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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Garrett v. Jackson
| 114939 | New arguments on appeal; law-of-the-case doctrine; Civ.R. 38(D); the mandate rule; pro se litigants. Affirmed. The trial court’s award of damages to appellee is affirmed because appellant raised new arguments on appeal, a jury demand issue was determined in a previous appeal, and the trial court followed the appellate court’s mandate on remand. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5516 |
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State v. Smith
| 114842 | Grand Jury; proceedings; transcript; evidence; particularized need; secrecy; disclosure; speculation; cost; burden; Crim.R. 6(E); R.C. 2939.11. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition for disclosure of grand-jury proceedings because the appellant failed to demonstrate a particularized need. The appellant’s speculation that the transcripts might be useful to impeach witnesses in a separate civil case, and that obtaining the information independently would be burdensome, was insufficient to warrant disclosure. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5512 |
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Phillips v. Independence
| 114685 | R.C. 2744.02; political-subdivision immunity; negligence; proprietary function; governmental function; summary judgment; genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment in favor of the city was appropriate where none of the claimed exceptions to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02 applied. The accident did not involve a proprietary function, a physical defect on the building or grounds of the city, or a negligent failure to keep roads in good repair. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5511 |
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State v. Terry
| 115016 | Finalized judgment of conviction; criminal sentence; final order; increased sentence; harsher sentence; due-process rights; defendant present at criminal proceedings; record affirmatively indicates defendant’s absence; defense counsel’s opportunity to object. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence on the defendant-appellant, remanded the defendant-appellant, and after a recess, unexpectedly resumed the hearing and increased the sentence on one conviction by one year. The initial sentence — a proclamation in open court — was not a final order because it had not been journalized. Defense counsel conceded the new sentence complied with the statutory requirements and the new sentence was supported by the facts. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s subsequent change in the defendant-appellant’s felonious-assault sentence was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Additionally, the defendant-appellant’s due-process rights were not violated because the record did not affirmatively indicate he was absent when the trial court imposed the harsher sentence, and defense counsel was present and objected to the increased sentence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5520 |
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State v. Morgan
| 114650 | R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), substantial-impairment rape, prejudicial joinder, motion to sever, simple and direct, Crim.R. 14, sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant appealed his conviction for rape. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to sever rape allegations involving separate women on separate dates where the State’s presentation of evidence was simple and direct. There was no overlap between the witnesses to each allegation. The court also did not abuse its discretion by not holding a hearing on the motion to sever or ordering the State to provide defendant’s own audio statements that only concerned one of the rape allegations, of which he was found not guilty. Sufficient evidence supported appellant’s conviction where his DNA was found in victim’s vagina, they had previously been drinking alcohol together, and appellant observed victim struggling to stand on her own. Use of the word “survivor” was not an error where witness used the word generically and the court granted objection to single use of the word to describe a specific victim. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5510 |
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State v. Johnson
| 114874 | Plea; knowing; voluntary; intelligent; Crim.R. 11; colloquy; burden of proof; beyond a reasonable doubt; presumption of innocence; presumed innocent; Alford plea. Although the trial court did not directly answer the defendant’s question regarding the meaning of the presumption of innocence, it did not err in accepting the appellant’s guilty pleas. The record reflects that the court fully complied with Crim.R. 11 by advising the appellant of the constitutional rights he was waiving, including the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant affirmed his understanding of this right and raised no further questions. Moreover, the court did not err by accepting the guilty plea without conducting an additional inquiry into the factual basis for the plea as would be required for an Alford plea. An Alford plea was not entered because the defendant did not assert his innocence at the time of the plea. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5513 |
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Parma v. Gardner
| 114945 | Venue; circumstantial evidence; sufficiency; resisting arrest; law enforcement officer; peace officer; continuance; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Venue may be established by circumstantial evidence. Here, there was sufficient evidence that venue was established. In addition, there was sufficient evidence that the witness was a police officer. Finally, the trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s request for continuance on the day of trial was not an abuse of discretion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5517 |
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yoo
| 114993 | Pro se; sovereign citizen; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; motions; credit card; motion to dismiss; counterclaim; motion for summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C); App.R. 3; App.R. 4; res judicata; bootstrapping. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and appellant’s person. This court has routinely rejected sovereign citizen claims. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. The evidence presented showed that appellant took out a credit card, stopped paying on the credit card, and owed money on the credit card. Appellant failed to show any material issues of fact; therefore, he was not entitled to a jury trial. Motions not ruled upon are deemed denied after a final judgment has been entered. Appellant did not timely appeal the trial court’s granting of appellee’s motion to dismiss his counterclaim. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5519 |
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Schmidt v. Lincoln Elec. Co.
