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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Coates 114534Murder; attempted murder; self-defense; castle doctrine; rebuttable presumption of self-defense; reasonable force; jury instructions; lesser-included offenses; expert testimony; post-traumatic stress disorder. Defendant’s convictions for murder, attempted murder and felonious assault, all with firearm specifications, are affirmed. Defendant admitted to shooting and killing his roommate but argued that he did so in self-defense. The victim was coming home and attempting to enter the house through the front door, with her seven-month-old child in her arms, when the defendant fired 14 shots from an assault rifle through the closed door while he was inside the house. The defendant argued he acted in self-defense because he has post-traumatic stress disorder and he thought someone was trying to unlawfully enter the house. He failed to look at the doorbell camera video of the front door before firing his gun. The court did not err in instructing the jury regarding self-defense and the castle doctrine. The court did not err in not instructing the jury regarding lesser-included offenses, because the defendant acted knowingly and/or purposefully when he fired the assault rifle. The court did not err in allowing defendant’s expert witness to testify about post-traumatic stress disorder but limiting what the expert said about the defendant’s state of mind.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5340
State v. Vega-Medina 114792Postrelease control; R.C. 2929.19(B); R.C. 2967.28; interpreter. Judgment affirmed. The trial court accurately informed the appellant regarding postrelease control. A Spanish interpreter was appointed and present for appellant’s sentencing.BoyleCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5341
State v. Clark 114808Complicity, jury instructions, sufficiency, manifest weight. Defendant was convicted of felonious assault. The State’s theory of the case was the defendant aided and abetted the principal shooter. Defendant alleged that the jury instructions with respect to complicity were incomplete because they failed to instruct the jury with respect to the proper mens rea. Here, the trial court instructed the jury regarding felonious assault, including the mens rea required and its definition. The court was not required to repeat the mens rea instruction with respect to complicity. As a result, the defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s complicity instruction, since the jury was properly instructed as to the culpable mental states necessary for the principal offense of felonious assault. Defendant also alleged that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that she aided and abetted the principal shooter in committing the felonious assault. In viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could infer from the defendant’s actions prior to, during, and after the shooting that she aided and abetted the principal offender in committing the felonious assault. Finally, defendant alleges that because of inconsistencies and contradictions of some of the State’s witnesses, her conviction for felonious assault was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witness testimony. As such, the defendant failed to demonstrate that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.SheehanCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5342
State v. Robinson 114859Motion to withdraw guilty pleas; involuntary manslaughter; felonious assault; aggravated robbery; presentence; presumption; liberally; abuse of discretion; reasons; circumstances; legitimate and reasonable basis. Affirmed trial court’s decision denying appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and aggravated robbery that was orally made at the time of sentencing. The trial court conducted a complete hearing on the motion, considered the relevant factors and all the circumstances involved, and gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request. Appellant, who was represented by competent counsel, did not have a legitimate and reasonable basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. No abuse of discretion occurred.S. GallagherCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5343
State v. Woods 114861Motion to suppress; warrantless search; Fourth Amendment; unreasonable search and seizure; voluntary consent; implied consent; totality of the circumstances; factual findings; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); plain view. - Judgment affirmed. The totality of the circumstances based on the undisputed facts are sufficient to find that the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the facts applied to an exception to the warrant requirement.KeoughCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5344
Mikes Handyman/HVAC Serv., L.L.C. v. DiFiore 114875Breach of contract; damages; summary judgment; fraud; dismiss. -Trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff the full agreed-upon contract price because the evidence was undisputed regarding the agreement. Trial court did not err in dismissing the fraud claim sua sponte. The breach-of-contract and fraud claims were duplicative because the plaintiff did not assert any additional duty or attribute any actual damages beyond that owed under the contract.KeoughCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5345
