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Urban Investors Mt. Lookout, L.L.C. v. Williams
| C-250213 | LEASE — OPTION TO PURCHASE — RES JUDICATA — VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: Voluntary dismissal by stipulation of the parties of all claims asserted in a prior action renders any interlocutory summary-judgment orders in that action a nullity and without res judicta effect in a subsequently filed action. | Zayas | Hamilton |
5/22/2026
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5/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1882 |
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Kuyper v. Kuyper
| C-250309 | DIVORCE — CHILD SUPPORT — MODIFICATION — UNCLEAN HANDS — EQUITY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s motion to modify child support where mother sought retroactive credit for in-kind support contributions that were voluntarily made during periods in which the child was supposed to be in father’s care but was not due to mother’s own contemptuous behavior. | Zayas | Hamilton |
5/22/2026
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5/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1885 |
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State v. Umeh
| C-250328 | SEXUAL IMPOSITION — CORROBORATION: The sexual-imposition complaint did not fail to allege an essential element of the offense, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of the complaint, where corroboration is a matter for determination by the trial court and not an element of the offense of sexual imposition. | Zayas | Hamilton |
5/20/2026
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5/20/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1836 |
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State v. Lea
| C-250589 & C-250590 | GUILTY PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C) — FAILURE TO COMPLY — MANDATORY CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE — PREJUDICE: Defendant’s guilty plea to failure to comply was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under Crim.R. 11(C) where the trial court correctly informed him of the maximum prison sentence he faced if the terms for the failure-to-comply charge and the other charges he faced were to be run consecutively but did not inform him the sentence for the failure-to-comply charge was required to be served consecutively to any other prison term imposed upon him, and defendant failed to demonstrate that he would not have otherwise entered the plea. | Zayas | Hamilton |
5/20/2026
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5/20/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1837 |
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State v. Holman
| C-250254 | CRIM.R. 24 — VOIR DIRE — BATSON CHALLENGE — EVID.R. 403 —EVID.R. 1002 — BEST-EVIDENCE RULE — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — SEXUAL IMPOSITION — SEXUAL CONTACT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a new venire after the State provided a brief description of the allegations during its examination of the venire where the parties are permitted to provide an explanation of the circumstances of the offense to determine if prospective jurors have any bias, the State’s explanation of circumstances was limited to uncontested allegations, and nothing in Crim.R. 24(A) limits the parties’ ability to conduct voir dire under Crim.R. 24(B). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant’s challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike of a juror under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the State’s race-neutral explanation was that the prospective juror had been prosecuted for a crime several decades ago and the State believed the prospective juror stated during voir dire that he felt unfairly prosecuted at the time because, even though the record suggested that the juror stated he did not feel that he was unfairly prosecuted, defendant argued during his Batson challenge that the State was mistaken as to what the prospective juror stated and the trial court was in the best position to judge the prosecutor’s credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s objection to defendant’s questioning of a police officer regarding the officer’s knowledge of male victims of sexual abuse or in excluding evidence of defendant’s history of being a sexual-assault victim where defendant offered the testimony to show that he could have an erection without experiencing sexual gratification but the sexual-contact element of sexual imposition does not require proof that a person actually experienced sexual gratification and the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a cell phone recording of surveillance footage, which depicted the events captured in the surveillance footage at double speed, where the cell phone recording was a duplicate under the best-evidence rule and defendant failed to meet his burden to show that it would be unfair under the circumstances to admit the duplicate. Defendant’s conviction for sexual imposition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant admitted in an interview with police that he put his hand in his pants and held his erect penis while pressing himself against the victim’s buttocks, surveillance footage corroborated defendant’s confession, and defendant admitted during the interview that he touched the victim for the purpose of gratification, and his asking officers what “gratification” meant did not render his confession incredible because the officers defined the word in clear terms. | Bock | Hamilton |
5/15/2026
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5/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1793 |
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Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Aud.
| C-250195 | BOARD OF TAX APPEALS — BOARD OF REVISION — VALUATION OF PROPERTY — JURISDICTION — R.C. 5715.19(C) — NOTICE: In an administrative appeal by a property owner challenging the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), the BTA erred in entering its decision concerning valuation of the properties at issue when it failed to find that the Board of Revision (“BOR”) lacked jurisdiction to enter the underlying decisions concerning valuation of the properties where the BOR failed to provide proper notice of its hearings to the property owner under R.C. 5715.19(C). | Zayas | Hamilton |
5/15/2026
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5/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1792 |
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Mitchell v. Conrex Property Mgt., L.L.C.
