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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Goldwin
| 113341 | Crim.R. 11; guilty plea; voluntarily made; Dangler; coercion; mental health; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. Defendant contends that his plea was not voluntary because he was “tricked” or “persuaded” into pleading guilty. Crim.R. 11 does not contain an explicit requirement that the trial court determine that a plea was voluntary. Here, while the trial court did not explicitly ask the defendant at his second plea hearing whether any threats or promises had been made in exchange for his plea did amount to a violation of Crim.R. 11, the questions in the Dangler analysis illustrate that the defendant’s plea was voluntary because the trial court did not completely fail to comply with the rule so as to excuse him from demonstrating prejudice. Moreover, common sense dictates that when reviewing the first guilty plea hearing in conjunction with the second hearing, the defendant was not “tricked” or “persuaded” into pleading guilty. Indeed, there is nothing in the record indicating that the defendant would not have entered his plea had the trial court explicitly asked whether any threats or promises had been made. We decline to find defense counsel ineffective because defendant’s assertion that he was “tricked” and “coerced” into pleading guilty are speculative and are not substantiated in the record. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4487 |
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Wood v. MAK Invest. Properties, L.L.C.
| 113228 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); negligence; duty; workmanlike manner; contract; tort; privity. Judgment affirmed. Appellants’ negligence cause of action fails because the evidence shows that appellee’s duty arose from a contract, not from the common-law duty of workmanlike manner. When the duty allegedly breached by a defendant arises out of contract, the cause of action is one of contract, not tort. Further, that duty did not extend to the appellants because there is no privity of contract. Therefore, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4485 |
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In re S.H.
| 113775; 113776; 113849 | Termination of parental rights; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.413; R.C 2151.414; R.C. 2151.353; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; hearsay: Evid.R. 801; Evid.R. 803; statements for medical treatment and diagnosis; due process. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court’s findings regarding the best interests of the children were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. The record demonstrates that the agency made “reasonable efforts” to return the children to the parents. The trial court did not err in permitting alleged hearsay evidence because the evidence fit into either an exclusion to hearsay or was duplicative of admissible evidence during trial. We also summarily overrule the parents constitutional due process challenges that were not raised in the trial court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4495 |
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State v. Colon
| 113468 | Manifest weight; Gross sexual imposition ("GSI"); sexual contact; ineffective assistance of counsel; deficient performance; prejudice. Defendant’s GSI convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though the victim confused the exact date of the assaults because her testimony was otherwise credible. Defendant failed to establish that the exclusion of a Facebook post from evidence at trial resulting from counsel’s failure to properly introduce the evidence for impeachment purposes prejudiced the defense where the information contained in the post was otherwise provided through witness testimony. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4488 |
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State v. Spivey
| 113559 | Mistrial; juror misconduct; deadlocked; double jeopardy; manifest necessity; racial bias; motion to dismiss. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy grounds. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the jury had not reached a verdict as to Counts 1-4, 7, and 8. The jury took a preliminary vote on the ten counts but did not sign verdict forms. The trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial due to manifest necessity was not an abuse of discretion based on the totality of the circumstances because the court had already excused three jurors and a fourth juror had asked to be excused; the jury twice told the court it was deadlocked, and two jurors felt that the jury was impermissibly influenced by another juror’s alleged racial bias. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4492 |
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In re G.T.
| 113519 | App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7); failure to argue each assignment of error separately. - Juvenile court’s judgment granting Appellee-Mother’s motion for custody of the parties’ minor child and denying Appellant-Father’s motion for immediate return of the child summarily affirmed where Father’s brief failed to comply with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure because it did not argue each assignment of error separately as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4489 |
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Nelson v. Testa
| 113280 | Divorce; stipulation to submit disputed issues to court on briefs; magistrate’s decision; objections to magistrate’s decision; failure to file transcript or affidavit of evidence; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii); App.R. 9(B). In this divorce case, the parties agreed to submit contested issues to the court via briefs. The magistrate issued a decision, and both parties filed objections. The parties failed to comply with Civ.R. 53 and Cuyahoga C.P., D.R.Div., Loc.R. 27, which requires a party filing objections to a magistrate’s decision to also file a transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate or, if the transcript is unavailable, an affidavit of evidence. The domestic relations court adopted the magistrate’s decision in its entirety. Husband appealed and failed to comply with App.R. 9, which requires a party appealing to file a transcript of the proceedings at issue or, if the transcript is unavailable, an affidavit of evidence. This court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s factual findings without a transcript or an affidavit of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4486 |
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State v. Christian
| 113580 | Public Records Act; R.C. 149.43; justiciable claim; abuse of discretion; parole hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an inmate’s public records request pursuant to R.C. 149.43 where the inmate had not established that the records were necessary to support a justiciable claim. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4493 |
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State v. D.T.
