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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. Smothers
| C-230663 | MURDER — GROSS ABUSE OF A CORPSE — TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — SEARCH WARRANT — PROBABLE CAUSE — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — POST-ARREST SILENCE — IMPEACHMENT — EVID.R. 403 ¬— SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — DUE PROCESS — BRADY V. MARYLAND — EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE — POTENTIALLY-USEFUL EVIDENCE — ADVERSE-INFERENCE INSTRUCTION — JUROR MISCONDUCT: The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence where the seizure of defendant’s car in Grant County, Kentucky, and the subsequent search of the car at the Sharonville Police Department was pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and not the alleged defective warrant that police obtained to search the car. The prosecutor’s alleged improper comments at trial did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct where the comments were either made to refute defendant’s testimony or based on evidence submitted at trial and where defendant failed to show, in light of other evidence of guilt presented at trial, that defendant would not have been found guilty of the charged offenses but for the prosecutor’s comments. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting photographs of the decedent’s autopsy where each photograph was relevant to illustrate the coroner’s testimony about the condition of the decedent’s body and the cause of death and the photographs were not repetitive as multiple photographs of the same area of the body showed different injuries to those areas. Defendant’s convictions for murder, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence were supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where (1) decedent’s cell phone and towels soiled with decedent’s blood were found in defendant’s car, (2) defendant’s DNA was under decedent’s fingernails and defendant had fresh scratches on his face, (3) shoe prints in the snow near decedent’s body matched defendant’s boots, and (4) “drag marks” and a blood trail in the snow led from defendant’s trailer home to where decedent’s body was found. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based on the State’s failure to preserve the sexual-assault kit or disclose its destruction where the kit did not contain materially exculpatory evidence and was not destroyed in bad faith: there was no allegation that the decedent had been sexually assaulted, any possibility that test results might have revealed another person’s DNA on the decedent’s body was purely speculative given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial, and the coroner testified that the kit had been destroyed due to storage constraints at the coroner’s new facility and because there had been no allegation of sexual assault. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant’s proposed adverse-inference jury instruction regarding the State’s destruction and non-testing of the sexual-assault kit where the record reflects that the coroner’s destruction of the kit was not due to malfeasance or gross neglect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant’s motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct where the court based its decision on each juror’s testimony that his or her findings were based on the evidence presented at trial, not the juror’s alleged experiment. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5250 |
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State v. Barker
| C-240408 | POSTCONVICTION PETITION — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — PLEA — CIV.R. 60(B) — EXCUSABLE NEGLECT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate the dismissal of his postconviction petition where defendant met all three requirements for relief: defendant filed his motion within the one-year time period, defendant had a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his suppression hearing to present, and defendant’s failure to attach the expert’s report to the petition or seek a stay following the State’s response to the petition constituted excusable neglect where defendant’s postconviction counsel had previously filed a notice with the court explaining defendant’s intent to amend the petition to add the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim after receiving the expert’s report in support and explained that the delay was caused by postconviction counsel being unaware that a suppression hearing had occurred prior to defendant’s plea hearing when notice of the suppression hearing and the entry denying the suppression motion was never docketed. The common pleas court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s petition for postconviction relief where the court failed to engage in the proper prejudice inquiry with respect to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate whether he could effectively waive his right to self-incrimination based on his intellectual disability: where defendant had entered pleas of no contest, the proper prejudice inquiry was not limited to whether defendant’s suppression motion would have been granted but whether, if the motion to suppress defendant’s statements had been granted, would defendant have declined to enter the his no-contest pleas and insisted on going to trial. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5251 |
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Kelley v. Horton
| C-240644 | EVIDENCE – RELEVANCE – HEARSAY – TIMELY – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – OBJECTION – CIV.R. 51(A) – WAIVER: Plaintiff’s failure to timely raise a hearsay objection waived the objection to the evidence on that basis: plaintiff’s hearsay objection was untimely where plaintiff initially objected based solely on relevance, only to renew the objection and assert a hearsay basis a day later after the witness was excused. Plaintiff’s acquiescence to the agreed-upon remote- or intervening-cause jury instruction, paired with plaintiff’s failure to object to defendants’ remarks that allegedly improperly shifted blame for her injury onto the plaintiff, constituted a waiver of the jury-instruction issue: pursuant to Civ.R. 51(a), a waived defect in a jury instruction shall not be considered on appeal. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5252 |
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Provolish v. DeCioccio Showroom, Inc.
