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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. F.S.
| 113712, 113713, 113714 | Juvenile court; competency hearing; incompetency; competency assumed; ineffective assistance of counsel; sufficient indicia of competency; probable cause hearing; bindover hearing; amenability hearing; moot; abuse of discretion. Juvenile appellant has three cases in juvenile court that were bound over to adult court. In his first assignment of error appellant appeals his convictions arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to raise the issue of his competency in juvenile court prior to an amenability hearing. For his first two cases, there was not sufficient indicia of incompetency such that his counsel was not ineffective for not raising the issue in juvenile court. However, his counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of competency in his third juvenile case since there was more than sufficient indicia of incompetency at that time such that counsel should have filed a motion in the juvenile court for a competency determination. This assignment of error is sustained in part, vacated in part and remanded in part. In appellant’s second assignment of error he argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding him not amenable to juvenile court and transferring his cases to adult court. We find, for his first two cases that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding appellant was not amenable and properly transferred the two cases. For this third case we find the abuse-of-discretion determination to be moot, since the third case’s amenability finding was vacated and remanded in the prior assignment of error. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1251 |
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Surf City Investors, L.L.C. v. Lofti-Fard
| 113804 | Home equity line of credit, note, mortgage, foreclosure action, action on account, Civ.R. 60(B), relief from judgment, excusable neglect, abuse of discretion, business records, hearsay, relevance, prejudice, Evid.R. 401, 403, 801, 803(3), and 901, authentication. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when it determined that the case was a foreclosure action. Although a home equity line of credit operates similarly to a credit card, it is secured by a mortgage on property, which gives the lender the ability to foreclose on the property when the debtor defaults. Therefore, the plaintiff-lender was only required to prove the amount of principal and interest due, not a complete payment history with a beginning balance of zero, as appellants contended. Further, the evidence establishing the amount of principal and interest due was properly admitted under the business records exception. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment finding excusable neglect. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1252 |
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Dueck v. Kerrigan
| 113865 | Motion for summary judgment; motion for reconsideration; res judicata; claim preclusion; issue preclusion. The trial court did not err in granting the defendants-appellees’ motions for summary judgment where the causes of action argued by the plaintiffs-appellants were barred by res judicata. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiffs-appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of Count 2 under its complaint. Pursuant to claim preclusion, Count 2 should have been litigated in a prior lawsuit that shared the same parties and arose from the same occurrence or transaction and, therefore, the claim was barred by res judicata. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1253 |
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State v. Anderson
| 113887 | Petition for postconviction relief; untimely petition; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; Brady material; ripeness. Trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s untimely petition for postconviction relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the petition failed to establish entitlement to consideration as required by R.C. 2953.23(A). Appellant’s unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that he did not receive police reports was insufficient to establish that the State suppressed evidence, where the appellant argued in the alternative that he did not receive the police reports, or if he received them, he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to utilize them to impeach the State’s witnesses. Appellant’s argument challenging the State’s res judicata argument is not ripe for review because the trial court summarily denied the petition and did not reach the merits. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1254 |
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In re D.W.
| 113994 & 113995 | Juvenile court; delinquency; amenability; discretionary transfer; bindover; R.C. 2152.12; abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s motion for a discretionary transfer where the court considered the relevant statutory factors in favor of and against transfer and the record reflects a rational basis for the court’s findings. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting the detective to testify at the amenability hearing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1255 |
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State v. Sanchez
| 114005 & 114011 | Sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); life sentence; clearly and convincingly; necessary. Judgment affirmed. A sentence of life with the possibility of parole after the statutory time period does not make it unnecessary or prohibit a trial court from ordering consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. Appellant pled guilty to felony murder with a three-year firearm specification in one case and attempted felonious assault and robbery in a second case. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Appellant’s consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public and to punish the appellant and is not disproportionate to the harm caused by appellant and the danger he poses to the public. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1256 |
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State v. Wacasey
| 114144 | Sufficiency; manifest weight; assault; R.C. 2903.13; attempt; physical harm. Affirmed. For the purposes of R.C. 2903.13(A) committed against a law enforcement officer, the State need not prove that the defendant actually harmed the officer or that the defendant purposefully or intentionally kicked the officer in an attempt to cause harm. Further, based on the evidence that the defendant intentionally bit an officer during a lawful arrest, the State has proven the crime of assault beyond a reasonable doubt. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1257 |
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In re T.P.