| C-250330 | LANDLORD-TENANT — R.C. 5321.03 — EVICTION — CIV.R. 56 — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — R.C. 5321.02 — RETALIATORY EVICTION — R.C. 5321.04 — LANDLORD OBLIGATIONS — R.C. 5321.07 — REMEDIES OF TENANT — NOTICE PLEADING — COMMON-LAW CLAIM — NEGLIGENCE PER SE: The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment against plaintiff tenant on her claim for retaliatory eviction where plaintiff was in arrears on rental payments, and therefore, was barred from pursuing that claim under R.C. 5321.04. Where plaintiff tenant asserted that defendant landlord filed its eviction action against her in retaliation for her filing a complaint with the city alleging that defendant failed to meet its obligations under R.C. 5321.04, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment against plaintiff on her retaliatory-eviction claim where the record shows that defendant did not receive notice of the city’s citation until after defendant issued its notice of eviction to plaintiff. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment against plaintiff tenant on her claim that defendant violated its obligations as a landlord under R.C. 5321.04 because, as Ohio is a notice-pleading state, plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged defendant’s statutory violations to preserve a claim for negligence per se, and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant is liable for violations under the statute. | Moore | Hamilton |
5/15/2026
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5/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1794 |
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State v. Lemaine
| C-250633 | IMPROPER DISCHARGE — FELONIOUS ASSAULT — MANIFEST WEIGHT — SUFFICIENCY — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — NOTICE OF ALIBI — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — CLOSING STATEMENTS — SENTENCING — FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS — MERGER — R.C. 2929.14 — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Where the victim’s testimony and reasonable inferences therefrom supported every element of the crimes, the State produced sufficient evidence to support those convictions. Where the victim’s testimony clearly described defendant committing the offense, and where the trial court found the victim to be credible, and where defendant did not introduce the sort of truly compelling evidence necessary for the appellate court to disregard that credibility finding, defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant was not entitled to reversal based on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because they relied upon the existence and weight of evidence not in the record. Although the prosecutor improperly relied upon statements outside the evidence during his closing statement, defendant failed to show that the prosecutor’s comments had deprived him of a fair trial because (1) a trial court sitting without a jury is presumed to consider only appropriate evidence in making its findings of fact, and (2) defendant pointed to nothing to rebut that presumption. Defendant’s firearm-specification sentences were not contrary to law (1) because R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) and State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370, required the trial court to impose sentences for the two firearm-facilitations specifications, which were the two most serious specifications imposed under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a), (2) because the trial court was required to merge and impose a sentence for one of the two vehicle-discharge specifications under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(c), as that specification was not subject to the merger rule articulated in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), and (3) because R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) required that all of defendant’s firearm-specification sentences be served consecutively to his other sentences. | Crouse | Hamilton |
5/13/2026
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5/13/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1741 |
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Foxx v. Condon
| C-250401 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIV.R. 56(C): The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment without reviewing all appropriate materials filed by the parties. | Crouse | Hamilton |
5/8/2026
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5/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1681 |
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Mahoney v. Moskowitz
| C-250228 | ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT — COERCION — OVERREACHING — SEPARATE PROPERTY – TRACING – EQUALIZATION – SPOUSAL SUPPORT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the parties’ antenuptial agreement where the parties could have postponed the wedding to allow wife to review the agreement with an attorney without undergoing significant hardship, embarrassment, or emotional distress and where the agreement was therefore free from coercion or overreaching. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the parties’ antenuptial agreement where husband discussed his financial condition with wife prior to the marriage and attached a list of his approximate assets and liabilities to the agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding bank accounts to be primarily husband’s separate property where husband presented a tracing expert and thousands of pages of financial documents to trace the funds in each account. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding silver bars to be husband’s separate property where the parties agreed that the bars were given as payment to a company in which husband held a separate interest. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying wife’s claim for an equalization payment for funds used to pay the tax liability on companies in which husband held a separate interest where the taxes were in fact paid from husband’s separate property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting a termination date for wife’s spousal support award, given that an award of indefinite spousal support is not required by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). | Kinsley | Hamilton |
5/6/2026
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5/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1638 |
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State v. Gamble
| C-250199 | MANIFEST WEIGHT — CREDIBILITY — AGGRAVATED MENACING — SENTENCING ENTRY: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record does not demonstrate that the trial court lost its way in crediting the testimony of the State’s witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it stated during the sentencing hearing that it was not imposing a fine on defendant and, by placing an “X” on the fine line of the sentencing entry and check marks on the lines for costs and remission of those costs, the court indicated that it had assigned and remitted court costs but had not imposed any fine. | Bock | Hamilton |
5/1/2026
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5/1/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1587 |
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State v. Brown
| C-250375 | SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court did not err in dismissing the charges against defendant for the violation of his right to a speedy trial where the State failed to try him within 90 days and the underlying delay was caused by the State’s repeated failure to provide a 9-1-1 call in discovery. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/29/2026
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4/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1541 |
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State v. Jester