| C-250047 | CONTRACTS — UCC — USAGE OF TRADE — MAGISTRATES — APP.R. 34 — CIV.R. 53 Plaintiff-appellant’s request to strike defendant-appellee’s brief, made in appellant’s reply brief, was improper, because the appellate court’s magistrate had already issued an order accepting appellee’s brief, and that order had to be challenged in a separate motion. In a dispute over whether custom chairs conformed to the parties’ agreement, the trial court’s finding that measurements provided by the chairs’ manufacturer accurately represented the chairs’ dimensions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where buyer introduced no evidence of alternative measurements or to suggest the manufacturer’s measurements were invalid. The trial court’s finding that the contract’s reference to “seat depth” referred to the distance from the front edge of the seat to the face of the seatback pillow (rather than the seatback itself) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where seller introduced evidence that this definition was a standard usage of trade under R.C. 1302.05(A) and 1301.303(C), and where buyer introduced no evidence to rebut this. Where a contract to purchase custom chairs expressly listed several dimensions and provided that the chairs would be similar to a provided concept photo and based on the manufacturer’s interpretation of the concept photo’s design, the seller and manufacturer were not required to deliver chairs that conformed to the dimensions of the chair in the concept photo that were not listed in the agreement. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5253 |
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State v. Bailey
| C-250116 | FELONY SENTENCING — R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) — PRESUMPTION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL — R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) — IMPROPER CONSIDERATIONS: The presumption in favor of community control under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) did not apply to defendant’s sentences where defendant was convicted of two fifth-degree felonies and, by its terms, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) applies only if the defendant is convicted of a single fourth- or fifth-degree felony. Defendant’s argument that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11(B) and 2929.12(A) fails because an appellate court cannot vacate or modify a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The trial court properly considered defendant’s possession of a machete during defendant’s attempted burglary because that fact was relevant to the seriousness of the offense and defendant’s conduct’s impact on the victim. | Bock | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5254 |
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State v. Harden
| C-250130, C-250131 | POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.23 — JURISDICTION: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s untimely petitions for postconviction relief where defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and therefore could not show that he would not have been found guilty by a reasonable fact finder without the constitutional error at trial, as required by R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). [See CONCURRENCE: Defendant makes a compelling case for expanding eligibility for expungement and the legislature should consider doing so.] | Bock | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5255 |
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In re D.B.
| C-250248 | APPELLATE REVIEW — CIVIL — JUVENILE — PRESUMED REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS: As appellant mother failed to cause the proper transcripts to be included in the record under App.R. 9, this court must presume the regularity of the proceedings and affirm the trial court’s judgment. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/21/2025
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11/21/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5256 |
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Bruns v. Adlard
| C-240636 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — EVIDENCE — CONVERSION — CONSPIRACY — BURDEN ON APPEAL — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of money left in ward’s bedroom where the money was capable of identification and the evidence—when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian—shows that the ward held title or the right to possess the specific money at issue and the money was taken at the direction of defendant and given to her, with only a partial amount being returned. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s ownership interest in a limited liability company where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s ownership interest in the limited liability company. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s personal property where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s personal property that may have been removed from the Kentucky property by other prayer group members. The trial court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for civil conspiracy deriving from the alleged taking of cash from ward’s bedroom where genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the conversion claim on which the civil-conspiracy claim was based. Guardian failed to meet his burden on appeal to show error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a not-for-profit corporation on his claim for unjust enrichment where guardian failed to identify any specific money received and/or retained by the not-for-profit corporation. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence shows that the ward experienced palpable anxiety and was declared incompetent based on defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over ward. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on ward’s daughter’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to daughter, fails to show that any severe emotional distress experienced by daughter was as a result of defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over her mother, the ward, rather than as a result of the litigation thereafter. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5202 |
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Reisman v. Sanskar, L.L.C.
