services or other entity to which a

defendant found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity is committed.

(2) The entity that has custody of an alleged juvenile offender pursuant to an order of disposition of a juvenile court, including the department of youth services or a school, camp, institution, or other facility operated for the care of delinquent children.

(C) "Defendant" means a person who is alleged to be the perpetrator of a criminal offense in a complaint, indictment, or information that charges the commission of a criminal offense and that provides the basis for the criminal prosecution and subsequent proceedings to which this chapter makes reference.

(D) "Member of the victim's family" means a spouse, child, stepchild, sibling, parent, stepparent, grandparent, or other relative of a victim but does not include a person who is charged with, convicted of, or adjudicated to be a delinquent child for the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or another criminal offense or delinquent act arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan.

(E) "Prosecutor" means one of the following:

(1) With respect to a criminal case, it has the same meaning as in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code and also includes the attorney general and, when appropriate, the employees of any person listed in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code or of the attorney general.

(2) With respect to a delinquency proceeding, it includes any person listed in division (C) of section 2935.01 of the Revised Code or an employee of a person listed in that division

who prosecutes a delinquency proceeding.

(F) "Public agency" means an office, agency, department, bureau, or other governmental entity of the state or of a political subdivision of the state.

(G) "Public official" has the same meaning as in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.

(H) "Victim" has the same meaning as in Section 10a of Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

(I) "Victim's representative" means a member of the victim's family or another person who pursuant to the authority of section 2930.02 of the Revised Code exercises the rights of a victim under this chapter.

(J) "Court" means a court of common pleas, juvenile court, municipal court, or county court.

(K) "Delinquency proceeding" means all proceedings in a juvenile court that are related to a case in which a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child.

(L) "Case" means a delinquency proceeding and all related activity or a criminal prosecution and all related activity.

(M) The "defense" means the defense against criminal charges in a criminal prosecution or the defense against a delinquent child complaint in a delinquency proceeding.

(N) The "prosecution" means the prosecution of criminal charges in a criminal prosecution or the prosecution of a delinquent child complaint in a delinquency proceeding.

(O) "Delinquent act" means an alleged act committed by a child, regardless of whether the child is competent, that does any of the following and is not disposed of by the juvenile traffic violations bureau serving the court under Traffic Rule 13.1 or is not a minor misdemeanor juvenile traffic offense:

(1) Violates any law of this state or the United States, or any ordinance of a political subdivision of the state, that would be an offense if committed by an adult;

(2) Violates any lawful order of the court made under this chapter, including a child who violates a court order regarding the child's prior adjudication as an unruly child for being an habitual truant;

(3) Violates any lawful order of the court made under Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code other than an order issued under section 2151.87 of the Revised Code;

(4) Violates division (C) of section 2907.39, division (A) of section 2923.211, or division (C)(1) or (D) of section 2925.55 of the Revised Code.

(P)(1) "Alleged juvenile offender" means a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act in a police report or in a complaint in juvenile court that charges the commission of a delinquent act and that provides the basis for the delinquency proceeding and all subsequent proceedings to which this chapter makes reference.

(2) As used in divisions (O) and (P)(1) of this section, "child" has the same meaning as in section 2151.011 of the Revised Code.

(Q) "Motor vehicle accident" means any accident involving a motor vehicle.

(R) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code.

(S) "Aircraft" has the same meaning as in section 4561.01 of the Revised Code.

(T) "Aquatic device" means any vessel, or any water skis, aquaplane, or similar device.

(U) "Vehicle," "streetcar," and "trackless trolley" have the same meanings as in section 4511.01 of the Revised Code.

(V) "Vehicle, streetcar, trackless trolley, aquatic device, or aircraft accident" means any accident involving a vehicle, streetcar, trackless trolley, aquatic device, or aircraft.

(W) "Vessel" has the same meaning as in section 1546.01 of the Revised Code.