| 115084 | Workers’ compensation; spinal stenosis; expert opinions; manifest weight; high-dose steroids. The trial court’s judgment finding that plaintiff was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there were conflicting expert opinions where there was evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s expert opinion and there was no evidence corroborating the employer’s expert opinion. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5523 |
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Hill v. Kiernan
| 114964 | R.C. Ch. 2744; R.C. 2744.02; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); political-subdivision immunity; political-subdivision employee immunity; willful, wanton or reckless conduct; summary judgment. Judgment affirmed, and case remanded. The trial court properly denied summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C) because genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute regarding the cause of the subject motor vehicle accident and whether appellant Kiernan’s actions constitute willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Appellants are not entitled to immunity under R.C. Ch. 2744 as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment is improper. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5518 |
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State v. Shelton
| 115171 | Felony sentencing; maximum sentence; contrary to law; drive-by shooting; seriousness of offense; remorse; risk of recidivism; concurrent sentence; firearm specification; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Judgment affirmed. After appellant pled guilty to felonious assault with a one-year firearm specification, improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation, and attempted having a weapon while under disability, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of eight years on each second-degree felony and 18 months on the attempted weapon-under-disability count, plus a consecutive one-year firearm specification. The aggregate maximum state sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) where the sentencing entries stated that the trial court had considered all required factors of law and found prison consistent with R.C. 2929.11. In addition, the sentencing transcript reflected the trial court’s consideration of the seriousness of the drive-by shooting, appellant’s lack of genuine remorse, and his risk of recidivism under R.C. 2929.12. An appellate tribunal lacks the authority to reweigh those factors or substitute its judgment for the trial court’s assessments. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5527 |
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In re F.B.
| 115271 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); best interests of the children; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; reasonable efforts. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court granted permanent custody of the children to the agency. The juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(D)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence. Mother was unable to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside the children’s home, which included substance-abuse concerns, along with a number of other concerns that caused the removal of the children from the home. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5528 |
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State v. Baker
| 115298 | Conceded error; postrelease control; jail-time credit; R.C. 2967.191(A); “arising out of the offense.” The trial court erred where it awarded defendant-appellee jail-time credit for days served on a prior, unrelated offense. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5529 |
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State v. Orr
| 114878 | Crim.R. 33; motion for leave to file motion for new trial; affidavit requirements; unsworn statements are not evidence; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21(A)(2); successive petition; lack of jurisdiction; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a); not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts; Brady violation; no suppression; vexatious litigator declaration; Loc.App.R. 3(A). Appellant’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and petition for postconviction relief were both properly denied by the trial court. Appellant’s motion for leave was based on alleged “new evidence,” but the motion only contained handwritten letters that did not contain the proper requirements to be an affidavit and were therefore merely unsworn statements which are not evidence. As such, appellant was unable to prove there was any “new evidence” to support his motion and it was properly denied. Similarly, his successive petition, which alleged suppressed evidence and that the trial court failed to consider the new evidence from a potential witness was unsupported. Appellant failed to present any evidence that there was suppressed evidence at trial. Further, appellant did not attach the alleged affidavits of the new potential witness or provide any other evidence to support his allegation that there was a new witness the trial court did not consider. Wherefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave and successive petition. Because of Orr’s repeated frivolous filings, this court sua sponte declares him a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 3(A). | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5514 |
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State v. Conley
| 115106 | Consecutive sentences; failure to comply; mandatory consecutive term; operation of law; R.C. 2921.331(B); R.C. 2921.331(D); R.C. 2929.331(C)(3); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); contrary to law. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly ordered appellant’s 18-month prison term for fourth-degree failure to comply to run consecutively to his concurrent six-month prison terms for breaking and entering and attempted theft. R.C. 2921.331(D) mandates that any prison term imposed for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) be served consecutively to any other prison term, removing the trial court’s discretion and eliminating any need for consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The sentence was therefore not contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The record indicated that the trial court understood and applied the statutory mandate, advising appellant at the plea hearing that any prison term for failure to comply “must be consecutive” and stating at the sentencing hearing that the sentence was “consecutive pursuant to law.” Finally, because the R.C. 2921.331(D) mandate extends to prison terms imposed in different cases, the aggregate 24-month sentence was valid. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5525 |
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State v. H.M.