| C-250154 | AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE – ATTORNEY FEES – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – INDEPENDENT REVIEW – LANDLORD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION – SERVICE OF PROCESS – SMALL CLAIMS COURT – TENANT – WAIVER: The trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over plaintiff on defendant’s amended counterclaim where plaintiff failed to raise the issue of insufficient service of process of defendant’s amended counterclaim by motion or by responsive pleading and where he fully participated in the litigation, effectively waiving the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. The trial court properly considered the merits of defendant’s amended counterclaim, even though defendant filed it after 28 days, because the procedural rules in small claims court are somewhat relaxed to accommodate pro se litigants. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explain its reasoning for adopting the magistrate’s decisions because it was not required to do so in order to perform a proper independent review of objected-to matters. The trial court’s judgments comported with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and this court has proper jurisdiction because the time to appeal the final order did not begin to run until the trial court properly ruled on plaintiff’s second set of objections. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5203 |
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State v. Freeman
| C-250291 | R.C. 2941.25 — ALLIED OFFENSES — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — STRANGULATION — PLAIN ERROR: The trial court did not plainly err in failing to merge defendant’s convictions for domestic violence and strangulation where the convictions were premised upon separate conduct and import. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5204 |
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Evans v. McGuffey
| C-250475 | WRITS — HABEAS CORPUS — BAIL DENIAL — R.C. 2937.222 — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — DUE PROCESS — NAPUE — SELF-DEFENSE Habeas corpus was the proper remedy for petitioner who alleged that he was denied bail without due process of law, because the trial court refused to reopen petitioner’s bail-denial hearing, such that he lacked an adequate remedy at law. Petitioner was deprived of his liberty without due process of law when he was denied bail because of the State’s knowing use of false and uncorrected testimony, and that false testimony could have, in any reasonable likelihood, contributed to the trial court’s decision to hold petitioner without bail. Where a police officer who investigated petitioner on behalf of the State then knowingly made false statements against petitioner in a judicial proceeding, knowledge of those statements’ falsity could be imputed to the State for due-process purposes. Although evidence of self-defense is not relevant to determining whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the charged offense under R.C. 2937.222(B), it can and should be considered when assessing whether the accused poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and whether any release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of that person and the community under the same provision. Petitioner demonstrated that he was unlawfully held without bail and entitled to a writ of habeas corpus where (1) petitioner claimed he shot the victim in self-defense, (2) a law-enforcement officer testified at petitioner’s bail-denial hearing that no witnesses had said the victim had a gun or had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (3) petitioner showed that the law-enforcement officer had interviewed witnesses prior to the hearing who told her that the victim had possessed a gun and had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (4) the State had introduced no substantive evidence regarding the shooting at the bail-denial hearing apart from the law-enforcement officer’s testimony, and (5) the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to reopen the bail-denial hearing after he had discovering the evidence of the officer’s false testimony. | Crouse | Hamilton |
11/19/2025
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11/19/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5205 |
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State v. N.S.
| C-250059 | RECORD SEALING — EXPUNGEMENT — R.C. 2953.32: Where the trial court concluded that all the factors under R.C. 2953.32(C) were met in support of granting defendant’s applications for record sealing and where the same factors apply when determining whether to grant defendant’s applications for expungement, the trial abused its discretion by denying defendant’s applications for expungement. [See CONCURRENCE: Where an applicant contemporaneously requests to seal and expunge a record of conviction, a trial court is not required to grant both, however, where the record supports both sealing and expungement, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying an expungement over sealing.] | Moore | Hamilton |
11/14/2025
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11/14/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5166 |
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State v. Sharkey
| C-240675 | BENCH TRIAL – BODY-WORN-CAMERA VIDEO – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – PREJUDICE – TRIAL STRATEGY: Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel’s decision to introduce body-worn-camera video constitutes trial strategy, and defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the introduction of the body-worn-camera video. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5117 |
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State v. Higgins
| C-240723 | FELONIOUS ASSAULT — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant’s felonious-assault convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the factfinder determined that the State’s witnesses were credible and believed the State’s witnesses over the defendant. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5118 |
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State v. Campbell
| C-250076 | EXPUNGEMENT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s application for expungement where the trial court considered the victim’s objection and sought additional information to address the victim’s objection. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/12/2025
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11/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5119 |
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Estate of Hodory v. Duke Realty Corp.
