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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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Deckman v. Joseph
| 113892 | Civ.R. 12(b)(6); motion to dismiss; standing; undue influence; breach of fiduciary duty; declaratory-judgment action; R.C. 2721.12(A); indispensable party; divorce decree; life insurance beneficiary; remedies; constructive trust; accounting. Son of decedent (“Alec”) appealed trial court’s grant of motion to dismiss his claims. Alec alleged that decedent’s niece (“Kim”) made herself beneficiary of decedent’s life insurance policy by obtaining power of attorney for decedent after he was no longer competent. Alec’s claims were properly dismissed for lack of standing because he failed to allege facts that, if proven, showed he was injured by Kim’s conduct. Alec did not allege that he was ever a beneficiary of the life insurance policy. The insurance application he attached to his complaint listed his mother as the beneficiary, not him. Though Alec alleged that the decree governing decedent’s divorce from Alec’s mother required decedent to maintain life insurance, Alec did not plead or attach documents to his complaint that showed the divorce decree required him to be the beneficiary of the policy. Relatedly, Alec failed to name his mother or brother as parties, despite the fact that any interest they had in the policy by virtue of the application or divorce decree would be terminated by the declaratory judgment he requested. Having failed to state a claim, Alec also established no basis for his requested remedies — constructive trust and accounting of decedent’s assets. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2360 |
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Banyan Living Ohio v. Vourliotis
| 114238 | Service; motion for default judgment; jurisdiction; abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 4.1; Civ.R. 4.2; Civ.R. 4.6; void. Judgment reversed and remanded. The municipal court’s order granting judgment in favor of plaintiff is reversed and, on remand, the court is instructed to vacate the default judgment. The trial court abused its discretion when it granted default judgment against the defendant when the docket reveals that the plaintiff never perfected service on the defendant. A default judgment rendered by a court without obtaining service over the defendant is void and the defendant is entitled to vacation of the judgment. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2361 |
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Seven Hills v. Stone Ridge
| 114316 | Permanent injunction, statutory injunctive relief, R.C. 715.30, municipality, building code, community association, governing documents, plat, retroactive enforcement, Ohio Const., art. II, § 28, attorney fees, punitive damages, bad faith. Residential subdivision’s maintenance association appealed judgment entry that granted a municipality permanent injunctive relief and ordered the Association to fix erosion to a stream bank located on the association’s common elements. The court did not err in ordering the permanent injunction without finding clear and convincing evidence of irreparable harm to the City because R.C. 715.30 gives municipalities authority to enforce their building codes by seeking a permanent injunction. Association’s failure to remedy erosion was a violation of the building code where the association agreed to maintain drainage systems in its governing documents, which were submitted to and approved by the City during the construction of the subdivision, and where the stream was relocated during construction of the subdivision. That current city ordinances were passed after construction of the subdivision did not make their application by the trial court unconstitutionally retroactive because prior city ordinances imposed similar maintenance requirements on the association, which the association had also accepted in its plat. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the city’s motion for attorney fees where the city did not seek punitive damages, was not a condo owner or association under R.C. 5312.12, and did not demonstrate bad faith conduct by the association. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2362 |
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State v. Jackson
| 114324 | Postconviction relief; untimely, successive petition; R.C. 2953.21; jurisdiction; abuse of discretion; de novo review; unavoidably prevented. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider appellee’s petition because appellee failed to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which his petition relied. | E. T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2363 |
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In re K.A.H.