| 115043 | Expungement; sealing; restitution; final discharge; cognovit note; eligible offender; rehabilitation. The judgment granting the defendant’s motion to seal or expunge is vacated. Although the Ohio Supreme Court Client Security Fund paid the victim the amount of restitution the trial court ordered the defendant to pay, the defendant has not fully reimbursed the Fund as ordered. The defendant signed a cognovit note for the amount of his remaining balance owed to the victim, but a cognovit note is not payment in full sufficient to constitute final discharge for the purpose of sealing or expunging a conviction. Further, the defendant failed to present testimony or evidence that the other statutory requirements for sealing or expungement were met. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5522 |
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State v. Moses
| 114937 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; R.C. 2903.13; assault; jury nullification; self-defense; entrapment. Affirmed. Defendant’s conviction for assaulting two law enforcement officers while they restrained her from striking at another officer is affirmed because trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise an insanity, self-defense, or entrapment defense, none of which is applicable. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5515 |
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State v. Jones
| 115113 | Consecutive sentences; findings; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); clearly and convincingly; findings supported by the record. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the record clearly and convincingly did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5526 |
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Howard Hanna v. Ford
| 115086 | Standing; jurisdiction; subject-matter jurisdiction; money damages; R.C. 1923.081; Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275; defense; timely preserved; capacity to sue; real party in interest; Civ.R. 9(A); Civ.R. 17(A); Civ.R. 8(C). Judgment affirmed. We decline to adopt the defendant-appellant’s broad conclusion that lack of standing always presents a nonwaivable-jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point in a proceeding. Instead, we find that certain standing-related objections, especially those inconsequential to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, can be waived if they are not timely preserved. Here, the defendant-appellant’s lack-of-standing argument does not present a nonwaivable-jurisdictional question; rather, the defendant-appellant challenges the plaintiff-appellee’s capacity to sue and questions whether plaintiff-appellee is the real party in interest — both of which are waivable defenses. Defendant-appellant’s answer did not include lack-of-capacity-to-sue or real-party-in-interest defenses. Nor did defendant-appellant seek to amend her answer to preserve those defenses. Therefore, defendant-appellant waived any lack-of-capacity or real-party-in-interest defenses and cannot subsequently raise them, even under the guise of standing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5524 |
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State v. Beard
| 115019 | Sufficiency of the evidence; failure to comply; substantial risk of physical harm; manifest weight of the evidence; having weapons while under disability; credibility of witnesses. Defendant was convicted of failure to comply with the felony-enhancement provision, finding that while committing the offense, he operated a motor vehicle in a way that caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm. The court found that the felony-enhancement finding was supported by sufficient evidence and that that finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The offender was parked in a parking lot when officers pulled behind him, activated their lights, approached his vehicle, and asked him turn off his car. Defendant refused and took off. The testimony of an officer on scene, along with the officer’s body-camera footage showed defendant’s vehicle pull out of the parking spot into another spot, fail to stop before entering the aisle of the parking lot, and fail to make a full stop at a stop sign. Police attempted to follow, but defendant was gone by the time officers returned to their vehicles and exited the parking lot. This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant operated his vehicle in a way that caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm. Defendant also alleges that because of inconsistencies and contradictions of some of the State’s witnesses, his conviction for having weapons while under disability was against the manifest weight of the evidence because these witnesses’ testimony was the only evidence demonstrating that defendant possessed a firearm that night. The court ruled that the jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witness testimony. As such, the defendant failed to demonstrate that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