(X) "Victim advocate" means a person employed or authorized by a public or private entity who provides support and assistance for a victim of a criminal offense or delinquent act in relation to criminal, civil, administrative, and delinquency cases or proceedings and recovery efforts related to the criminal offense or delinquent act.

(Y) "Victim's attorney" means an attorney retained by the victim for the purpose of asserting the victim's constitutional and statutory rights.

(Z) "Prosecutor's designee" means any person or entity designated by the prosecuting attorney but does not include a court or court employee.

(AA) "Suspect" means a person who is alleged to be the perpetrator of a criminal offense.

Last updated March 9, 2023 at 3:43 PM

Available Versions of this Section

September 29, 2013 – House Bill 59 - 130th General Assembly

September 8, 2016 – Senate Bill 293 - 131st General Assembly

April 6, 2023 – Amended by House Bill 343 - 134th General Assembly

Section 2930.07 | Privacy of victim's information.

Effective: *July 7, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 16 - 135th General Assembly*

(A) As used in this section:

(1)(a) "Case document" means a document or information in a document, or audio or video recording of a victim of violating a protection order, an offense of violence, or a sexually oriented offense, regarding a case that is submitted to a court, a law enforcement agency or officer, or a prosecutor or filed with a clerk of court, including, but not limited to, pleadings, motions, exhibits, transcripts, orders, and judgments, or any documentation, including audio or video recordings of a victim of violating a protection order, an offense of violence, or a sexually oriented offense, prepared or created by a court, clerk of court, or law enforcement agency or officer, or a prosecutor regarding a case.

(b) "Case document" does not include materials subject to the work product doctrine, materials that by law are subject to privilege or confidentiality, or materials that are otherwise protected or prohibited from disclosure by state or federal law. "Case document" also does not include motor vehicle accident reports submitted to the department of public safety pursuant to section 5502.11 of the Revised Code unless the victim or victim's representative requests redaction pursuant to division (B)(1)(p) of section 2930.04 of the Revised Code.

(2) "Court" has the same meaning as in section 2930.01 of the Revised Code and includes

a court of appeals and the supreme court.

(3) "Minor victim" means any person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the criminal offense or delinquent act of which the person is a victim.

(4) "Public office" and "public official" have the same meanings as in section 149.011 of the Revised Code.

(5) "Sexually oriented offense" has the same meaning as in section 2950.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) The victim and victim's representative, if applicable, have the right at any court proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, not to testify regarding the victim's address, telephone number, place of employment, or other locating information unless the victim specifically consents or the court determines that the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice prevails over the victim's rights to keep the information confidential.

The court shall make this determination pursuant to an in-camera review. If the court determines that the information shall be disclosed, the court proceeding shall be closed during the disclosure.

(C) Any public office or public official that is charged with the responsibility of knowing the name, address, or other identifying information of a victim or victim's representative as part of the office's or official's duties shall have full and complete access to the name, address, or other identifying information of the victim or victim's representative. That public office or public official shall take measures to prevent the public disclosure of the

name, address, or other identifying information of the victim or victim's representative through the use of redaction as set forth in division (D) of this section. Nothing in this section prevents a public agency from maintaining unredacted records of a victim's or victim's representative's name, contact information, and identifying information for its own records and use or a public office or public official from allowing another public office or public official to access or obtain copies of its unredacted records. The release of unredacted records to a public office or official does not constitute a waiver of any exemption or exception pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code. This section prohibits the public release of unredacted case documents pursuant to division (A)(1)(v) of section 149.43 of the Revised Code and division (D) of this section.

(D)(1)(a)(i) On written request of the victim or victim's representative to a law enforcement agency, prosecutor's office, or court, all case documents related to the cases or matters specified by the victim maintained by the entity to whom the victim or victim's representative submitted the request shall be redacted prior to public release pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code to remove the name, address, or other identifying information of the victim.

(ii) If the victim of violating a protection order, an offense of violence, or a sexually oriented offense, or the victim's representative, was unable to complete the form at the time of first contact with law enforcement pursuant to section 2930.04 of the Revised Code, until the victim's initial interaction with a prosecutor, all case documents related to the cases or matters currently before the court regarding that offense shall be redacted prior to public release pursuant to section 149.43 of the Revised Code to remove the name, address, or other identifying information of the victim.