| C-250444 | RESISTING ARREST — FORCE — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — CRIM.R. 12(D) — HEARSAY —LAWFUL ARREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it struck defendant’s motion to suppress as untimely where defendant’s motion was filed one day before trial and was not dependent on discovery disclosed by the State the morning of trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted an officer to testify that defendant had an open arrest warrant based on a computer search, as the testimony was admitted to show the officer’s state of mind, not the truth of the matter asserted. Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant was the subject of an arrest warrant and where defendant pulled away from the officer who attempted to place him under arrest. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/29/2026
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4/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1542 |
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Greenlee v. Fairfax
| C-250284 | APPELLATE JURISDICTION — FINAL ORDERS — CIV.R. 60(B) — CIV.R. 54(B): The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the trial court’s order purporting to deny plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) because the order plaintiff’s motion sought to set aside was not a “final judgment, order or proceeding” subject to Civ.R. 60(B), and the trial court’s denial of that motion was therefore not a final, appealable order. | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/29/2026
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4/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1539 |
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State v. Maley
| C-250353 | PUBLIC INDECENCY — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s conviction for public indecency was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established defendant urinated next to a bus stop on a public roadway with heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic. The defendant was convicted of a fourth-degree misdemeanor but the judge’s sheet erroneously reflects that defendant was convicted of a third-degree misdemeanor, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to correct the error via a nunc pro tunc entry. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/29/2026
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4/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1540 |
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Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones
| C-250521 | DEFAULT JUDGMENT — SERVICE — MOTION TO VACATE — EVIDENTIARY HEARING — CIV.R. 60(B)— REASONABLE TIME: Where defendant filed a motion to vacate a default judgment based on improper service and lack of actual notice, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion—whether based on lack of proper service or under Civ.R. 60(B)—where the motion lacked sufficient evidence to grant the motion and the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to granting the motion. The trial court abused its discretion in granting relief from the default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) where defendant’s motion for relief from the default judgment was filed over 16 months after defendant admittedly became aware of the action and the default judgment and over 18 months after the default judgment was entered and where the defendant did not offer any rationale, either here or below, for why he waited over 16 months after he learned of the action and the default judgment to file his motion. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/24/2026
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4/24/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1482 |
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Drake v. UC Health, L.L.C.
| C-250581 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — WRONGFUL TERMINATION — PUBLIC POLICY — OVERRIDING JUSTIFICATION: The trial court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendant-employer hospital on the plaintiff-employee’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where the employer demonstrated that it terminated the plaintiff for her unauthorized access of a patient’s private health information and the plaintiff failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer’s overriding business justification for the termination. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/24/2026
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4/24/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1483 |
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State v. Mounts
| C-210608 | APP.R. 26(B) — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL — REOPENED APPEAL — EXPERT TESTIMONY — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: In defendant’s jury trial for murder that hinged on expert medical testimony regarding the timing of the infant’s skull fracture, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance (1) by acquiescing to the State’s objection limiting the scope of a defense expert’s testimony and abandoning the expert’s clarification that she had reviewed the original histology slide prepared by the autopsy physician and it had not changed her opinion that the fracture predated the period in which the child was in defendant’s care; (2) by failing to object to the testimony of a State’s expert who had not provided the written report required by Crim.R. 16(K), allowing undisclosed expert opinions to be heard by the jury, including the assertion that the victim’s injuries were the result of intentional child abuse rather than accidental trauma or another unidentified etiology; and (3) by failing to object when the prosecutor asserted, during closing argument, that the State could have called eight additional medical experts who purportedly would have testified that the injuries were recent and caused by child abuse. Because defendant’s appellate counsel in his original appeal provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise on appeal the meritorious issue of defense counsel’s effectiveness at trial, we vacate our prior judgment in this appeal. See App.R. 26(B)(9). | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/22/2026
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4/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1443 |
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Puckett-Morrissette v. Durrani
| C-250067, C-250069, C-250276 | CIV.R. 42 – CIV.R. 50(B) – CIV.R. 59(A) – COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT – CONSOLIDATED TRIALS – EVID.R. 601 – EVID.R. 702 – EXPERT TESTIMONY – FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES – JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL – PREJUDGMENT INTEREST – SETOFF – WAIVER: The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 by joining plaintiffs’ claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, underwent similar surgeries performed by defendant doctor, and presented similar expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. [See CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority’s opinion on this issue but writing separately regarding the proper postjudgment assessment of prejudice from the joinder of trials that reveals no reversible error.] The trial court did not err in admitting testimonial evidence from plaintiffs’ experts as defendants’ challenges concerning whether an expert was qualified to provide testimony under Evid.R. 601 and whether an expert’s testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702 were meritless. Because defendants consented to a resolution of the issue of past medical damages in the trial court, defendants’ appellate arguments regarding past medical damages are waived. The trial court erred by awarding future medical expenses, because the record lacks expert testimony, as to each plaintiff, establishing the anticipated course of future treatment, the likelihood that treatment will be required, and the projected costs associated with that treatment sufficient to sustain the awards of future medical expenses. The trial court erred in denying defendants’ request for a setoff because intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court did not err in awarding plaintiffs prejudgment interest, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs made good faith efforts to settle and defendants failed to make good faith efforts to settle. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/22/2026