12/11/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5521 |
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State v. Richards
| 115849 | Habeas corpus, excessive bond, deprivation of justice, R.C. 2725.04, commitment papers, verification, proper respondent, R.C. 2969.25, prior lawsuit affidavit, and proper poverty affidavit. This court sua sponte dismissed a petition for habeas corpus for excessive bond and deprivation of justice because the petition had multiple fatal pleading defects pursuant to R.C. 2725.04 and 2969.25: failure to attach commitment papers, failure to verify, failure to attach prior lawsuit affidavit, failure to attach proper poverty affidavit, and failure to name a proper respondent. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/9/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5531 |
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State v. Silver
| 114499 | App.R. 26(B); ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, R.C. 2929.04(A), capital specifications, and authentic assignments of error. This court denied the defendant’s App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. He did not list assignments of error as required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(c). He argued that he was not provided with the safeguards of a capital case, but he was not tried in a capital case pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/9/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5509 |
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Johnson v. Torres-Lugo
| 115375 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 10(A); R.C. 2731.04; moot. It is well settled that the failure to properly caption a mandamus action is sufficient grounds for denying the writ. In addition, R.C. 2731.04 provides that an application for a writ of mandamus must be brought in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying. Finally, relief is unwarranted because the request for a writ of mandamus is moot. This court will not compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
12/5/2025
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12/11/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5530 |
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In re K.C.
| 114999 | File a transcript; presume the regularity of the proceedings; identification of error in the record; App.R. 4(A)(1); App.R. 9(B)(1); App.R. 16(A)(7). Affirmed. Father’s appeals of the juvenile court’s April 10 and May 23, 2025 entries are overruled because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the date of the entry as required by App.R. 4(A)(1). The juvenile court’s March 26 and March 27, 2025 entries are affirmed because Father failed to file a transcript. Without a record, the appellate court presumes the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court. In addition, Father did not identify the error in the record and did not provide supportive legal arguments. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5414 |
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State v. J.D.B.
| 115065 | R.C. 2953.32; application to seal record of conviction; abuse of discretion; legitimate reasons; burden; evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an application to seal a record of conviction where the applicant did not testify or present any evidence at the hearing demonstrating legitimate reasons for sealing the record and therefore does not satisfy their statutory burden. Likewise, while a trial court is generally required to place its findings on the record when denying an application to seal, the absence of any evidence or testimony supporting the application negates this requirement. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5415 |
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State v. Robinson
| 114912 | Having weapons while under disability; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); carrying a concealed weapon; R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle; R.C. 2923.16(B); motion to suppress; criminal trespass; search and seizure; Terry stop; Fourth Amendment; plain view; reasonable suspicion; probable cause. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress when the evidence at the hearing showed that appellant entered and exited a gas station with a firearm in his pocket. The gas station had a sign posted stating that weapons were prohibited on the premises. The evidence also showed that appellant got into his car after exiting the gas station and based on this the agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry investigative stop. The agents then saw a firearm in plain view in the car and found out that appellant could not lawfully possess a firearm, giving agents probable cause to arrest appellant. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5413 |
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State v. Davis