State v. White 114883 & 114905Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); prejudice; driver’s license suspension; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to enter guilty plea; maximum sentence; consecutive sentence; principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In this consolidated and delayed appeal, defendant-appellant appeals his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694023-A (“CR-694023”) and domestic violence and endangering children in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694024-A (“CR-694024”). Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty pleas, defense counsel’s effectiveness, his domestic-violence conviction, and the trial court’s imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences. First, appellant challenges his guilty pleas in CR-694023, claiming that he did not understand their “full effect” since the trial court never informed him that the maximum penalty included a mandatory driver’s license suspension. However, appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudice, we cannot say that his plea was unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily entered. Next, appellant claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in CR-694023. But appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim focuses solely on sentencing outcomes; appears to be misguided, tenuous, and purely speculative at best; and lacks any explanation as to how his counsel’s alleged failure amounts to deficient performance. Consequently, appellant fails to set forth a valid basis for reversal of his CR-694023 convictions due to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel. Appellant also argues that his 18-month sentence for amended Count 1 in CR-694024 is contrary to law since he did not enter a valid plea to the domestic-violence charge. The State concedes that appellant never formally entered a plea to amended Count 1, despite intentions to do so, on the record. Our review of the record reveals that appellant entered a guilty plea to amended Count 2 (child endangering) but did not enter a guilty plea to amended Count 1 (domestic violence). Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s convictions and any pleas in CR-694024 and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court’s imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. Our review is limited to CR-694023 since the reversal of appellant’s CR-694024 convictions render the issue moot in that case. We find that appellant has not affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider the required R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors. Nor can we say that the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record, particularly where appellant makes no argument to the contrary. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the maximum and consecutive sentences imposed in CR-694023 were contrary to law.GrovesCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5346
Richmond Hts. v. Turner 114920Failure to file transcript; presumption of regularity. Municipal court’s judgment is affirmed. Pro se appellant failed to file the transcript of the proceeding he appealed, and this court must presume regularity.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5347
State v. Buchanan 114948Aggravated murder, murder, firearm specifications, merger, lesser-included offenses. Appellant challenged his conviction for aggravated murder, arguing that the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence did not support a finding that he acted with prior calculation and design. The evidence supported conviction for aggravated murder where appellant and victim pumped gas next to each other for several minutes prior to the shooting. Further support for this element of the offense is that the purported threat that victim made occurred several seconds before the shooting, during which time appellant walked away from the victim, changed course, moved back towards the victim, and shot him. Appellant gave conflicting testimony regarding whether he thought ahead before shooting the victim or was merely reacting, which the court could reasonably have weighed against him, in favor of a finding that he acted with prior calculation and design. Although convictions for lesser-included felonious assault charges merged with aggravated murder, appellant was properly sentenced for related firearm specifications under State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370.ForbesCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5348
In re J.T. 114989Juvenile court; legal custody; child; motion; modify; parent; R.C. 2151.353(F)(1); R.C. 2151.353(F)(2); R.C. 2151.42(A); R.C. 2151.42(B); change of circumstances; best interest; mother; pro se; transcript; regularity; res judicata; App.R. 16(A)(7). Affirmed juvenile court’s decision denying mother’s motion to modify an order of legal custody of the child to the maternal grandmother. The juvenile court determined a change in circumstances has not occurred and did not find a modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. Mother, who was pro se, did not file a transcript or comply with App.R. 16(A)(7), regularity was presumed, and no error was found to have occurred.S. GallagherCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5349
State v. Miller 115090Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2943.032; R.C. 2929.19(B)(3); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); advisements. - Judgment affirmed. The record does not reflect that the advisements issued during Miller’s colloquy and sentencing were improperly made or prejudicial to Miller. The trial court was not required to make consecutive-sentence findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) because Miller’s consecutive sentences were statutorily required.KeoughCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5350
In re C.H. 115187Permanent custody; best interests of the child; R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court considered all of the required statutory factors, made findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D), and those findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court’s findings statutorily obligated the court to award permanent custody to the agency.KlattCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5351
