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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Bunn v. Hlubek
| C-240680 | MALPRACTICE — CIV.R. 10(D)(2) — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — COMMON-KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION: The trial court did not err in requiring an affidavit of merit under Civ.R. 10(D)(2) and not allowing plaintiff’s malpractice claim to proceed under the common-knowledge exception where all the malpractice allegations in the complaint are highly technical and concern matters of professional skill and judgment beyond the common knowledge of a jury. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4563 |
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State v. Williamson
| C-240692 | JUDGMENTS — COMMUNITY CONTROL — RES JUDICATA — APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL — SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Defendant’s new sentence for violating community control was not invalid because his original sentence, which had imposed community control consecutive to a prison term, had not been void, but merely voidable, and defendant had not challenged it on direct appeal. The court lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) to review defendant’s sentence imposed following the revocation of community control, where the defendant and prosecutor had jointly recommended a fixed, ten-year prison term for any violation of community control as part of defendant’s original plea, and the sentence imposed for violating community control was entirely consistent with that recommendation and within the range of sentences permitted by law. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4564 |
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State v. Hill
| C-240703 | SIXTH AMENDMENT — SPEEDY TRIAL — MOTION TO DISMISS: Defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights were violated by the State’s two-and-a-half-year delay between charging defendant with misdemeanor theft and arresting defendant for the theft where the State knew defendant’s address the entire time, made no effort to serve her with the warrant, and failed to rebut the presumption that the lengthy delay prejudiced defendant. [See CONCURRENCE: Where the State negligently allowed enough time to pass between the filing of charges and arresting defendant that the statute of limitations had lapsed, the State cannot rebut the presumption that defendant was prejudiced by the delay.] | Bock | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4565 |
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Fenner v. Durrani
| C-240498 & C-240499 | MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — ADVERSE INFERENCE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — DAMAGES — CIV.R. 19 — PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — PUNITIVE DAMAGES — R.C. 2315.21 — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST — R.C. 1343.03 — GOOD-FAITH EFFORT — R.C. 2323.43 — SETOFF — R.C. 2307.28 — R.C. 2307.25: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where the plaintiffs asserted the same causes of action against the same defendants and the expert testimony presented at trial focused on whether the surgeries performed on the plaintiffs were medically indicated, and because the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court’s instruction to consider each case on its own merits. [But see CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority’s opinion on this issue subject to a caveat regarding the proper postjudgment considerations when assessing prejudice from the joinder of trials under Civ.R. 42.] The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the active-clinical-practice requirement in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which assessed the competency of a witness to testify at the time of the alleged medical negligence, because plaintiffs’ cases were pending at the time that the trial court applied the amended rule. The trial court did not commit reversible error in issuing an absent-defendant jury instruction advising that defendant doctor’s absence from trial gave rise to a negative inference where it also instructed the jury that it retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider and award damages for past medical expenses to plaintiffs where it conditioned the receipt of those damages on the requirement that plaintiffs obtain releases from their insurers. The trial court did not err in including the jury’s award of past medical expenses when calculating the statutory cap on punitive damages. [But see CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: Where Appellants failed to raise an assignment of error or issue presented for review challenging the trial court’s award of punitive damages, this court should not determine whether the trial court’s award of punitive damages was proper when the issue of punitive damages was raised only within a sub-argument related to joinder, an issue which the majority opinion declined to address due to the lack of an assignment of error regarding joinder.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs made a good-faith offer to settle and in awarding prejudgment interest to plaintiffs where plaintiffs’ settlement offers were based on an amount that could have been awarded under available law. R.C. 2307.28, and not R.C. 2307.25, is implicated when one defendant seeks a setoff from the amount of damages owed to a plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s settlement with other defendants. Where R.C. 2307.28 prohibited plaintiffs from receiving a double recovery and entitled defendants to a setoff from the damages owed to plaintiffs based on plaintiffs’ settlements with other defendants, the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a setoff. Pursuant to the test set forth in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, the wrongfully-decided precedent in Eysoldt v. Proscan Imaging, 2011-Ohio-6740 (1st Dist.), and Adams v. Durrani, 2022-Ohio-60 (1st Dist.), which held that R.C. 2307.25 provided a narrow legislative exception to the general rule that among joint tortfeasors a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery and that intentional tortfeasors could not be entitled to a setoff, is overruled. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4477 |
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State v. Hodge
| C-240633 | CRIMINAL TRESPASS — EVIDENCE —SUFFICIENCY: Defendant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State failed to prove that defendant was without privilege to enter and remain on the property. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4478 |
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State v. Waters
| C-240659 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — TRAFFIC STOP — PROBABLE CAUSE — REASONABLE SUSPICION —AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in defendant’s car following a traffic stop where officers had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop based on their observing defendant commit a traffic violation and the officer’s smelling marijuana coming from defendant’s car along with defendant’s admission to having smoked marijuana recently provided the officers with probable cause to believe that they would find contraband in defendant’s car justifying the search of defendant’s car under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4479 |
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State v. Ponce-Suares
| C-240669 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A VEHICLE IMPAIRED ("OVI") — PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST — FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS — SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE — TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: Where defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because, even if the field-sobriety-test results had been suppressed, the totality of the circumstances support a finding that probable cause existed to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol where the arresting officer testified that defendant nearly collided his car with the police cruiser, committed marked-lane infractions, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and had the smell of alcohol coming from his mouth. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/26/2025
