| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Albers v. Lyon
| C-250017 | AMENDMENT – DISCOVERY – MEDIATION – PRIVILEGE – PROTECTIVE ORDER – R.C. 2710.04 – R.C. 2710.05 – WAIVER: The trial court’s refusal to allow plaintiffs-appellants to amend their complaint was not an abuse of discretion because the motion to amend was not timely, and the information plaintiffs-appellants sought to amend was information that the trial judge relied on in granting a protective order. Where the fact that an informal mediation had occurred was a pleaded to and admitted fact, and where plaintiffs did not sufficiently preserve their open court argument for appellate review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a protective order on the grounds that the mediation privilege protected certain statements from discovery. The trial court did not err in finding that defendants-appellees did not waive the mediation privilege where defendants-appellees did not expressly waive the privilege. | Nestor | Hamilton |
1/23/2026
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1/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-209 |
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Boggs v. Durrani
| C-250068, C-250072, C-250275 | CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — CONSOLIDATED TRIALS — CIV.R. 42 — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — EVID.R. 1002(Y) — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 702 — HARMLESS ERROR — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES — SETOFF — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 by joining plaintiffs’ medical claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, underwent similar surgeries by defendant doctor, and presented identical expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. [See CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority’s opinion on this issue but adding a postjudgment assessment of prejudice from the joinder of trials that reveals no reversible error.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ experts to testify about prior surgeries performed on each plaintiff by defendant doctor, even though those prior surgeries were not at issue in the cases, because the testimony was in line with the court’s limiting instruction and any deviation from that instruction was harmless error. While the trial court erred by admitting hearsay expert testimony, the error was harmless where if the challenged testimony was excised the record still supported the jury’s verdicts. The trial court did not err in admitting testimonial evidence from plaintiffs’ experts as defendants’ various challenges concerning whether an expert was qualified to provide testimony under Evid.R 601, whether an expert’s testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702, and alleged irrelevant evidence were meritless. The trial court did not err when it denied defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because defendants failed to demonstrate that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s future-damages awards. The trial court erred in denying defendants’ request for a setoff where this court held that intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court did not err when it awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendants had failed to make a good-faith effort to settle the cases. | Moore | Hamilton |
1/23/2026
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1/23/2026
| 2026-Ohio-210 |
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State v. Lee
| C-250197 | CHILD ENDANGERING — R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) — RECKLESSNESS — SUFFICIENCY: Defendant’s conviction for child endangering was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State failed to put forth any evidence that defendant acted recklessly; the State failed to show that there was a strong possibility that a child would be harmed as a result of defendant’s conduct. | Moore | Hamilton |
1/21/2026
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1/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-173 |
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Dotson v. Durrani
| C-250205 | R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) — FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 10(D) — DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE — JURISDICTION — CIV.R. 54(B) — MOOT — APP.R. 12: Where the order appealed from vacated a prior final judgment issued by the trial court, it was a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(3). Where the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, the trial court erred in sua sponte vacating that judgment and granting plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. An appellate court will not rule on assignments of error that are rendered moot by another decision rendered by the court in the appeal. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/21/2026
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1/21/2026
| 2026-Ohio-174 |
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In re C/W Children
| C-240553 | JUVENILE COURT — ADJUDICATION — NEGLECT — DEPENDENCY — REMOVAL — CLEAR AND CONVINCING — MENTAL HEALTH — SUICIDE HOTLINE: The juvenile court’s adjudication of Mother’s newborn twins as neglected was not supported by clear and convincing evidence because Mother’s phone call to a suicide hotline after the twins were removed from her custody and her subsequent short-term hospitalization for a psychological evaluation did not establish that Mother abandoned the babies, that they lacked adequate parental care due to her faults or habits, or that Mother refused to provide subsistence, education, or medical treatment to them. The juvenile court’s adjudication of Mother’s six children as dependent was not supported by clear and convincing evidence where that determination was based on a neglect finding involving Mother’s twins that was also unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
1/16/2026
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1/16/2026
| 2026-Ohio-138 |
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State v. Hoskins
| C-240634 | CRIM.R. 44 – CONCEALED CARRY – DANGEROUS ORDNANCE – SUFFICIENCY – WAIVER OF COUNSEL – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – R.C. 2923.12 – R.C. 2923.13 – R.C. 2923.17: The trial court erred by failing to ensure that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, despite defendant’s apparent unwillingness to engage in any good-faith discussion regarding his representation. Where the State charged defendant under the improper subsection of R.C. 2923.12, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for carrying concealed weapons: defendant’s weapon was a dangerous ordnance, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict him under R.C. 2913.12(A)(2) of carrying a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance. | Nestor | Hamilton |
1/14/2026
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1/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-100 |
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State v. Cooper