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4/22/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1444 |
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State v. Winkle
| C-250381 | ABUSE OF DISCRETION – DEDUCTIBLE – ECONOMIC LOSS – INSURANCE – RESTITUTION – VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: Because the victim impact statement contains competent, credible evidence from which the trial court could determine that victim-appellant suffered an economic loss by paying an insurance deductible and therefore could be entitled to restitution in the amount of the insurance deductible, the cause must be remanded for the trial court to hold a restitution hearing. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/15/2026
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4/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1365 |
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State v. Hauser
| C-250390 | NO-CONTEST PLEA — EXPLANATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES — THEFT — CONSENT: The State’s explanation of circumstances prior to defendant’s no-contest plea stating that defendant went to a bar, provided a credit card to open a tab, was served drinks, left without closing the tab, and her card was later declined, affirmatively negated the without-consent element of defendant’s theft charge under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) as it demonstrated that defendant had the bar owner’s consent to obtain control over the drinks when defendant obtained control over the drinks; the trial court accordingly erred in accepting defendant’s no-contest plea to theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). | Bock | Hamilton |
4/15/2026
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4/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1366 |
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State v. Snow
| C-250335 | DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — REASONABLE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE — R.C. 1.51 — JAIL TIME CREDIT: Defendant’s conviction for domestic violence was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where there was video evidence showing the defendant punching her daughter and the court determined that that act was not reasonable parental discipline. The State could choose to prosecute the defendant for domestic violence and assault rather than endangering children pursuant to R.C. 1.51 because the child endangering statute contains different elements. The trial court erred by failing to award jail time credit where defendant spent one day in jail and the cause must be remanded for the trial court to award defendant proper jail time credit. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/15/2026
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4/15/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1364 |
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In re J.D.
| C-250372 | INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT — PROBATE COURT — EXPUNGEMENT — LAW OF THE CASE: The probate court properly denied appellant’s motion to expunge the records of his involuntary commitment because the involuntary-commitment statute does not authorize the expungement of appellant’s involuntary-commitment records and the court of appeals has already determined that the probate court lacked inherent authority to expunge those records. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/10/2026
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4/10/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1310 |
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In re T.B.
| C-250279, C-250288 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — OHIO CONST., ART. I, § 14 — TERRY — REASONABLE SUSPICION — JAYWALKING — R.C. 2935.26(A) — AUTOMATIC-COMPANION RULE — EVID.R. 901(A) — AUTHENTICATION — CHAIN OF CUSTODY — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS — MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA: The juvenile court did not err in denying juvenile’s motion to suppress the gun found on his person as the fruit of an unreasonable seizure because an officer had observed the juvenile crossing the street illegally and was therefore authorized to perform a limited detention for the purpose of citing juvenile, as contemplated by R.C. 2935.26(A). The juvenile court did not err in denying juvenile’s motion to suppress the gun found on his person as the fruit of an unreasonable search because the officer who stopped juvenile reasonably suspected that juvenile was armed and dangerous based on (1) another officer’s report that juvenile and his companion had bulges consistent with firearms in their waistband areas, and (2) the officer’s own frisk of the companion, which revealed a firearm, thereby corroborating the other officer’s report. The juvenile court did not err in denying juvenile’s motion to exclude the firearm found on his person under Evid.R. 901(A) where body-worn-camera footage and officer testimony provided a rough chain of custody stretching back to the moment the gun was removed from juvenile’s person. Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the firearm taken from juvenile’s person was operable, and that finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court abused its discretion by implicitly denying juvenile’s motion to withdraw his plea of “admit” to the jaywalking charge, where (1) juvenile was presumptively entitled to withdraw his plea because he had made his motion prior to any final order of disposition, (2) the juvenile court had granted juvenile’s contemporaneous motion to withdraw his plea to the concealed-carry charge, and (3) the juvenile court offered no explanation for why the motion to withdraw the plea to the jaywalking charge should be denied or why it should be treated differently than the motion in the concealed-carry case. | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/10/2026
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4/10/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1309 |
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State v. McCrary
| C-250240 | WAIVER — RIGHT TO COUNSEL — SELF-REPRESENTATION — CRIM.R. 44 — SUFFICIENCY – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – PROBABLE CAUSE – DRUG OFFENSES: The trial court erred by failing to perform the necessary colloquy under Crim.R. 44(A) to determine whether defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, where defendant was not apprised of the role of defense counsel, the nature of the charges and the statutory offenses included within them, the range of potential punishments, the possible defenses and mitigating circumstances, and all other essential facts that provide a comprehensive understanding of the whole matter. Defendant’s convictions for trafficking and possession of a controlled substance were supported by sufficient evidence where the State presented evidence demonstrating that defendant both actually and constructively possessed and trafficked in the controlled substances. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress where an officer observed defendant conduct multiple hand-to-hand drug transactions, supplying probable cause for his arrest. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
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4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1263 |
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State v. Smith