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9/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4480 |
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State v. Snyder
| C-230666 & C-230680 | HEARSAY — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DUE PROCESS — PREINDICTMENT DELAY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — FELONY MURDER — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — CHILD ENDANGERMENT-R.C. 2919.22(A) — IMPROPER VOUCHING — WITNESS COMPETENCY — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: Where parents were charged with murder of a child, felonious assault, and endangering children, a foster parent’s testimony recalling two of defendants’ children’s statements describing the defendants’ assaulting the victim more than two months after the victim’s death was not admissible under the excited-utterance hearsay exception because the children did not make the statements shortly after reaching “safety” and made the statements long after they witnessed the event, but the error was harmless because the hearsay statements were cumulative of the children’s trial testimony. Although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unredacted emails between defendant’s mother and defendant’s sister under the state-of-mind hearsay exception where only portions of the email related to the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, that admission was harmless as the email itself did not establish any element of any of the charges and other trial testimony was cumulative of the email. The trial court did not err by allowing a pediatrician specializing in child abuse to offer an opinion as to whether a bruise on the victim’s forehead was related to the victim’s fatal subdural hematoma because the expert was a pediatrician with 25 years’ experience who regularly consulted on suspected child-abuse cases, had reviewed the child’s complete medical records, and had consulted with other specialists. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendants’ convictions for felony murder and felonious assault where testimony established that defendants jointly struck their son’s head against a wall the day their son died, and medical experts established that defendants’ son died from a subdural hematoma that occurred on the day he died. The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain R.C. 2919.22(A) child-endangerment convictions involving two of defendants’ children where the State’s evidence involved affirmative acts of abuse that should have been charged under R.C. 2919.22(B), failed to establish the normal rate of weight gain for one child, and failed to establish that the children experienced pains associated with starvation; but the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a third R.C. 2929.22(A) conviction because expert testimony established that the child had experienced pain associated with starvation and malnutrition. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4444 |
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Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Krehnbrink
| C-240511 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — WAIVER — AUTHENTICATED EVIDENCE — CIV.R. 54(B) CERTIFICATION: The trial court properly granted mortgage-loan servicer’s motion for summary judgment on homeowner’s counterclaims where homeowners failed to submit authenticated evidence in opposition to summary judgment and accordingly failed to carry their reciprocal burden in opposing summary judgment, and homeowners raised several arguments on appeal that they did not advance before the trial court, and therefore were forfeited on appeal. The trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification of no just reason for delay was proper because the trial court’s order resolved all of the homeowners’ claims against mortgage-loan servicer and homeowners failed to perfect service on the remaining counterclaim defendants. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4445 |
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State v. Thacker
| C-240523 | SELF DEFENSE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT: Defendant’s convictions for two counts of felonious assault were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s claim of self-defense failed and because evidence showed that defendant’s fear of imminent death or severe bodily harm was not objectively reasonable where the defendant chased after fleeing would-be burglars and fired shots at them while they were driving away. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4446 |
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State v. Jenkins
| C-240565 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — CRIM.R. 12(F) — FINDINGS OF FACT —WARRANTLESS SEARCH — POSTRELEASE CONTROL — REASONABLE GROUNDS: The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and a gun found in a bag carried by defendant on the basis of the staleness of a tip where, even after five months, there remained a reasonable likelihood that the parole officer would find a gun in the bag defendant brought to a meeting because the tip was made by a reliable informant, defendant had not carried a bag during the parole officer’s previous encounters with defendant, and the bag defendant was carrying during a meeting with the parole officer met the description given in the tip five months prior. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4447 |
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State v. Mosley
| C-240574 & C-240575 | RAPE — MURDER — INTIMIDATION — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — DISCOVERY — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The convictions for rape, conspiracy to commit murder, and intimidation were not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the jury believed the testimony of the State’s witnesses and did not believe defendant’s testimony, and the credibility of the witnesses is a determination for the trier of fact. Defendant did not establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance where counsel, after consultation with defendant, made a strategic decision to not oppose the consolidation of the indictments for trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call that was not disclosed until trial and allowing defendant a continuance to review the evidence where the discovery violation was not willful, the 911 call corroborated events, and the 911 caller testified at trial. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered defendant’s criminal history and his risk of future offenses, the need to protect the community, and the nature and circumstances of the offenses, including that defendant committed one or more of the offenses while awaiting trial. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4448 |
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State v. White
| C-250150 | RESTITUTION — EVIDENCE: Following defendant’s guilty plea to criminal damaging, the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution for drywall repair where defendant objected to the amount of restitution requested, and the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary restitution hearing prior to entering its restitution order. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/24/2025
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9/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4449 |
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Branson v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.