In re C.H. 115194Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2); best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); placement of child within a reasonable time; manifest weight; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the juvenile court to grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody. Mother was not able to successfully complete her case plan, concerns remained regarding Mother’s mental health and substance abuse, Father is in prison, and the child had been in agency custody more than two years and no longer qualified for temporary custody. In addition, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s motion for continuance because Mother had been properly notified of trial, she was present at the hearing two days prior to trial, at which time the trial was discussed, and Mother failed to communicate any reason for her absence to her attorney.BoyleCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5352
Cleveland v. Renger 115254Crim.R. 48(A); denial of dismissal; voluntary dismissal by prosecution; conceded error. - Judgment reversed. The record supports that the trial court improperly denied the City of Cleveland’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Crim.R. 48(A) because the City of Cleveland demonstrated that it could not prove an element of the offense. The appellee conceded the error.KeoughCuyahoga 11/26/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5353
Ferguson v. Cleveland Div. of Police 115469Mandamus, arrest record, close and seal arrest record, no duty or right, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Civ.R. 10(A), R.C. 2731.04. The complaint for mandamus is procedurally defective because the relators failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(A), a defective caption, and R.C. 2731.04, complaint for mandamus not brought in the name of the state on relation of the person applying. In addition, it is well settled that in order for a writ of mandamus to issue the relator must demonstrate (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the CDP is under a clear duty to perform the requested act; and (3) there exists no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The relator has failed to establish a clear legal right, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent, and there exists no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Complaint dismissed.BoyleCuyahoga 11/25/2025 11/26/2025 2025-Ohio-5354
Fannie Mae v. Clarkwood Apts., L.P. 114542; 114543; 115105Final appealable order; final order; substantial right; receiver’s bond; interim order; appointment of a receiver; subject-matter jurisdiction; case consolidation; motion to consolidate; jurisdictional priority rule; event of default; default; ex parte appointment of a receiver; irreparable harm; waiver of notice; clear and convincing evidence; Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3; R.C. 2505.02; Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(J); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(H); R.C. 2735.01. Affirmed. Appellants’ appeal of the trial court’s modification of the receiver’s bond is overruled because it does not contain a final appealable order. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court’s ex parte appointment of a receiver is affirmed where the appellants expressly consented to the ex parte appointment of a receiver after any event of default in their loan documents and appellee showed multiple events of default.CalabreseCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5221
Ori Group, L.L.C. v. Nicols 114641Cleveland M.C. Hous.Div., Section 3(B)(4)(a), rental registration certificate; forcible-entry-and-detainer actions, R.C. Ch. 1923; final appealable orders, R.C. 2505.02 and 2505.03; mootness doctrine; exceptions to mootness doctrine; Cleveland Codified Ordinance 365.02, nonowner-occupied residential unit registration required. Cleveland Housing local Rule Cleveland M.C. Hous.Div., Section 3(B)(4)(a) is contrary to law and invalid because it conflicts with the purpose and policy of R.C. Ch. 1923 pursuant to this court’s holding in Shaker House LLC v. Daniel, 2022-Ohio-2778 (8th Dist.). The local rule “effectively adds an additional element to an eviction cause of action that is not required by the eviction statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15. The local rule also “abridge[s], enlarges[s], or modif[ies]” the substantive rights of a landlord under R.C. Ch. 1923 in violation of Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). Id. at ¶ 19. The local rule conflicts with Civ.R. 83, Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B), and Civ.R. 1(C)(3); exceeds the trial court’s authority under R.C. 1901.181; and allows the Housing Court to use its equitable powers to negate the summary purpose of R.C. Ch. 1923. The issue of the validity of the local rule falls within the mootness exception of capable of repetition yet evading review.Laster MaysCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5222
In re M.P. 114661Juvenile court; child support; amount; potential income; voluntarily underemployed; imputed income; criteria; statutory requirements; reasons; sound reasoning; Juv.R. 40(D); R.C. Ch. 3119; R.C. 3119.05(A); R.C. 3119.01(C)(18)(a); objections; magistrate’s decision; hearing. Reversed the decision of the juvenile court and remanded the matter for a hearing on the issue of child support. The juvenile court did not evaluate the relevant statutory criteria under R.C. 3119.01(C)(18), and there was not sufficient information in the record from which to ascertain whether the juvenile court’s decision for imputing potential income to the child’s father was the product of a sound reasoning process. A juvenile court is permitted to conduct a hearing when ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision.S. GallagherCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5223
Parma v. Perotti 114803Postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; municipal court jurisdiction; R.C. 1901.18; R.C. 1901.20; void judgment. Appeal dismissed. A municipal court lacks jurisdiction to review a petition for postconviction relief filed under R.C. 2953.21 pursuant to State v. Cowan, 2004-Ohio-1583.BoyleCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5224