| 114169 | Juvenile court; discretionary bindover; probable cause; grand theft; aggravated robbery; robbery. - Juvenile court erred in finding no probable cause on certain counts of the complaint. The State presented credible evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the then-juvenile committed grand theft, aggravated robbery, and robbery because the then-juvenile refused to return the victim’s property after the victim revoked his consent and fled the scene with the property after another individual shot the victim. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1258 |
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In re L.H.
| 114187 | Plain error; Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv); adjudication; disposition; R.C. 2151.35(A)(1); R.C. 2151.353(A)(2)(a); temporary custody. Judgment affirmed. Mother waived any arguments regarding the juvenile court’s dependency finding and fails to argue that the juvenile court plainly erred in adjudicating L.H. dependent on appeal. Accordingly, her challenge to the juvenile court’s adjudication of L.H. is overruled. Moreover, Mother did not object to the magistrate’s decision recommending temporary custody be granted to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) and does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court’s adoption of that recommendation amounted to plain error. However, even if Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s temporary custody determination were properly raised, we decline to find that the trial court plainly erred in granting temporary custody to CCDCFS. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1259 |
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State v. Baldwin
| 114247 | Postconviction-relief petition; R.C. 2953.21(H); findings of fact and conclusions of law; apprise; appellate review. - Trial court erred in failing to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(H) to apprise the appellant of the basis for the trial court’s denial of his timely postconviction-relief petition and to facilitate appellate review. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1260 |
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State v. Burgos
| 114258 | Appellate review; maximum sentence. Appellant claimed that the eight-year prison sentences imposed on his convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted rape were not supported by the record. This court is without authority to review whether a sentence is supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1261 |
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State v. Holliman
| 114286 | Improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises; postrelease control; manifest weight of the evidence; offense of violence. - Judgment affirmed. The jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of a single violation of improper discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in imposing postrelease control because this court has previously found that R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) qualifies as an offense of violence that allows for the imposition of postrelease control. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1262 |
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Cumberland Lakefront B., L.L.C. v. Blackwing, L.L.C.
| 114311 | Summary judgment; commercial lease; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Civ.R. 52; Civ.R. 56; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; tenant improvement allowance. Judgment affirmed. This court declines to address assignments of error in which appellants failed to follow the appellate rules and in which have been rendered moot by prior judgments and orders. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the tenant’s counterclaims because the tenant was unable to show that it was entitled to tenant improvement funds when the tenant never submitted receipts or invoices for improvements made to the business. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1263 |
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In re C.D.
| 114329 | Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; dispositional hearing; R.C. 2151.35; 90 days after filing of complaint; dismiss with prejudice; plain error; hearing must commence; ineffective assistance of counsel; deficiency prejudiced defense; failure to seek writ of procedendo; R.C. 2151.414; statutory timeframe for resolution of motion for permanent custody. The trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the case because it did not violate the statutory timeframe. The dispositional hearing was commenced within 90 days of the refiled complaint. Further, Mother’s counsel did not demonstrate that her counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a writ of procedendo with regard to the motion for permanent custody. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1264 |
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In re U.B.
| 114341 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); best interests of the child; manifest weight of the evidence. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the child to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"). The juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) were supported by competent and credible evidence. Mother was unable substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the child’s home, which included mental health, substance abuse, and adequate housing concerns. Father was not in contact with CCDCFS, and mother continued to test positive for marijuana, had stopped taking her medications, and had continued to use marijuana to deal with her mental-health issues. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1265 |
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State v. Colson
| 114447 | Community-control-sanction violation; hearing; Crim.R. 32.3; minimum requirements of due process. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to community-control-sanction-violation hearings because they are not criminal prosecutions. Hearsay statements were admissible at defendant’s community-control-sanctions-violation hearing as long as there was no due-process violation. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/10/2025
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4/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1266 |
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Cleveland v. Wimbley
| 113864 | Sentencing entry; sentencing hearing; misdemeanor community-control sanctions; moot; presence during the imposition of sentence; Crim.R. 43(A)(1). Judgment affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Appellant’s arguments that the trial court’s community-control sanctions are improperly excessive as they relate to other properties are dismissed as moot because appellant did not own any other properties and the sentencing orders only relate to the subject property. Although not verbatim, the sentencing entry did not differ from the sentencing imposed during the sentencing hearing. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1178 |
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State v. Philpotts
| 114047 | Having weapons while under disability; facially unconstitutional; Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; right to keep and bear arms; temporarily disarm a person who is under indictment for a violent felony. The trial court’s finding that a portion of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which governs having weapons while under disability, is unconstitutional on its face under the Second Amendment is affirmed. The offending provision of the statute prohibits people who are under indictment for violent felonies — rather than having been convicted of violent felonies — from possessing a firearm. Under the United States Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning the right to keep and bear arms pursuant to the Second Amendment, this provision of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) does not pass constitutional muster because it has no “historical analogue” in this Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1179 |
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State v. Creer