| C-240558 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — CONFLICTING TERMS — PAROL EVIDENCE RULE — BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING — BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: The trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant-bank on plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract following defendant’s liquidation of assets held as collateral to secure an asset-backed line of credit when the value of the assets fell below the contractually set minimum value because (1) defendant was not required to provide notice prior to the liquidation of the assets as while the contract contained conflicting terms regarding the need for notice, the contract specifically provided defendant with the power to choose the more favorable terms in the event of a conflict; (2) while the contract permitted plaintiff to pledge additional collateral to bringing his loan into compliance, the terms of the contract required that collateral to be either cash or marketable securities and plaintiff offered defendant neither; and (3) plaintiff’s evidence that defendant orally agreed to refrain from liquidating the assets during the terms of the 120-day loan was barred by the parole evidence rule as it directly conflicted with the terms of the parties’ written contract. The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing where defendant’s actions were authorized by the express terms of the parties’ contract. The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim where plaintiff’s complaint was limited to allegations of defendant’s self-dealing and plaintiff’s sole evidence in support of his claim related to defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff ten-days’ notice prior to the liquidation of the assets—which the contract did not require—and defendant’s failure to deleverage plaintiff in accordance with plaintiff and defendant’s plan as by the time defendant obtained control of plaintiff’s assets, the assets’ value had fallen below the contractually-determined minimum value resulting in a breach under the contract. [But see DISSENT: The trial court erred in finding that defendant-bank met its burden on summary judgment to show that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim where defendant-bank moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was permitted to sell the assets under the terms of the loan contracts without addressing its dual roles as lender and investment advisor and where none of the written agreements (the loan contracts or the written investment-management agreement) incorporate the dual roles played by defendant-bank or expressly acknowledge the conflict and risk involved or set forth how the dual roles may ultimately affect the investment account.] | Bock | Hamilton |
9/19/2025
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9/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4396 |
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State v. Dickey
| C-250022 | PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C) — VOLUNTARINESS — COERCION — CLERICAL ERROR — NUNC PRO TUNC: Where an allegation was made that the trial court gave “some indication” that it would impose a sentence that would “very likely be less” than the sentence offered by the State during plea negotiations, and where the trial court denied making any promises regarding sentencing, the record did not establish that the trial court’s involvement in the plea-bargaining process rendered defendant’s plea involuntary. Where the sentencing entry contains a clerical error incorrectly reflecting the count to which a weapon specification is attached, the error must be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry on remand. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/19/2025
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9/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4397 |
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State v. Thompson
| C-240446 | DRUG OFFENSES — WEAPONS — JURISDICTION — CONTEMPT — RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL — DUE PROCESS — CONFRONTATION — COUNSEL WAIVER — OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE — AUTHENTICATION — FIREARM OPERABILITY — COMPETENCY — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — CUMULATIVE ERROR: Where the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment in the trial court, he waived that issue on appeal; the trial court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant, and the judgment of conviction was not void. Where the defendant did not appeal the entry finding him in contempt and imposing a sentence, this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the assignment of error challenging the contempt finding. Defendant waived his right to be present at trial by refusing to attend and participate in his trial. Defendant’s being tried despite his refusal to sign the waiver-of-counsel form was harmless error where the trial court engaged in a thorough colloquy that established defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior drug sales where the evidence was necessary and relevant to the background of the offenses and explained the issuance of the search warrant. The trial court did not err in admitting still photos from a recording device where the officer authenticated the photos by testifying to the reliability of the recording device and the accuracy of the photos. The operability of the firearms was proven where the officer testified that a loaded firearm was found on defendant’s bed, a firearm with ammunition was found in the headboard of defendant’s bed with mail addressed to him, and the firearms, test-fire packs, and ammunition were presented to the jury. Defendant waived the competency hearing by stipulating to the contents of the report finding him competent. The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the firearms found on his bed and in his headboard with mail addressed to him; the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant possessed the drugs where the evidence established the drugs were found in his home, defendant prepared the drugs for sale, and defendant admitted drugs were confiscated from his home. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered the presentence investigation, defendant’s criminal history, which included offenses involving a firearm, the harm to the community from the offenses, and the necessity of protecting the public. Defendant failed to demonstrate that cumulative errors denied him of due process and a fair trial where he failed to establish any instance of error. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4359 |