| C-240545 | CONTRACTS – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - ENFORCEABILITY – ESSENTIAL TERMS – AMBIGUOUS – EVIDENTIARY HEARING - DURESS – FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION – MUTUAL MISTAKE – CIV.R. 38(B) – PAROL EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err when it concluded the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement was an enforceable contract where plaintiff failed to demonstrate the agreement was a result of duress or that defendants had fraudulently induced plaintiff into agreeing to the terms: the third-party offer to purchase property in which both parties had an interest was made available to each party prior to the settlement conference. The plaintiff was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the enforceability of the 2019 settlement agreement where it failed to identify a legitimate dispute to the existence of the agreement: the settlement agreement was made in court and the terms were read into the record. The trial court did not err when it resolved an ambiguity in the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement concerning defendant’s expected obligations to minimize plaintiff’s tax exposure or in its conclusion that the term was not a result of mutual mistake: the settlement conference transcript and an evidentiary hearing on the issue reflected that the parties were aware that defendants were not going to amend past tax returns. Plaintiff was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before a jury on its motion to set aside the settlement agreement where it only sought equitable relief in the form of contract recission. The trial court did not err when it concluded the parties’ 2009 settlement agreement was unenforceable, because the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on all essential terms. The trial court erred when it interpreted a payment term in the parties’ 2019 settlement agreement as obligating defendants to pay plaintiff an additional sum above the intended settlement award when the term was unambiguous: the contract language clearly stated that the $150,000 payment was a part of the total settlement award. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5068 |
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Sidloski v. Fischer
| C-240570 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT – PRODUCTS LIABILITY – DESIGN DEFECT – FAILURE TO WARN – PROXIMATE CAUSE – TORT – WRONGFUL DEATH: The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor regarding proximate cause because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a design defect in the jet boat and/or the lack of an adequate warning about carbon monoxide exposure contributed to the drowning death of a passenger. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor on the failure-to-warn claim because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the warning labels on the boat adequately apprised consumers of carbon monoxide risks. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants-manufacturers’ favor on the design-defect claim because the court impermissibly treated one factor of R.C. 2307.75, which sets forth the appropriate analysis for such a claim, as dispositive of the entire analysis, even though genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the boat was defective in its design, including whether there were economically feasible design alternatives. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5069 |
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State v. Norman
| C-240663 | COMPETENCY — RESTORATION — INVOLUNTARY-MEDICATION ORDER — MOOTNESS: Defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s involuntary-medication order is moot where defendant has been restored to competency, and the involuntary-medication order has expired. The exception to the mootness doctrine is inapplicable as defendant cannot show that the expired involuntary-medication order is capable of repetition yet evading review where defendant has maintained her competency over the course of six months pending her trial, and any subsequent concerns of incompetency require a new competency assessment and hearing. | Moore | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5070 |
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Maccarone v. Mark Mandell-Brown, M.D., Inc.
| C-250052 | STANDING — PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION — RESTRICTIVE COVENANT — EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT — NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting employee’s request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the noncompetition restrictive covenant in the employment agreement between employee and employer where the record supports the trial court’s determination that the noncompetition restrictive covenant was greater than required for the protection of the employer. Appellant, a third-party plaintiff, lacks standing to appeal from the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction where the record does not support that the appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court at issue in the appeal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5071 |
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Longnecker v. Velontra Inc.
| C-250082 | APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — JURISDICTION – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – R.C. 2505.02 — CIV.R. 54(B) — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his breach-of-contract claim against defendant corporation was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02 where the trial court failed to award any damages for the breach. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his declaratory-judgment claim was improper because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether plaintiff’s stock is subject to repurchase under the agreement: the terms of the stock restriction agreement are ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/7/2025
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11/7/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5072 |
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In re J.W.
| C-240566 | JUVENILE — CUSTODY — PARENTING TIME — MODIFICATION — SHARED PARENTING — EVIDENCE — TESTIMONY — RELEVANCY — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — EVID.R. 401 — EVIDENCE PRESENTATION — MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding father parenting time where the juvenile court adopted mother’s proposed shared parenting plan with certain modifications that supported the best interest of the child: the juvenile court’s findings that child was adjusted to father’s home, father’s schedule accommodated increased parenting time, father had increased his participation in child’s life, and father was willing to communicate with mother were all supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about mother’s alleged prior violence that occurred prior to the last custody order and prior to the child’s birth where the information was relevant to the current proceedings in that father offered the testimony to explain his behavior since the initial decree, including his trepidation in communicating with mother. The trial court did not provide father with any unfair advantage at trial due to the permitted mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence at trial where mother was ultimately permitted to cross-examine father on all his direct evidence, and she was permitted to testify in rebuttal to all of father’s testimony and was given the last word. | Zayas | Hamilton |
11/5/2025
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11/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5031 |
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Toelke v. Williams
| C-250005 | BREACH OF CONTRACT — LAND SALE — DEFAULT: The trial court’s decision in favor of plaintiff on her breach of contract claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the terms of the contract required defendants to pay a certain sum at the time of signing, and they failed to do so: defendants could not produce receipts of later, smaller payments to or on behalf of plaintiff. | Nestor | Hamilton |
11/5/2025
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11/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5032 |
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State v. Stonewall
| C-240607 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CONCEALED CARRY — IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE: The statute prohibiting defendant from carrying a concealed handgun until he reaches 21 years of age did not violate the Second Amendment because defendant is permitted to openly carry a firearm. The statute prohibiting defendant from carrying a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle until he reaches 21 years of age did not violate the Second Amendment where regulating individuals aged 18 to 20 is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of restricting the rights of those who were deemed unable to responsibly bear arms. [But see DISSENT: The statutes prohibiting defendant, a 19-year-old, from carrying a concealed handgun and transporting a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle until he reaches 21 years of age violate the Second Amendment as applied to defendant where the State failed to carry its burden to show that regulating a young adult’s access to firearms while travelling and ability to carry a concealed weapon fall within our Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation when the State presented no evidence to support the “why” underlying the challenged firearm regulations, which effectively prevented the identification of a similarly relevant historical analogue.] | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/31/2025
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10/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4974 |
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State v. Henry
| C-250188 | COMMUNITY-CONTROL SANCTION: The trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited the defendant from working in an establishment with firearms where the restriction had no relationship to the vandalism conviction and was not reasonably related to rehabilitation. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/31/2025
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10/31/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4975 |
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Dornette v. Green Bldg. Consulting, L.L.C.