| 114050 | Felony murder; independent intervening cause; sufficiency; manifest weight; effective assistance of counsel; grand jury; essential facts. - Judgment affirmed. There was no error in allowing a witness to testify who had not been present for the grand jury proceedings. The defendant’s convictions were not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in deciding not to instruct the jury on independent intervening cause. The defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1180 |
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State v. Pettaway
| 114051 | Felony murder; improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation; sufficiency of the evidence; insufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; drive-by shooting; habitation, video surveillance; forensic analysis; direct evidence; circumstantial evidence; aiding and abetting; accomplice liability; affirm; vacate; remand; resentencing. Defendant-appellant’s jury trial convictions for felony murder and one count of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation are affirmed on direct appeal. There was sufficient evidence presented that defendant-appellant aided and abetted the principal offender in the commission of the offenses and his convictions for felony murder and one count of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because there were no credibility issues or inconsistencies with regard to the State’s witnesses’ testimonies. The remaining four counts of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation are vacated, however, due to the fact that only one habitation was at issue. Case remanded for resentencing. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1181 |
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State v. Wood
| 114064 | Felony murder; improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation; jury instructions; independent intervening cause of death; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant’s conviction for felony murder in this drive-by-shooting case is affirmed. Defendant and two accomplices fired over 30 shots into a house from their car. One person in the house died of a gunshot wound. Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction about independent intervening cause of death, even though the evidence showed that return gunfire from inside the house may have been the immediate cause of death of the victim. Under felony murder, the direct cause of death is irrelevant if the proximate cause of death is the defendant’s commission of the underlying felony, which in this case was improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation. It is foreseeable, natural and logical that firing a gun into an occupied structure might kill someone. Four of the five convictions for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation are reversed based on insufficient evidence. The State charged the defendant with one count of this offense for each individual who was inside the house when the shooting took place. A jury convicted the defendant of five counts of this offense. However, this court has held that the offense is a crime against the habitation, not a crime against a person. One house was shot into in this case, and this supports one count of the offense. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1182 |
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King-Bey v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.
| 114089 | Personal injury; jury trial; medical expert; damages award; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.19. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in upholding the jury’s $75,000 noneconomic damages verdict based on the guidance in R.C. 2315.19. The trial court also did not err in the various rulings raised as error both before, during, and after trial. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1183 |
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Murfey v. Muth
| 114212 | Compel arbitration; waiver. Affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling arbitration based on tangentially related claims being litigated in an out-of-state proceeding, which has since concluded, or based on the defendants’ conduct in the underlying case that was limited to responding to the complaint by filing a motion to compel arbitration after a series of requests for continuances to respond. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1184 |
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State v. Niyonzima
| 114104 | Interpreter; interpreter oath; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); Evid.R. 604; Evid.R. 702; R.C. 2311.14(B); sex offender registration. Affirmed. Appellant appeals his judgment of conviction after pleading guilty to attempted rape and burglary, arguing that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. The court finds no error when the oath to the interpreter is not on the record verbatim, the interpreter asked the prosecutor to repeat himself twice, and defendant expressed he did not know what the word “probation” meant, or if he had been advised by an immigration attorney. The trial court’s statement during the plea colloquy that there was “the chance” defendant would have to register as a sex offender was not error. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1185 |
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State v. Eggleton
| 114268 | Consecutive sentences; agreed term; contrary to law; authorized by law; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows consecutives whenever a person is convicted of multiple felonies without regard to the level of offense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it imposed consecutive sentences for a charge of murder with a life tail and a charge of felonious assault with an S.B. 201 sentence as the sentence was authorized by law. Finally, the sentence on felonious assault was within the statutory range and therefore not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1186 |
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State v. Holliman
| 114280 | One- and three-year firearm specifications attendant to same count; R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g); sentencing on firearm specifications is not analogous to sentencing for allied offenses; trial court decides under which specification defendant will be sentenced. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant on the one-year firearm specification after he was found guilty of both the one- and a three-year firearm specification for the same count. The exception under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is inapplicable to this case, and the other relevant statutes — R.C. 2941.141(B) and 2941.145(B) — preclude sentencing on both a one- and three-year firearm specification attendant to the same count. The statutes do not elevate the three-year specification over the one-year specification. Firearm specifications are sentencing enhancements and are not analogous to allied offenses, where the State chooses which count to proceed to sentencing on. | Michael John Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1187 |
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State v. Davis
| 114114 | Guilty plea; maximum sentence; Crim.R. 11. Trial court was not required to advise appellant of the maximum penalty he faced on his community-control violation when he pleaded guilty to a new case. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 when it advised appellant of the maximum penalties of his current charges. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1188 |
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State v. Stewart
| 114361, 114362 | Fourth Amendment; warrantless entry; consent; search warrant; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine; exclusionary rule. Judgment affirmed. The denial of the suppression motion was not in error. Appellant consented to officers’ initial entry into his home to retrieve clothing for appellant to wear. The evidence was in plain view, and that observation can be used as the basis for a subsequent search warrant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/3/2025
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4/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1189 |
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Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co.