| 114354 | Juvenile; adjudicated delinquent; sexual imposition; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence. - Judgment affirmed. The juvenile’s adjudications were not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2364 |
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Morris v. Turk
| 114375 | Res judicata; motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; stock shares; jurisdiction; probate court; trustee; trust; will; estate; estate assets; Loc.App.R. 3. Judgment affirmed. The probate court did not err when it determined that it had jurisdiction over stock shares and its distribution of those shares was not barred by res judicata. The cross-appeal has no merit because the claims are barred by res judicata, and the cross-appellant did not properly perfect the appeal as to one of the cross-appellees. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2365 |
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State v. Albright
| 114448 | Crim.R. 11; plea hearing; firearm specifications; mandatory sentence; consecutive sentence; minimum sentence; maximum sentence. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting appellant’s plea. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2366 |
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Brockler v. Turner
| 114524 | Summary judgment; foreseeable; risk of harm; handcuffed; Political Subdivision Tort Immunity Act; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); employee; reckless and wanton; policy. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of sheriff deputies because the risk of harm to the attorney in the courtroom by his inmate-client was not foreseeable and a violation of a departmental policy is not per se reckless. Moreover, the deputies are entitled to immunity because the plaintiff failed to satisfy his reciprocal burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the deputies acted recklessly or wantonly when the inmate was handcuffed in front of his body and by failing to anticipate the inmate’s behavior during sentencing. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
7/3/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2367 |
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Jacobs v. Kilbane
| 115188 | Mandamus; App.R. 9(C) statement; moot. This court denied a mandamus action to resolve an App.R. 9(C) statement as moot when the trial court issued a journal entry denying the relators’ version of events and specifying what the record would be and when this court issued a journal entry accepting the trial court’s journal entry. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
7/1/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2370 |
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S.M.W. v. Cassidy
| 114701 | Procedendo, motion to seal records, and mootness. This court dismissed a procedendo action to compel a ruling on a motion to seal or expunge records when the respondents granted the motion and the relator filed no opposition. This court ordered the records of the instant case sealed. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/27/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2369 |
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C.B. v. B.B.
| 114172 | Dissolution decree; separation agreement; conflicting terms; ambiguity; controlling; contract; intent of the parties; de novo; evidentiary hearing. Trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to terminate spousal support on a bright-line rule of law that when a provision in a dissolution decree and separation agreement conflict, the separation agreement controls. When provisions conflict, the trial court should review the language of the documents and consider the intent of the parties in deciding which document controls. Because the trial court did not consider the intent of the parties or the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the conflicting terms, denying appellant’s motion without such consideration was in error, and thus, the record is silent for this court to conduct a de novo review of the issue on appeal. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2219 |
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In re A.H.
| 114216 | Juvenile, rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), force or threat of force, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.41(A), R.C. 2152.19(A)(8). Juvenile defendant appealed finding of delinquency for, among other offenses, two counts of rape. Sufficient evidence and manifest weight of evidence supported finding of delinquency where defendant admitted to finger penetration of victim and victim stated defendant pointed a knife at her prior. Corroborating evidence included mother’s testimony describing victim’s behavior after the alleged rape, nude photos of victim that defendant posted online without victim’s consent, nurse examiner’s observations of abrasions on various parts of victim’s body, and victim’s DNA on dildo that investigator found in defendant’s bedroom. Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences without making specific findings under R.C. 2929.41(A) that would be required to impose consecutive sentences on an adult defendant. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2220 |
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State v. Wardlaw
| 114376 | Abuse of discretion; joinder; Crim.R. (8)(A); severance; Crim.R. 14; joinder test; simple and direct; preindictment delay; manifest weight; hearsay; Evid.R. 104; Evid.R. 801(C); Evid.R. 802; Evid.R. 803(4). The appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to sever the counts of the indictment. Appellant failed to demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice from the counts being tried together. Even if appellant had demonstrated prejudice, the State rebutted any prejudice because the evidence presented by the State was presented in a way that was simple and direct and unlikely to confuse the jury. Appellant argues that his right to due process was violated by the trial court’s failure to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment that involved an offense that was alleged to have occurred in 1999. Because appellant failed to demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay between the alleged offense and filing of the indictment, this argument is overruled. Appellant argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial. He challenges the credibility of the evidence. Since the jury was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony, we cannot say the jury lost its way. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a video interview conducted by a child-protection specialist with a victim. Since the primary purpose of the interview was for medical diagnosis and treatment, the video fell within the hearsay exception set forth in Evid.R. 803(4). Finally, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court classifying him as a sexually violent predator. The evidence presented demonstrates that appellant committed multiple sexually motivated offenses over a period of 20 years and involved three separate minors. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to classify appellant as a sexually violent predator. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2221 |
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Clark v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.