| 112955 | Competency; R.C. 2152.58; discretionary transfer; R.C. 2152.12; waiver of appealable errors by guilty plea; amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system; abuse of discretion; meaningful review. Juvenile court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing and to issue a written determination regarding juvenile’s competency as required under R.C. 2152.58. There was insufficient information in the record regarding the juvenile court’s reasoning when ordering juvenile to be bound over to adult court for appellate court to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that juvenile was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. Because the juvenile court (1) did not identify all of the factors it considered, (2) did not identify or discuss the factual or evidentiary basis for its determination that particular factors did or did not apply, and (3) did not explain its weighing of those factors, appellate court could not determine to what extent juvenile court’s decision may have been based on erroneous facts and could not properly assess whether the juvenile court’s decision was the product of a sound reasoning process or an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable one. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4482 |
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State v. Williams
| 113520 | Crim.R. 29; sufficient evidence; direct; indirect and circumstantial evidence. The State showed sufficient evidence through witness testimony and surveillance video that appellant committed the crimes with which he was charged. Appellant, who wore an all-red outfit, was identified in the store surveillance video by a detective and his parole officer, who provided a previous picture of appellant wearing the same all-red outfit and standing in front of the same make, model, and color of car the shooter in the robbery fled in. Testimony about appellant’s prior conviction was proper. The certified journal entry of conviction was admitted through the detective’s testimony, and appellant chose to have the having weapons while under disability charge tried to the jury, rather than the bench. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4490 |
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In re S.N.A.-K.
| 113677 | Modification of legal custody; R.C. 3109.04; best interest of the child; App.R. 16(A)(7). Appellant-Mother failed to establish a change in circumstances that would warrant granting a modification of legal custody. Additionally, appellant, acting pro se, failed to construct an argument in support of her contention that the guardian ad litem ("GAL") violated his duties. The court of appeals will not construct an appellant’s arguments for them. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4494 |
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In re A.I.H.
| 112999; 113000; 113110 | Denial of continuance; abuse of discretion; Unger factors; expert witness testimony; qualifications; Evid.R. 702; modification of custody; R.C. 3109.04; change in circumstances; writ of habeas corpus; R.C. 2151.23; unlawfully detained; superior right to custody; adequate remedy at law; GAL fees; jurisdiction during pending appeal. The trial court’s order modifying custody based on a change in circumstances was affirmed where the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to continue, (2) did not err in allowing the expert witness testimony and admission of an expert report, (3) did not err in granting a motion to modify custody based on a change in circumstances established by the evidence presented at trial, and (4) did not err in awarding GAL fees while an appeal was pending. However, the trial court erred in granting a writ of habeas corpus where an adequate remedy at law existed. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4483 |
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Cleveland v. Clark
| 113546 | Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; suppression hearing; driving while under the influence; OVI; failure to stop at a stop sign. The trial court did not err in denying defendant-appellant’s motion to suppress where, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff-appellee presented competent, credible evidence at the motion to suppress hearing showing probable cause existed to arrest the defendant-appellant for driving under the influence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, the defendant-appellant’s convictions were based upon sufficient evidence. Further, weighing all the evidence, we cannot say this is a rare case where the trier of fact lost its way; the defendant-appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4491 |
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State v. Fisher
| 113205 | Aggravated murder; R.C. 2903.01(A); murder; R.C. 2903.02(A); felonious assault; R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); improperly discharging into habitation; R.C. 2923.161(A)(1); improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle; R.C. 2923.16(A); involuntary manslaughter; R.C. 2903.04(A); having weapons while under disability; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; double jeopardy; allied offenses; merger; firearm specifications; rule of lenity; R.C. 2901.04(A). The defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, improperly discharging into habitation and having weapons while under disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A coconspirator testified that the defendant shot the victim to death after growing concerned that the victim, who had planned a robbery with the conspirators, was trying to “set them up.” While there was no forensic evidence directly tying the defendant to the murder or to a drive-by shooting that occurred immediately after the murder, the coconspirator’s testimony was largely corroborated through cellphone location data and the