| 113863 | Motion for reconsideration; Civ.R. 6; response time; due process; judgment on the pleadings; saving statute; statute of limitations; double-dismissal rule. Trial court did not violate plaintiff’s due-process rights even though it ruled on motion for reconsideration before plaintiff’s response deadline had passed because plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that was the subject of the reconsideration. Trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s third complaint was barred by Ohio’s saving statute and the applicable statutes of limitations where first refiled complaint was dismissed by the trial court without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2), and Civ.R. 41(A)(2) does not include a double-dismissal rule. Late production of plaintiff’s expert reports did not warrant dismissal where court did not grant defendants’ motion to strike the reports. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1058 |
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State v. Brown
| 113879 | Anders brief; lack of meritorious grounds for appeal; wholly frivolous; motion to withdraw; dismiss the appeal; plea made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); remand; nunc pro tunc; clerical error. Motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), granted where there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Case remanded for the trial court to issue nunc pro tunc judgment entries that reflect the offenses to which the defendant-appellant pleaded guilty and the sentences imposed. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1059 |
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Naiman v. Cleveland Elec. Illum., Co.
| 113926 | Summary judgment, de novo review, trespass, prescriptive easement, nuisance, affidavit, personal knowledge. Judgment affirmed. Because appellate review of a trial court decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court’s decision for a different reason. We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on a ground different than the trial court. While the trial court found that the appellee had an express easement for one of the subject poles at issue and a prescriptive easement for the other two poles at issue, our de novo reveals that all three poles were subject to a prescriptive easement. Because the poles were subject to a prescriptive easement, appellant failed to demonstrate a trespass cause of action against appellee. We further find that the poles did not constitute a nuisance. The trial court properly disregarded portions of an affidavit as not being based on personal knowledge and containing conclusory averments. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1060 |
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Cleveland v. Johnston
| 114044 | Housing court; community control; violations of community control; sanctions; interior inspection; reasonably related; overbroad. Judgment reversed. The trial court’s order requiring defendant to permit interior inspections of his two properties as a violation of his community control was not reasonably related to the goals of community control and overbroad and, therefore, impermissible. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1061 |
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M.J.S. v. C.S.S.