| 114386 | Unemployment Compensation Review Commission ("UCRC"); Department of Job and Family Services; unemployment benefits; just cause; R.C. 4141.282(H); R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). Judgment affirmed. The trial court and the UCRC’s determinations that Clark was terminated from her employer with just cause and, thus, she is not entitled to unemployment compensation is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2222 |
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State v. Hicks
| 114432 | Aggravated murder; prior calculation and design; identity; allied offenses of similar import; resentencing. Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing on Counts 6 and 7. Appellant’s convictions were based on sufficient evidence demonstrating that appellant’s actions were premeditated and evidence supporting appellant’s identity was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the trial court erred in sentencing Hicks separately on two counts that were allied offenses of similar import; the State concedes this error. Accordingly, we remand this case for the limited purpose of resentencing appellant on Counts 6 and 7. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2223 |
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State v. Cirisan
| 114433 | Registration violation; R.C. 2950.06(F); sufficiency of the evidence; out-of-state conviction; registration requirements. Affirmed. Because the State presented undisputed evidence that the offender was under a duty to register as a sex offender in another state before moving to Ohio, based on a lawfully imposed requirement, and because he failed to timely verify his Ohio residence, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the registration violation under R.C. 2950.06(F). | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2224 |
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Rivera v. Petition for Relief From Firearm Disability
| 114478 | R.C. 2923.14; firearm disability; chronic alcoholism; relief from disability. The application for relief from firearm disability should have been denied according to the unambiguous language of R.C. 2923.14(D) because, as the State concedes, the applicant has no Ohio firearm disability and is potentially subject to a firearm disability in another jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court lacked authority to grant the requested relief. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2225 |
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State v. Foster
| 114527 | App.R. 18(C); lack of briefing; dismissed. Because the parties briefed issues in a case that was not part of the appeal, no arguments have been presented for the purposes of App.R. 18(C) and this appeal is dismissed. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2226 |
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Maddox v. Indochino Apparel (US), Inc.
| 114530 | Arbitration; compel; stay; final, appealable order; default; leave; answer; waiver; abuse of discretion; totality of the circumstances; affidavit; employment agreement; electronic signature; arbitration provision; enforceable. Affirmed the decision of the trial court to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The appeal was taken from a final, appealable order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling arbitration and finding no waiver occurred. The evidentiary materials were properly considered, appellant’s act of electronically signing the employment agreement was sufficient, it was not argued or shown that the arbitration provision was unconscionable, and the trial court did not err in finding the arbitration provision is enforceable. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2227 |
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HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Bonner
| 114612 | R.C. 1923; forcible entry and detainer; holdover tenant. The trial court’s grant of possession of the property to appellee was supported by competent, credible evidence and was not against the manifest weight. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2228 |
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Capital One, N.A. v. Outland
| 114668 | Pro se; motion for summary judgment; real party in interest; 15 U.S.C. 1692; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 15 U.S.C. 1692; 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b); debt collector; original creditor. Appellant-debtor raises three assignments of error concerning the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee-creditor. Appellant alleges that the creditor is not the real party in interest and that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the debt was validated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b) and whether the debt was paid off by an insurance premium. On review we find that appellee as a party to the cardmember agreement has standing to bring the breach of contract claim. We also found that 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b) only applies to “debt collectors” and appellee is an original creditor and is therefore not bound by 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b). Last, we find that there is no evidence submitted in either appellant’s brief in opposition or appellate brief to support the allegation that this debt was paid off through some insurance premium. Summary judgment is therefore affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2229 |
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Pickett v. Steve's Doghouse, Inc.