| C-250216 | EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — DISORDERLY CONDUCT — RECKLESSNESS: Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct was supported by sufficient evidence where the victim testified that defendant continued to broadcast the victim on social media at a bar after the victim asked defendant to get away and hit defendant’s phone out of her hand, blocked the victim’s mother’s driveway with her car at 2:00 a.m. and refused to move her car, broadcast the victim and the victim’s mother’s house on social media, and approached the victim’s mother after fighting the victim in front of the house. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1262 |
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State v. Jones
| C-250269, C-250270 | EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — PERMITTING DRUG ABUSE — CHILD ENDANGERMENT — CUSTODY OR CONTROL: Defendant’s conviction for permitting drug abuse was supported by sufficient evidence where the State presented evidence that officers located drug scales, baggies, large amounts of cash, firearms, and a small quantity of drugs in defendant’s home. Defendant’s convictions for child endangerment under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a) following an officer’s locating accessible firearms in defendant’s home in which she cohabitated with her boyfriend and her boyfriend’s minor children were based on insufficient evidence where the State failed to present any evidence that defendant had custody or control over her boyfriend’s children or was in loco parentis to the children. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1265 |
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Asbury Woods Senior Apts. v. Render
| C-250297, C-250298 | MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION — HANDWRITING — AUTHENTICATION: The trial court did not err when it failed to rule on defendant’s motion for reconsideration of its judgment overruling defendant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision because a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is a nullity. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he admitted a form transferring responsibility over utility payments to defendant into the evidence despite defendant’s claim that her signature on the form was forged because the magistrate was allowed to compare the allegedly forged signature with defendant’s signature on other documents in the record and could have concluded that allegedly forged signature was defendant’s. The magistrate did not err when he allowed plaintiff-landlord’s damages claim to continue after plaintiff-landlord’s eviction claim was dismissed because there is no indication that defendant-tenant requested a dismissal of the damages claim and because the damages claim was separate from, and independent of, the eviction claim. | Bock | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1266 |
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State v. Unser
| C-250329 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — FOURTH AMENDMENT — LAWFUL SEARCH — VEHICLE — FREE AIR SNIFF — EXPLANATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES — POSSESSING DRUG ABUSE INSTRUMENTS: Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied where the responding police officer did not prolong a traffic stop to perform a free air sniff with his dog and where the dog provided the officer with probable cause to perform a legal search of the defendant’s vehicle. Where defendant pleaded no contest to possessing drug abuse instruments, the trial court did not err in convicting defendant of a misdemeanor of the first degree because the State’s recitation of the facts is not part of the State’s burden of proof and the trial court had adequate knowledge of the defendant’s prior drug charges. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1267 |
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In re B.B.
| C-250428 | R.C. 3109.04(E) — R.C. 2151.42 — LEGAL CUSTODY — CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES: The juvenile court was mistaken when it applied R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), rather than R.C. 2151.42(B), to assess mother’s request to modify the juvenile court’s prior dispositional order, which had awarded legal custody to father pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). The juvenile court reasonably found that mother had failed to prove that changes in circumstances required a modification of its prior dispositional order awarding custody to father. Although the juvenile court applied the wrong statutory standard, its judgment was affirmed, because the standard it should have applied under R.C. 2151.42(B) was more onerous than the standard that trial court found mother had failed to meet under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii). | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1268 |
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State v. Boddy
| C-250250 | NO-CONTEST PLEAS — CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(B) — MOTION TO DISMISS — SECOND AMENDMENT —WITHDRAWAL: The trial court did not err by accepting defendant’s no-contest pleas where defendant expressly tendered his no-contest pleas in a writing, changing his pleas from not guilty to no contest, and did not orally tender his no-contest pleas. Although the trial court did not fully comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)’s requirement to inform defendant of the effect of his no-contest pleas, the court did not completely fail to comply, requiring defendant to establish prejudice, and defendant failed to allege or demonstrate that he would not have entered the pleas, but for the court’s failure to explain the effect of the pleas. Defendant withdrew or abandoned his motion to dismiss the charges for violating his Second Amendment right to bear arms by failing to argue it below, and by withdrawing the motion, defendant waived the issue for appeal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/8/2026
|
4/8/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1264 |
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State v. Whitney
| C-250349 | COMMUNITY CONTROL – NOTICE – PREJUDICE – R.C. 2929.19: Where the trial court failed to provide all statutory warnings under R.C. 2929.19 when imposing a term of community control, and where defendant did not appeal the trial court’s initial imposition of community control, when defendant later violated the terms of community control the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to a sanction it had informed defendant of because defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s failure to provide the rest of the warnings. | Nestor | Hamilton |
4/3/2026
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4/3/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1217 |
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Kuchera v. Pfalzgraf
| C-250453 | R.C. 3109.04 — PARENTING TIME — BEST INTEREST — OBJECTIONS — CONTEMPT — ATTORNEY FEES — GUARDIAN AD LITEM FEES: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting father’s motion to modify parenting time where the record established that the modification was in the best interest of the child. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find father in contempt of court for multiple violations of a shared-parenting plan and court orders where the record supported the trial court’s determinations that father did not withhold parenting time from mother, block mother from contacting the child, fail to provide mother with login information for the child’s devices, or fail to set up a court-ordered wage-deduction order, and that father’s unilateral decision making regarding the child’s care did not rise to the level of contempt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award mother all requested attorney fees where father prevailed on the motion to modify parenting time and on all but one of the alleged violations in mother’s motion for contempt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each parent to pay half of the guardian ad litem’s outstanding fees. | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/3/2026
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4/3/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1218 |
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In re J.L.