| C-240689 | SUMMARY JUDGMENT — REPLEVIN — BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT — ATTORNEY’S FEES — COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: In plaintiff’s replevin action arising out of a construction contract with defendant, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor where the parties had entered into a previous settlement agreement releasing each other from future claims related to the construction contract. The trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s request for attorney’s fees on its counterclaim for breach of the settlement agreement was not contrary to law where Ohio courts, the Northern District of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit have all held that a party’s expenditure on attorney’s fees due to a breach of a settlement agreement is recoverable as compensatory damages. | Moore | Hamilton |
10/29/2025
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10/29/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4944 |
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Ditech Fin., L.L.C. v. Balimunkwe
| C-240060 | FORECLOSURE — FORGERY — EXPERT WITNESS — EVID.R. 702 — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE — MAGISTRATES — STANDING — MORTGAGES — PROMISSORY NOTES — ABUSE OF DISCRETION The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s decision to exclude defendant’s handwriting expert under Evid.R. 702 where that expert failed to notice or indicate that two of the known signatures used as comparators and included in her report were, in fact, duplicates, and where the expert employed methods of magnification that yielded distorted results. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate’s finding that defendant’s signature on the disputed promissory note and mortgage were not forged, because the magistrate’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, given evidence that defendant had received a court order to refinance his home several months before the mortgage was signed and that highly personal documents regarding defendant’s finances had been transmitted to the lender around that time were included in the mortgage file. Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint, because, at the time of filing, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had been assigned the mortgage on the property. Plaintiff was not prohibited from introducing evidence of an agreement to modify the interest rate of defendant’s loan where plaintiff alleged the modified interest rate in its complaint and defendant impliedly consented to try issues regarding the applicability and validity of the modification agreement by failing to object to its admission at trial. A signed and notarized agreement to modify the terms of defendant’s loan was properly admitted as self-authenticating under both Evid.R. 902(B)(8) and (9). The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision applying the interest rate in a loan-modification agreement, because a finding that the party listed as note-holder held the note at the time it entered into the agreement with defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4884 |
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Ostigny v. France
| C-240210 | DAMAGES — CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT — R.C. 1345.09 — HOME SOLICITATION SALES ACT — R.C. 1345.23 — CIV.R. 37 — NOTICE — DISMISSAL — SANCTION — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Under R.C. 1345.09(B) of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the trial court erred in awarding damages beyond the statutory $200 where the consumer only established supplier’s liability for failing to comply with R.C. 1345.23(B)(1) and (2) and did not show any actual pecuniary loss from the proven violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs-suppliers’ remaining claims with prejudice under Civ.R. 37 where they did not comply with the court’s order to produce responses by a date certain and failed to offer any reason for the failure to comply, and the discovery requests had been outstanding for over one year at the time of the dismissal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4885 |
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State v. Riffee
| C-240535 | CRIMINAL LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL — SECOND AMENDMENT — R.C. 2923.15 – HANDLING FIREARM WHILE INTOXICATED — DANGEROUSNESS — ARTICLE 1, § 4 OHIO CONSTITUTION — REASONABLE REGULATION — MOTION TO DISMISS: The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Second Amendment: R.C. 2923.15 is sufficiently similar to our Nation’s history and traditions of firearm regulation. The trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of handling a weapon while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15 where that statute did not violate the Ohio Constitution: limiting an intoxicated person’s use of a firearm is a reasonable regulation substantially related to the safety of the public. [See CONCURRENCE: In certain cases, a general “dangerousness” analysis could be used to more efficiently assess the constitutionality of a challenged firearm regulation.] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4886 |
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Gilbert v. Welter
| C-250090 | TESTIMONY — OATH — SWEAR IN — EVID.R. 603 — R.C. 2317.30 — SECTION 7, ARTICLE 1 of the OHIO CONSTITUTION — WAIVER — PLAIN ERROR — MOTION TO STRIKE — CIV.R. 59: Where an objection to the trial court’s failure to swear in a witness is not timely made, any resulting error is waived. Where the trial court failed to swear in a witness before the witness testified, the court did not err in allowing the jury to hear the witness’ testimony or in denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike where the court administered a belated oath to the witness after testimony was concluded, the witness swore that the testimony previously given was truthful, plaintiffs had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and the record contained no indication that the witness would have testified differently had the oath been timely administered. Under these same circumstances, the record did not establish that the trial court’s failure to swear in a witness before that witness testified deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial or resulted in the rendering of a judgment that was contrary to law, and the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ Civ.R. 59 motion to set aside the jury verdict and order a new trial. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/24/2025