(b) If the victim or victim's representative uses the victims' rights request form to request redaction, that redaction request applies only to the case or cases to which the form pertains. If the victim requests redaction using some other manner than the victims' rights request form, that written request shall specify the cases or matters to which the request applies.

(2) On written request of a victim or victim's representative to the department of public safety, through the contact information provided under division (B)(1)(p) of section 2930.04 of the Revised Code, a report submitted pursuant to section 5502.11 of the Revised Code as maintained by the department of public safety shall be redacted prior to public release as a public record under section 149.43 of the Revised Code to remove the name, address, or other identifying information of the victim.

(3) If multiple victims are involved in a single case, the public office or official shall take reasonable precautions to protect the information of the victims from other victims, unless all of the victims consent to the release of information.

(E)(1)(a) Once a case is closed or inactive, a victim or victim's attorney, if applicable, may view the recorded forensic interview of a minor victim or developmentally disabled victim upon request. The victim or victim's attorney shall be permitted to view the unredacted forensic interview at the location of the child advocacy center or other agency responsible for the forensic interview. An employee or designee of the child advocacy center or agency shall be present at all times during the victim's or victim's attorney's viewing of the interview. The victim or victim's attorney shall not be permitted to record, copy, photograph, or remove from the location the forensic interview or any materials summarizing, documenting, transcribing, or otherwise associated with the forensic

interview. The release of an unredacted copy of any recorded forensic interview to a victim, victim's attorney, or victim's representative pursuant to this division is not a violation of section 2151.421 of the Revised Code.

(b) Once a case is closed or inactive, on written application under seal to the court of common pleas in the county in which the forensic interview was recorded, a victim, victim's attorney, if applicable, or victim's representative may request an unredacted copy of any recorded forensic interview of a minor victim or developmentally disabled victim.

(2) Upon receiving the application, the court shall notify the child advocacy center or other agency responsible for the forensic interview and shall provide the child advocacy center or other agency an opportunity to respond or object to the application. While the application is pending, the child advocacy center or other agency responsible for the forensic interview shall not make available for inspection or otherwise disclose the forensic interview or associated materials to the applicant or any person or entity acting on behalf of the applicant.

(3) The forensic interview shall be made available to the court for an in-camera review.

(4) The court may grant the application only upon an express finding that allowing the applicant to receive an unredacted copy of the forensic interview is in the interest of the victim under the totality of the circumstances.

(F) This section does not apply to any disclosure of the name, address, or other identifying information of a victim that is required to be made in the statewide emergency alert program under section 5502.52 of the Revised Code, missing person alert system, or other similar alert system.

(2) This section does not apply to any disclosure of the name, address, or other identifying information of a victim of a criminal offense or delinquent act that resulted in the death of the victim.

(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent a victim, a victim's representative, or a victim's attorney from receiving a copy of any case document with the victim's name, contact information, and identifying information unredacted. A public office's or official's provision of a copy of a case document with the victim's name, contact information, and identifying information unredacted to a victim, victim's representative, or victim's attorney, if applicable, does not constitute a waiver of any exemption or exception under section 149.43 of the Revised Code.

(4) Nothing in this section shall affect either of the following:

(a) Any rights of a victim or victim's representative to be provided with notice or to make any written or oral statement under this chapter or other applicable law;

(b) The disclosure of the location where the reported criminal offense or delinquent act occurred.

(5) Nothing in this section prohibits the defendant from including necessary information about the victim in filings with the trial court, court of appeals, or the supreme court. The victim's name and identifying information in the filings is not a public record under section 149.43 of the Revised Code if the victim has requested that the victim's name and identifying information be redacted from public records.