| 114151 | Civil contempt; clear and convincing evidence; prima facie case; valid court order; knowledge of the order; violation of the order; abuse of discretion; agreed judgment entry; shared-parenting plan; intent of parties; order is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation; ambiguous. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt for home-schooling the children because the language in the agreed judgment entry was ambiguous, and thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that he had violated the court’s order. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1062 |
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E. Cleveland v. Kline
| 114180 | Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI"); under the influence; Traf.R. 10; Traf.R. 10(D); Traf.R. 10(B); Traf.R. 1(B); Traf.R. 2(D); Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 1(C)(3); traffic case; ordinance; misdemeanor; petty offense; plea; effect; no contest; accepted; never entered; conviction; nullity. Reversed appellant’s conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence, which was a petty misdemeanor traffic offense. Because the case involved the violation of a traffic ordinance, Traf.R. 10 applied, rather than Crim.R. 11. Appellant challenged whether the trial court complied with Traf.R. 10(B) and (D). Regardless of any deficiencies in informing appellant of the effect of the plea of no contest, the record showed that appellant never actually entered a plea of no contest, which was conceded by the city. Therefore, appellant’s conviction was a nullity. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1063 |
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State v. Shirley
| 114225 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; drug possession; R.C. 2925.11(A). Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s conviction for possession of drugs was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant argued that he did not possess the pill bottle that was later found to contain methamphetamines. Both police officers’ testimonies and video evidence showed that appellant had something in his hand that resembled the pill bottle, and later, as he was being apprehended by police, he crouched down near the spot where the pill bottle was found. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1064 |
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Garfield Hts. v. Poree
| 114308 | Manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Appellant’s theft conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court was in the best position to judge the witnesses’ credibility, and this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against the conviction. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1065 |
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State v. Todd
| 114349 | Sentencing hearing; victim-impact statement; Marsy’s Law; rights of crime victims; Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a; R.C. 2929.19(A); trial court discretion; nonvictim statements at sentencing hearing; victim’s representative; R.C. 2930.02(A)(1); R.C. 2930.02(D). Trial court did not err by allowing the victim’s mother to speak at the defendant’s sentencing hearing, even though she was not a designated victim representative under Marsy’s Law. Ohio law grants trial courts discretion to allow others besides victims to speak at sentencing hearings with the court’s approval. Marsy’s Law expanded the rights of crime victims but did not limit the trial court’s preexisting discretion under R.C. 2929.19(A) to hear from other individuals. In addition, nothing in the record indicated the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court permitting the victim’s mother to speak. When the trial court proceeded to sentencing, it focused on the statutory factors relevant to sentencing and did not mention the statements of the victim’s mother. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/27/2025
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3/27/2025
| 2025-Ohio-1066 |
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State v. McClain
| 113597 | Substantial impairment rape; sufficiency of the evidence; hearsay; failure to object; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment vacated. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence that the defendant knew of the alleged victim’s substantial impairment. Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the victim’s hearsay testimony that a bartender told her that other woman at the bar had been drugged, as well as other witnesses’ hearsay testimony. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-962 |
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State v. Hinton
| 113836 | Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; hearsay testimony; sentence contrary to law. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not allow inadmissible hearsay testimony. The appellant’s sentence was not contrary to law. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-963 |
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Legacy Village Investors, L.L.C. v. Bravo Brio Restaurants, L.L.C.
| 113853 | Magistrate’s decision; breach of lease; late fees; local rules. The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision and further concluding that the appellant’s request for monetary damages was improper under the local rules. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-964 |
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Sammon v. Leneghan
| 113886 | Equitable contribution, summary judgment, declaratory judgment, life estate, de novo review. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and declaring that she was not required to reimburse appellant for the monies he paid towards the tax liens because the surrender of appellee’s life estate without compensation was sufficient contribution. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-965 |
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State v. McCann
| 113982 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; objections; trial strategy; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel’s purported failure to object to a witness’s testimony amounts to a trial strategy that, even if debatable, does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Moreover, the defendant fails to establish that trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that the defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Further, we find that the trial court engaged in the proper analysis, considered the required statutory criteria, and made the necessary findings before imposing consecutive sentences. The record clearly supports the trial court’s findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate in this case. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-966 |
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State v. Goldsby
| 114118 | Felonious assault; strangulation; abduction; inducing panic; domestic violence; Crim.R. 29 motion; manifest weight of the evidence; merger; effective assistance of counsel; court’s witness; restitution. Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions, and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to merge the counts. The harm caused by each count was separate and/or committed with a separate animus. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek merger of the counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to call the victim as a court witness, even if the State was not surprised by the victim’s recantation. The city and its police department were not victims, and thus the order of restitution in their favor was error. Convictions affirmed; restitution order reversed. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-967 |
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Salone v. Stovall
| 114257 | Declaratory judgment; quiet title; deed; fraudulent transfer; motion for summary judgment; voluntary satisfaction; judgment; stay; moot. Appeal dismissed as moot. Plaintiff claimed that defendants defrauded her out of her home and recorded a fraudulent deed. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, voided the fraudulent deed, and entered declaratory judgment ordering that the subject property is quieted and all right, title and interest is vested in plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a copy of the trial court’s judgment entry with the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office. The next day, defendants filed the instant appeal and sought a stay of the judgment with the trial court five days later. The trial court denied the stay as moot, finding that plaintiff has already executed the judgment. It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot. Here, defendants failed to obtain a stay of the trial court’s judgment nullifying a quitclaim deed to the subject property prior to plaintiff quieting title against the defendants. Therefore, the appeal is moot. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-968 |
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In re Z.D.