| C-250036 | JUVENILE — CUSTODY — NONPARENT — MOOTNESS — EVIDENCE — ABANDONMENT — CIV.R. 60(B) — JUV.R. 13 — R.C. 2151.23(A)(2): A judgment granting legal custody to a nonparent under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) supersedes an interim-custody order entered under Juv.R. 13(A) and renders any subsequent challenge to the interim-custody order moot. An interim-custody order entered under Juv.R. 13(A) does not bar subsequent litigation of a parent’s suitability. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody of father’s daughter to appellee grandmother where the record supports that father abandoned his daughter by having no contact with her for at least an eight-year period because he wanted to avoid confrontation with mother. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when denying father’s motion for relief from the legal-custody judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) without holding a hearing where father failed to allege operative facts warranting relief. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/3/2026
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4/3/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1216 |
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Rialto on Hurstbourne, L.L.C. v. US LBM Operating Co. 3009, L.L.C.
| C-250077 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIV.R. 56 — OHIO PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT — ECONOMIC HARM — BREACH OF CONTRACT — BREACH OF WARRANTY — EXPRESS WARRANTIES — WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY — WARRANTY OF FITNESS — DESIGN DEFECTS — INDEMNITY — ATTORNEY FEES: Because plaintiff-buyer alleged only economic harm in the form of nonphysical property damage, losses in value, cost of replacement, and consequential business harms, its breach-of-warranty claims were not governed by the Ohio Products Liability Act, codified at R.C. 2307.71 through 2307.80.The trial court’s summary judgment for defendant-seller on plaintiff-buyer’s claims for breach of express warranties of merchantability and suitability for intended purpose was improper where plaintiff-buyer’s expert evidence showed that flooring materials delivered by defendant-seller failed to provide noise isolation that came close to the manufacturer’s advertised capabilities and fell below generally-accepted housing-code standards, because a reasonable factfinder could determine that the flooring material had failed to conform to the warranties. The trial court’s summary judgment for defendant-seller on plaintiff-buyer’s claim for breach of an express warranty against defects in design was proper where context indicated that the design-defect warranty covered only defects that rendered the product unsafe, and where plaintiff-buyer had not alleged that the flooring material at issue was not reasonably safe. Defendant-seller was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff-buyer’s breach-of-warranty claims where plaintiff-buyer had introduced evidence that would support a plausible theory of damages, even if plaintiff-buyer did not adequately prove what those damages would be. Plaintiff-buyer would not be entitled to recover attorney fees from defendant-seller under the contract’s indemnification provision, in which defendant-seller promised to indemnify plaintiff-buyer for litigation expenses resulting from a breach of warranty, because it was ambiguous whether the parties intended the indemnification provision to permit recovery of litigation expenses incurred in direct actions between the contracting parties, and ambiguous provisions are to be construed against the party that drafted them—in this case, plaintiff-buyer. | Crouse | Hamilton |
4/1/2026
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4/1/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1179 |
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State v. Wilson
| C-240696 | HEARSAY – PLAIN ERROR – EVID.R. 803(4) – HARMLESS ERROR – COUNSEL – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE – CUMULATIVE ERROR – BRADY – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE – SENTENCING – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The trial court did not err by allowing multiple hearsay statements into evidence where defendant did not object and did not raise plain error on appeal. The trial court erred in admitting a hearsay statement on the basis that the statement was admissible for its effect on the listener where the declarant took no action, but the error was harmless. The trial court did not err in admitting witness testimony offered to explain the investigation because it was nonhearsay, where the testimony was relevant, the testimony was more probative than prejudicial, and the testimony did not connect the defendant to the crime. The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting statements made to a social worker for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment because they were admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). The trial court erred in admitting the therapist’s testimony to bolster the victim’s credibility, but the error was harmless where the victim testified, allowing the jury to ascertain the victim’s credibility. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the therapist’s testimony and the Mayerson Center report because the evidence was admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State’s written timeline and agreeing to admit the transcript of the Mayerson Center interview where both exhibits were demonstrative in nature to aid the jury, the timeline mirrored the indictment, the defendant did not allege any difference between the video and the transcript, and the defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by the evidence. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the victim’s testimony that attending court proceedings was a financial burden where defense counsel used the testimony to undermine the victim’s credibility. Defendant failed to demonstrate that cumulative errors denied him of due process and a fair trial where he failed to establish a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different after viewing the harmless errors cumulatively. The State did not fail to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where the evidence was disclosed during the trial, the evidence was not material to guilt or punishment, and the evidence related to an unsuccessful investigative attempt. Defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the factfinder believed the victim’s testimony. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences where the court failed to make the requisite findings under R.C. 2919.14 (C)(4) prior to imposing consecutive sentences. | Zayas | Hamilton |
4/1/2026
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4/1/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1178 |
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State v. Flannery
| C-250230 | GRAND JURY — TESTIMONY — CRIM.R. 6(E) — DISCLOSURE: Where defendant had a particularized need to establish whether exculpatory evidence was presented to the grand jury, and where the State stipulated it had not presented any exculpatory evidence to that body, defendant’s particularized need was met and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of additional testimony from the grand jury transcript. | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/27/2026
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3/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1076 |
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LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. Evans
| C-250383 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIVIL PLAIN ERROR: Where defendant-debtor failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-creditor, defendant-debtor waived all but plain error on appeal, and the trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision and granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-creditor will be affirmed where defendant-debtor failed to raise a plain-error argument on appeal and plain error is not apparent in the record or the trial court’s decision. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/27/2026
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3/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1078 |
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In re S.H.