testimony of a second coconspirator. Considering the complicity statute, the convictions stemming from the drive-by shooting were also not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the defendant’s actions before, during and after the shooting suggest that he was not a mere bystander but rather complicit in those offenses. It does not violate double jeopardy to impose a prison term for a firearm specification consecutive to a prison term on the underlying offense. The offenses of felonious assault (for the drive-by shooting) and having weapons while under disability were not allied offenses of similar import with any of the other offenses in the matter. The rule of lenity does not allow this court to overrule binding Supreme Court precedent on the interpretation of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g); under that precedent, firearm specifications survive merger under the specific circumstances enumerated in that statute. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4484 |
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State v. Lucas
| 113861 | Conceded error; Loc.App.R. 16(B); Crim.R. 11; plea colloquy; knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; repeat violent offender specification; R.C. 2929.14; R.C. 2941.149(A); abuse of discretion; maximum potential penalty. Appellant’s plea is vacated where the trial court’s failure to advise of the maximum potential penalty appellant faced was a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and therefore not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/12/2024
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9/12/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4496 |
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State v. Nashe
| 112947 | Reversible error; mistrial; improper jury communication; mandatory hearing; voir dire; allied offenses; dissimilar import; separate victims; consecutive sentences; statutory findings; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); limited remand; judgment vacated. The jury during its deliberation was approached by the defendant’s family member who communicated with a juror in front of four other jurors. The trial court properly held a hearing and conducted voir dire with the jurors. The jurors stated they were able to be fair and impartial and that this incident would not affect their judgment. As such, it was not reversible error to deny defendant’s motion for a mistrial because there was no evidence defendant was prejudiced by the communication. The trial court properly found that the felonious assault charges and the improper discharge of a firearm over a public roadway were offenses of dissimilar import since they have different victims and therefore they did not merge for sentencing. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence as there was clearly substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Last, the trial court failed to make the requisite statutory findings to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive sentences. The case is limitedly remanded for the trial court to make the required statutory findings to support the consecutive sentences. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3400 |
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In re J.F.
| 113822 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; two-prong test; clear and convincing evidence. The Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) presented clear and convincing evidence to establish both prongs of the two-part test enumerated in the permanent custody statute. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted CCDCFS’s motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3407 |
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State v. Drake
| 113708 | Motion to vacate postrelease control; reversal and remand; case reinstated at point in which error occurred; original sentence; statutorily mandated postrelease control; delay; prejudice; laches is not imputable to the government; court has inherent right to control docket and trial schedule. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to vacate postrelease control. The term of postrelease control was mandated by statute, and the trial court lacked authority to alter or to eliminate it. Further, appellant was not prejudiced by any delay in adjudicating his case following remand by this court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3406 |
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State v. Stitt
| 113286 | Felonious assault; plea; Crim.R. 11; claim of innocence; appellate record; factual guilt; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. Defendant’s direct appeal was an improper vehicle for attempting to withdraw his guilty plea or argue his competence because the facts and documents defendant relied on were never made part of the trial court record or afforded consideration by the trial court first through a postsentence or postconviction motion. Additionally, the record as it is before this court did not support that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3401 |
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Gallagher v. Cochran
| 113554 | Motion to strike jury demand; equitable relief; specific performance; statute of frauds; R.C. 1335.05; oral contract for employment; equity stake; dismiss; Civ.R. 41(B)(2); manifest weight of the evidence; competent, credible evidence; formation of contract; offer; acceptance; meeting of the minds; successor liability; mere continuation of seller corporation. The trial court did not err in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s claims pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) or in striking appellant’s jury demand and limiting his remedy to specific performance. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3403 |
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In re H.G.