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10/24/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4887 |
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State v. Kinman
| C-240622 | CONTEMPT — RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS — RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES: Where defendant did not appeal the entry finding him in contempt and imposing a sentence, this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the assignment of error challenging the contempt finding. The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to compulsory process when it denied his request to recall the victim where defendant failed to subpoena the victim to testify in court. The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him when it denied his request to recall the victim where defendant thoroughly cross-examined the victim during the State’s case-in-chief. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4822 |
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State v. Oliver
| C-240702 | AGGRAVATED MENACING — MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated menacing was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant admitted the victim could see her gun, and defendant told victim that she wished she had the gun loaded. | Moore | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4824 |
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State v. Thompson
| C-240720 & C-240721 | RECOMMENDED SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Where the defendant and the State agreed to a joint recommendation to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court was not required to make the consecutive-sentence findings, despite imposing a prison term that deviated from the joint recommendation for one of defendant’s underlying convictions. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4825 |
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State v. McKinney
| C-250007 | RESTITUTION — SENTENCING: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for damage to the prosecuting witness’s car hood where there was competent, credible evidence in the record to show that the economic loss sustained by the owner of the car was a direct and proximate result of defendant’s conduct in throwing a brick at the car’s windshield. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4826 |
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Burge v. Bethesda Hosp., Inc.
| C-250023 | MEDICAL MALPRACTICE — R.C. 2305.113(C) — STATUTE OF REPOSE — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — DISMISSAL — TOLLING — R.C. 2305.15 — R.C. 2305.16: The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s medical-malpractice complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where the claims were filed almost seven years after the alleged malpractice and the allegations in the complaint do not set forth any facts sufficient to indicate an applicable tolling provision that would extend the statute of repose under R.C. 2305.113(C) and cause the claims to be timely filed. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4827 |
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Ndiathe v. Ndiath
| C-250038 | DIVORCE — CONTEMPT — TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS — APP.R. 9 — APP.R. 16(A)(7) — R.C. 2705.02: Where defendant husband failed to file the necessary transcripts, this court will presume the regularity of the proceedings. Where this court must presume the regularity of the contempt proceedings and there are no apparent errors of law on the face of the trial court’s contempt decision, this court must affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4828 |
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State v. Beckley
| C-250087 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — ANONYMOUS TIP — MANIFEST WEIGHT — DISARMAMENT — POSSESSION OF A FIREARM — CONSTITUTIONAL/CRIMINAL — PLAIN ERROR: The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip because the information provided in the anonymous tip was both verifiable and reliable. Defendant’s firearm convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because although there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of the officers and the firearm was never identified or introduced into evidence, this was not an exceptional case where the evidence weighed heavily against defendant’s convictions. The trial court did not plainly err in failing to dismiss defendant’s firearms charges as being unconstitutional where defendant failed to show an obvious error, especially where the law surrounding whether defendant’s disarmament is constitutional is unsettled. | Kinsley | Hamilton |
10/22/2025
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10/22/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4829 |
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State v. Chambers
| C-240578 | MOOTNESS — OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS — R.C. 2921.31 — RESISTING ARREST — R.C. 2921.33 — MENS REA — SPECIFIC INTENT — FIRST AMENDMENT — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — SUBSTANTIAL STOPPAGE: Because defendant was sentenced only to the time he had involuntarily served prior to trial, defendant did not serve his sentence voluntarily, and his misdemeanor appeal was not moot. Evidence that defendant shouted and cursed at officers and his alleged victim in a manner that derailed the officers’ investigation, together with evidence suggesting an obstructive intent, including defendant’s refusal to sit on the curb and attempts to step away from the approaching officer, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for obstructing official business. Evidence that officers witnessed defendant obstruct official business, that defendant protested he did not wish to be arrested, and that the officers sought to physically seize and restrain him before he resisted, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/15/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4737 |