| C-250361 | JUVENILE — DELINQUENCY — VENUE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish venue where the testimony of the officer includes mention of two responding police departments, several road names that are all in the same area and connect in some manner, several landmarks, and descriptions of the area that all identify the area in which this incident occurred as Indian Hill, a State’s exhibit identifies the area of the accident on Given Road, which was at Livingston Lodge, as being located in “Cincinnati, Ohio,” the police report attached to the complaint is from the Indian Hill Rangers, the complaint was file stamped in Hamilton County, and the police report was assigned a Hamilton County case number. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/27/2026
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3/27/2026
| 2026-Ohio-1077 |
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State v. Held
| C-250268 | OVI — CHEMICAL TEST — REFUSAL — R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: In an OVI prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to dismiss where officer observation that defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred his speech, was acting strangely, and refused to participate in field sobriety tests supported a finding of probable cause to arrest for OVI. Defendant’s conviction for refusing to take a chemical test under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury considered testimony from the arresting officers that defendant strongly smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred his speech, acted strangely, and refused to participate in field sobriety testing, and could observe footage from an officer’s body-worn camera showing defendant’s actions. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/18/2026
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3/18/2026
| 2026-Ohio-898 |
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GEICO Ins. Co. v. Glendale Body Shop, Inc.
| C-250278 | R.C. 4513.70 — STORAGE FACILITY — TOWING SERVICE — FOR-HIRE MOTOR CARRIER — REASONABLE CHARGES — EVIDENCE: Defendant car repair shop is not a “towing service” under R.C. 4513.70 where the shop was hired to facilitate having the insured’s car towed by a third-party towing company but did not itself carry or transport the insured’s car. Defendant car repair shop is a “storage facility” under R.C. 4513.70 where nothing in R.C. 4513.70 prevents the shop from functioning as both a “storage facility” and a “repair facility” under R.C. Ch. 4513 and where the evidence shows that the shop charged storage fees from the first day that the insured’s vehicle arrived at the shop, included storage fees as a part of the repair costs in the contract for repairs, and accepted vehicles that were “an obvious total loss” from plaintiff insurer on other claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that storage charges for ten days was reasonable under the circumstances where the testimony established that storage is typically not charged until there is a total-loss determination and plaintiff insurer presented evidence that the ten days of storage arises from the date the insured’s vehicle was determined to be a total loss with a “few extra days” covered in the beginning. | Zayas | Hamilton |
3/18/2026
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3/18/2026
| 2026-Ohio-899 |
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State v. Jones
| C-250308 | IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – PLAIN ERROR – RESISTING ARREST – R.C. 1.51 – R.C. 2921.31 – R.C. 2921.33: The trial court did not commit plain error in convicting defendant of obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31, because R.C. 2921.31 is not in irreconcilable conflict with R.C. 2921.33, the resisting arrest statute, and the State had discretion in determining under which statute to charge defendant. | Nestor | Hamilton |
3/13/2026
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3/13/2026
| 2026-Ohio-852 |
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State v. Hurt
| C-250236 | CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLY PREVENTED — NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: Although the trial court, when ruling on defendant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion, improperly considered the merits of defendant’s new-trial motion and whether defendant had delayed seeking leave after discovering the new evidence on which his new-trial motion was based, this did not result in prejudicial error nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave where the court also conducted the proper inquiry and determined that defendant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering his codefendant’s confession within 120-days of the jury’s verdict. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/13/2026
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3/13/2026
| 2026-Ohio-851 |
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Walker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
| C-250451 | MOTION TO DISMISS — CREDIT-CARD APPLICATION — IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD — BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: Plaintiff’s breach-of-implied-contract claim based on defendant bank’s retention of plaintiff’s personal information included in a denied credit-card application was properly dismissed where the processing of a credit-card application does not form a contract and plaintiff pleaded no facts supporting an inference that the bank agreed to enter into contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff’s unjust-enrichment claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff alleged no facts supporting an inference that she conferred a benefit on defendant through the submission of a credit-card application that included her personal information and did not allege that her information had monetary value or that the bank sold the information for a profit. Plaintiff’s conversion claim was properly dismissed where her complaint alleged that defendant came into possession of her property lawfully and did not allege that plaintiff demanded the return of the property and defendant refused to return the property. Plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff’s submission of a credit-card application to defendant bank did not establish a fiduciary relationship between the two. Plaintiff’s constructive-fraud claim was properly dismissed where defendant bank owed no duty to disclose facts to plaintiff as it did not stand in any special relationship that would result in defendant owing plaintiff a duty to disclose. Plaintiff’s challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of her declaratory-judgment claim is overruled where plaintiff failed to comply with App.R. 16 by not citing to any relevant law. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-813 |
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In re S.P.