(6) Nothing in this section prevents a law enforcement agency or prosecutor from

providing a victim's preferred contact information to a designated agency that provides victim services and rights notification, and any release of documents or information to a law enforcement officer or public official's designee does not constitute a waiver of a victim's right to redaction under this section.

Last updated September 8, 2023 at 4:20 PM

Available Versions of this Section

November 22, 1999 – House Bill 3 - 123rd General Assembly

April 6, 2023 – House Bill 343 - 134th General Assembly

July 7, 2023 – Amended by Senate Bill 16 - 135th General Assembly

Section 4511.19 | Operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs - OVI.

Ohio Revised Code / Title 45 Motor Vehicles-Aeronautics-Watercraft / Chapter 4511 Traffic Laws - Operation Of Motor Vehicles

Effective: *April 4, 2023* ***Latest Legislation:*** *Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly*

(A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.

(b) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one per cent or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(c) The person has a concentration of ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent or more but less than two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(d) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(e) The person has a concentration of eleven-hundredths of one gram or more but less than two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(f) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(g) The person has a concentration of two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(h) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(i) The person has a concentration of two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(j) Except as provided in division (K) of this section, the person has a concentration of any of the following controlled substances or metabolites of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds any of the following:

(i) The person has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ii) The person has a concentration of cocaine in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or

plasma.

(iii) The person has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(iv) The person has a concentration of heroin in the person's urine of at least two thousand nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(v) The person has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vi) The person has a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's urine or a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vii) The person has a concentration of marihuana in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of

marihuana in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least two nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(viii) Either of the following applies:

(I) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, and the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least fifteen nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(II) The person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least thirty-five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ix) The person has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(x) The person has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a

concentration of phencyclidine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(xi) The state board of pharmacy has adopted a rule pursuant to section 4729.041 of the Revised Code that specifies the amount of salvia divinorum and the amount of salvinorin A that constitute concentrations of salvia divinorum and salvinorin A in a person's urine, in a person's whole blood, or in a person's blood serum or plasma at or above which the person is impaired for purposes of operating any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, the rule is in effect, and the person has a concentration of salvia divinorum or salvinorin A of at least that amount so specified by rule in the person's urine, in the person's whole blood, or in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(2) No person who, within twenty years of the conduct described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this division, a violation of division (A)(1) of this section, or any other equivalent offense shall do both of the following:

(a) Operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them;

(b) Subsequent to being arrested for operating the vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley as described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, being asked by a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test or tests under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, and being advised by the officer in accordance with section 4511.192 of the Revised Code of the consequences of the person's refusal or submission to the test or tests, refuse to submit to

the test or tests.

(B) No person under twenty-one years of age shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(1) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one per cent but less than eight-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(2) The person has a concentration of at least three-hundredths of one per cent but less than ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(3) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one gram but less than eight-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(4) The person has a concentration of at least twenty-eight one-thousandths of one gram but less than eleven-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(C) In any proceeding arising out of one incident, a person may be charged with a violation of division (A)(1)(a) or (A)(2) and a violation of division (B)(1), (2), or (3) of this section, but the person may not be convicted of more than one violation of these divisions.

(D)(1)(a) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of

division (A)(1)(a) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the result of any test of any blood or urine withdrawn and analyzed at any health care provider, as defined in section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, may be admitted with expert testimony to be considered with any other relevant and competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the defendant's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged violation. The three-hour time limit specified in this division regarding the admission of evidence does not extend or affect the two-hour time limit specified in division (A) of section 4511.192 of the Revised Code as the maximum period of time during which a person may consent to a chemical test or tests as described in that section. The court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or a combination of them as described in this division when a person submits to a blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance test at the request of a law enforcement officer under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code or a blood or urine sample is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Only a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical technician-intermediate, an emergency medical technician-paramedic, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist shall withdraw a blood sample for the purpose of determining the alcohol, drug, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination content of the whole blood, blood serum, or blood plasma. This limitation

does not apply to the taking of breath or urine specimens. A person authorized to withdraw blood under this division may refuse to withdraw blood under this division, if in that person's opinion, the physical welfare of the person would be endangered by the withdrawing of blood.

The bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.

(c) As used in division (D)(1)(b) of this section, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) In a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, if there was at the time the bodily substance was withdrawn a concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified in divisions (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section or less than the applicable concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance specified for a violation of division (A)(1)(j) of this section, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This division does not limit or affect a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to that division.

(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the chemical test shall

be made available to the person or the person's attorney, immediately upon the completion of the chemical test analysis.

If the chemical test was obtained pursuant to division (D)(1)(b) of this section, the person tested may have a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist of the person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests, at the person's expense, in addition to any administered at the request of a law enforcement officer. If the person was under arrest as described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the arresting officer shall advise the person at the time of the arrest that the person may have an independent chemical test taken at the person's own expense. If the person was under arrest other than described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the form to be read to the person to be tested, as required under section 4511.192 of the Revised Code, shall state that the person may have an independent test performed at the person's expense. The failure or inability to obtain an additional chemical test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the chemical test or tests taken at the request of a law enforcement officer.

(4)(a) As used in divisions (D)(4)(b) and (c) of this section, "national highway traffic safety administration" means the national highway traffic safety administration established as an administration of the United States department of transportation under 96 Stat. 2415 (1983), 49 U.S.C.A. 105.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a

controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:

(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

(c) Division (D)(4)(b) of this section does not limit or preclude a court, in its determination of whether the arrest of a person was supported by probable cause or its determination of any other matter in a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding of a type described in that division, from considering evidence or testimony that is not otherwise disallowed by division (D)(4)(b) of this section.

(E)(1) Subject to division (E)(3) of this section, in any criminal prosecution or juvenile

court proceeding for a violation of division (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j) or (B)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to any of those divisions, a laboratory report from any laboratory personnel issued a permit by the department of health authorizing an analysis as described in this division that contains an analysis of the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance tested and that contains all of the information specified in this division shall be admitted as prima-facie evidence of the information and statements that the report contains. The laboratory report shall contain all of the following:

(a) The signature, under oath, of any person who performed the analysis;

(b) Any findings as to the identity and quantity of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a controlled substance, a metabolite of a controlled substance, or a combination of them that was found;

(c) A copy of a notarized statement by the laboratory director or a designee of the director that contains the name of each certified analyst or test performer involved with the report, the analyst's or test performer's employment relationship with the laboratory that issued the report, and a notation that performing an analysis of the type involved is part of the analyst's or test performer's regular duties;

(d) An outline of the analyst's or test performer's education, training, and experience in performing the type of analysis involved and a certification that the laboratory satisfies appropriate quality control standards in general and, in this particular analysis, under rules of the department of health.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding the admission of evidence, a report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section is not admissible against the defendant to whom it pertains in any proceeding, other than a preliminary hearing or a grand jury proceeding, unless the prosecutor has served a copy of the report on the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant has no attorney, on the defendant.

(3) A report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section shall not be prima-facie evidence of the contents, identity, or amount of any substance if, within seven days after the defendant to whom the report pertains or the defendant's attorney receives a copy of the report, the defendant or the defendant's attorney demands the testimony of the person who signed the report. The judge in the case may extend the seven-day time limit in the interest of justice.

(F) Except as otherwise provided in this division, any physician, registered nurse, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical technician-paramedic, or qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist who withdraws blood from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, and any hospital, first-aid station, or clinic at which blood is withdrawn from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, is immune from criminal liability and civil liability based upon a claim of assault and battery or any other claim that is not a claim of malpractice, for any act performed in withdrawing blood from the person. The immunity provided in this division also extends to an emergency medical service organization that employs an emergency medical technician-intermediate or emergency medical technician-paramedic who withdraws blood under this section. The immunity provided in this division is not available to a person who withdraws blood if the person engages in willful or wanton misconduct.