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Navy Fed. Credit Union v. McAfee
| C-240451 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIV.R. 56 — AFFIDAVITS — BUSINESS RECORDS — EVID.R. 803(6) — PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: Plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on its action on account where the affidavit and evidence attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were inadmissible. The trial court abused its discretion when it considered the affidavit and evidence attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the affidavit did not cite the affiant’s personal knowledge as a basis for the statements in the affidavit and the affiant’s job title does not create an inference that the affiant had personal knowledge of either plaintiff’s record-keeping system or documents allegedly showing defendant’s outstanding balance. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4360 |
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State v. Miller
| C-240649 | ASSAULT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — WITNESS CREDIBILITY — SENTENCING — RESTITUTION: Where the trial court, which was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, specifically found the victim’s testimony to be credible despite its inconsistencies, defendant’s conviction for assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Where defendant had a lengthy criminal record including multiple convictions for offenses of violence, and where defendant had struck the victim in her side, hit her with a kettlebell, and slammed her head on the ground, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a maximum sentence for a misdemeanor offense and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of damages that the victim testified she had incurred as a result of the offense. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/17/2025
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9/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4361 |
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State v. Jones
| C-240449 | SPEEDY TRIAL – ACTUAL PREJUDICE – PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE – FAILURE TO REINSTATE DRIVER’S LICENSE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial rights were not violated despite an 11-month delay in executing arrest warrants where defendant failed to demonstrate how he was actually prejudiced by the disposal of a responding officer’s body-worn camera footage and where the circumstances surrounding the delay, including defendant’s driver’s license, which contained an outdated address, were not particularly egregious to warrant a presumption of prejudice. [See CONCURRENCE: Where an arrest warrant is executed beyond the statutory-limitation period, issues involving delays caused by a lack of reasonable diligence are better suited for statute-of-limitations analyses under R.C. 2901.03.] Defendant’s conviction for failure to reinstate license was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State only introduced defendant’s BMV record, which indicated that, at the time of the incident, defendant was under an active suspension, and no testimony was offered explaining if another expired suspension obligated defendant to reinstate his license. Defendant’s conviction for failure to maintain control was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness identified defendant as the driver and retrieved defendant’s wallet at the scene of the accident. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3297 |
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Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor
| C-240504 | DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — JUSTICIABILITY — DISMISSAL: Where plaintiff’s complaint for a declaratory judgment did not satisfy the justiciability requirement of presenting a live controversy, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: a collateral attack on a criminal conviction does not present a live controversy but instead asks the court to determine whether rights that were previously adjudicated were properly adjudicated and a declaratory judgment action cannot be used as a substitute for the remedies the Ohio criminal rules and statutes provide for direct review of criminal judgments. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/12/2025
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9/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3298 |
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State v. Jones
| C-240533 | ROBBERY — R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) — DEADLY WEAPON — EVID.R. 404(B) — BODY-WORN-CAMERA VIDEO – PLAIN ERROR – MANIFEST WEIGHT: When statements on the police officer’s body-worn-camera video indicating that the robbery defendant had committed other theft offenses were muted at trial but inadvertently sent to the jury for deliberations, no plain error occurred because the statements would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Defendant’s conviction for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the record shows that he used a knife recovered by Cincinnati police officers as he stole goods from the store. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3252 |
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In re G.T.