| 114526 | Sexual harassment; retaliation; summary judgment; hostile work environment; severe or pervasive; admissible evidence; causal connection; temporal proximity; Civ.R. 15(A); Civ.R. 56(C); App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A); App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 16(A)(8); affidavit of disqualification; judicial bias; due process; amended complaint; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s claims of hostile-environment sexual harassment and retaliation. Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the alleged conduct, consisting primarily of occasional physical contact in a cramped workspace, a single incident involving a sexually explicit image and story, and an isolated inappropriate comment, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile-work environment under applicable legal standards. Appellant also failed to argue her retaliation claim on appeal, and even if she had, a two-month interval between her last harassment complaints and the termination of her employment was insufficient to establish a causal connection between the protected conduct and any adverse employment action. The trial court also acted within its discretion in striking appellant’s proposed second amended complaint, which appellant filed without leave and which contained inflammatory allegations, primarily directed at appellees’ counsel and appellant’s former attorney, that exceeded the scope of the litigation. Appellant’s claims that the trial judge conspired to obstruct justice, engaged in fraud, or was biased were required to be raised through an affidavit of disqualification, not on direct appeal, and nothing in the record suggested a due-process violation. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
6/26/2025
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7/3/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2368 |
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Point E. Condominium Owners' Assn. v. Bilfield
| 113738 | R.C. 5312.12; condominium lien certificates; R.C.5815.36; disclaimers of testamentary and nontestamentary property; foreclosure; doctrine of res judicata. The trial court’s findings of res judicata was not in error. Appellant had actual knowledge of appellees’ purported interests and disclaimers of interest in the condominium unit at the time it filed the condominium lien certificate foreclosure action against the unit owner who passed away while the case was pending. Appellant failed to pursue the issue against appellees as purported successors-in-interest who were named parties in the case. Appellant filed the instant action against appellees seeking recovery of the assessments and fees while the foreclosure was pending. The matter should have been adjudicated during the foreclosure case and is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court’s finding that the statutory disclaimers of interest in the unit were void and that appellees were bound by the condominium declaration is reversed as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2142 |
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State v. Jenkins
| 114022 | R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), felony sentencing; sentence contrary to law; R.C. 2929.144, maximum prison terms; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences; R.C. 2941.25, allied offenses; merger. The aggregate prison term exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by law and is therefore contrary to law. Appellant has not demonstrated that the record fails to clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings. The failure to merge the allied offenses of attempted grand theft and aggravated robbery constitutes error. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2143 |
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State v. Jones
| 114038 | Aggravated murder; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; pre-arrest silence; privilege against self-incrimination; self-defense; jury instruction; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B); ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error; sentence. Defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Statements made regarding a detective’s attempts to communicate with the defendant during the investigation were not improper comments on her pre-arrest silence. There was no plain error in declining to give a self-defense jury instruction where the evidence did not support the defense. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to admissible testimony or failing to request an inapplicable jury instruction. The trial court erred by considering the defendant’s silence in crafting its sentence. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2144 |
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Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Croom
| 114222 | Voluntary dismissal; self-executing; final, appealable order. Appeal dismissed as untimely because appellant failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the action. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2145 |
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State v. Fletcher
| 114230 | Postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1; res judicata; direct appeal. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. We find that appellant’s assignments of error are properly overruled because the issues raised in his postsentence motion could have and should have been brought in his direct appeal and are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2146 |
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State v. Andrews
| 114249 | Sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, having weapons while under disability, tampering with evidence, controlled buy, confidential reliable informant, Evid.R. 702, expert-opinion testimony. Andrews appealed convictions for aggravated trafficking in drugs, aggravated possession of drugs, possessing criminal tools, having weapons while under disability (“HWWUD”), and tampering with evidence. Insufficient evidence supported HWWUD conviction because officer testimony established only that Andrews walked near an area in an open field where a gun was later found. Insufficient evidence supported tampering with evidence conviction because nothing in the record indicated Andrews knew of investigation when he discarded drugs in open field. Testimony that Andrews had cash on his person that police had previously used in a “controlled buy” did not require disclosure of informant identity because Andrews was not charged with selling drugs to the informant. Testimony that drug dog alerted to presence of illegal drugs in Andrews’s car was not expert-opinion testimony because officer was interpreting dog’s behavior based on his own firsthand observations. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2147 |
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State v. Dobson
| 114303 | Fatal shooting; aggravated murder; complicity; prior calculation and design; video evidence; sufficiency of evidence; manifest weight of evidence; effect on the listener; unanimity instruction; consecutive terms on firearm specifications. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error by admitting a video that was a compilation of surveillance footage overlayed with global positioning system ("GPS") data from the appellant’s ankle monitor. The defense stipulated to the individual components of the video, and the video was authenticated under the silent witness theory. The State presented sufficient evidence, through eyewitness testimonial evidence, as well as physical evidence, that the appellant aided and abetted the principal, purposely and with prior calculation and design, in shooting the victim. The weight of the evidence supports the convictions. This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a witness to testify that she initially lied to the police because she was afraid of the codefendant. The testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, it was offered to show the effect it had on the witness, i.e., to explain her actions. The trial court’s instruction that the jury must be unanimous of each element of the crime, but need not agree on a single means by which the element is satisfied, comported with the law. The trial court properly sentenced the appellant under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) to consecutive terms for the firearm specifications under two counts even though one count merged into the other count. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2148 |
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Faya, L.L.C. v. Abdurahman Halil Khalil, L.L.C.