As used in this division, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(G)(1) Whoever violates any provision of divisions (A)(1)(a) to (i) or (A)(2) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them. Whoever violates division (A)(1)(j) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance. The court shall sentence the offender for either offense under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, except as otherwise authorized or required by divisions (G)(1)(a) to (e) of this section:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, and the court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of three consecutive days. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. The court may sentence an offender to both an intervention program and a jail term. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the three-day mandatory jail term or intervention program. However, in no case shall the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense exceed six months.

The court may suspend the execution of the three-day jail term under this division if the court, in lieu of that suspended term, places the offender under a community control

sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code and requires the offender to attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program certified under section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. The court also may suspend the execution of any part of the three-day jail term under this division if it places the offender under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code for part of the three days, requires the offender to attend for the suspended part of the term a drivers' intervention program so certified, and sentences the offender to a jail term equal to the remainder of the three consecutive days that the offender does not spend attending the program. The court may require the offender, as a condition of community control and in addition to the required attendance at a drivers' intervention program, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose on the offender any other conditions of community control that it considers necessary.

If the court grants unlimited driving privileges to a first-time offender under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, all penalties imposed upon the offender by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(i) of this section for the offense apply, except that the court shall suspend any mandatory or additional jail term imposed by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(i) of this section upon granting unlimited driving privileges in accordance with section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory

jail term of at least three consecutive days and a requirement that the offender attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program that is certified pursuant to section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. If the court determines that the offender is not conducive to treatment in a drivers' intervention program, if the offender refuses to attend a drivers' intervention program, or if the jail at which the offender is to serve the jail term imposed can provide a driver's intervention program, the court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory jail term of at least six consecutive days.

If the court grants unlimited driving privileges to a first-time offender under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, all penalties imposed upon the offender by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(ii) of this section for the offense apply, except that the court shall suspend any mandatory or additional jail term imposed by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(ii) of this section upon granting unlimited driving privileges in accordance with section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

The court may require the offender, under a community control sanction imposed under section 2929.25 of the Revised Code, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services, in addition to the required attendance at drivers' intervention program, that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose any other conditions of community control on the offender that it considers necessary.

(iii) In all cases, a fine of not less than three hundred seventy-five and not more than one thousand seventy-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of one to three years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code. The court may grant unlimited driving privileges with an ignition interlock device relative to the suspension and may reduce the period of suspension as authorized under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one violation of division (A) of this section or one other equivalent offense is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days. The court shall impose the ten-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the ten-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or

continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction services provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days. The court shall impose the twenty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the twenty-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction service provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request

of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than five hundred twenty-five and not more than one thousand six hundred twenty-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of one to seven years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, immobilization of the vehicle involved in the offense for ninety days in accordance with section 4503.233 of the Revised Code and impoundment of the license plates of that vehicle for ninety days.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to two violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days. The court shall impose the thirty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol

monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the thirty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days. The court shall impose the sixty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than eight hundred fifty and not more than two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of two to twelve years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses, an offender who, within twenty years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more violations of that nature, or an offender who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code

if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the

court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the one hundred twenty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand three hundred fifty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(vii) In all cases, if the court sentences the offender to a mandatory term of local incarceration, in addition to the mandatory term, the court, pursuant to section 2929.17 of the Revised Code, may impose a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring. The term shall not commence until after the offender has served the mandatory term of local incarceration.

(e) An offender who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section that was a felony, regardless of when the violation and the conviction or guilty plea occurred, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or

(j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a sixty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a one hundred twenty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison

term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand three hundred fifty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(2) An offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section and who subsequently seeks reinstatement of the driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege suspended under this section as a result of the conviction or guilty plea shall pay a reinstatement fee as provided in division (F)(2) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(3) If an offender is sentenced to a jail term under division (G)(1)(b)(i) or (ii) or (G)(1)(c)(i) or (ii) of this section and if, within sixty days of sentencing of the offender, the court issues a written finding on the record that, due to the unavailability of space at the jail where the offender is required to serve the term, the offender will not be able to begin serving that term within the sixty-day period following the date of sentencing, the court may impose an alternative sentence under this division that includes a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(b)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to five consecutive days in jail and not less than eighteen consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the five consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The five consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days required by