| 114872 | Jury instructions; abuse of discretion; flight instruction; consciousness of guilt; manifest weight; self-defense; reasonable belief; imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; objective and subjective belief; bona fide belief; Crim.R. 12.2; Crim.R. 29; Crim.R. 52(A); R.C. 2903.01(A); R.C. 2903.01(B); R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); R.C. 2921.31(A); R.C. 2921.04(B)(2); R.C. 2941.141(A); R.C. 2941.145(A). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving a flight instruction because the evidence showed more than “mere departure” from the scene of the shooting. Appellant remained hidden near the scene while police arrived but did not approach despite the safety afforded by police presence. He stayed at a hotel following the shooting, changed his Instagram handle, attempted to delete Instagram direct messages, and disassembled and discarded the firearm used in the shooting, all conduct supporting a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt. In any event, the instruction’s limiting language left weight and motive to the jury, defeating any claim of prejudice. Appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight as to self-defense. Video and audio established that only appellant fired. He never claimed anyone brandished a weapon or threatened him, and his recorded statement described immediately “letting off shots” when the victim exited the car. The jury could reasonably find the State disproved a bona fide, objectively reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm and that appellant’s use of deadly force was disproportionate to any perceived threat. This was not the exceptional case where the jury lost its way. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5412 |
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N. Star Med. Research, L.L.C. v. Kozlovich
| 114598 | Small claims court; motion for continuance; discretion of the court; ruling on discovery matters; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 1925.02; small-claims complaint; R.C. 1925.04; unauthorized practice of law; R.C. 1925.17; inadmissible evidence; Evid.R. 101(C)(8); indispensable party; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; fraud upon the court. The municipal court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant-appellant’s third motion to continue the hearing or when the court ruled on all properly filed motions on the hearing date. The municipal court’s small claims division had jurisdiction over plaintiff-appellee’s complaint pursuant to R.C. 1925.02, and the complaint sufficiently identified the amount and nature of the claim thereby meeting the statutory requirements of R.C. 1925.04. The plaintiff-appellee’s chief operating officer prepared and filed a complaint with a small claims court and presented the contract case on behalf of her corporation. Where the chief operating officer acted within the parameters of R.C. 1925.17 and did not engage in cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy, she did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The municipal court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the introduction of specific evidence allegedly in contravention to the Ohio Rules of Evidence because Evid.R. 101(D)(8) states those rules do not apply in small claims court. This court may disregard an assigned error where the defendant-appellant failed to cite any legal authority in support of his argument. The defendant-appellant did not present meritorious arguments in support of his fraud-upon-the-court claim. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5410 |
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State v. Nicholson
| 114659 | R.C. 2929.19; R.C. 2967.271(F); R.C. 2929.13(F); mandatory service; Reagan Tokes Law advisements. Vacated and remanded. The trial court erred by imposing the four- to six-year non-life indefinite term as a mandatory prison sentence that cannot be reduced under the Earned Reduction of Minimum Prison Term ("ERMPT") credit and by failing to provide the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) sentencing advisements. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
12/4/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5411 |
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State ex rel. Shepherd v. Gall
| 115826 | Mandamus; Crim.R. 32(B); notification of appellate rights; revision of sentencing entry; clear legal duty; and adequate remedy at law through motion and appeal. The court dismissed sua sponte a mandamus action seeking to compel revision of a sentencing entry to include notification of appellate rights pursuant to Crim.R. 32(B) because there is no duty to include such notification. The relator also has an adequate remedy at law through a motion to revise and an appeal, if necessary. Moreover, the relator is pursuing those remedies. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
12/3/2025
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12/4/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5416 |
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In re J.T.