Macron Inv. Co. v. Jack Cleveland Casino, L.L.C. 114816Motion to dismiss; 14-day time period to respond; motion to dismiss converted to motion for summary judgment; waiver. The trial court timely ruled on appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss after the briefing period had expired. Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment was never raised below and has therefore been waived on appeal.SheehanCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5225
Overdrive Espresso, L.L.C. v. Finein 114870Cognovit note; motion for relief from judgment; meritorious defenses to cognovit notes; consumer transaction. Pursuant to an employment agreement, appellant agreed to reimburse appellee for training costs if she quit or breached the contract within a period of two years of signing the employment agreement. She signed a cognovit note simultaneously with signing the employment agreement requiring that $10,000 be paid if she quit before the two year period had expired. Appellant voluntarily terminated her employment before the two years expired. Appellee filed a complaint and an answer confessing judgment on the cognovit note with the court of common pleas. A judgment entry on the cognovit note was filed the same day in favor of appellee. Almost two and a half months later, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment on the cognovit note that was subsequently denied by the trial court in a single sentence judgment entry. Appellant appealed alleging that the trial court’s judgment entry denying the motion for relief from judgment was insufficient because it did not adequately explain or give reasons for its denial. Appellant also claimed that she presented numerous meritorious defenses to the cognovit note. A trial court is not required to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. Appellant argued that the trial court was precluded from rendering a judgment on the cognovit note since the note arose out of a consumer transaction. Since the transaction from which the note arose was not a consumer transaction, the trial court had jurisdiction to render a judgment on it. Appellant’s remaining challenges concerning whether the $10,000 on the note adequately represented training costs, and whether New York law or federal law precluded the note’s enforcement, did not fall within the range of meritorious defenses to a cognovit note.SheehanCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5226
State v. Rembert 114876Sex offender; Tier II classification; guilty plea; invited error; ineffective assistance of counsel. Affirmed. The defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges, in part, in exchange for agreeing to be classified as a Tier II sexual offender, and as a result, any error with the classification was invited.S. GallagherCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5227
State v. Saunders 114893Community-control sanctions; residential sanctions; consecutive sentences; reimbursement of attorney fees; res judicata. The appellant challenged the two six-month terms of residential sanctions imposed as a condition of community control and the trial court’s order running these terms consecutively to one another. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to reimburse attorney fees. It was in the trial court’s discretion to order six-month jail sentences as a condition of community control. However, the trial court’s decision to run those jail terms consecutively to one another is contrary to law. Finally, to the extent that appellant challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to repay assigned attorney fees, that argument is barred by res judicata.SheehanCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5228
U.S. Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v. Wittman 114918Foreclosure; mortgage; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo review; evidentiary materials; affidavit; personal knowledge; tax foreclosure; R.C. 323.65 to 323.79. Because appellant’s mortgage lien was extinguished at the conclusion of the Tax Foreclosure, appellant failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in a subsequent foreclosure action on the same lien. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5229
State v. Bahner 114940Rape, gross sexual imposition, child victim, delayed disclosure, social worker, lay testimony, manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The social worker testified as a lay, not expert, witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the social worker to testify that delayed disclosure is common in child-sexual-abuse cases and to explain why it is common. The witness’s testimony was based on her perceptions as a trained sexual-abuse investigator and was helpful for the jury to understand why a sexual-abuse victim may delay disclosure, as required for lay opinion testimony under Evid.R. 701. Further, the social worker did not offer an opinion as to the truth of the victim’s disclosure, which would have been improper. The weight of the evidence supports the conviction. The victim’s testimony was not so incredible as to cast doubt on the conviction and require a new trial. The jury did not lose its way in resolving conflicts in the victim’s testimony. The case is not an exceptional case in which a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.RyanCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5230
State v. Pubill 115018Competency; abuse of discretion; presumption of competency; competency hearing; volitional misconduct; sovereign citizen beliefs; R.C. 2909.05; R.C. 2945.37(G); R.C. 2945.371(A). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding to trial without ordering a new competency evaluation. There was ample reliable, credible evidence supporting finding of competency, including repeated prior findings of competency as specified in a detailed June 22, 2022 report and the trial court’s on-the-record observations of appellant’s organized writings and calculated courtroom conduct. This evidenced deliberate noncooperation and volitional obstruction rather than mental illness. Trial counsel did not identify any intervening decompensation or formally request a new evaluation, and the trial court conducted fulsome pretrial hearings addressing competency, satisfying any hearing requirement. Given the statutory presumption of competency and the permissive (“may”) language with respect to ordering evaluations, the trial court reasonably declined to order a new assessment where the record showed patterned, strategic misconduct, including performative outbursts before the jury, consistent with sovereign-citizen views but not incompetency.CalabreseCuyahoga 11/20/2025 11/20/2025 2025-Ohio-5231