division (G)(1)(b)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to ten consecutive days in jail and not less than thirty-six consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the ten consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The ten consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to fifteen consecutive days in jail and not less than fifty-five consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the fifteen consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed one year. The fifteen consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to thirty consecutive days in jail and not less than one hundred ten consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the thirty consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed

one year. The thirty consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

(4) If an offender's driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under division (G) of this section and if section 4510.13 of the Revised Code permits the court to grant limited driving privileges, the court may grant the limited driving privileges in accordance with that section. If division (A)(7) of that section requires that the court impose as a condition of the privileges that the offender must display on the vehicle that is driven subject to the privileges restricted license plates that are issued under section 4503.231 of the Revised Code, except as provided in division (B) of that section, the court shall impose that condition as one of the conditions of the limited driving privileges granted to the offender, except as provided in division (B) of section 4503.231 of the Revised Code.

(5) Fines imposed under this section for a violation of division (A) of this section shall be distributed as follows:

(a) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), thirty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), one hundred twenty-three dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and two hundred ten dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be paid to an enforcement and education fund established by the legislative authority of the law enforcement agency in this state that primarily was responsible for the arrest of the offender, as determined by the court that imposes the fine. The agency shall use this share to pay only those costs it incurs in enforcing this section or a municipal OVI ordinance and in informing the public of the laws governing the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the

dangers of the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and other information relating to the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

(b) Fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) of this section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section and was confined as a result of the offense prior to being sentenced for the offense but is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, the fifty dollars shall be paid to the political subdivision that paid the cost of housing the offender during that period of confinement. The political subdivision shall use the share under this division to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs of any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.

(c) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) and fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the county or municipal indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund under the control of that court, as created by the county or municipal corporation under division (F) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(d) One hundred fifteen dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred seventy-seven dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and four hundred forty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this

section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. The political subdivision shall use this share to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs for any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.

(e) Fifty dollars of the fine imposed under divisions (G)(1)(a)(iii), (G)(1)(b)(iii), (G)(1)(c)(iii), (G)(1)(d)(iii), and (G)(1)(e)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the special projects fund of the court in which the offender was convicted and that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, to be used exclusively to cover the cost of immobilizing or disabling devices, including certified ignition interlock devices, and remote alcohol monitoring devices for indigent offenders who are required by a judge to use either of these devices. If the court in which the offender was convicted does not have a special projects fund that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, the fifty dollars shall be deposited into the indigent drivers interlock and alcohol monitoring fund under division (I) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(f) Seventy-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), one hundred twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and five hundred dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be transmitted to the treasurer of state for deposit into the indigent defense support fund established

under section 120.08 of the Revised Code.

(g) The balance of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), (b)(iii), (c)(iii), (d)(iii), or (e)(iii) of this section shall be disbursed as otherwise provided by law.

(6) If title to a motor vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under division (G)(1)(c), (d), or (e) of this section is assigned or transferred and division (B)(2) or (3) of section 4503.234 of the Revised Code applies, in addition to or independent of any other penalty established by law, the court may fine the offender the value of the vehicle as determined by publications of the national automobile dealers association. The proceeds of any fine so imposed shall be distributed in accordance with division (C)(2) of that section.

(7) In all cases in which an offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section, the offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, the court, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense for which the offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section.

(8) A court may order an offender to reimburse a law enforcement agency for any costs incurred by the agency with respect to a chemical test or tests administered to the offender if all of the following apply:

(a) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section.

(b) The test or tests were of the offender's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine.

(c) The test or tests indicated that the offender had a prohibited concentration of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the offender's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine at the time of the offense.