| C-240546, C-240547 | JUVENILE — SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in committing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services where the court did not base its decision on an incorrect statement of the dispositional alternatives under R.C. 2152.19: The court narrowed down the options in the juvenile’s case to commitment or out-of-state probation, and it properly chose commitment. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing the juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth Services instead of alternative dispositional options. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3253 |
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State v. McCollum
| C-250051 | AGGRAVATED MENACING — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court was aware of the witnesses’ close relationships to one another and, nonetheless, found their testimony to be credible. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3254 |
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State v. Howell
| C-250106 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — OPERATION — PROBABLE CAUSE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Because the State may prove operation of a motor vehicle through circumstantial evidence, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress her arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated for lack of probable cause that defendant had operated the vehicle where defendant admitted she was coming from Columbus, attempted to locate her driver’s license in the car, and was the only person standing near the car when the officer arrived. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/10/2025
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9/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3255 |
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State v. Bediako
| C-240567 | GROSS NEGLECT OF A PATIENT — R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — CAUSATION: The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the inaction of defendant, an employee at an “intermediate care facility,” upon finding her patient unresponsive was the actual cause of harm to her patient where the evidence fails to show when or how defendant’s patient died, or that Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation ("CPR") would have prevented harm to her patient. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3169 |
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Tirado v. Tirado
| C-240666 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — TRANSCRIPT: Father cannot prevail on his appeal challenging the trial court’s shared-parenting decision where Father failed to file a transcript of the shared-parenting hearing and failed to develop legal arguments in support of his appeal. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3170 |
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OTR Hous. Assocs., Ltd. v. Engleman
| C-240693 | EVICTION — FORCIBLE-ENTRY-AND-DETAINER — R.C. 1923.06(H)(1) — CONTEMPT — CURE: In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, the trial court erred in issuing an immediate writ of restitution without holding a trial on the merits. The trial court did not err in striking defendant tenant’s jury demand where defendant failed to pay the required bond. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant tenant an opportunity to purge her contempt for nonpayment of the required bond. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/5/2025
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9/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3171 |
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State v. Smith
| C-240579 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — MIRANDA — EVID.R. 404(B) — MURDER — WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress under Miranda where the evidence showed that defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time defendant voluntarily told detectives that he was not at the scene of the shooting, but instead at a Bengals tailgate and then out of town. The trial court did not err under Evid.R. 404(B) in admitting defendant’s ex-girlfriend’s testimony that defendant threatened to set her on fire the night before defendant allegedly shot and killed the victim outside the ex-girlfriend’s apartment: The State offered defendant’s threatening statement in the context of the ex-girlfriend’s broader testimony regarding the events leading up to the shooting, and the evidence was relevant to explain defendant’s identity as the shooter and his intent when the shooting occurred. Defendant’s murder conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s ex-girlfriend testified that she had called the victim to change the locks on the front door of her apartment to keep defendant out when defendant arrived unannounced and a fight ensued between defendant and the victim, the victim was shot, defendant left the scene, and police could not locate any firearm at the scene of the shooting. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3131 |
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State v. Marshall
| C-240601 | POSTCONVICTION — DNA TESTING — OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s postconviction application for DNA testing of a shell casing found at the crime scene where an exclusionary result would not have been outcome determinative: even if another person’s DNA was present, it would only suggest that another person loaded the gun, not that defendant was not the shooter in light of other evidence presented at trial implicating defendant. | Zayas | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3132 |
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Tabbosha v. Abdelrehim
| C-250001 | SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — ANNULMENT — RES JUDICATA: The general division of the court of common pleas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment that amounted to a request for an annulment where the domestic relations division of the court of common pleas has exclusive jurisdiction to grant annulments, and annulments represent a special statutory proceeding that cannot be circumvented through a declaratory-judgment action. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/3/2025
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9/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3133 |
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State v. Jones
| C-230564 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – CROSS-EXAMINATION – PRIOR TESTIMONY – EVID.R. 806 – HEARSAY: The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of the now-deceased police-officer witness given at defendant’s prior trial under the Confrontation Clause, where defendant had not been provided an adequate opportunity to cross-examine that witness at his prior trial because the State withheld records crucial to impeach the witness. Defendant’s ability to introduce impeachment materials against an unavailable witness under Evid.R. 806 could not render the unavailable witness’s prior testimony admissible under the Confrontation Clause, where defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine that witness in the prior proceeding. [But see DISSENT: The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the order excluding the testimony where the State had perfected its appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court of this court’s order denying the State leave to appeal the trial court’s previous order granting defendant a new trial.] | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3095 |
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Clark v. Durrani