| 113872 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.414(A)(2); Juv.R. 4(A); continuance; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); clear and convincing; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court’s decisions granting permanent custody of two children to the agency and terminating father’s parental rights. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance of the permanent-custody hearing. The court did not err with regard to its reasonable-efforts findings. The court’s best-interest findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the court’s permanent-custody decisions, and the court’s decisions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3408 |
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State v. Vega-Medina
| 113320 | Manifest weight; kidnapping; abduction; force; threat of force; ineffective assistance of counsel; violent-offender designation; sentence; R.C. 2929.11; findings; contrary to law. Defendant’s kidnapping and abduction convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where competent, credible evidence showed that defendant’s conduct paralyzed the victim with fear and rendered her incapable of escape. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not impeach the victim on two inconsistencies between her statements to police and her trial testimony because the inconsistencies involved were minor and did not involve facts material to the defendant’s conduct and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the defendant’s convictions. The trial court failed to properly designate the defendant as a violent offender because the court failed to comply with the procedure outlined in the violent-offender statute and it was not clear whether the defendant understood his violent-offender duties. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3409 |
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T.K. v. D.R.
| 113402 | Civ.R. 53; failure to file objection to magistrate’s decision; extension; Civ.R. 53(D)(5); Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c); “good cause”; error of law or apparent defect; plain error. Where defendant-appellant failed to object to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days; failed to demonstrate “good cause” under Civ.R. 53(D)(5); and failed to show there was an error of law or apparent defect related to the magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c), the reviewing court was to consider the matter under the plain-error doctrine. The trial court’s miscalculation of the award for dental expenses constituted plain error; the trial court’s order on that specific award is reversed and the case remanded. The defendant-appellant’s remaining assignments of error did not demonstrate plain error by the trial court and, therefore, we affirm the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision on the remaining assignments of error. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3402 |
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State v. Redmond
| 113556 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; abuse of discretion; ineffective assistance of counsel; effective cross-examination; trial preparation; right to testify. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. The petitioner failed to present credible evidence outside the record establishing a triable issue of fact as to whether his trial counsel was deficient and whether any deficiency prejudiced him. The trial court found that the self-serving affidavits submitted by the petitioner and the petitioner’s mother were not credible, and this finding was within the trial court’s discretion. Judgment affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3404 |
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In re S.P.
| 113647; 113993 | Conceded error; in camera review; confidential records. Judgment vacated and remanded. The trial court erred in ordering the disclosure of statutorily confidential information without first conducting an in camera review of the records, as is required by this court’s precedent. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
9/5/2024
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9/5/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3405 |
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Tabbaa v. Nouraldin
| 113091 | Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; breach of contract; de novo; illegal contract. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff-appellant’s breach-of-contract claim. Our independent review of the record reveals that the purported oral contract was illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law and plaintiff-appellant failed to set forth sufficient evidence to establish the elements of his breach of written-contract claim. Accordingly, there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact and summary judgment was properly granted. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3296 |
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EduCare Med. Staffing, L.L.P. v. Stabler
| 112877 | Settlement agreement, subject-matter jurisdiction. Trial court’s ruling on motion to enforce settlement agreement must be vacated where the trial court failed to retain jurisdiction to do so in its journal entry. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3295 |
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In re K.S.
| 113829 | Parental rights; permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; R.C. 2151.414(E) factors; best interest of the child; motion for continuance. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applied and that it was in the best interests of the children to grant permanent custody to the agency. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s motion for continuance of trial. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3312 |
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Cleveland v. Johns
| 113329 | Endangering children; weight of the evidence; witness credibility; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. The defendant’s endangering conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It was not incredible that the jury believed the sole eyewitness’s account of the incident. The eyewitness was a neutral person who had no incentive to fabricate the incident. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that the result of the trial would have been different had counsel obtained the defendant’s medical records. Counsel questioned the witnesses about the defendant’s alleged shoulder injury and argued to the jury, in part, that based on the alleged shoulder injury, the defendant could not have committed the act. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3301 |
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State v. Reillo
| 113531 | Weight of the evidence, rape, gross sexual imposition. Reversed and remanded. The defendant’s convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition are against the weight of the evidence, and in this exceptional case, the convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3307 |
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In re J.S.