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State v. Saunders
| C-240664 | DOUBLE JEOPARDY — SUA SPONTE MISTRIAL — CONSENT —NECESSITY: The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based on double jeopardy where the trial court presiding over defendant’s first trial had abused its discretion in sua sponte declaring a mistrial: defendant did not consent to the mistrial and the original judge’s act of affirming the prosecutor’s recollection of an in-chambers discussion between the parties did not prevent a fair trial. | Nestor | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4741 |
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Quehl v. Roberts
| C-250031 | CUSTODY – MAGISTRATE – CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES – BEST INTEREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overturned the magistrate’s decision and denied a nonresidential parent’s motion to modify the custody decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities because the trial court had a duty to conduct an independent review of the facts and law, and competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that modification was not necessary to serve the best interests of the two children. | Bock | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4742 |
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State v. Bishop
| C-250050 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WAIVER — ALLIED OFFENSES — FAILING TO DISCLOSE A CONCEALED HANDGUN: Defendant waived his Fifth-Amendment challenge regarding the officer’s questioning where he failed to raise the issue in his motion to suppress. The trial court committed plain error by failing to merge the carrying-a-concealed-weapon and improper-handling convictions where the offenses were similar in import, committed at the same time, and committed with a single animus, where both offenses were based on defendant’s failure to disclose a concealed handgun to the officer. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4743 |
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In re M. Children
| C-250379 | PERMANENT CUSTODY – REASONABLE EFFORTS – BEST INTERESTS – MANIFEST WEIGHT: The juvenile court did not have to determine whether the child-services agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family when deciding a motion for permanent custody filed under R.C. 2151.413 where a reasonable-efforts finding was made at earlier stages of the proceedings. The juvenile court’s decision to grant the child-services agency permanent custody of the children based on mother’s inability to provide a legally secure permanent placement to the children was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine months before the custody hearing and had not distanced herself from her abusive relationship with father. [See CONCURRENCE: Given that permanent custody is the family law equivalent of the death penalty, and given that “behavioral change” is a vague term with no legal meaning, greater precision is required in distinguishing cannot-or-should-not-place cases, in which the juvenile court can consider whether a parent remedied the conditions that led a child to be removed from the home, from 12-in-22 cases, in which the juvenile court considers the broader question of whether a parent can provide a legally secure placement for the child.] | Bock | Hamilton |
10/15/2025
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10/16/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4744 |
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Edelstein v. Edelstein
| C-240626 | DIVORCE — PROTECTION ORDER — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE —JURISDICTION — SERVICE OF PROCESS — EVIDENCE — EX PARTE — SUBPOENA: The trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over Respondent where Respondent failed to raise the issue of insufficiency of process by motion or in a responsive pleading and where Respondent fully participated in the litigation, effectively waiving the affirmative defense of insufficiency of process. The trial court’s issuance of a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where Respondent caused Petitioner to fear for his and the minor child’s safety and the child’s age and previous enmeshment with Respondent justified discounting the child’s testimony. The trial court did not err in quashing a subpoena for the minor child’s school records where Respondent failed to file the subpoena with the clerk of courts. The trial court did not err in finding no improper ex parte communications between Petitioner and the court where Respondent failed to substantiate the claim of improper ex parte communication. The trial court did not err in reviewing exhibits from the ex parte hearing where those exhibits were relevant to the proceedings, and where the issuance of the Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was based on testimony and exhibits issued at the full evidentiary hearing. | Nestor | Hamilton |
10/10/2025
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10/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4686 |
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State v. Reed
| C-240530 | SECOND AMENDMENT — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS: Nineteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did not violate Ohio Const., art. I, § 4. Nineteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did not violate the Second Amendment. [See CONCURRENCE: Although defendant’s age alone could not justify restricting defendant’s right to bear arms, our Nation has a history and tradition of restricting all concealed carry, as explained in State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.).] [But see DISSENT IN PART: The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his charge for carrying a concealed weapon where the State failed to carry its burden under the Second Amendment to show that the charge was consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations, including demonstrating that the State’s reasons for the restriction on defendant’s ability to possess a concealed weapon was for comparable reasons as historical analogues.] | Per Curiam | Hamilton |
10/10/2025