State v. Gaines 114223 & 115225Reagan Tokes Law; constitutionality; voluntariness of plea; prejudice. - Judgment affirmed. Gaines has not met his burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s imprecise but de minimis, nonconstitutional advisements prejudiced Gaines such that justify vacating the plea. Further, Gaines’s assertions about the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law have already been addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, and are accordingly overruled.KeoughCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5132
State v. Steele 114554Jury instructions; proximate result; ineffective assistance of counsel; plain error; R.C. 1.51; general v. specific statutes; allied offenses; closing argument; vouching; weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to instruct on proximate result where the evidence was straightforward, the issue was not disputed, and the record did not reflect that the jury lost its way when it found the appellant guilty of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B). Additionally, appellant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request the instruction, because appellant was not prejudiced by the omission. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel did not move to dismiss the felonious assault serious physical harm count under R.C. 1.51. While felonious assault serious physical harm is a general statute when compared to felonious assault deadly weapon, the statutes are not irreconcilable. Counsel, therefore, did not commit an error when he did not move to dismiss the count. The trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecution to comment on the failure of the defense to call a witness with knowledge of the crime. A party may comment on the failure of the opposing party to call a witness with knowledge. Here, the appellant generally challenged the State’s key witness’s credibility and the failure of police to pursue investigative leads. The State was permitted to comment on the defense’s failure to call the family member to refute claims made in the State’s case in chief. Further, the State’s commentary did not rise to the level of vouching for its witness. The State was permitted to comment on the testimony of its witness during closing. Appellant’s convictions were supported by the weight of the evidence where the evidence was simple and direct; the sole issue was the identity of the shooter. In addition to eyewitness testimony, there was evidence that appellant took steps to obscure the car driven during the crime and that he was concerned about a witness “snitching” on him.GrovesCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5133
AGZ Properties, L.L.C. v. Zdolshek 114580Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; personal knowledge; abuse of discretion; genuine issue of material fact; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; fraud; motion to strike. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties’ motion to strike evidence. Further, the appellant has not shown that the trial court failed to consider evidence in accordance with Civ.R. 56. Summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee was proper.KlattCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5134
State v. Yancy 114608Admission of evidence; hearsay; excited utterance; Evid.R. 803; foundation; sufficiency of the evidence; complicity; R.C. 2923.03; aid or abet; principal offender; involuntary manslaughter; firearm specification; manifest weight of the evidence; credibility of witness; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to assert defense; self-defense; trial strategy; nunc pro tunc; appeal perfected; trial court jurisdiction divested; R.C. 2929.14; mandatory prison sentence; R.C. 2941.145; sentencing entry differs from sentence imposed at hearing; Crim.R. 43; sentence contrary to law; plain error; cross-appeal; failure to file brief; App.R. 18(C). The trial court did not err in allowing statements made by the decedent as an excited-utterance exception to hearsay. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence with the exception of her conviction on the five-year firearm specification attendant to the involuntary-manslaughter charge. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the trial court erred in failing to sentence appellant on the three-year firearm specification attendant to the aggravated-robbery count. The State’s cross-appeal was dismissed because it failed to file a merit brief in support of its cross-appeal.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5135
State v. Rykena 114702Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; government actors; state actors; search; Snapchat; National Center for Missing and Exploited Children; private entity; electronic service provider; expectation of privacy; hash matching; child pornography. Affirmed. Trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. The evidence in question was 12 images later determined to contain child pornography that appellant uploaded to his Snapchat account. The trial court did not err when it found that Snapchat was not a state actor when it conducted a hash-matching search of the uploaded images. Once he revealed the images to a third party, Snapchat, appellant no longer had an expectation of privacy in the content of the images. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children conducted their own search that did not extend outside the scope of the search conducted by Snapchat.CalabreseCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5136