| 114377 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); best interest of the child, reasonable efforts; manifest weight; legal custody; termination of parental rights. Judgment affirmed. The termination of Mother’s parental rights and granting of permanent custody to the Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother did not complete the case-plan services, which included services for substance abuse and mental health, or did not demonstrate she benefitted from services. The juvenile court did not err when it denied the motion for legal custody of three of the Children to a maternal aunt because it was not in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court did not err when it found that reasonable efforts had been made to reunify Mother with the Children. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-969 |
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In re A.V.
| 114379 | Motion for continuance; due process; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for continuance or violate his right to due process. The record before us does not suggest that Father exhibited cooperation or communicated with counsel and the juvenile court and fails to demonstrate good cause for a continuance. Moreover, after weighing the potential prejudice to Father against the juvenile court’s right to control its docket and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, we cannot say that the juvenile court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying Father’s motion. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-970 |
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In re B.V.
| 114421 | Permanent custody; continuance; R.C. 2151.414(A)(2); Juv.R. 4(A); discretion; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court’s judgments granting permanent custody of two children to the agency and terminating mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance of the permanent-custody trial. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D) and (E), and its judgments were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
3/20/2025
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3/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-971 |
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State v. Tucker
| 113843 | Motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; murder; new witness; recanting witness; affidavit testimony; Crim.R. 33; newly discovered evidence; unavoidably prevented. - Judgment affirmed. Tucker’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial fails to make the required showing that Tucker was unavoidably prevented from discovering an allegedly previously unknown witness, and Tucker’s arguments regarding a recanting witness are barred by res judicata. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
3/18/2025
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3/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-923 |
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Caldwell v. Custom Craft Builders, Inc.
| 113209 | Admissibility of evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; pierce the corporate veil; breach of contract; apparent agency; consumer sales practices act; conspiracy to commit fraud. The trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on breach-of-contract, consumer sales practices act violations, and conspiracy-to-commit-fraud-claims after a bench trial is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment for plaintiff on her breach-of-contract claim is affirmed. There was evidence presented at trial that the defendant LLC is liable for the actions of the “bad actor” in this case under the doctrine of apparent agency. Judgment on the remaining two claims is reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence in the record. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-828 |
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Parsai v. Parsai
| 113550; 113747 | Divorce; division of marital property; equitable division of property; spousal support; temporary support; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 75(N); R.C. 3105.171; de facto marriage termination; financial entanglements; bilateral; unilateral; motion for new trial; motion for relief from judgment; invited error; failure to prosecute; modification of temporary support; credit for payments during divorce proceedings; valuation of property; valuation evidence; time limits on presentation of evidence; prejudice; mootness; marriage inception date; pension; R.C. 3105.18. On Husband’s assignments of error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in rejecting a de facto marriage termination date of May 1, 2017, in favor of the final hearing date, October 11, 2023. The record supported the trial court’s determination that the separation was the result of unilateral action by Wife rather than bilateral action by both parties, that there were continuing financial entanglements, and that there was insufficient evidence of the value of marital property on May 1, 2017, hampering the trial court’s ability to equitably divide marital property as of that date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not retroactively modifying the temporary spousal-support order premised upon Husband’s retirement. Husband did not prosecute his Civ.R. 75(N)(2) motion and never filed a motion to modify temporary support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by not granting Husband credit for direct payments made to Wife during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Trial court took payments into account in its ultimate property division determinations, and arguments regarding marital property valuation were waived where Husband failed to submit valuation evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by placing time limitations on direct examination and cross-examination. Husband did not demonstrate what evidence he was prohibited from presenting due to the limitations and how he was prejudiced by the limitations. Furthermore, the transcript does not reflect that the trial court favored one side over the other in its timekeeping. Husband’s arguments with respect to his motion for a new trial are disposed of by our resolution of his other assignments of error. Having overruled Husband’s other assignments of error, we find that his assignment of error regarding the denial of his motion for a new trial is moot. On Wife’s assignments of error, the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in finding that the parties were married on September 8, 1989, the date of their civil marriage, rather than sometime in 1981, when Wife claimed they privately exchanged vows in an Islamic ceremony. There was no evidence that it would be inequitable or prejudicial for the trial court to use the legal marriage date as the marriage inception date, especially where all significant marital property was obtained after the civil marriage date. The trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in ordering Husband to pay Wife monthly support in the amount of $1,500 per month for life, absent Wife’s cohabitation or remarriage. The record reflects that the trial court considered Husband’s pension in its analysis of the R.C. 3105.18 factors with respect to an equitable division of property and did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of Husband’s pension. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
3/13/2025
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3/13/2025
| 2025-Ohio-829 |
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