| C-240294 | CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL — COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE — ABSENT-DEFENDANT INSTRUCTION — EVID.R. 601(B)(5)(b) — EXPERT WITNESS —PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — CIV.R. 17(A) —REAL PARTY IN INTEREST — CIV.R. 19(A) — JOINDER: In a medical-malpractice case, the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) where the evidence showed that reasonable minds could not conclude in defendants’ favor, and the weight of the evidence was not contrary to the judgment and no reason for good cause to grant the motions was shown. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendants’ request for a comparative-negligence instruction where there was no evidence to support giving the instruction. The trial court did not err a matter of law in giving its instruction on defendant doctor’s absence at trial as the trial court informed the jury that any inferences it drew from defendant doctor’s absence were permissive, not required; further, the fact that the jury found for defendants on some claims, and the instructions were tested by interrogatories, demonstrated the trial court’s instruction did not affect the jury’s verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting plaintiffs’ doctor-witness to testify as an expert where Evid.R. 601(B)(5)(b), as amended in July 2023, applied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff’s motion for past medical expenses where the plaintiff’s health insurer had a subrogation agreement under which the insurer would collect the medical expenses it paid on plaintiff’s behalf from plaintiff’s damages. The trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A). | Moore | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3096 |
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State v. Beard
| C-240388 | RAPE — R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) — SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — SUFFICIENCY — KNOWLEDGE — SIXTH AMENDMENT — VINDICTIVE SENTENCE: The State’s evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant knew the victim was substantially impaired as an element of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) where testimony described the victim’s instability on her feet, heaving, and vomiting near defendant after drinking alcohol with defendant earlier in the night. Defendant’s conviction for rape and the jury’s finding that the victim was substantially impaired are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury believed testimony from witnesses and the victim describing her condition, which indicated that alcohol had impaired the victim’s ability to apprise the nature of her conduct and consent to sexual intercourse. Defendant’s sentence is contrary to law where the trial court’s repeated condemnatory remarks at the sentencing hearing about defendant’s not-guilty plea and decision to have a jury trial suggest that defendant received the maximum penalty for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/29/2025
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8/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3097 |
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State v. Hudson
| C-240554 | SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — IMPORTUNING — R.C. 2907.07: Defendant’s conviction for importuning was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile victim testified that defendant school-security guard texted her to determine what class she was in, showed up outside of her classroom, and when the victim left class to go to the restroom, defendant waited for her and then asked her to engage in sexual activity. | Nestor | Hamilton |
8/27/2025
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8/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3057 |
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State ex rel. Daniels v. Hinkson
| C-240688 | WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO — SUMMARY JUDGMENT— LACHES — MUNICIPAL CHARTER — REMOVAL OF OFFICERS: Relator was entitled to a writ of quo warranto ousting respondent from relator’s seat on the municipality’s city council where the city council failed to pass a resolution declaring relator’s seat vacant as required by the removal provision of the municipal charter, and therefore, realtor was never legally removed from his seat on the council and respondent was never legally appointed to fill relator’s seat. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/27/2025
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8/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-3058 |
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State v. Protich
| C-240507 | CRIMINAL — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — CRIMINAL TRESPASS —RESISTING ARREST: Defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence as the totality of the defendant’s interaction with the police in which defendant argued with officers, refused to provide identification, attempted to walk away from officers after being asked to provide identification, “slung” his arm back when an officer grabbed his arm, and then physically resisted the officers’ attempts to restrain him constituted a substantial stoppage of the officers’ official duties. Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant refused to leave a brewery after being told by an employee to leave three times and defendant did not leave until learning that the police had been called. Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported by sufficient evidence where there was a lawful basis for his arrest as the police possessed probable cause to believe that defendant had criminally trespassed and obstructed official business. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2981 |
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State v. Walker
| C-240551 | R.C. 2921.13 – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – PURPOSE – SUBSTANTIAL STOPPAGE : The trial court’s finding that defendant acted with a purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was supported by sufficient evidence where the State’s evidence showed that uniformed police officers had been waiting to warn and cite defendant at the home of his ex-girlfriend, but that defendant, upon meeting the officers’ eyes in a well-lit hallway, fled, despite the officers’ commands to halt. The trial court’s finding that defendant acted with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, because circumstantial evidence of specific intent was not manifestly outweighed by the evidence that the officers never stated they were police and that defendant sat down and complied upon seeing additional officers in his path after a 40-second flight. The trial court’s finding that defendant hampered or impeded the officers in the performance of their duties within the meaning of the obstructing-official-business statute was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where officers had been waiting outside the apartment of defendant’s former partner in order to cite defendant on an outstanding warrant and warn him to stay away, and where they were delayed in doing so by defendant’s 40-second flight through a hallway, down multiple flights of stairs, around the apartment building, and over a fence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2982 |
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State v. Jeffries
| C-240695 | R.C. 2921.331 — FAILURE TO COMPLY — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(A) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence presented at trial established that defendant ignored repeated commands from officers to exit from a vehicle in which he was a passenger after the officers conducted a traffic stop of that vehicle. | Crouse | Hamilton |