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10/10/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4708 |
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State v. Swanigan
| C-240598 | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL — DUE PROCESS — R.C. 2945.38: During the course of a single proceeding, a defendant may not be ordered to receive competency-restoration treatment for a cumulative period greater than that specified in R.C. 2945.38(C). The trial court erred in ordering defendant to undergo six months of competency-restoration treatment, where defendant had previously undergone five months of competency-restoration treatment, a forensic examiner concluded defendant could only be restored to competency again if the six-month period was “reset,” and the parties did not dispute the application of R.C. 2945.38 to the proceedings below. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4648 |
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Souders v. Lazor
| C-240613 | R.C. 2323.52 — VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR — SCOPE OF APPEAL — FIRST AMENDMENT: The classification of plaintiff as a vexatious litigator was not violative of the First Amendment and the right to seek redress of grievances where the classification does not prevent him from seeking redress for legitimate grievances. An appellant challenging a vexatious-litigator determination must set forth more than a mere conclusory assertion that the litigation pursued by him was neither frivolous nor intended to cause harm to meet the burden to demonstrate error on appeal. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4649 |
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Stansberry v. Theetge
| C-240687 | MOTION TO DISMISS — SERVICE — CIV.R. 5: The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff was not properly served with the motion to dismiss where the record shows that the motion to dismiss was served on plaintiff at the address provided in the complaint and subsequent filings by plaintiff, and plaintiff did not challenge service below or offer any evidence in the record that service was not accomplished. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/8/2025
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10/8/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4650 |
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435 Elm Invest., L.L.C. v. CBD Invest. Ltd.
| C-230599 & C-240596 | APPELLATE JURISDICTION — APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL — BANKRUPTCY — MOOTNESS — UNPAID JUDGMENT: In an action to recover on an unpaid judgment, the appeals are moot, and the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction, where intervening bankruptcy orders discharged the underlying debt and avoided “any and all judgment liens” in favor of the judgment creditor. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/3/2025
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10/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4606 |
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State v. Gray
| C-250119 | MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WARRANTLESS SEARCH — SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST — WAIVER — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — MARIJUANA — PROBABLE CAUSE — R.C. CH. 3780: Where the record contained no evidence that officers had a reasonable belief that evidence related to the crime of arrest would be found in the vehicle driven by defendant, and where defendant was secured in a police cruiser and not within reaching distance of the vehicle, a warrantless search of the vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest. Where a party fails to raise an argument below, the argument is waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. A vehicle search for officer safety pursuant to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), is not permissible where the officers have not yet determined if the detained individual will be returning to the vehicle. Following Ohio’s legalization of marijuana under certain circumstances in R.C. Ch. 3780, the odor of marijuana alone is no longer sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The odor of marijuana remains a relevant factor under the totality of the circumstances in a probable-cause analysis. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/3/2025
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10/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4607 |
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Bunn v. Hlubek
| C-240680 | MALPRACTICE — CIV.R. 10(D)(2) — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — COMMON-KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION: The trial court did not err in requiring an affidavit of merit under Civ.R. 10(D)(2) and not allowing plaintiff’s malpractice claim to proceed under the common-knowledge exception where all the malpractice allegations in the complaint are highly technical and concern matters of professional skill and judgment beyond the common knowledge of a jury. | Zayas | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4563 |
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State v. Williamson
| C-240692 | JUDGMENTS — COMMUNITY CONTROL — RES JUDICATA — APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL — SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: Defendant’s new sentence for violating community control was not invalid because his original sentence, which had imposed community control consecutive to a prison term, had not been void, but merely voidable, and defendant had not challenged it on direct appeal. The court lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) to review defendant’s sentence imposed following the revocation of community control, where the defendant and prosecutor had jointly recommended a fixed, ten-year prison term for any violation of community control as part of defendant’s original plea, and the sentence imposed for violating community control was entirely consistent with that recommendation and within the range of sentences permitted by law. | Crouse | Hamilton |
10/1/2025
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10/1/2025
| 2025-Ohio-4564 |
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