| 114989 | Juvenile court; legal custody; child; motion; modify; parent; R.C. 2151.353(F)(1); R.C. 2151.353(F)(2); R.C. 2151.42(A); R.C. 2151.42(B); change of circumstances; best interest; mother; pro se; transcript; regularity; res judicata; App.R. 16(A)(7). Affirmed juvenile court’s decision denying mother’s motion to modify an order of legal custody of the child to the maternal grandmother. The juvenile court determined a change in circumstances has not occurred and did not find a modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. Mother, who was pro se, did not file a transcript or comply with App.R. 16(A)(7), regularity was presumed, and no error was found to have occurred. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5349 |
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State v. Robinson
| 114859 | Motion to withdraw guilty pleas; involuntary manslaughter; felonious assault; aggravated robbery; presentence; presumption; liberally; abuse of discretion; reasons; circumstances; legitimate and reasonable basis. Affirmed trial court’s decision denying appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and aggravated robbery that was orally made at the time of sentencing. The trial court conducted a complete hearing on the motion, considered the relevant factors and all the circumstances involved, and gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request. Appellant, who was represented by competent counsel, did not have a legitimate and reasonable basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. No abuse of discretion occurred. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5343 |
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State v. White
| 114883 & 114905 | Guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); prejudice; driver’s license suspension; ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to enter guilty plea; maximum sentence; consecutive sentence; principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In this consolidated and delayed appeal, defendant-appellant appeals his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694023-A (“CR-694023”) and domestic violence and endangering children in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694024-A (“CR-694024”). Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty pleas, defense counsel’s effectiveness, his domestic-violence conviction, and the trial court’s imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences. First, appellant challenges his guilty pleas in CR-694023, claiming that he did not understand their “full effect” since the trial court never informed him that the maximum penalty included a mandatory driver’s license suspension. However, appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudice, we cannot say that his plea was unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily entered. Next, appellant claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in CR-694023. But appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim focuses solely on sentencing outcomes; appears to be misguided, tenuous, and purely speculative at best; and lacks any explanation as to how his counsel’s alleged failure amounts to deficient performance. Consequently, appellant fails to set forth a valid basis for reversal of his CR-694023 convictions due to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel. Appellant also argues that his 18-month sentence for amended Count 1 in CR-694024 is contrary to law since he did not enter a valid plea to the domestic-violence charge. The State concedes that appellant never formally entered a plea to amended Count 1, despite intentions to do so, on the record. Our review of the record reveals that appellant entered a guilty plea to amended Count 2 (child endangering) but did not enter a guilty plea to amended Count 1 (domestic violence). Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s convictions and any pleas in CR-694024 and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court’s imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. Our review is limited to CR-694023 since the reversal of appellant’s CR-694024 convictions render the issue moot in that case. We find that appellant has not affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider the required R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors. Nor can we say that the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record, particularly where appellant makes no argument to the contrary. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the maximum and consecutive sentences imposed in CR-694023 were contrary to law. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5346 |
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State v. Miller
| 115090 | Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2943.032; R.C. 2929.19(B)(3); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C); advisements. - Judgment affirmed. The record does not reflect that the advisements issued during Miller’s colloquy and sentencing were improperly made or prejudicial to Miller. The trial court was not required to make consecutive-sentence findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) because Miller’s consecutive sentences were statutorily required. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5350 |
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Mikes Handyman/HVAC Serv., L.L.C. v. DiFiore
| 114875 | Breach of contract; damages; summary judgment; fraud; dismiss. -Trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff the full agreed-upon contract price because the evidence was undisputed regarding the agreement. Trial court did not err in dismissing the fraud claim sua sponte. The breach-of-contract and fraud claims were duplicative because the plaintiff did not assert any additional duty or attribute any actual damages beyond that owed under the contract. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5345 |
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State v. Vega-Medina
| 114792 | Postrelease control; R.C. 2929.19(B); R.C. 2967.28; interpreter. Judgment affirmed. The trial court accurately informed the appellant regarding postrelease control. A Spanish interpreter was appointed and present for appellant’s sentencing. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5341 |
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In re C.H.