| 113758 | Adjudication; disposition; bifurcation; Juv.R. 34(A); R.C. 2151.35(B)(1); permanent custody; best interests of child; CCDCFS; R.C. 2151.414; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The record is clear that there was a definite bifurcation of the proceedings, as well as consent by Mother to hold the hearings on the same day. Mother was aware, prior to the hearing, of the court’s intent to address both adjudication and disposition on the same day and chose not to attend the hearings. Additionally, Mother was given an opportunity to present witnesses and any other evidence regarding disposition. While sufficiency and manifest weight are distinct legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evidence supports the judgment. Here, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, the court’s decision to grant permanent custody is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3310 |
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State v. Bates
| 113620 | Postsentence motion to withdraw guilty pleas; Crim.R. 32.1; manifest injustice; abuse of discretion; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to investigate; motion to suppress; postrelease control; void/voidable sentence; knowing, intelligent, voluntary guilty pleas. Defendant’s claims were insufficient to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel that rendered his guilty pleas unknowing, unintelligent or involuntary. Defendant did not set forth facts in his motion and supporting affidavit that, if true, would have demonstrated a manifest injustice and required the trial court to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to predict the Ohio Supreme Court’s rulings in State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, State v. Hudson, 2020-Ohio-3849, and State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, and file a motion to suppress evidence from a “warrantless search” on that basis. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Bates’ postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without an evidentiary hearing. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3309 |
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State v. Bergstresser
| 113269 | Death pending appeal; motion to substitute; App.R. 29(A); State v. McGettrick; theft; sufficiency of the evidence; restitution; hearing; R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); merger; postrelease control. Where a criminal defendant dies during the pendency of their direct appeal, App.R. 29(A) provides that a party may file a motion to substitute. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. The trial court was required to hold a restitution hearing where trial counsel objected to the amount of restitution ordered at sentencing. It was not plain error to decline to merge appellant’s offenses. A challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly advise the appellant as to postrelease control was mooted by the appellant’s death. | Kiilbane | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3299 |
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State v. Kohler
| 113394 | Evid.R. 404(B); other-acts evidence; admissibility; intrinsic evidence; background information; explains the circumstances; context; common scheme or plan evidence; sexual battery; R.C. 2907.03(A)(11); Tier III sex offender; R.C. 2950.01; R.C. 2950.01(B)(2) exceptions; lack of consent; custodial authority. Evidence that explained the circumstances or background of the events leading to the charged offenses and provided context for the relationships of the parties involved was not subject to Evid.R. 404(B) and was properly admitted by the trial court. Even assuming the disputed evidence was subject to Evid.R. 404(B), the other-acts evidence was admissible as common scheme or plan evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. The jury found defendant-appellant, who was working as a corrections officer at all relevant times, engaged in sexual conduct with two inmates at the correctional facility where he worked and, therefore, rendered a verdict that he was guilty of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(11). Based upon the established authoritarian relationship between defendant-appellant as a corrections officer and the victims — his inmates — the jury’s guilty verdict impliedly determined that the sexual conduct occurred without the victims’ consent. Thus, it was not plain error for the trial court to designate defendant-appellant as a Tier III sex offender under R.C. 2950.01. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3302 |
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Thomas v. Salahaldin
| 113234 | Pro se litigants; municipal court; failure to file transcript of proceedings before a magistrate; Civ.R. 53(D); Civ.R. 4; service; failure to grant continuance; recusal of magistrate. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3298 |
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In re JF
| 113778 | Permanent custody; R.C. 2929.414(E); manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of a minor child to a Children and Family Services Agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court’s finding that the minor child could not be placed with mother within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with mother, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E) was based on clear and convincing evidence that the Agency engaged in reasonable case planning and diligent efforts and mother failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the minor child’s removal. Further, mother had chronic mental illness and chemical dependency that was so severe that it made her unable to provide an adequate permanent home. Mother also neglected the minor child from the date of the original complaint to the dispositional hearing, and mother had parental rights terminated involuntarily with respect to a sibling of the minor child. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B), the finding that permanent custody was in the child’s best interests was supported by evidence that mother had a lengthy history of ongoing, unaddressed problems with substance abuse and mental health, did not engage with the case plan implemented, and had another child removed from her care in the past for similar reasons. Mother did not show she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She could not show that the decision to stipulate to an amended complaint at the adjudicatory hearing was anything more than a tactical decision or that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had she not stipulated. Further, mother did not show that had counsel requested a continuance of the adjudicatory or dispositional hearing, the continuance would have been granted or that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3311 |