8/20/2025
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8/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2983 |
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Ravenscraft v. Durrani
| C-240297, C-240298 | MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE — ADVERSE INFERENCE — PREJUDICE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 702 — COMPETENCE — EVID.R. 601 — HABIT EVIDENCE — EVID.R. 406 — JURY INTERROGATORIES — CIV.R. 49: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where (1) the plaintiffs received the same diagnosis and spine surgery from surgeon defendant; (2) expert testimony focused on whether those surgeries were medically indicated; and (3) the plaintiffs sought damages from the same defendants for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and informed-consent claims and the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court’s instruction to consider each case on its own merits. The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of surgeon defendant’s habitual assurances to patients under Evid.R. 406 without a proper foundation, but that error was harmless where the record (1) includes evidence of identical assurances to patient plaintiffs and (2) does not suggest that the jury relied on the habit evidence to reach its verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the physician witness satisfied Evid.R. 601’s active-clinical-practice requirement demonstrating the physician witness’s competency because the rule was amended during the pendency of the plaintiffs’ actions, and therefore applied to their cases, to permit a trial court to find that a physician who devoted half of his professional time to the active clinical practice in his field when the negligent act occurred is competent to testify as an expert. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on patient plaintiff’s comparative negligence where the evidence failed to show that patient plaintiff’s failure to complete physical therapy that surgeon defendant recommended was the contemporaneous, active, and efficient contributing cause of patient plaintiff’s injury. The trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury that surgeon defendant’s absence gave rise to a negative inference was harmless where the trial court explained that the decision to draw an inference rested with the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the neuroradiologist witness to testify about operative reports, explain surgeries and recovery times, and assess surgical technique because that testimony related his interpretation of medical imaging, which falls within the scope of a neuroradiologist’s area of expertise. Defendants forfeited their challenge to the trial court’s omission of a jury interrogatory where defendants failed to object to the trial court’s omission during a conference or at trial and defendants failed to argue that the trial court committed plain error. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2900 |
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Shteiwi v. Abdelmassih
| C-240429 | DIVORCE – DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS – SEPARATE PROPERTY – TRACING – CHILD SUPPORT – DEVIATION – R.C. 3119.23 – LIFE INSURANCE – EQUITABLE DIVISION: The trial court did not err when it found Husband failed to demonstrate that a rental property constituted separate property. The trial court did not err when it found Husband failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that subsequent rental properties were purchased with separate funds, nor did the court err when it found Husband’s expert’s tracing report to be unreliable. The trial court did not err when it adopted an upward child support deviation, and the court properly relied upon the relevant factors under R.C. 3119.23. The trial court did not err when it required Husband to maintain a life insurance policy that exceeded the total support obligation Husband would have provided his minor child until the child reached the age of majority if Husband remained alive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it equitably divided the parties’ marital property, nor did the court abuse its discretion when it required the parties to divide their cryptocurrency wallets by number of coins as opposed to value. | Moore | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2901 |
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State v. Williams
| C-240534 | GUILTY PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(a) — MANDATORY SENTENCE — COMMUNITY-CONTROL ELIGIBILITY — PLEA COLLOQUY: The trial court completely failed to determine, as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), that defendant understood he was facing a mandatory sentence and was ineligible for community control where its colloquy and the plea form misrepresented defendant’s eligibility for community control and the trial court failed to correct defendant when he requested community control at the plea hearing. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2902 |
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State v. Wilson-Jones
| C-240548 | SEALING — REHABILITATION — CRIMINAL HISTORY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s application to seal a 2012 drug-trafficking conviction based on defendant’s lack of rehabilitation where defendant’s criminal history revealed a pattern of drug-trafficking convictions following his 2012 conviction, defendant had only been released from prison for two years since his last conviction, defendant’s evidence of rehabilitation included facts that were true prior to his subsequent drug-trafficking convictions, and defendant’s remaining evidence was not so overwhelming that the appellate court could reverse the trial court’s judgment. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2903 |
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Harsh v. NHC - Five Points, L.L.C.
| C-240699 | CIV.R. 56 — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF PROMISSORY NOTE — BREACH OF GUARANTY — NOTICE — MITIGATION OF DAMAGES — WAIVER — AFFIDAVIT: Where the language of the promissory notes and guaranties precluded defendants from relying on a lack of notice of default as a failure to mitigate damages, and defendants presented no evidence or argument regarding plaintiffs’ lack of reasonable efforts to mitigate damages as the nonbreaching party, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding notice and mitigation of damages that precluded a grant of summary judgment. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment did not rely on a finding of credibility where the record lacked evidence contradicting plaintiffs’ affidavit’s averments regarding defendants’ outstanding principal balance on promissory notes and guaranties. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/15/2025
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8/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2904 |
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State v. Quattara
| C-240549 | VENUE: The State failed to prove venue where the State presented no evidence of the location of the soccer stadium where the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk to the health or safety of a mentally-retarded person or a developmentally-disabled person. | Zayas | Hamilton |
8/13/2025
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8/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2850 |
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Middlebrooks v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth.