(9) As used in division (G) of this section, "electronic monitoring," "mandatory prison term," and "mandatory term of local incarceration" have the same meanings as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(H) Whoever violates division (B) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle after underage alcohol consumption and shall be punished as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (H)(2) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class six suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(6) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code. The court may grant unlimited driving privileges with an ignition interlock device relative to the suspension and may reduce the period of suspension as authorized under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code. If the court grants unlimited driving privileges under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, the court shall suspend any jail term imposed

under division (H)(1) of this section as required under that section.

(2) If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(3) The offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, then, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, the court may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the violation of division (B) of this section.

(I)(1) No court shall sentence an offender to an alcohol treatment program under this section unless the treatment program complies with the minimum standards for alcohol treatment programs adopted under Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services.

(2) An offender who stays in a drivers' intervention program or in an alcohol treatment

program under an order issued under this section shall pay the cost of the stay in the program. However, if the court determines that an offender who stays in an alcohol treatment program under an order issued under this section is unable to pay the cost of the stay in the program, the court may order that the cost be paid from the court's indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund.

(J) If a person whose driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under this section files an appeal regarding any aspect of the person's trial or sentence, the appeal itself does not stay the operation of the suspension.

(K) Division (A)(1)(j) of this section does not apply to a person who operates a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley while the person has a concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds the amount specified in that division, if both of the following apply:

(1) The person obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs.

(2) The person injected, ingested, or inhaled the controlled substance in accordance with the health professional's directions.

(L) The prohibited concentrations of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance listed in division (A)(1)(j) of this section also apply in a prosecution of a violation of division (D) of section 2923.16 of the Revised Code in the same manner as if the offender is being prosecuted for a prohibited concentration of alcohol.

(M) All terms defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code apply to this section. If the meaning of a term defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code conflicts with the meaning of the same term as defined in section 4501.01 or 4511.01 of the Revised Code, the term as defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code applies to this section.

(N)(1) The Ohio Traffic Rules in effect on January 1, 2004, as adopted by the supreme court under authority of section 2937.46 of the Revised Code, do not apply to felony violations of this section. Subject to division (N)(2) of this section, the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to felony violations of this section.

(2) If, on or after January 1, 2004, the supreme court modifies the Ohio Traffic Rules to provide procedures to govern felony violations of this section, the modified rules shall apply to felony violations of this section.

Last updated April 22, 2023 at 7:15 AM

Available Versions of this Section

September 29, 2013 – House Bill 59 - 130th General Assembly

April 6, 2017 – House Bill 388 - 131st General Assembly

September 29, 2017 – Amended by House Bill 49 - 132nd General Assembly

April 4, 2023 – Amended by Senate Bill 288 - 134th General Assembly

Section 4561.15 | Unsafe operation of aircraft.

Effective: *September 8, 2010* ***Latest Legislation:*** *House Bill 50 - 128th General Assembly*

(A) No person shall commit any of the following acts:

(1) Carry passengers in an aircraft unless the person piloting the aircraft is a holder of a valid airperson's certificate of competency issued by the United States that authorizes the holder to carry passengers and the person is carrying any passenger in accordance with the applicable certificate requirements; this division of this section is inapplicable to the operation of military aircraft of the United States, aircraft of a state, territory, or possession of the United States, or aircraft licensed by a foreign country with which the United States has a reciprocal agreement covering the operation of such aircraft;

(2) Operate an aircraft on the land or water or in the air space over this state in a careless or reckless manner that endangers any person or property, or with willful or wanton disregard for the rights or safety of others;

(3) Operate an aircraft on the land or water or in the air space over this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, controlled substances, or other habit-forming drugs;

(4) Tamper with, alter, destroy, remove, carry away, or cause to be carried away any object used for the marking of airports, landing fields, or other aeronautical facilities in this state, or in any way change the position or location of such markings, except by the direction of the proper authorities charged with the maintenance and operation of such

facilities, or illegally possess any object used for such markings.

(B) Jurisdiction over any proceedings charging a violation of this section is limited to courts of record.

(C) Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Available Versions of this Section

September 8, 2010 – House Bill 50 - 128th General Assembly