| 114337 | Contract; breach; lease; specific performance; agreement; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered defendants to transfer the subject property to plaintiff for $1.1 million less any rent plaintiff paid from August 1, 2021, to September 3, 2024, and found that plaintiff was no longer required to pay rent to defendants. The record demonstrates that plaintiff and defendants entered into a lease and asset purchase agreement for a gas station and convenience store, which included an option for plaintiff to purchase defendants’ property. Defendants refused to sell the property to plaintiff when plaintiff exercised its option to buy because defendants changed their mind and no longer wanted to sell the property. Plaintiff complied with its contractual obligations in the lease and asset purchase agreement, and defendants breached the lease when they refused to sell the property. As a result, the trial court did not exercise its judgment in an unwarranted way when rejecting defendants’ reason to not comply with their contractual obligations and ordering the specific performance. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2149 |
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State v. Hubbard
| 114352 | Postsentence; motion to withdraw; Crim.R. 32.1; abuse of discretion; manifest injustice; res judicata; DNA; ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s second, postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea where defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were barred by res judicata and defendant could not show a manifest injustice from counsel’s failure to attend DNA collection. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2150 |
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Soler v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist.
| 114427 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; physical defect; R.C. 2744.02; de novo review; political subdivision; immunity; public education; software filter; negligence claim; district-issued computer; school grounds. Reversed. The trial court erred when it denied school district’s motion to dismiss based on political subdivision immunity. The plaintiff-appellee was unable to withstand the school district’s motion to dismiss because he was unable to show and/or did not properly plead in his complaint that there was a physical defect in the filtering software, that school employees misused or failed to monitor the software, or that the injury occurred on school grounds. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2151 |
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State v. Beck
| 114522 | Guilty plea; no-contest plea; blanket policy of not accepting no-contest pleas; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Although a defendant has to have the consent of the trial court to plead no contest, a trial court may not adopt a blanket policy of rejecting no-contest pleas. The record does not demonstrate that the trial court had a blanket policy of not accepting no-contest pleas in all cases. Further, the trial court gave due consideration to the facts and circumstances presented in this case in denying the appellant’s request to plead no contest. Further, after consultation with counsel, the appellant stated that he understood the plea agreement and wished to abide by it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s request to plead no contest. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2152 |
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State v. Hall
| 114539 | Court-appointed attorney; abuse of discretion; hybrid representation. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2153 |
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In re I.M.