State v. Massimiani 114755Postrelease control; R.C. 2967.28(C). The trial court did not properly impose postrelease control on the appellant because it failed to notify the appellant of the consequences of violating postrelease control.Laster MaysCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5137
State v. R.L. 114828Expungement. The trial court erred when it denied R.L.’s application for expungement and failed to articulate and create a record for this court to engage in a meaningful appellate review.Laster MaysCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5138
Cleveland Mun. Court Criminal Div. v. Edgewater Park Manor, L.L.C. 114829Motion to vacate; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; mootness. Appellant sought to overturn trial court’s ruling denying its motion to vacate judgment. However, since that decision, the underlying judgment that was the basis of the order has been vacated and the associated judgments and liens were revoked. Appeal dismissed because there were no remaining controversies in issue.GrovesCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5139
State v. Miller 114867R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); jail-time credit calculation; competent, credible evidence; plain error. The trial court’s calculation of jail-time credit was not based on competent, credible evidence, and as such, its calculation was plain error. Appellant’s assignment of error is sustained, the trial court’s judgment is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate appellant’s jail-time credit based on competent, credible evidence.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5140
State v. Harvey 114869Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; statutory speedy trial; judicial bias or intimidation. Judgment affirmed. Trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise the issue of statutory speedy trial. The record demonstrates that the trial date was tolled for much of the case because of the defendant’s numerous requests for continuances and his failure to respond to the State’s request for reciprocal discovery. The record further demonstrates that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into. There was no indication whatsoever of judicial bias or intimidation.RyanCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5141
State v. E.B. 114897; 114898; 114900R.C. 2152.121; mandatory transfer; juvenile court; adult court; bindover; reverse bindover; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court committed plain error when it failed to comply with the reverse bindover procedures as mandated in R.C. 2152.121. Counsel’s failure to raise this issue constituted ineffective assistance.KlattCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5142
In re S.M. 114922Termination of parental rights; plain error; limited review; failure to object to magistrate’s decision; failure to provide transcripts for juvenile court’s review. Judgments affirmed. Mother failed to object to the magistrate’s decisions recommending permanent custody of the children be given to the Agency. Mother also failed to file the transcripts in the juvenile and therefore, although she has made them part of the appellate record, we are precluded from reviewing them. Our review is limited and for plain error. We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s judgments granting the Agency’s motion for permanent custody. The record demonstrates that both prongs required for an agency to be granted permanent custody were met.RyanCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5144
State v. Kirks 114949Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); untimely petition; lack of jurisdiction; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a); unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts. Appellant’s petitions for postconviction relief were properly denied by the trial court. The petitions were facially untimely and appellant failed to present any evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts alleged in his petitions as required pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). As such, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petitions as a matter of law and they were properly denied without a hearing.E.A. GallagherCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5145
State v. Jenkins 114969 & 114970Conceded error; guilty plea; knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; postrelease control; complete failure to comply. Appellant’s plea was required to be vacated where the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) by not advising appellant of the imposition of mandatory postrelease control prior to accepting his plea.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5146
In re D.C. 115133 & 115139Department of Youth Services commitment; disposition vacated; remand for new dispositional hearing; R.C. 2907.02; R.C. 2907.05; R.C. 2905.02. Judgment vacated and case remanded. The juvenile court erred by failing to afford D.C. his right of allocution before imposing disposition, committing him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services. Juveniles enjoy a right of allocution analogous to Crim.R. 32(A), and here the juvenile court never invited D.C. to speak in mitigation at his dispositional hearing. Remarks made at the earlier adjudicatory hearing did not cure the error. The juvenile court had moved to the State’s proffer and continued the case for disposition without soliciting mitigation remarks from D.C. Asking only one factual question and proceeding to disposition did not satisfy the allocution requirement. Because alleged lack of remorse and personal accountability were central themes at disposition, the denial was not harmless. The disposition is vacated and the case is remanded for a new dispositional hearing.CalabreseCuyahoga 11/13/2025 11/13/2025 2025-Ohio-5147
