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State v. Sweeten
| C-250664 | RESTITUTION — ECONOMIC LOSS — RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY: Where the State failed to show that defendant, who was convicted of receiving the victim’s stolen gun, repainted the victim’s gun, which caused an economic loss, and failed to provide evidence of the amount of economic loss resulting from the gun’s new paint job, defendant cannot be responsible for paying restitution to the victim for the economic loss from the paint job. The trial court erred in computing the amount of restitution owed because the record contained insufficient evidence from which it could compute a proper restitution figure, and the amount ordered was simply the approximate difference between the costs of the victim’s original stolen gun and the replacement purchased by the victim. | Crouse | Hamilton |
9/30/2026
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9/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3842 |
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State v. Ellington
| C-260033 | CRIM.R. 33(B) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — UNAVOIDABLE PREVENTION: The trial court properly denied defendant’s delayed motion for a new trial where defendant failed to comply with the first step of Crim.R. 33(B)’s mandatory two-step procedure: defendant was required to seek and obtain an order granting leave to file the delayed motion for a new trial. Defendant did not comply with Crim.R. 33(B) by arguing that he was unavoidably preventing from discovering the evidence upon which his new-trial motion depends in his delayed motion for a new trial where Crim.R. 33(B) requires defendants to obtain an order granting leave before filing the new-trial motion. See State v. McAlpin, 2026-Ohio-148. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/30/2026
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9/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3843 |
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Beavan v. Durrani
| C-250207, C-250208 | CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — JOINT TRIALS — CIV.R. 42 — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — HARMLESS ERROR — SET OFF — ATTORNEY FEES: Although the trial court improperly joined plaintiffs’ claims for trial under Civ.R. 42, the jury’s verdicts and interrogatories reveal that the jury separated and independently assessed each case, so the error was harmless. [See CONCURRENCE: “Commonality” under Civ.R. 42(A) and Civ.R. 23 does not have the same meaning because the rules serve different purposes; any error in the consolidation of plaintiffs’ trials was harmless.] The trial court miscalculated the amount that plaintiff’s settlement with codefendant tortfeasors setoff the award of damages when it reduced the setoff amount by the attorney fees and litigation expenses. R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court erred when it awarded plaintiff attorney fees where the jury did not award her punitive damages. | Bock | Hamilton |
9/30/2026
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9/30/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3844 |
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State v. Johnson
| C-240621 | PLAIN ERROR — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Defendant’s Bruen challenge is waived where defendant failed to argue below that the weapons under disability statute in R.C. 2923.13 and the concealed carry statute in R.C. 2923.12 are unconstitutional as applied to him. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) where the trial court made all necessary statutory findings and there was clear and convincing evidence to support those findings. Defendant has not shown trial counsel was ineffective where trial counsel made a strategic decision to not file a Bruen challenge and there is not a reasonable probability that the challenge would have been successful. | Nestor | Hamilton |
9/25/2026
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9/25/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3760 |
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Favaron v. Durrani
| C-250065, C-250066, C-250274 | CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — CONSOLIDATED TRIALS — CIV.R. 42 — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — EVID.R. 1102(Y) — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 702 — HARMLESS ERROR — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — “CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP” — SUPERCEDING AND INTERVENING CAUSE — FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES — SETOFF — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: The trial court abused its discretion under Civ.R. 42 by joining plaintiffs’ medical-malpractice claims for trial where plaintiffs’ cases did not present a common question of law or fact, but the court’s error was harmless where the record did not disclose any prejudice to defendants. [See CONCURRENCE: The trial court abused its discretion when it joined plaintiffs’ actions for trial because of the deficiencies in plaintiffs’ motion and the trial court’s reliance on past cases indicate that the trial court did not consider the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims and was therefore arbitrary.] The trial court did not err in admitting testimony from plaintiffs’ experts as defendants’ various challenges concerning whether an expert was qualified to provide testimony under Evid.R 601, whether an expert’s testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702, and alleged irrelevant evidence were meritless. [But see DISSENT: The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiff’s expert neuroradiologist testify that defendant’s procedure caused subsequent health problems for the plaintiff.] While the trial court erred by admitting improper habit evidence, the error was harmless where the improper habit evidence was echoed by other testimony and the remaining evidence in the record supported the jury’s verdict. While the trial court erred by admitting improper expert opinion testimony, the error was harmless where the challenged testimony consisted of one isolated statement, and the remaining evidence in the record supported the jury’s verdict. [But see DISSENT: The cumulative effect of the trial court’s multiple errors was prejudicial and not harmless where the medical-malpractice case was a battle of the experts and the errors affected the jury’s credibility determinations as shown by the jury interrogatories.] The trial court did not err by admitting hearsay expert testimony where the statement was made by a party-opponent. [But see DISSENT: The trial court’s admission of an out-of-court statement describing defendant’s propensity for aggressively recommending surgery was improper character evidence and should have been excluded under Evid.R. 404.] The trial court correctly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion when it did not issue defendants’ proposed jury instructions concerning defendant doctor’s absence from trial, the “captain of the ship” doctrine, superseding and intervening causes, and comparative negligence. [But see DISSENT: The trial court improperly instructed the jury that defendant’s absence from trial gives rise to an adverse inference and that error was compounded by plaintiffs’ counsel’s closing argument that invited the jury to improperly wield the adverse inference.] While the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it relates to the jury’s future-damages award for one plaintiff, the trial court erred in part when it denied defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it relates to the jury’s future-damages award for another plaintiff, because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s future-damages award to that plaintiff. The trial court erred in denying defendants’ request for a setoff where this court has held that intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court did not err by awarding plaintiffs prejudgment interest, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendants had failed to make a good-faith effort to settle the cases and that plaintiffs had made a good-faith effort to settle. | Moore | Hamilton |
9/25/2026
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9/25/2026
| 2026-Ohio-3761 |
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