| 114643 | Service of process; Civ.R. 4.1; improper service; presumption; rebut; permanent custody; jurisdiction; invalid; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. The juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order of permanent custody where mother rebutted the presumption of proper service of the motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2154 |
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State v. Fisher
| 114980 | Conceded error; sentencing; community control; probation violation; reserved prison term; sentencing error; notice requirement; vacated sentence; Loc.App.R. 16(B). Judgment reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded. The trial court erred by imposing a prison term after defendant-appellant’s community-control violation because it had never reserved a prison term or notified defendant-appellant of a specific prison term or range at his original sentencing. The State conceded the error under Loc.App.R. 16(B). | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/18/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2155 |
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State v. Price
| 113540 | Application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B); genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; untimely supplement; good cause; App.R. 26(B)(1); App.R. 26(B)(2)(b). Application to reopen appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) denied. Applicant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to advance assignments of error related to the alleged improper admission or exclusion of evidence at trial, the trial court’s failure to advise applicant on the record that he had the right not to testify, and alleged errors in the jury instructions. Court did not need to resolve issue of whether applicant could file untimely supplement to application because even if arguments raised in proposed supplement were considered, it would not find grounds to reopen appeal. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
6/18/2025
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6/26/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2218 |
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State v. Trujillo
| 114113 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; denial; findings of fact and conclusions of law; affidavit; credibility. The trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in its denial of appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2069 |
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State v. Jackson
| 114131 | Nunc pro tunc order; clerical errors; jail-time credit. The trial court erred when it issued a nunc pro tunc order to correct jail-time credit. A nunc pro tunc order is confined to correcting clerical errors to adjust an order to reflect what actually happened in court. The trial court’s order did not reflect what happened in court, since it added an additional 78 days of jail-time credit that was never discussed on the record at sentencing. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2070 |
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State v. Flowers
| 114287 | Anders; motion to withdraw; guilty plea; Crim.R. 11(C); knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently; dismissed. - Motion to withdraw of appellant’s counsel granted and the appeal dismissed where, after a thorough review of the record pursuant to the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, the appellate court determined that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) when accepting appellant’s guilty plea, appellant’s plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and any appeal would be wholly frivolous. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2071 |
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State v. Tramble
| 114431 | Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; receiving stolen property; R.C. 2913.51(A); intimidation; R.C. 2921.04(B); right to be present; Crim.R. 43(B); abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. After a thorough review of the record, we find that sufficient evidence was presented for a rational trier of fact to find that the elements of receiving stolen property and intimidation of a victim were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We further find that the defendant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably and abused its discretion when Tramble was removed from the courtroom during the State’s rebuttal closing argument. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2073 |
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State v. Ledger
| 114506 | Felony sentencing; purposes and principles; seriousness factors; mitigating factors. Indefinite prison term of five to seven and a half years was not contrary to law where the prison terms imposed were within the statutory range and were clearly and convincingly supported by the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2074 |
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In re T.B.
| 114749 | Permanent custody; termination of parental rights; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(2); R.C. 2151.414(E); best interests; manifest weight; sufficiency; substance abuse; homelessness; case-plan compliance. Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of T.B. to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services. The evidence supported the court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that T.B. had been in agency custody for over 12 of 22 consecutive months and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. Despite mother’s recent progress, the court found she had a chronic history of substance abuse and relapse, lacked stable housing, and had previously had her parental rights terminated with respect to one of T.B.’s siblings. The agency’s efforts at reunification were unsuccessful, and the child needed permanency after more than two years in care. The court’s determinations under both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) were supported by clear and convincing evidence and the judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Calabrese | Cuyahoga |
6/12/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2075 |
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In re Petition of Hicks v. Russo
| 115186 | Petition for writ of mandamus; dismissed; sua sponte; moot. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed, sua sponte, as moot where respondent common pleas court judge had already ruled on the motions to which relator sought to compel rulings prior to the filing of her petition, such that relator had already received all the relief she could have received through her mandamus claim. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/11/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2077 |
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State v. Clark