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Ferrell v. Cole
| 113435 | Magistrate’s decision; objections; failure to file transcript; Civ.R. 53; plain error; waiver. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to file a transcript with her objections to the factual findings in the magistrate’s decision granting appellee’s eviction action. If a party fails to follow the procedures set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) for objecting to a magistrate’s findings by failing to provide a transcript to the trial court when filing objections, that party waives any appeal as to those findings other than claims of plain error. Appellant failed to argue and demonstrate that this is an “extremely rare case” in which exceptional circumstances exist warranting application of the plain error doctrine in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3305 |
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State v. Long
| 113406 | Sentence contrary to law; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law because the sentence does not fall outside the statutory range for the offense and the sentencing court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3303 |
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Cleveland v. Congeni
| 113418 | Final appealable order; jurisdiction. The appealed judgment entry does not indicate any ruling on the defendant-appellant’s motion to modify probation to permit the use of medical marijuana, nor does it contain any ruling as to any probation violation. While the transcript reflects the trial court’s opinion as to the substantive question of whether medical marijuana use can amount to a probation violation, this is insufficient to create a final appealable order. Since the defendant-appellant’s motion to modify probation technically remains pending and the record reflects only that the court will presumably find a violation of the terms of her community control if she continues to test positive, there is no final, appealable order. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to address the appeal as the record now stands. Therefore, we dismiss the case for lack of final, appealable order. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3304 |
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State v. Jones
| 113598 | Confrontation Clause; Sixth Amendment; defendant’s right to be present; plea agreement; Crim.R. 11; joint sentencing recommendation; court discretion; court not obligated to follow sentencing recommendation; defendant on notice; due process; knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea; consecutive sentences; findings; R.C. 2953.08; clearly and convincingly; record supports consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); statements during hearing viewed in their entirety; findings can be found in record. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by his absence at his codefendant’s sentencing. In addition, the trial court did not err in imposing a sentence greater than the jointly recommended sentence. Further, the trial court made the requisite findings during the sentencing hearing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and the findings are clearly and convincingly supported by the record. The imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3308 |
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M.F. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Div. of Children & Families
| 113521 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; administrative appeals; R.C. 2506.01(A) and (C); child services agency; substantiated neglect. A child services agency’s determination of substantiated neglect against the plaintiff is not a final decision under R.C. 2506.01 because it does not determine a person’s “rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships.” See Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs., 2024-Ohio-2898. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3306 |
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WBL SPO I, L.L.C. v. D-V.I.P. Properties & Mgt. Group, L.L.C.
| 113305 | Foreclosure; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); plain error. Trial court did not commit plain error in denying appellants’ motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3) or (5) based on appellants’ alleged mistake in the “identity of the lender” and appellee’s alleged forgery of, or misrepresentations in, the mortgage acknowledgment and the “accounting” appellee submitted to the trial court. Appellants admitted in their answer that they executed the note at issue, the error in the mortgage acknowledgment was evident from the face of the document, and the “accounting” about which appellants complained was submitted by appellants, not appellee. Appellants failed to oppose appellee’s motion for summary judgment on its foreclosure complaint, failed to file objections to magistrate’s decision on summary judgment, failed to appeal the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment and ordering foreclosure, and failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision denying appellants’ motion for relief from judgment. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3300 |
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W.A.F.P., Inc. v. Sky Fuel, Inc.