State v. Zolikoff 114660Gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Evid.R. 404(B); other-acts evidence; motive; preparation or plan; lack of mistake or accident. Defendant appealed his conviction for gross sexual imposition, arguing that he was prejudiced by introduction of other-acts evidence that served no permissible purpose under Evid.R. 404(B). Testimony that defendant had developed relationships with and touched a friend of his daughter years prior to the charged offense did not show motive, preparation or plan, or lack of mistake or accident regarding alleged touching of victim in this case. Inadmissible other-acts evidence prejudiced defense, requiring a new trial, where only defendant and victim had firsthand knowledge regarding the touching at issue.ForbesCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5040
Estate of Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp. 114713Motion for class certification; R.C. 2505.39; remand; mandate; law-of-the-case doctrine; standing; concrete injury. The trial court erred in granting class certification where plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they had suffered a concrete injury. The court further erred by granting class certification in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine.E.T. GallagherCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5041
State v. Chavers 114727Sufficient evidence; plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court erred when it found appellant guilty of the higher degree of the felonies charged because there was not sufficient evidence. The appellant did not argue plain error, so we are not inclined to address it. The appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.Laster MaysCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5042
S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson 114777Summary judgment; standing; counterclaims; limited-liability company; vessel; boat; fraud; breach of contract; indemnification; defamation; flooding; broker; third-party defendant; damages; false statement of fact; genuine issue of material fact. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a boat-brokerage firm, was affirmed as to defendant, the sole member of a limited-liability company, where the defendant failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact on his counterclaim for defamation. The defendant did not have standing to assert claims on appeal that belonged to the limited-liability company, for which he was the sole member. These claims belonged to the limited-liability company, not the defendant in his individual capacity.ForbesCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5043
Galloway v. Garmon, Exr. 114786, 115075Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; de novo; evidence; unauthenticated; contract; agreement; property; real estate; right of first refusal; signed; statute of frauds; offer; acceptance; meeting of the minds; motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); grounds for relief; meritorious claim; abuse of discretion. Affirmed probate court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees on plaintiffs-appellants’ claims for “declaration of validity of agreement to sell” and specific performance where there was a lack of admissible evidence to support appellants’ claims, and even if a purported letter were admissible, there was no valid contract. The alleged contract was not signed by a co-owner of the property and arguably violated the statute of frauds, acceptance was not made in a reasonable time, and there was no meeting of the minds. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).S. GallagherCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5044
JTC Solutions, L.L.C. v. New Age Consulting Serv., Inc. 114799Motion to compel; statutory interpretation; de novo standard of review; R.C. 1335.11(F)(3); mootness; failure to address presented issue; reversal. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it found R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) rendered a contract’s arbitration provision void and denied defendant-appellant’s motion to compel on that basis. Pursuant to this court’s finding that R.C. 1335.11(F)(3) did not void the arbitration provision, the trial court’s alleged failure to state whether the presented facts and parties met the statutory definitions was moot. Where the trial court’s denial of the defendant-appellant’s motion to compel was in error and not based on the merits of the case, the trial court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further inquiry on the additional arguments raised in the motion to compel.KlattCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5045
State v. Smith 114814Guilty plea; ineffective assistance of counsel; preindictment delay. Judgment affirmed. The defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on preindictment delay resulted in actual prejudice to him.RyanCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5046
In re K.C. 114958Kinship Caregiver Act; legal custody; best interests; placement in temporary custody; intensive efforts; foster parents; foster placement; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); R.C. 2151.011(B)(21); R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.4115; R.C. 5180.50; R.C. 2151.4118; R.C. 2151.4119; R.C. 2151.412(F)(2); R.C. 2151.417(A). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Order awarding legal custody to foster parents is reversed and remanded for a determination of why legal custody to foster parents rather than maternal great grandmother was in the best interests of the child. Juvenile court did not err when it determined that foster parents have a kin relationship with the child pursuant to the Kinship Caregiver Act and that determination is affirmed.CalabreseCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5047
Monroe v. Petition for Relief From Firearms Disability 115011R.C. 2923.14(A), “law-abiding life,” application for relief from firearm disability. Denial of application for relief from firearm disability affirmed. Appellant failed to file a hearing transcript, firearm disability arose from appellant’s commission of multiple offenses of violence, and multiple arrest warrants had been issued since appellant’s conviction regarding his failure to appear in court.ForbesCuyahoga 11/6/2025 11/6/2025 2025-Ohio-5048
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