| C-250049 | POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY — PHYSICAL DEFECT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: In a personal injury action brought by a tenant against a public housing authority stemming from a leaking ceiling in the tenant’s apartment, the trial court did not err in denying the housing authority’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of political subdivision immunity: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the tenant, a factfinder could reasonably determine under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) that the housing authority had notice of the physical defect in the tenant’s apartment prior to the tenant’s injury. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
8/13/2025
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8/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2851 |
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State v. Byers
| C-240147 | GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION — INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — CREDIBILITY: The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of gross sexual imposition because a rational trier of fact could find that the victim’s testimony proved that defendant had touched the victim to achieve sexual arousal or gratification where the victim described waking up in the middle of the night to defendant licking her toes before he rubbed her breasts. Defendant’s conviction for gross sexual imposition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim’s testimony established that defendant touched the victim’s erogenous zone to achieve sexual arousal or gratification, and the trial court found the victim credible and defendant’s account of the touching incredible. | Bock | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2795 |
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State v. Harris
| C-240342 | FAILURE TO COMPLY — DISORDERLY CONDUCT — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Defendant’s conviction for failure to comply was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established that defendant stopped her vehicle in a lane of travel, was ordered to move her vehicle by a police officer, and remained in the lane of traffic, and the factfinder found the police officer’s testimony to be credible. Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct was not supported by sufficient evidence where no evidence was presented to prove that defendant’s shouting of profanities at a police officer inconvenienced the neighboring bystanders. Defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business was not supported by sufficient evidence where no evidence was presented to prove that defendant’s conduct hampered or impeded the investigation. Although the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of failure to comply, the defendant did not establish that she was prejudiced by the error. | Zayas | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2796 |
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Ragouzis v. Madison House Condominium Owners Assn., Inc.
| C-240402 & C-240407 | CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION – IMPRACTICABILITY REQUIREMENT – NUMEROSITY REQUIREMENT – CIV. R. 23: In an action involving a dispute among the owners of condominium units in a 175-unit high-rise building, plaintiffs appeal a common pleas court order certifying a class action on behalf of 153 unit owners who filed counterclaims against the plaintiffs. Counterclaimants failed to meet their burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the numerosity requirement of Civ.R. 23 by failing to argue any specific facts to establish that the "class" was so numerous that joinder for purposes of class action certification is impractical where the potential class members were already joined in the litigation when named as "interested defendants" in the plaintiffs' complaint, were represented by the same attorney and law firm, and had already filed the counterclaims they sought to have certified as a class action. | Hendrickson | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2797 |
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State v. Henderson
| C-240434 | POSTCONVICTION RELIEF — SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS — EVALUATION: The common pleas court erroneously dismissed defendant’s petition for postconviction relief based on Ohio’s serious-mental-illness law, see R.C. 2909.025, where the record lacked competent, credible evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant had knowingly refused to submit to a court-ordered serious-mental-illness evaluation, which effectively led to defendant waiving his right to seek the commutation of his death sentence to life imprisonment: the mental-health professional who was conducting the evaluation was not allowed to speak with defendant and therefore there was no evidence that defendant was informed that the evaluator was at the prison to conduct the court-ordered evaluation or of the consequences for not submitting to the evaluation. | Nestor | Hamilton |
8/8/2025
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8/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2798 |
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State v. Grubbs
| C-240165 | EVID.R. 404 — MURDER — SELF-DEFENSE — COUNSEL — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT: While the admission of the still shot of a Facebook video portraying defendant and codefendant holding guns was admissible for impeachment purposes, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the still shot to be published to the jury bearing a caption containing both violent and racially pejorative language, however, the admission of the still shot was harmless error as the State showed defendant was not prejudiced by its admission as, if it were excised, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt remained to support defendant’s conviction. The trial court did not plainly err by admitting evidence of other guns and drugs where defendant cannot show, if the evidence were excised, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Defendant received the effective assistance of counsel as he cannot show that, had counsel objected to the evidence of other guns and drugs, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. While counsel’s statements regarding defendant’s initial burden of production were unnecessary since it is the trial court’s duty to instruct the jury on self-defense, it did not amount to a deficient performance nor was it so prejudicial to defendant as to constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel; further, counsel did not misstate the law as to a defendant’s initial burden of proof. The State’s calling defendant a “liar” on the record did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct where the statement was made based on defendant’s inconsistent testimony, and there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the State did not mischaracterize the forensic expert’s testimony that the decedent was not holding his gun when defendant used deadly force against him. Defendant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State’s evidence to refute defendant’s self-defense claim showed that defendant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of which the only means of escape was the use of deadly force, and expert testimony refuted defendant’s claim that he shot the decedent after seeing the decedent draw his gun. | Moore | Hamilton |
8/6/2025
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8/6/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2756 |
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