| 113232 | Sua sponte dismissal for want of prosecution; Civ.R. 41(B)(1); sua sponte journal entry vacating dismissal; continuing jurisdiction; default judgment; Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment. The municipal court did not err by sua sponte dismissing a case for want of prosecution, sua sponte vacating its own dismissal, and granting default judgment. On remand the court is instructed to consider and rule on defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/29/2024
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8/29/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3297 |
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State v. Holloway
| 113296 | Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity; grand theft; conspiracy; liquor; corporation status; indictment; venue; allied offenses. Appellant’s convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, conspiracy, grand theft; and theft upheld where the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that appellant actively participated in large-scale liquor thefts from Giant Eagle stores. The failure to include corporation status in an indictment did not render it defective. Venue proper in Cuyahoga County because appellant’s conduct either occurred in or constituted a significant nexus to Cuyahoga County. Appellant’s conviction for grand theft was an aggregate of all individual theft offenses, thus were allied and should have merged at sentencing. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3189 |
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Kerkay v. Kerkay
| 112855 | Divorce; de facto termination date; statutory presumption for date of last hearing; R.C. 3105.171; equitable division of marital property and assets; 3105.17(F); spousal-support award; 3105.18(C)(1) factors (a)-(n); not an abuse of discretion; award of attorney fees; R.C. 3105.73(A). Husband appeals from the trial court’s journal entry granting him a divorce from Wife. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Husband could not overcome the statutory presumption that the termination date for their marriage as the date of the last hearing. A review of the record showed that the trial court divided the parties’ assets and real property equally and the decision was supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court’s award of spousal support was based on testimony and evidence and was within the trial court’s sound discretion. Last the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney fees was also within the trial court's discretion. There is certainly enough information in the record for the trial court to justifiably award $3,000 a month for spousal support to Wife. The award was well within the trial court’s sound discretion. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3185 |
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Fig v. Lynch
| 113584 | Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment; foreclosure; objections to magistrate’s decision; meritorious defense. In foreclosure action, trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision denying the plaintiff’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and overruling defendant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision where the defendant failed to demonstrate she had a meritorious defense if the Civ.R. 60(B) motion was granted and that she was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3196 |
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State v. Richard
| 113528 | Plea; defective indictment; waived; consecutive-sentence findings; incorporate; nunc pro tunc; Reagan Tokes Law. - Appellant’s plea and convictions upheld when appellant did not object to any alleged deficiency in the indictment. Trial court’s failure to incorporate consecutive-sentence findings in the judgment entry does not render appellant’s sentence contrary to law; rather, it can be corrected nunc pro tunc. Appellant’s challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law summarily rejected. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3194 |
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In re KY.D.
| 113615 | Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; R.C. 2151.413; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.414; clear and convincing evidence; cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; best interests of the children; competent, credible evidence; reasonable efforts to reunite family; R.C. 2151.419; due process. The juvenile court’s findings related to the best interests of the children were supported by competent, credible evidence, and the factors weighed in favor of permanent custody. The court was not required to make a “reasonable efforts” finding in its permanent custody order; however, the record demonstrates that the agency did, in fact, make reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother’s home. Finally, Mother did not demonstrate that her due process rights were violated by the juvenile court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3198 |
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State v. U.T.
| 113612, 113613, 113614 | R.C. 2953.32(A)(5); expungement; sealing the records of conviction. The trial court’s judgment sealing the records of the applicant’s three drug-trafficking convictions is reversed. The applicant’s convictions are not eligible to be sealed because the April 2023 version of R.C. 2953.32(A)(5) prevents the expungement or sealing of more than two third-degree felony convictions. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3197 |
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Parma v. Coyne
| 113407 | Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; investigatory stop; “fruit of the poisonous tree”; reasonable suspicion; reliable tip; totality of the circumstances; manifest weight. Judgment affirmed. A 9-1-1 caller’s reliable tip that the defendant was belligerent, drunk, and threatening to be physically violent provided a sufficient basis to develop reasonable suspicion justifying the investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle. The evidence obtained after the stop, including the arresting officer’s observations of the defendant’s intoxication, the defendant’s own admissions that he was drinking and should not be driving, and subsequent field sobriety tests, substantiated the reasonable suspicion arising from the 9-1-1 call, leading to the defendant’s OVI arrest. Because reasonable suspicion justified the investigatory stop, the evidence gathered thereafter is not “fruit of the poisonous tree” requiring suppression. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
8/22/2024
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8/22/2024
| 2024-Ohio-3192 |
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