| 115194 | Parental rights; permanent custody; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2); best interest of the child; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); placement of child within a reasonable time; manifest weight; motion for continuance; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the juvenile court to grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody. Mother was not able to successfully complete her case plan, concerns remained regarding Mother’s mental health and substance abuse, Father is in prison, and the child had been in agency custody more than two years and no longer qualified for temporary custody. In addition, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s motion for continuance because Mother had been properly notified of trial, she was present at the hearing two days prior to trial, at which time the trial was discussed, and Mother failed to communicate any reason for her absence to her attorney. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5352 |
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Cleveland v. Renger
| 115254 | Crim.R. 48(A); denial of dismissal; voluntary dismissal by prosecution; conceded error. - Judgment reversed. The record supports that the trial court improperly denied the City of Cleveland’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Crim.R. 48(A) because the City of Cleveland demonstrated that it could not prove an element of the offense. The appellee conceded the error. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5353 |
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Richmond Hts. v. Turner
| 114920 | Failure to file transcript; presumption of regularity. Municipal court’s judgment is affirmed. Pro se appellant failed to file the transcript of the proceeding he appealed, and this court must presume regularity. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5347 |
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State v. Coates
| 114534 | Murder; attempted murder; self-defense; castle doctrine; rebuttable presumption of self-defense; reasonable force; jury instructions; lesser-included offenses; expert testimony; post-traumatic stress disorder. Defendant’s convictions for murder, attempted murder and felonious assault, all with firearm specifications, are affirmed. Defendant admitted to shooting and killing his roommate but argued that he did so in self-defense. The victim was coming home and attempting to enter the house through the front door, with her seven-month-old child in her arms, when the defendant fired 14 shots from an assault rifle through the closed door while he was inside the house. The defendant argued he acted in self-defense because he has post-traumatic stress disorder and he thought someone was trying to unlawfully enter the house. He failed to look at the doorbell camera video of the front door before firing his gun. The court did not err in instructing the jury regarding self-defense and the castle doctrine. The court did not err in not instructing the jury regarding lesser-included offenses, because the defendant acted knowingly and/or purposefully when he fired the assault rifle. The court did not err in allowing defendant’s expert witness to testify about post-traumatic stress disorder but limiting what the expert said about the defendant’s state of mind. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5340 |
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State v. Clark
| 114808 | Complicity, jury instructions, sufficiency, manifest weight. Defendant was convicted of felonious assault. The State’s theory of the case was the defendant aided and abetted the principal shooter. Defendant alleged that the jury instructions with respect to complicity were incomplete because they failed to instruct the jury with respect to the proper mens rea. Here, the trial court instructed the jury regarding felonious assault, including the mens rea required and its definition. The court was not required to repeat the mens rea instruction with respect to complicity. As a result, the defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s complicity instruction, since the jury was properly instructed as to the culpable mental states necessary for the principal offense of felonious assault. Defendant also alleged that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that she aided and abetted the principal shooter in committing the felonious assault. In viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could infer from the defendant’s actions prior to, during, and after the shooting that she aided and abetted the principal offender in committing the felonious assault. Finally, defendant alleges that because of inconsistencies and contradictions of some of the State’s witnesses, her conviction for felonious assault was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witness testimony. As such, the defendant failed to demonstrate that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5342 |
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State v. Buchanan
| 114948 | Aggravated murder, murder, firearm specifications, merger, lesser-included offenses. Appellant challenged his conviction for aggravated murder, arguing that the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence did not support a finding that he acted with prior calculation and design. The evidence supported conviction for aggravated murder where appellant and victim pumped gas next to each other for several minutes prior to the shooting. Further support for this element of the offense is that the purported threat that victim made occurred several seconds before the shooting, during which time appellant walked away from the victim, changed course, moved back towards the victim, and shot him. Appellant gave conflicting testimony regarding whether he thought ahead before shooting the victim or was merely reacting, which the court could reasonably have weighed against him, in favor of a finding that he acted with prior calculation and design. Although convictions for lesser-included felonious assault charges merged with aggravated murder, appellant was properly sentenced for related firearm specifications under State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5348 |
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State v. Woods
| 114861 | Motion to suppress; warrantless search; Fourth Amendment; unreasonable search and seizure; voluntary consent; implied consent; totality of the circumstances; factual findings; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); plain view. - Judgment affirmed. The totality of the circumstances based on the undisputed facts are sufficient to find that the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the facts applied to an exception to the warrant requirement. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5344 |
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In re C.H.