| 112886; 112888 | App.R. 26(B) application to reopen appeal; App.R. 26(B)(1); App.R. 26(B)(2)(b); 90-day period to file timely application; untimely filed; failure to establish good cause. Application to reopen appeal under App.R. 26(B) denied. Application was filed beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application under App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b). Applicant failed to show good cause for the untimely filing of the application. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/11/2025
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6/17/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2126 |
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Jacobs v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas
| 114946 | Writ of prohibition, subject-matter jurisdiction, jurisdictional-priority rule, R.C. 2305.01, R.C. 2701.03, courts of concurrent jurisdiction, Supreme Court of Ohio, judicial bias, breach-of-contract claim, negligence claim, basic statutory jurisdiction, adequate remedy at law, and appeal. Relator commenced prohibition actions in the Supreme Court of Ohio and this court to correct an exercise of judicial bias and other errors. Because the court of appeals and the Supreme Court are courts of concurrent jurisdiction for the extraordinary writs and because the action was instituted first in the Supreme Court, the priority-of-jurisdiction principle divested this court of jurisdiction over the prohibition action. Assuming arguendo that the priority-of-jurisdiction principle does not apply, prohibition will not lie in this case. The trial court had basic statutory jurisdiction to hear the breach-of-contract and negligence claims, precluding prohibition. The relator has and is pursuing her adequate remedy at law, an appeal. Prohibition is designed to act as a preventive measure, not to review an accomplished act. Prohibition does not lie to correct instances of judicial bias. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
6/6/2025
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6/12/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2076 |
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State v. Newberry
| 113844 | Petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel; conflict of interest; Brady violation. Appellant convicted for, among other offenses, two counts of murder, petitioned for postconviction relief on basis that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAOC”). IAOC claim was based in part on alleged conflict of interest arising from trial counsel’s prior civil representation of officer that lead investigation of these homicides. Trial counsel’s prior representation of the lead investigator concerned allegations that he and several other officers had failed to complete required trainings. Appellant also alleged IAOC on the basis that trial counsel failed to cross-examine two officers who investigated these homicides about past failures to complete required trainings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying without hearing appellant’s petition on these claims. Trial counsel disclosed to defendant, prior to trial, his prior representation of the investigator and the officer training issues that case involved. Therefore, appellant could have or did raise these arguments on direct appeal, meaning res judicata prevented him from doing so now. Appellant also claimed the State violated Brady v. Maryland during pretrial discovery by failing to disclose to appellant testimony that one of the officers had provided in an unrelated criminal case regarding his training history. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State did not violate Brady where this testimony was in the public record of the unrelated criminal trial and, therefore, not in the exclusive control of the prosecution. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2004 |
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Cleveland v. Harvey
| 113877 | Community-control sanctions; failure to comply; housing court; community-control-sanctions-violation hearing; community-control-sanctions-status hearing; R.C. 2929.25; due process. The municipal housing court’s jurisdiction to modify the terms of community-control sanctions is limited by R.C. 2929.25(D)(2), which requires a finding that the offender violated the terms of community-control sanctions before extending the length of the sanctions, imposing a more restrictive term, or imposing a jail term. The court in this case modified the defendant’s community-control sanctions by extending the sanctions for one year and three days and by imposing five days in jail. However, the court failed to first find that the defendant violated the terms of his sanctions. Furthermore, the court did not comply with the defendant’s due-process rights when it spontaneously attempted to “convert” a status hearing into a violation hearing. The court’s judgment is reversed and vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2005 |
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Broadview Rd. Holdings, L.L.C. v 7800 Broadview, Inc.
| 114298 | Civ.R. 12(C); judgment on the pleadings; allegations in the complaint; breach of contract; fraudulent concealment; negligent misrepresentation; merger doctrine; caveat estoppel; as-is clause; R.C. 5301.253. Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Reviewing the complaint and answer, we find that appellant properly pled claims for breach of contract, fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation and that the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger, as well as an as-is clause, does not preclude recovery at this stage in the litigation. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2006 |
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State v. Cooper
| 114411 | Rape; admissibility of evidence; Evid.R. 70; opinion testimony by lay witnesses; delayed disclosures; post-traumatic stress disorder; sufficiency of the evidence; forcible rape; psychological force; manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant’s conviction for rape of a child under 13 years old is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed three lay witnesses to testify about their opinions pursuant to Evid.R. 701, because the testimony was rationally based on the perception of each witness and it was helpful to the jury. The rape conviction was supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Inconsistent testimony does not factor into a sufficiency analysis, a rape conviction can be based on the victim’s testimony alone, and coercion can be inherent in a parental authority scenario. The rape conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence in the record. Although the victim testified about sexual conduct that she had not disclosed prior to trial, the defendant was convicted of one rape charge, which was consistent with the victim’s disclosure, and acquitted of all other charges. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
6/5/2025
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6/5/2025
| 2025-Ohio-2007 |
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