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State v. Allison
| C-250425 | JURY WAIVER — CRIM.R. 23 — R.C. 2945.05 — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION — SIXTH AMENDMENT — MENS REA — RECKLESSNESS — MANIFEST WEIGHT — VEHICULAR HOMICIDE — VEHICULAR ASSAULT — AUTOMOBILE/CRIMINAL: Where defendant signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, and where he acknowledged that waiver in open court, and where the record included evidence suggesting defense counsel was present for that acknowledgment, the resulting waiver complied with R.C. 2945.05 and was presumptively valid. Where the record included no evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of defendant’s jury waiver, the appellate court had no reason to doubt that defendant’s waiver was sufficiently knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to waive his rights under Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant’s convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where testimony, photographs, and video showed that defendant had acted recklessly by speeding up to pass other drivers while attempting to merge into a single lane of southbound traffic, driving off the side of the road, and then attempting to force his vehicle back into traffic, thus causing another car to veer into oncoming traffic and leading to the death of its driver and serious injury of its passenger. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/29/2026
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7/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2912 |
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State v. Sawyer
| C-250455 | FOURTH AMENDMENT — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — MARIJUANA — PROBABLE CAUSE: Officer had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle where (1) the defendant had been driving the wrong way on a one-way street, (2) the officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from defendant’s vehicle, and (3) the officer observed a partially-smoked marijuana blunt in an ashtray in the car’s console area. | Crouse | Hamilton |
7/29/2026
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7/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2913 |
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State v. Davis
| C-250514 | GUILTY PLEA — CRIM.R. 11(C) — TRAFFICKING — MANDATORY PRISON TERM — PREJUDICE — JOINTLY-RECOMMENDED SENTENCE — COURT COSTS: Defendant’s guilty plea to trafficking with a major-drug-offender specification was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under Crim.R. 11(C) where the trial court gave him ample time to consider the plea, advised him that he was waiving his right to confront the witnesses against him in a reasonably intelligible manner, and correctly informed him of the maximum prison sentence he faced but did not inform him the sentence was mandatory, and defendant failed to demonstrate that he would not have otherwise entered the plea. Defendant’s sentence is not subject to review under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) because the trial court imposed the jointly-recommended sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing court costs where R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) required the court to impose costs, and defendant did not request the costs to be remitted or object to the imposition of court costs. | Zayas | Hamilton |
7/29/2026
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7/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2914 |
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State v. Lenzer
| C-250517 | RAPE — R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) — FORCE — CHILD — SUFFICIENCY— MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s convictions for rape of his 17-year-old stepdaughter were supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury watched the victim’s recording of the assault, and the victim and the victim’s mother identified defendant as the assailant in the video. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/29/2026
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7/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2915 |
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State ex rel. Jackson v. Sycamore Community City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
| C-250578 | OPEN MEETINGS ACT — EXECUTIVE-SESSION PRIVILEGE — ATTORNEY-CLENT PRIVILEGE: Because the trial court declined to decide the question of whether an executive-session privilege exists under Ohio law, the question is not ripe for appellate review. [See CONCURRENCE: Where the trial court bypassed the question of whether an executive-session privilege exists under R.C. 121.22(G) and 102.03(B) and instead held that R.C. 121.22(H) invalidated any claim of executive-session privilege for purposes of discovery, even assuming such privilege exists, the question of whether R.C. 121.22(H) invalidated any claim of executive-session privilege for discovery purposes is ripe for appellate review and defendant school board failed to show that the trial court erred in making this finding where it failed to challenge the trial court’s finding that the record indicates a potential violation of R.C. 121.22.] Where defendant school board failed to establish that the attorney-client privilege applied, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a protective order. | Moore | Hamilton |
7/29/2026
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7/29/2026
| 2026-Ohio-2916 |
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