| 115187 | Permanent custody; best interests of the child; R.C. 2151.414(D); R.C. 2151.414(E); manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court considered all of the required statutory factors, made findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D), and those findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court’s findings statutorily obligated the court to award permanent custody to the agency. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
11/26/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5351 |
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Ferguson v. Cleveland Div. of Police
| 115469 | Mandamus, arrest record, close and seal arrest record, no duty or right, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Civ.R. 10(A), R.C. 2731.04. The complaint for mandamus is procedurally defective because the relators failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(A), a defective caption, and R.C. 2731.04, complaint for mandamus not brought in the name of the state on relation of the person applying. In addition, it is well settled that in order for a writ of mandamus to issue the relator must demonstrate (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the CDP is under a clear duty to perform the requested act; and (3) there exists no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The relator has failed to establish a clear legal right, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent, and there exists no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Complaint dismissed. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
11/25/2025
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11/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5354 |
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State v. Rembert
| 114876 | Sex offender; Tier II classification; guilty plea; invited error; ineffective assistance of counsel. Affirmed. The defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges, in part, in exchange for agreeing to be classified as a Tier II sexual offender, and as a result, any error with the classification was invited. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5227 |
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State v. Saunders
| 114893 | Community-control sanctions; residential sanctions; consecutive sentences; reimbursement of attorney fees; res judicata. The appellant challenged the two six-month terms of residential sanctions imposed as a condition of community control and the trial court’s order running these terms consecutively to one another. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to reimburse attorney fees. It was in the trial court’s discretion to order six-month jail sentences as a condition of community control. However, the trial court’s decision to run those jail terms consecutively to one another is contrary to law. Finally, to the extent that appellant challenged the trial court’s 2023 sentencing entry ordering him to repay assigned attorney fees, that argument is barred by res judicata. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5228 |
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Macron Inv. Co. v. Jack Cleveland Casino, L.L.C.
| 114816 | Motion to dismiss; 14-day time period to respond; motion to dismiss converted to motion for summary judgment; waiver. The trial court timely ruled on appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss after the briefing period had expired. Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment was never raised below and has therefore been waived on appeal. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5225 |
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Overdrive Espresso, L.L.C. v. Finein
| 114870 | Cognovit note; motion for relief from judgment; meritorious defenses to cognovit notes; consumer transaction. Pursuant to an employment agreement, appellant agreed to reimburse appellee for training costs if she quit or breached the contract within a period of two years of signing the employment agreement. She signed a cognovit note simultaneously with signing the employment agreement requiring that $10,000 be paid if she quit before the two year period had expired. Appellant voluntarily terminated her employment before the two years expired. Appellee filed a complaint and an answer confessing judgment on the cognovit note with the court of common pleas. A judgment entry on the cognovit note was filed the same day in favor of appellee. Almost two and a half months later, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment on the cognovit note that was subsequently denied by the trial court in a single sentence judgment entry. Appellant appealed alleging that the trial court’s judgment entry denying the motion for relief from judgment was insufficient because it did not adequately explain or give reasons for its denial. Appellant also claimed that she presented numerous meritorious defenses to the cognovit note. A trial court is not required to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. Appellant argued that the trial court was precluded from rendering a judgment on the cognovit note since the note arose out of a consumer transaction. Since the transaction from which the note arose was not a consumer transaction, the trial court had jurisdiction to render a judgment on it. Appellant’s remaining challenges concerning whether the $10,000 on the note adequately represented training costs, and whether New York law or federal law precluded the note’s enforcement, did not fall within the range of meritorious defenses to a cognovit note. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5226 |
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Fannie Mae v. Clarkwood Apts., L.P.
| 114542; 114543; 115105 | Final appealable order; final order; substantial right; receiver’s bond; interim order; appointment of a receiver; subject-matter jurisdiction; case consolidation; motion to consolidate; jurisdictional priority rule; event of default; default; ex parte appointment of a receiver; irreparable harm; waiver of notice; clear and convincing evidence; Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3; R.C. 2505.02; Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(J); Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 15(H); R.C. 2735.01. Affirmed. Appellants’ appeal of the trial court’s modification of the receiver’s bond is overruled because it does not contain a final appealable order. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court’s ex parte appointment of a receiver is affirmed where the appellants expressly consented to the ex parte appointment of a receiver after any event of default in their loan documents and appellee showed multiple events of default. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
11/20/2025
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11/20/2025
| 2025-Ohio-5221 |
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