| C-250641 | PARENTAL TERMINATION — PERMANENT CUSTODY — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD — LEGALLY SECURE PLACEMENT — ABANDONMENT: Where Mother failed to assert in her objection to the magistrate’s decision that the magistrate’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence, and she did not advance a plain-error argument on appeal, she has failed to preserve this argument for appeal. The juvenile court’s decision to commit the children to the permanent custody of the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence demonstrated that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest where the record and testimony showed that the children had been in the agency’s care for approximately 16 consecutive months, and Mother (1) failed to visit the children for nearly three years, (2) refused to sign a release of information so that she could be referred for services, including making a referral so that Mother could continue supervised visits, (3) failed to remedy the concerns regarding her housing, including having working utilities, and (4) failed to verify her income. The juvenile court’s finding that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Mother was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence demonstrated that she did not remedy the issues that initially caused the children to be removed from her care. | Moore | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-815 |
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State v. Barrow
| C-250259 | MOTION TO DISMISS — CHILD ENDANGERMENT — CINCINNATI MUN.CODE 915-3 — R.C. 9.68 — FIREARM: The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motions to dismiss three charges of child endangerment in violation of Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3 where the dismissals were based on the trial court’s erroneous determination that that this provision was preempted by R.C. 9.68. Following this court’s opinion in State v. West, 2024-Ohio-1951 (1st Dist.), the State may continue to charge offenders under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3, and where the charges relate to the offender’s storage of firearms, the trier of fact must decide, based on the individual facts of each case, whether the offender’s storage of the firearm created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child. [But see DISSENT: The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaints where the complaints charged a violation of Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(b), which was nullified in State v. West, 2024-Ohio-1951 (1st Dist.), because it redefined the element of substantial risk to include the negligent storage of firearms.] | Crouse | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-811 |
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State v. Gray
| C-250459 | CRIMINAL DAMAGING — WITHOUT CONSENT — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — CLERICAL ERROR — RESTITUTION: Defendant’s conviction for criminal damaging was supported by sufficient evidence because a rational trier of fact could infer that defendant damaged the victim’s property without the victim’s consent based on tension preceding the damaging, the victim involving the police in the dispute, and the victim’s pursuit of repair estimates. Defendant’s conviction for criminal damaging was not contrary to the weight of the evidence because the trier of fact was entitled to find the victim’s testimony credible despite minor inconsistencies in the victim’s account. The trial court did not commit plain error when it relied on excluded testimony and information from the State to determine restitution because evidentiary rules are inapplicable at sentencing proceedings and the restitution statute allows the trial court to consider information provided by the State. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-814 |
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Ohnstad v. Bruce & Mary Ann Erickson Found.
| C-240714, C-250239 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS — STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — COMMENCEMENT — CAPACITY — WAIVER — TRUST: Defendant trust waived the defense of lack of capacity to be sued by not asserting the defense in its answer and the trial court accordingly erred in granting the trust summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims based on plaintiffs’ failure to perfect service where plaintiffs served the trustee of the trust within the statute-of-limitations period and plaintiffs’ naming the trust rather than the trustee as the defendant did not cause service to be insufficient because the trust waived the defense of lack of capacity. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of their motion for relief from judgment was moot where the appellate court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment from which plaintiffs sought relief. | Bock | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-810 |
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State v. Thompkins
| C-250277 | ABUSE OF DISCRETION – R.C. 2929.28 – RESTITUTION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay $6,341.43 in restitution after a two-day restitution hearing because the testimony and evidence presented by the State supported the award, and the trial court’s decision to deduct some charges, and not others, was within the trial court’s discretion. | Nestor | Hamilton |
3/11/2026
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3/11/2026
| 2026-Ohio-812 |
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State v. Giron
| C-250342, C-250343 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — PROBABLE CAUSE — REASONABLE SUSPICION — CRIM.R. 7(D) — AMENDMENT OF CHARGE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to amend the statutory subsection that formed the basis of its operating a motor vehicle while under the influence charge from R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) as the amendment did not change the name or identity of the crime, nor did it prejudice defendant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, as reasonable suspicion supported the officer’s traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle where the license plate inquiry indicated that the car was not registered to a licensed driver, and the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence where defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and was swaying during his interactions with the officer. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
3/6/2026
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3/6/2026
| 2026-Ohio-753 |
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