| C-250088 | INVITED ERROR — CRIM.R. 48(B): The State invited error where it informed the trial court that it believed it would be unable to meet its burden of proof at trial based on the State’s reading of precedent and requested the trial court to dismiss the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B), and the trial court complied with the State’s request by dismissing the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B). | Bock | Hamilton |
1/14/2026
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1/14/2026
| 2026-Ohio-101 |
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State v. Garrett
| C-240463 | SECOND AMENDMENT — OHIO CONSTITUTION — FIREARMS — HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) — MURDER — DISCOVERY SANCTIONS — CRIM.R. 16 — BRADY OBLIGATIONS — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 801(C) — VENUE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — BENCH VIEW — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution did not bar the State from prosecuting defendant for having a weapon while under a disability, where that disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) was based on a prior conviction for aggravated assault involving a firearm. The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss his weapons-under-disability charges under the Ohio Constitution, because defendant developed no argument as to why the statute was not “a reasonable regulation, promoting the welfare and safety of the people,” as that phrase was used in Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 48 (1993). Where the State failed to disclose police interview recordings until shortly before the trial was to begin, but where the trial court determined that this nondisclosure was not the result of willful or bad-faith conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Crim.R. 16 by denying defendant’s motion to compel police to disclose their file to prosecutors, and then to compel prosecutors to review that file and certify that they had provided defendant with all the materials to which defendant was entitled. Where a police officer testified that, after interviewing an eyewitness, he suspected that defendant had shot the victim, but where the officer did not actually describe the statements that the eyewitness made, the police officer’s testimony did not contain hearsay under Evid.R. 801(C) and State v. Smith, 2022 Ohio 2592 (1st Dist.), and therefore, that testimony was not barred by Evid.R. 802. Evidence supporting venue for defendant’s prosecution in Hamilton County was sufficient where witness testimony established that a nearby apartment complex was in Hamilton County, and where the trial judge, sitting without a jury, had visited the site of the murder as part of a bench view and thereafter took “judicial notice that the entire action took place in Hamilton County, Ohio. ”Defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness testified she saw a man she identified as defendant shoot the victim, and where that testimony was circumstantially corroborated by the coroner’s testimony, by surrounding surveillance video, and by the testimony of defendant’s romantic partner who saw defendant fleeing the scene. Defendant’s conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where it was undisputed that the murder was committed with a firearm, and where defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction for a felony offense of violence giving rise to a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-49 |
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Vandemark v. Reder
| C-250029 | CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — AGENCY — SIGNATURES — CORPORATIONS — CONTRACTS — FRAUD — THEFT — R.C. 2307.60 — UNJUST ENRICHMENT: The trial court did not err in dismissing appellants’ breach-of-contract claim against appellees where appellees’ letter of engagement unambiguously manifested an intent to bind only appellees’ corporate principal, where the corporation was not a party defendant, and where the complaint furnished no basis for holding appellees liable for the corporation’s debts. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claims for fraudulent inducement to contract and civil theft because the complaint alleged that appellees falsely represented to appellants that they intended to perform under the contract, because that false representation reasonably and foreseeably induced appellants to retain appellees’ corporation to appellants’ detriment, and because the legal duties breached in doing so existed independent of and prior to the appellants’ contract with appellees’ corporate principal. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claim for restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because, even though the subject matter was covered by an express contract, appellants alleged that appellees were enriched by means of fraud, illegality, or bad faith. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-50 |
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State v. Walker
| C-250511 | SENTENCING — MULTIPLE SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY SENTENCES: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a 180-day jail term imposed on defendant in the instant misdemeanor case to run consecutively to a 30-month prison term imposed against defendant in a related felony case because the consecutive nature of the misdemeanor sentence was not authorized under R.C. 2929.41(B). | Bock | Hamilton |
1/9/2026
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1/9/2026
| 2026-Ohio-51 |
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Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost
| C-240668 | CIV.R. 12(C) — INJUNCTIONS — SEVERABILITY — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where plaintiffs’ complaint sought to enjoin all provisions enacted or amended by S.B. 23, but where the complaint alleged that only one provision of S.B. 23 was substantively unconstitutional, the trial court did not commit reversible error by addressing the severability of those provisions of S.B. 23 not alleged to be unconstitutional when entering judgment on the pleadings, despite plaintiffs’ failure to substantively address the issue of severability in their initial Civ.R. 12(C) motion. The trial court abused its discretion by enjoining enforcement of provisions whose constitutionality had not been challenged, on the grounds that those provisions were substantively unconstitutional; the trial court should have presumed those provisions’ constitutionality and asked only if they were severable from the challenged provision. | Crouse | Hamilton |
1/7/2026
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1/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-23 |
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State v. Kyambadde
| C-250006 | EVIDENCE — BIAS — EVID.R. 616 — HARMLESS ERROR — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — REASONABLE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE: The trial court’s erroneous exclusion of evidence admissible to prove witnesses’ biases and motivations to lie under Evid.R. 616 was harmless where the jury saw photographic evidence of the victim’s injuries that proved defendant’s parental discipline was unreasonable. | Bock | Hamilton |
1/7/2026
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1/7/2026
| 2026-Ohio-24 |